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ABSTRACT
Over the past century and a half, an international system to assist refugees has 
evolved, which gives priority to health. This thesis looks at the processes by which 
policies for the health of refugees have been formulated and implemented in three 
historical periods. It begins with the Red Cross movement of the late 1800s when 
medical care was first organised for those wounded in war. Provision of basic medical 
care for entire populations affected by the World Wars is then reviewed, highlighting 
the creation of organizations by governments collectively for relief and aid.
The bulk of the analysis, however, focuses on the past forty years when western 
charities and inter-governmental organizations increasingly made medical and public 
health interventions available for refugee relief in poorer countries. Organizational 
policies, mandates and structures of the specialised agencies of the United Nations and 
the charitable agencies based in Europe and North America are examined. This places 
existing policies for the health of refugees within the context of the cultural and 
political environment in which they originate. It also identifies more general patterns 
in institutional responses, allowing their roles in particular relief operations to be 
anticipated.
Health policies for the Afghan refugees in Pakistan during the 1980s are then 
analyzed. Not only does this analysis validate earlier conclusions about international 
policies for refugee health, it reveals unbalanced relationships of power between 
internationally- and nationally-based organizations. In so doing, cultural dimensions 
of the policy process and the complexity of vested interests within national societies 
arc found to have been neglected. Although recommendations can be made, the policy 
process indicates that they are unlikely to be put into practice.
Consequently, more general conclusions about the policy process, key policy issues 
and characteristics of existing policies for the health of refugees bring the analysis to 
a close. In particular, this research indicates that there is a coherent system through 
which health relief is provided. Health relief is not, however, promoted as a human 
right; instead it is provided as a humanitarian activity by powerful groups within 
national societies and globally. Sadly, many of the activities carried out under the 
aegis of relief appear to be symbolic since they do not alter existing balances of 
power. The intention of these policies to promote the health o f refugees is, therefore, 
subject to debate.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
AACC All Africa Conference of Churches
ACBAR Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief
ACVAFS American Council of Voluntary Agencies
AGFUND Arab Gulf Programme for the United Nations Development 
Organization
AICF Action International Contra la Faim
AMI Aide Medicale Internationale
AVICEN Afghanistan Vaccination/ Immunization Centre
BIA Bureau Internationale de 1* Afghanistan
BHU Basic Health Unit
BRC British Refugee Council
CAR Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees (GOP provincial)
CARE Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere
CCAR Chief Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees (GOP federal)
CDC Centres for Disease Control (US Govt)
CHREP Christian Hospital Extension Programme
CHW Community Health Worker
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (US Govt)
CIMADEC Ecumenical Aid Service
CRB Commission for Relief in Belgium
CRED Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters
CRS Catholic Relief Services
CWS Catholic World Service
DAC Development Assistance Committee (OECD)
dai Afghan traditional birth attendant
DOC Division of Coordination (WHO)
ECOSOC Economic and Social Council (UN)
EPI Expanded Programme of Immunizations
EPR Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response (WHO)
ERO Office for Emergency Relief Operations (WHO)
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization (UN)
FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Pakistan)
FSMO Field Supervisory Medical Officer (GOP)
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GNP Gross National Product
GOP Government of Pakistan
IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICARA I,II International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (first and 
second)
ICC Islamic Coordinating Council
ICD Italian Corporation for Development (Govt of Italy)
ICEM Inter-governmental Committee for European Migration
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ICVA International Council of Voluntary Agencies
IGCR Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees
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IMF International Monetary Fund
IRO International Refugee Organization
LHV Lady Health Visitor (GOP)
LRCS/LORCS League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
LSHTM London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
LWF Lutheran World Federation
LWR Lutheran World Relief
MCH Maternal and Child Health
MM Medecins du Monde
MSF Medecins Sans Frontieres
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO Non-Governmental Organiztaion
NGOIM Non-Governmental Organizations interested in international migration
NWFP North West Frontier Province (Pakistan)
QAS Organization of American States
OAU Organization for African Unity
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEEC Organization for European Economic Co-operation
OEOA Office for Emergency Operations in Africa (UN)
OXFAM Oxford Famine Relief Committee
PAHO Pan American Health Organization
PHC Primary Health Care
PRCS Pakistan Red Crescent Society
PDH Project Director for Health (GOP)
PVO Private Voluntary Organization
RHG Refugee Health Group (LSHTM)
SAFRON States and Frontiers Regions and Kashmir Affairs Division (GOP)
SCAWR Standing Committee of Voluntary Agencies Working for Refugees
SCF Save the Children Fund
SCN Sub-Committee on Nutrition of the UN Administrative Committee on 
Coordination
SEATO South-East Treaty Organization
SWABAC South Western Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief
TSS Technical Support Service (UNHCR)
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNBRO United Nations Border Relief Operation
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNDRO Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator
UNECA United Nations Economic Commission on Africa
UNEO United Nations Environmental Organization
UNESCO United Nations Education, Social and Cultural Organization
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
Unicef United Nations International Children’s Fund
UNIPAC Unicef s Procurement and Assembly Centre
UNKRA United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency
UNNGLS United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Unit
UNRRA United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration
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UNRWA United Nations Reliefs and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees
US/USA United States of America
USAID US Agency for International Development
US$ United States dollars
USSR United Socialist Soviet Republic
WCC World Council of Churches
WFP World Food Programme
WHA World Health Assembly
WHO World Health Organization
WWI The first World War
WWII The second World War
YMCA Young Mens Christian Association
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CHAPTER ONE
Exegesis
Forced migrations of entire communities is a growing problem of our times. Most of 
the 20 million refugees in today’s world1 come from and seek asylum in the poorer 
countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Some of the poorest nations in the world 
host the largest refugee populations, although they have difficulty caring for their own 
people. Widespread conditions of systematic insecurity and oppression mean that 
voluntary repatriation will not be possible for many refugees; together with a growing 
reluctance to accept refugees for resettlement in more wealthy nations leaves long 
term refuge in Africa, Asia and Latin America the only remaining option. The 
Palestinians scattered throughout the Middle East since 1948 and the Tibetans in India 
since 1959 illustrate the indefinite or lengthy duration of such refuge today.
In response to refugees firstly of the World Wars and later of decolonization, a system 
evolved to provide international relief for refugees. In support of the numerous 
organizations in this system, several academic, research and consulting groups were 
formed to study the many problems encountered and to advise on policy and practice. 
Most of the prominent groups which specialised in refugee health care were formed 
in the 1970s and 1980s, for example at the School of Public Health at the University 
of California at Los Angeles, US, the Centres for Disease Control of the US 
Government, the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters at the 
University of Louvain, Belgium and the Refugee Health Group at the London School 
of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, UK. These groups and others studied the health 
problems of refugees and made recommendations of how best they could be 
addressed.
Throughout the published literature, and in many internal organizational reports, the 
questions under study and the recommendations offered generally focused exclusively 
on the health needs of refugees. Yet, when populations migrate, there are 
repercussions not only for those who move, but also for those communities into which
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the refugees settle. But, in the health sector, international concern and relief efforts 
have focused almost exclusively on the problems of refugees thereby neglecting the 
consequences of an influx of refugees, and the resulting international relief operation, 
for host nations. In recognition of this gap in our understanding of refugee health 
relief, the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine proposed to study the 
ways in which health policies are formulated and implemented in response to refugees, 
by both national governments and the international community2. The proposal was 
accepted for funding firstly by the Overseas Development Administration of the UK 
Government who generously funded the case study in Pakistan during 1987,1988 and 
early 1989 and later by the Pew Charitable Trusts of the US who kindly funded the 
review of the policies and practices of the international community during 1989,1990 
and 19913.
1.1 Aims and objectives
1.1.1 National health policies for refugees
The original aim of this study was to identify the major health policy issues faced by 
host governments and to document the specific health policies adopted by them. It was 
thought that the ways in which national health policies for refugees were formulated 
and implemented could then be improved: it was also hoped that the lessons learnt 
could be generalised to other host nations. Thus, this research began with the case 
study of national health policies for Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The objectives of 
this study focused the research on:
1. Documenting health policies adopted by host governments and the factors 
which influenced the development of such policies.
2. Documenting the organization of health planning for refugees by host 
governments and the factors which influenced the evolution of organizational
systems adopted.
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3. Providing information on the most effective roles for international agencies, 
inter- and non-governmental, in providing support to countries responsible for 
large numbers of refugees.
1.1.2 International health policies for refugees
From the analysis of national health policy for refugees in Pakistan, it became clear 
that international agencies played a crucial role in many aspects of policy formation 
and implementation. In order to understand better the evolution and implementation 
of health policies for refugees in the national setting, it was then necessary to 
understand the policy process within which the international agencies operate and the 
extent to which they affect policy within countries. Subsequently, additional research 
on the policies, practices and roles of international aid agencies involved in refugee 
health care was undertaken; the objectives of reviewing health policies for refugees 
of international aid organisations were specifically:
1. To document the involvement of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations International Children’s fund (Unicef) 
and the World Health Organization (WHO) in refugee health generally since 
their establishment in the 1940s.
2. To identify and analyze the mandates and health policies and plans for
refugees of UNHCR, Unicef and WHO, with specific emphasis on their role 
in refugee health care and their relationships with each other, governments, 
private, charitable agencies and refugees.
3. To identify the types, mandates, structure and source of funds of charitable
agencies assisting in refugee health care in Pakistan.
4. To document health policies for refugees of these charitable agencies and
specific programmes, activities and other support provided by them for refugee 
health care.
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5. To clarify the relationship of charities working in Pakistan with host
governments, donor governments, agencies of the UN and the refugees.
6. To determine reasons for their involvement in relief operations for refugees in
Pakistan and reasons for their withdrawal.
1.2 Methods
1.2.1 National health policies for refugees
An analysis of national health policies was undertaken in Pakistan during 1987, 1988 
and 1990. Pakistan was chosen for the national case-study for several different 
reasons. Firstly, Pakistan has been host to the largest refugee population in Asia 
throughout the 1980s. Secondly, the Government of Pakistan has developed an 
extensive health service specifically for the Afghan refugees. Lastly, numerous 
charitable organisations and specialised agencies of the United Nations were involved 
in the Afghan refugee health programme; thus, the evolution of health policies for 
Afghan refugees illustrated the roles played by international aid agencies in the policy 
process.
Several different methods were used, mainly to reconstruct the historical development 
of refugee health policy and the ways in which it was expressed in practice. Most 
methods were qualitative and included the use of questionnaires, interviews, 
observation and archival research. These methods were supplemented by two surveys, 
based on structured questionnaires, which were administered personally.
1.2.1.1 Archival research
Written documents were reviewed, primarily national and regional files of the 
government, the main UN agencies involved in health and refugee relief, and private 
charitable organizations working with the refugees. Although these written documents 
are secondary sources, they were often the only remaining sources of information.
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Since access was obtained to the records of several different organizations, it was 
possible to verify information obtained by more than one source.
1.2.1.2 Individual interviews
Open conversation was frequently used to uncover new facts and to validate 
information obtained from written sources. It was also used to elucidate the 
perspectives and views of individuals and the organizations they represented. This was 
especially important in understanding how different parties viewed particular problems, 
decisions taken and the effectiveness of actions implemented. Such conversations were 
held with general relief workers as well as with key informants within the refugee 
health programme at all levels.
1.2.1.3 Interviews with a brief schedule and conversation
Similarly, structured interviews were conducted, primarily with organizational 
representatives; for example, during the survey of private charitable agencies working 
in the refugee health programme. These interviews were important in determining 
common perceptions of problems and the relationships between the various institutions 
involved in providing health care, such as the government and UN agencies. In 
addition, these interviews allowed common interests and ways of working to be 
identified for this disparate group of organizations.
1.2.1.4 Observation
Nearly twelve months were spent in Pakistan, visiting the different offices, people and 
health facilities. This provided an opportunity to see how people, organizations and 
facilities were organized and how they communicated with each other. This was 
important because antagonistic relationships in particular are seldom documented in 
writing. Nor are individuals always willing to talk openly about conflict, competition 
or disagreements with others. Being able to observe some of the mteractions among 
the different parties was an invaluable help in understanding why certain developments
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occurred and others never materialised. In addition to the research, invitations to 
observe workshops and meetings were accepted whenever possible.
1.2.1.5 Surveys
Two different surveys were conducted. The first used a structured questionnaire of 
mainly closed questions to document the implementation of health policies. Because 
a structured questionnaire was used, the survey focused on material evidence of policy 
implementation in a sample of refugee camps, for example the presence of health 
facilities, drugs and supplies or personnel. The questionnaire did, however, also 
include some questions on management, in particular relationships with district, 
regional and national offices as well as with UN and charitable agencies working in 
the camp. Thirty camps were randomly selected and visited in Pakistan.
The second survey was of charitable agencies working in the refugee health 
programme. Again a structured questionnaire was used. Unlike the previous survey of 
camp health services, this questionnaire was given to the medical or health directors 
of a sample of agencies to complete. A structured interview was then conducted when 
the questionnaire was collected.
The data gathered from these two surveys is vast; an analysis and presentation of 
individual results has, therefore, not been included separately in this thesis; instead, 
the results have been incorporated into the narrative, both in making statements about 
historical facts as well as in drawing conclusions.
1.2.2 International refugee health policies
The analysis of international health policies for refugees was undertaken in 1990 and 
1991. Archival research, interviews, questionnaires and reviews of published literature 
were again used. Questionnaires were used only for charitable agencies and have been 
described previously. Written documentation and interviews were the main sources of
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information on the mandates, organizational structures, roles and activities of the UN 
agencies involved in health relief and the Red Cross. Visits were made to Geneva and 
New York where these agencies have their main offices, and published literature was 
reviewed in London and Oxford.
The use of these methods allowed a history of the development of national refugee 
health policies in Pakistan as well as international refugee health policies to be 
reconstructed. In such a complex phenomenon, there is no doubt that other facts and 
perspectives have been omitted, rendering the history, or in scientific parlance - the 
data, biased in one way or another. In an effort to validate the findings of the national 
case study, the various interest groups reviewed the summary and found it to be an 
acceptable representation of overall events. Perhaps more importantly, the summary 
was complete enough to reveal relationships between the various interest groups and 
policy issues of concern as well as the benefits or disadvantages of different options 
for the groups involved. To date, the findings on the roles and work of the specialised 
agencies of the UN and the Red Cross have only been shared with selected groups 
during academic presentations; the fact that the results have been well received and 
backed up by the provision of additional data are encouraging, even if such feedback 
is insufficient evidence of their validity.
30
as the benefits or disadvantages of different options for the groups involved. To date, 
the findings on the roles and work of the specialised agencies of the UN and the Red 
Cross have only been shared with selected groups during academic presentations; the 
fact that the results have been well received and backed up by the provision of 
additional data are encouraging, even if such feedback is insufficient evidence of their 
validity.
13 An analytical framework: reflecting on policy processes
13.1 Helping or hindering national efforts?
An analysis of the case studies in Pakistan and Somalia in 19895 led to several 
conclusions which extended the research to include international policies6 and which 
suggested criteria for an analytical framework for the study as a whole. Firstly, it was 
noted that the original aims and objectives were biased, reflecting certain assumptions 
about refugees and policy-making. For example, they carried on the tradition of f/j j „
A
focusing almost exclusively on refugees by evaluating governmental response to 
refugees in order to improve those responses. More importantly, by seeking to 
understand and expose the strategies used by host governments to protect and promote 
their own interests in the wake of a large influx of refugees and international aid 
organizations, the purpose of the research had a sinister side to it. Such information 
would clearly be of use not only to those genuinely seeking to assist the governments 
and peoples of poorer nations who host refugees but also to those foreign 
organizations wanting to impose their own policies.
13.2 A rational or political process?
Secondly, the original proposal assumed that national policies were statements of 
intent, aims, ideals or plans of governments. Such a concept of policy is widely held 
and has been articulated by a variety of organizations and individuals. For example, 
the charitable agencies which had official relations with the World Health 
Organization in the late 1970s defined ’A National Health Policy [as] an expression
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of the goals established for improving and sustaining the health situation, the priorities 
among these goals, and the main directions for attaining them*7. This definition of 
health policies suggests that they can be readily and easily identified, their 
implementation documented and, to some extent, their impact measured. It also 
suggests that the policy process ’for specifying health goals and priorities should 
follow the identification and careful analysis of health problems and the country’s 
socio-economic capacity to deal with them’8. Furthermore, as such, the most 
influential reasons for their adoption could be deduced.
Policy as an expression of goals indicates an attempt to analyze policy rationally. In 
other words, it suggests that there would be logical steps in the policy process within 
which somewhat rational decision-making patterns could be identified and attributed 
to the needs or demand for care or to one or many social, economic or political 
interests of the groups involved. Such a popular concept of the policy process is based 
on the need or demand for services in its logic9. Yet, there are other factors which 
motivate institutions to provide health relief for a group of refugees, all of which 
further the interests of those supplying care somewhat irrespective of the need for care 
which is generated by the refugees themselves. Since the findings of this research 
show that health relief for refugees is based less on the needs of refugees than on 
those providing care, this analysis of health relief policy does not pivot around the 
demand for health care which is generated by the refugees themselves; instead, 
attention is focused on those who supply health relief services for refugees and 
specifically the ways in which refugee health relief furthers their own institutional 
interests.
The coherence of such an approach in analyzing and interpreting the findings of these 
studies highlights that the emphasis in the original objectives on identifying influential 
factors was naive. The factors which were found to influence policy are 
comprehensive, even ’infinite’10, and they cannot, therefore, be singled out 
systematically or considered out of context. Clearly, the reality of a rational or 
normative process by which policy is formulated has not been borne out by this 
analytical study. It was also found, consequently, that health policies for refugees
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could not be studied in isolation from the surrounding social, cultural, economic and 
political environment.
1 3 3  Seeking simple solutions?
Common to all of these assumptions inherent in the original proposal is an emphasis 
on technical interventions or solutions and on describing policy-making rather that 
explaining it. By using a more technical and descriptive focus, which it was hoped 
would lead to standards of care or administrative mechanisms which could be applied 
universally, the research was biased to benefit those conducting it and the 
organizations who could apply it universally - the international aid organizations. This 
technical and descriptive emphasis is characteristic of research and literature on 
refugee health relief generally. A review of published literature on refugee health care 
since 1948 found that nearly all documents were concerned with measuring primarily 
the extent of specific health or nutritional problems, the impact of specific 
interventions on the health status of refugee populations or, occasionally, the 
management of allopathic medical services for refugees. Published literature on 
national or international policies for health in response to an influx of refugees and 
the associated international relief operation is scant. Specific health policies in 
operation and the political processes behind their adoption are seldom stated. Instead, 
’policy’ decisions in the form of recommended technical or managerial standards and 
goals are frequently suggested following descriptions of refugee health conditions and 
services.
1.4 Policy redefined
Unlike more common perceptions of policy, which in the health sector are generally 
technical or administrative in nature, this analysis will conclude that policies are the 
instruments through which an environment is ordered or regulated Policies are the 
means through which power is managed. Thus, policies reflect relationships o f power 
and the ways in which power is used - in other words for what ends. In order to focus
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this analysis of health policies for refugees, emphasis will be given to four key aspects 
of policy.
1.4.1 Analyzing the policy process
1.4.1.1 Refugee health relief as a historical concept
Although health and health relief are generally thought of as biological concepts, the 
meaning of health and health relief has, in fact, changed over time and differs within 
different cultures. This means that health relief must be considered historically as a 
concept which is defined culturally, economically and politically.
1.4.1.2 Institutions and institutional relationships through which health relief 
policy is created and practised
Secondly, health relief is a policy of institutions within national societies. As such, the 
analysis needs to focus on the role played by health relief for these institutions. To do 
this, the institutions and the ways in which they interact with each other to formulate 
health policies for refugees will be examined.
1.4.1.3 The dominant body of knowledge dictating the content of health relief
policy
Thirdly, an official discourse has been developed for refugee health relief which 
defines the roles and shapes the identity of health care providers as well as perceptions 
of beneficiaries of health relief services. This discourse has institutional, political, 
social and scientific implications for defining health relief problems and the ways to 
solve them. In particular, it allows some kinds of knowledge which explain health 
relief issues to dominate the content of policy. This analysis will look at which body 
of knowledge is used to dictate the content of health relief policy.
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1.4.1.4 The experts who provide organizational and cultural leadership which
directs and legitimises health relief policy
Lastly, since the Red Cross movement of the late 1800s medical professionals have 
been the providers of health relief. Thus, medical professionals are endowed with the 
authority of the institutions for health relief and are generally recognised as experts. 
However, the training of these experts in specialised institutions is a process which 
inculcates ideological views and values in addition to scientific or technical 
knowledge. This means that their practice of health relief is also a practice of 
particular political and ideological views and values. Thus, it is important to identify 
and examine the group of experts who provide the organizational and cultural 
leadership which directs and legitimises policy.
1.5 Thesis structure
In order to understand the international context in which health relief is given as well 
as the policy environment in which the inter-govemmental organizations and foreign 
private charitable agencies work, the evolution of the system for health relief 
worldwide is considered in Chapters 2 through 9. The formulation and practice of 
health relief policies for the Afghans living in Pakistan between 1978 and 1988 are 
then analyzed in Chapters 10 through 14. A discussion of the key policy issues and 
the characteristics of the policy-making process conclude the thesis in Chapter 15.
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Red Cross movement - World War I: 
establishing international health relief as 
a humanitarian activity of nation-states
2.1 Legacies of the Red Cross movement
2.1.1 Europe in the late 1800s
Although the Red Cross is only one of many organizations involved in international 
health relief for refugees today, many current perceptions of disasters and practices 
of health relief generally are legacies of the Red Cross movement of the 1860s. The 
Red Cross was founded in a world very different from today. Europe was the most 
densely populated part of the world, and together with Russia, it accounted for a 
quarter of the world’s population1. Within Europe, peoples were divided. In central 
and eastern Europe a wide range of ethnic groups, which differed by language and 
customs but had common agricultural lifestyles, were incorporated into three large 
empires, the Austrian, Russian and Turkish empires.
In western Europe, the British, Belgian, Dutch, French, German, Italian, Portuguese 
and Spanish empires were undergoing industrialisation. Unlike the peoples to the east, 
most workers in the west were increasingly employed in industry. Growth of industry 
required a large, cheap and mobile labour force which was drawn from rural areas. 
The movement of large numbers of people from rural areas to urban centres meant 
that cities such as Amsterdam, Berlin, Brussels, London, Paris and Vienna had 
population increases of between 100 and 300 per cent in the latter half of the 1800s2. 
However, unlike the Austrian and Russian empires which were slower to industrialise 
or which had vast national resources, the needs of industry in western Europe soon 
exhausted national markets and resources. Western European empires then scrambled 
for colonies in Africa and Asia as new sources of cheap labour, raw materials and 
markets.
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The growth of industrial economies in western Europe and North America brought 
profound changes in societies and the roles of national governments. Widespread 
poverty, overcrowding and appalling working conditions in cities and towns stimulated 
greater governmental intervention in industry and social services in the latter part of 
the 1800s, for example, in the areas of industrial legislation, education, health and 
social insurance3. These same conditions which prompted governments to take action 
to ensure healthy working and military populations and social stability, also acted as 
a catalyst for more general discussions and activities of a humanist nature throughout 
society.
Since the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, there was no war which involved all the major 
powers in Europe and North America (Austria, Britain, France, Germany (Prussia until 
1871), Russia and the US). But there were numerous smaller wars as empires tried to 
extend their boundaries and influence and as groups of people tried to set up their own 
independent homelands and states. It was during one such conflict between the Italians 
and Austrians that Henry Dunant, a Swiss citizen, witnessed the Battle of Solfcrino 
in Italy in 1859. As a result he began a campaign to protect victims of war and to 
establish voluntary relief societies4.
2.1.2 Health relief in law
Legal rules to protect those injured during war were first advocated by the Red Cross 
in the Geneva Convention of 1864. This Convention was signed initially by ten 
European governments. The Convention was later revised in 1906, 1929 and 1949 to 
include prisoners of war, refugees and civilians5. One-hundred-sixty-two countries had 
signed these Conventions by 19856. Initially, the promotion and implementation of 
these Conventions was the work of the Geneva Committee, the founding fathers of the 
Red Cross. It originally consisted on only 5 members, all of whom were prominent 
citizens able to volunteer their time, resources and social status to nurturing the Red 
Cross movement: two distinguished surgeons, a retired army general, a lawyer active 
in social work and Henry Dunant7. The Geneva Committee was renamed in 1880 the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRQ which continues today as a private
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committee of between 15 and 25 Swiss citizens responsible for protecting and 
assisting victims of armed conflict.
Five of the ten articles of the first Geneva Convention gave neutrality to health 
workers and health facilities of national committees set up to assist those wounded in 
war. Ten such committees were established in Europe in 1863 and 1864s, and health 
relief was their main activity. The designated roles and activities of these committees, 
later called national Red Cross or Red Crescent societies, established a pattern of 
dependency on national governments as well as an emphasis in health relief policy on 
the practice of clinical medicine and surgery which continued for nearly 100 years.
2.13 Charitable agencies as conduits of health relief
The two most important relationships which the Red Cross had were with Christianity 
and national governments. The relationship with Christianity was ideological, and the 
relationship with national governments was political and organizational. Both ensured 
acceptance of and support for health relief.
In the middle of the nineteenth century, Europe was under the influence of the 
’revival’ which imposed new rigour on prevailing Christian religions, especially 
Catholicism and Calvinism. In keeping with the times, the Dunant family were 
’passionate followers of religious services’9, and Henry was no exception. Less than 
ten years before the Red Cross was established, Henry Dunant had organised weekly 
meetings ’to bring about among the youth a reawakening to the cause of God’10. 
These meetings developed under Dunant’s leadership into Young Men’s Christian 
Unions and later, in 1855, into a World Federation of Young Men’s Christian 
Association, known today as the YMCA. The similarities between the YMCA and 
national Red Cross societies were striking, both in their roles of providing assistance 
to the poor or needy and in their organization as federations of national groups.
The only institutional relationship which the newly formed national Red Cross 
societies had were with national governments. National societies were, and still are,
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dependent on national governments in two ways. Firstly, national Red Cross societies 
can only be set up in nation-states whose governments have signed the Geneva 
Conventions. Moreover, only one such society can be created in any given nation­
state; in other words, it must have a national orientation and character. Secondly, 
national societies were created to ’aid the wounded should the Military Medical 
Services prove inadequate * (emphasis added)11. Each society’s duty is, thus, ’to assist 
Army Medical Services’12. To do this, each society ’shall get in touch with the 
government of its country, so that its services may be accepted’13. Not only must the 
government generally accept their national society, but voluntary medical personnel 
can only be sent to the battlefield ’on the request or with the consent of the military 
authorities’14. Clearly, national Red Cross societies depend on national governments 
not only to be allowed to act in times of war, but to exist at all. Moreover, health 
relief was originally under the control of military apparatuses of nation-states, even 
though it was carried out by private citizens working for private, humanitarian 
organizations.
2.1.4 Health relief: a military or social welfare concern?
Yet health relief could have been part of the social welfare apparatuses of nation­
states. In the latter half of the 1800s, nation-states were well-established in Europe and 
were increasingly developing social welfare apparatuses in addition to more traditional 
apparatuses for national security (eg. the military and police), political administration 
and financing (eg. systems for public administration and taxation) and economic 
growth (eg. systems to enact and enforce legislation)15. After a relatively short period 
of laissez faire or non-interventionist policies at the turn of the nineteenth century, 
national governments in Europe increasingly accepted health as a concern of the state 
in response to the overwhelming effects and needs of industrialisation. They began to 
create state apparatuses to address health needs, particularly of the working class 
population. These apparatuses were first institutionalised in many European countries 
during the nineteenth century when governments began to provide free or inexpensive 
medical services for the poor as well as public health programmes to control specific 
diseases which were epidemic at the time, for example cholera, typhus and
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smallpox16. Similarly, systems of government sponsored medical services were also 
set up in the African, Asian and Caribbean colonies of many European nations at the 
same time17. Later, in the first half of the twentieth century, national systems were 
created for health insurance and health services in most European countries18,19. 
Clearly, health had become a priority of national governments in Europe and separate 
health institutions were being created for the delivery of health services as part of the 
social welfare apparatuses of nation-states.
There was a crucial difference between these national health systems and health relief. 
While national health systems addressed on-going social and economic needs, health 
relief met only the needs of soldiers wounded during war. In those times, wars were 
fought on battlefields by armies using firearms and seige tactics. In comparison with 
wars today, they had a distinct beginning and end, and many were only of short 
duration. Even at the beginning of World War II, most European governments were 
expecting a decisive battle based on the military strength of participants20. In 
addition, wars were fought only by able-bodied men, involving less than half of the 
population. Health relief was, therefore, a temporary activity; compared with wars and 
disasters today, it was only needed infrequently, over short periods of time and for a 
small proportion of the population.
2.1.5 Health relief as a sub-speciality of medicine and surgery
The initial tasks of national Red Cross societies all focused on providing timely 
medical and surgical care to those wounded in war, ranging from first aid to 
sophisticated surgical treatments. This emphasis on medical and surgical care is not 
surprising given that military medicine was a distinct occupation of the times. 
Numerous wars and internal conflicts in Europe since the 1400s had led to the 
development of military medicine, primarily surgical care of gun shot wounds21. 
Experiences on the battlefield were complimented greatly by, and were complimentary 
to, early developments in anatomy and surgery in the 1500s, physiology and chemistry 
in the 1600s, and bacteriology and the natural history of diseases in the 1700s. But it 
was not until the late 1800s that micro-organisms were accepted as the causes of
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disease, establishing the framework within which medical and surgical research and 
practice have been based ever since. Nevertheless, by the end of the eighteenth 
century, medicine in Europe generally had evolved to such a degree that during the 
1800s practitioners increasingly specialised in only one part of the body or age group, 
one type of disease(s) or one aspect of medical sciences (in the case of researchers 
and teachers)22. This applied equally to military medicine and surgery which remain 
today as sub-specialties within the fields of general medicine and surgery. 
Inadequacies of military medical services and advances in medicine and surgery 
generally provided a natural focus for humanitarian health relief priorities on the 
medical and surgical care of war casualties. Medical and surgical care of individuals 
wounded during armed conflict was one of the main activities of voluntary relief 
agencies, especially the Red Cross. Even today, the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) continues to specialise in war surgery.
2.1.6 Medical and surgical doctors annex the field of health relief
The application of positivist science to medicine not only had benefits for the 
effectiveness of medical and surgical practices, but it also allowed doctors to take the 
lead in and control of the healing professions generally. It did this in several ways.
’It increased the technical effectiveness of doctors, providing a basis for 
increasing public confidence in the profession. The need for research and the 
teaching of medical sciences created a whole new category of academic 
medicine. It united the interests of these academic physicians, who sought total 
victory for scientific medical schools over less adequate ones, with the interests 
of elite practitioners, who wanted to reduce production of and competition 
among doctors in order to raise their income and status. The requirements of 
scientific medical education strained the resources of ’commercial’ medical 
education to the breaking point, closing down many medical schools and 
reducing the production of physicians. It also provided the rationale for 
requiring extensive preliminary education of medical school applicants, forcing 
the poorer classes out of medicine and thereby raising the social class base of 
the profession. Furthermore, scientific medicine undermined sectarian 
medicine, uniting most of the divided profession under the banner of 
’nonsectarian’ scientific medicine. Finally, it provided a basis for further 
decreasing competition within the profession through the development of 
specialization. Thus, scientific medicine helped complete the 
professionalization of medicine’23.
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Not surprisingly, while the Red Cross initially accepted voluntary assistants to help 
in their relief work, medical and surgical doctors were to organise and manage health 
relief practice, using accepted practices and standards of medicine and surgery. Two 
distinguished surgeons were members of the Geneva Committee and its successor the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Both of these surgeons had 
reputable practices as well as professional links with medical societies and schools. 
They were able to make use of and contribute to new advances in scientific medicine 
generally as they developed the practice of war surgery for the Red Cross. By 1867, 
significant advances in war surgery practices led them to insist that the Red Cross 
train nurses and medical orderlies in times of peace rather that relying on volunteers 
who were instructed on site24. Later in this century, when the medical profession had 
secured its place as the dominant healing profession in industrialised countries, 
national Red Cross societies and other charitable agencies were able to recruit and 
send entire teams of medical and nursing personnel to relief operations. Whether as 
employees of charitable agencies or as volunteers, medical and surgical doctors were 
recognised as the experts in health relief practice. Since its inception, the content of 
international health relief policy and its practice has always been dictated by the 
medical profession.
2.2 The first World War: extending the scope and scale of health relief
2.2.1 Medical concerns alone dominate the practice of health relief
The process of attaining professional status was largely complete by World War I25, 
bringing with it a new set of institutions which organized and carried out medical 
education and practice, a new body of scientific and medical knowledge which 
dominated health policy, and a new group of experts in health - medical doctors. This 
new medical system which had initially benefited from the support of industry and 
private philanthropies, now had substantial interests in, and a considerable base of 
support for, expanding the private organization and practice of medicine. Whereas 
public health policy priorities in the 1800s had been to regulate and improve the 
environment, for example by improving wages and working conditions, preventing or
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alleviating unemployment and reducing the effects of poverty through pensions, 
education, improved nutrition, housing and sanitation, by the 1920s health and medical 
care policy had become synonymous26. Health policy was then dominated by 
questions of how best to organize and finance medical services. Conflicts of interest 
arose between those who wanted to ensure that medical care was readily available and 
affordable to the general public and those who wanted to ensure profitable and 
prestigious practices. There was extensive debate and political interest in the policy 
processes for health by at least nine different groups.
national governments - whose interests in promoting a thriving national 
economy, a strong military and social consensus generally had led to the 
creation of separate state apparatuses specifically for health in the form of 
national ministries or departments of health and government sponsored health 
services for special groups27;
private philanthropies and industry - whose interests in maximising the 
health of the working class had led them to establish their own medical 
institutes and trusts, mainly for research but also for teaching and the 
organization of practice28;
hospital administrators - whose interests were to secure funding for hospital 
services and to maintain control over their organization;
insurance groups (either voluntary, commercial, industrial or 
philanthropic) * who wanted to preserve their role in financing, and to some 
extent controlling, medical practice as well as ensuring that such a role was 
profitable29;
medical academics and specialists/consultants - who wanted to control 
research, teaching and practice generally but who were dependent on outside 
sources of funding for research facilities and technologies30;
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general medical practitioners - who wanted to manage primary medical care 
and control its funding as well as referrals to hospitals31,32;
public health doctors - who wanted to preserve and elevate their position 
within the profession by controlling and managing all medical services in their 
geographical area33.
The main issue of concern to all of these groups throughout the first half of this 
century was how best to organise and finance medical services so as to protect and 
further their own interests. None of these groups contested the merits of the new and 
advancing medical sciences as the solution to problems of illness, disability and 
premature death. Very early in this century, health and medical care policies became 
synonymous, focusing on the provision of medical services as the best way for 
promoting health. In other words, there was general agreement on the content of 
health policy, even though the various interest groups had conflicting or competing 
views over the organization and funding of medical care.
Although there were numerous compromises and solutions which were adopted in 
different industrialised countries, there were common characteristic features in their 
medical service systems which influenced the organization and practice of health 
relief. Firstly, hospitals were the centres for practice, teaching and research since they 
provided increasingly sophisticated facilities and equipment essential to the practice 
and further development of the medical sciences. Consensus on the pivotal role of 
hospitals meant that medical services were organised hierarchically: the most 
sophisticated services were provided by relatively few teaching hospitals, while more 
general care was given in smaller hospitals in each region. The point of contact with 
the public was through individual practices of doctors, who could then refer 
individuals to hospital for additional care if needed. Medical services were organized 
hierarchically and regionally34.
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The pharmaceutical revolution of the 1930s later gave medical practitioners access to 
a wide range of effective and quick acting treatments for the most common illnesses. 
Pharmaceuticals not only boosted the prestige and profitability of medical practice - 
especially after prescriptions were required, they brought a new interest group to 
health politics - the pharmaceutical industry. As medical practice relied increasingly 
on pharmaceuticals as the core of nearly all therapeutic regimes, the pharmaceutical 
industry would become one of the most powerful interest groups in health, having 
acquired considerable financial profits and widespread popular and professional 
support for their products. Nevertheless, during the first half of this century and 
beyond, it was the medical doctors who dictated the content of health policy since it 
continued to be concerned primarily with medical service issues and they controlled 
its practice.
One can hardly be surprised that medical care remained the dominant concern of 
health relief policy and practice throughout the first half of the twentieth century. On 
the one hand, priority was given to military medicine during both World Wars. 
National militaries greatly expanded their medical services both at the battlefield and 
at home. On the other hand, civilians were also in urgent need of emergency and on­
going care during both wars in many European countries. Their needs were met by 
governments and charitable agencies, often in collaboration with inter-governmental 
organizations.
Yet the priorities were the same. Emergency and basic medical services were provided 
and medical practitioners expanded their clinical interests to include the effects of war. 
For example, malnutrition and its treatment were dominant concerns in countries under 
seige or experiencing famine as a result of agricultural disruption or ’scorched earth’ 
policies35. Mental disturbances were another prevalent problem which medical 
practitioners increasingly documented in the literature36. Similarly, the biologic 
effects of the atomic bomb on health were prominent subjects of study in many 
medical journals after the second World War37. Others documented their experiences 
and efforts more generally38. The provision of emergency and basic medical services
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for both combatants and civilians was the prevailing practice in relief operations, and 
medical relief was organized and carried out under the direction of medical doctors.
2.2.2 Refugee relief: a charitable or governmental responsibility?
Throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century, the Red Cross provided relief in 
14 international wars and 11 internal conflicts39. During this period, the Red Cross 
established itself as an organization with expertise in international humanitarian law 
and in war surgery and emergency medical care. As a federation of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and 36 national societies by 190040, the Red 
Cross was organised and worked within a political perspective where nation-states 
were dominant: its work was under the control of the apparatuses of nation-states, and 
its presence in many different countries made its work part of the relationships 
between them, inter-national.
The Red Cross first extended its services to refugees in 1913. The Armenian, 
Bulgarian and Turkish Red Cross societies, for example, assisted Armenian, Bulgarian, 
Ottoman and Russian refugees between 1913 and 1925. Yet their involvement was 
temporary, and they advocated for a longer-term programme of relief and 
rehabilitation by governments. Their first contacts with refugees set two precedents: 
firstly, that the Red Cross ’undertakes emergency measures for refugees until other 
agencies can take over’41 and secondly, that refugee relief be a responsibility of the 
newly created inter-governmental organizations. The latter would in turn set a 
precedent that inter-governmental organizations, especially the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), would provide the bulk of finances needed for 
the Red Cross to participate in refugee health relief.
2J23 A new strategy of war
At the beginning of this century, Britain, France and Germany in Europe and the 
United States in North America were the leading industrial and imperial powers in the 
world. The very technologies which had enabled these powers to thrive and expand
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greatly changed the way in which the World Wars were fought. Similarly, improved 
systems of transport and communication and large industries for mass production of 
material goods changed the way in which relief was organized as well as the scope 
of relief provided, since massive quantities of food, equipment, supplies and other 
resources could be mobilised and moved quickly. During World War I, industries were 
re-oriented to support the war, producing vast quantities of weapons and ammunition. 
Extensive railways enabled these armaments along with men, food and other supplies 
to be delivered speedily to war fronts. Since both sides were equally equipped, this 
resulted in most battles of World War I ending not in victory or defeat, but in 
exhaustion42. Thus, the war went on and more nation-states became involved. But not 
until it had dragged on for several years and had consumed nearly all of the national 
resources of most European governments.
Relief was desperately needed in the first six months of World War I. Following the 
German occupation of Belgium in 1914, some 7-9 million people faced starvation, 
since most industries stopped working, agricultural production was disrupted and 
access to outside sources of supply was cut off. Local relief groups were formed but 
they needed governmental assistance to take supplies through the British blockade. 
Belgian businessmen approached the Ambassadors of the US for Belgium and Great 
Britain in London. The Embassy of the US in London then asked Herbert Hoover, a 
prominent and wealthy businessman known for his ability to organise and manage 
successful ventures, to oversee a large relief effort for occupied Belgium43.
2.2.4 Comprehensive relief for entire populations
Faced with urgent needs to gather, transport and distribute ultimately more than 5 
million tons of food to 11 million people in Belgium and northern France, and 
convincing both sides that relief should be provided, as well as locating enormous 
sums of money to finance this work, Herbert Hoover formed the American Committee 
for the Relief of Belgium in 1914, soon renamed the Commission for Relief in 
Belgium (CRB)44. By convincing each side that relief was in their interests, the 
Commission for Relief in Belgium was able to obtain sponsorship from the
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Governments of the US, UK, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain, and 
offices were set up in London, Rotterdam, Brussels and New York45. Funds were 
drawn from Belgian deposits overseas, loans were obtained from the Governments of 
Great Britain, France and the US, and private donations of more than 52 million US$ 
in total were solicited. The financial costs of the Commission for Relief in Belgium 
effort ultimately reached 25 million US$ per month, and at its closure in 1919, the 
Commission for Relief in Belgium had distributed supplies worth 1 billion USS46. 
Through local civilian committees, the Commission for Relief in Belgium distributed 
essential supplies - mostly food and clothing, supported some welfare services 
financially and materially and revived some sectors of the economy between 1914 and 
191847. The Commission for Relief in Belgium was, thus, the first organization to 
provide general relief on a large scale.
The Commission for Relief in Belgium has been described as ’an organization without 
precedent in international relations’48, partly because of its success in maintaining 
several million people throughout the war, partly because of the cooperation it 
obtained from warring governments and partly because it had many characteristics and 
privileges of national governments. In contrast to the Red Cross which worked under 
the direct supervision of national militaries, the Commission for Relief in Belgium 
operated in a manner similar to national governments. The Commission for Relief in 
Belgium dealt directly with governments at the highest levels. It had a wide remit 
which was determined partly by sponsoring governments and partly by the hundreds 
of volunteers who worked for it. As a result, it carried out a wide range of activities - 
many of which were in the traditional domain of national governments, from the 
provision of essential supplies and services to the rehabilitation of basic economic 
sectors. It had its own flag and passports with accompanying privileges of independent 
authority and mobility, and it had vast resources for maintaining a nation throughout 
the war. The work of the Commission for Relief in Belgium set two important 
precedents. Firstly, comprehensive relief for entire populations could be provided and 
maintained for several years - the technologies and resources needed were available 
and governmental cooperation was possible, even from those at war with each other. 
Secondly, civilians who could be distinguished clearly from combatants had a right
50
to relief. This right was subsequently incorporated into the legal conventions of the 
Red Cross in 194949.
2.2.5 Forerunners of inter-governmental relief organizations
Both the Red Cross and the Commission for Relief in Belgium were created with the 
approval of concerned national governments, and both depended on these governments 
for legitimate authority to carry out their work. Furthermore, both were organizations 
which relied partly on charity or voluntary contributions for many of their resources. 
Their charitable status enabled them to be more generally acceptable to, and worthy 
of support from, the general public and individual governments. However, unlike the 
Red Cross which aimed to establish a permanent movement for peace and 
humanitarian assistance somewhat independent of national governments, the 
Commission for Relief in Belgium was created as a temporary organization for relief 
in occupied Belgium on the initiative of national, allied governments.
The Commission for Relief in Belgium was a landmark in the history of relief 
organizations. The Commission for Relief in Belgium extended the tradition of 
international relief as an activity under the direct control of national governments 
instead of religious, philanthropic and charitable agencies. It is misleading to think of 
the Commission for Relief in Belgium solely as a private or charitable organization 
because it assessed relief needs and determined its programme of work jointly with 
the governments concerned and it relied on these governments for most of its 
resources - especially money and food. The concurrence of the various governments 
is somewhat easily understood since all gained from the Commission for Relief in 
Belgium’s work. For example, the Belgian government ensured the survival of its 
people and the preservation of existing infrastructures. The Allies strengthened their 
links with the Belgian Government and people, ideologically and economically, and 
the Germans maintained the Belgian people at the expense of the Allies. In many 
ways, the Commission for Relief in Belgium was organised and worked more like an 
inter-govemmental organization, such as the United Nations (UN) today.
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Singling out the Commission for Relief in Belgium is not meant to imply that it was 
the only organization involved in the relief operation. It was not. Many religious and 
philanthropic agencies extended their work to assist relief efforts during and after the 
war, for example the YMCA, the Society of Friends and the Rockefeller 
Foundation50,51. In addition to existing private agencies, new charities were also 
created, for example the American Friends Service Committee in 191752 and the 
Save the Children Fund in 1919 - which has become one of the largest and most 
active charitable organizations in health relief today53. In these examples, we see the 
beginnings of a pattern which continues today. With each new crisis and subsequent 
international relief operation, private charitable organizations are created. Many 
continue after the operation has ended, usually those which have other roles and 
purposes and those which adopt new priorities, such as the Commission for Relief in 
Belgium which became the American Relief Commission in Russian during the famine 
of the 1920s54. Others cease to exist.
23  International health relief as a policy of nation-states
The Red Cross movement of the late 1800s marked the beginning of health relief as 
a humanitarian activity of nation-states. This policy was formulated and implemented 
through charitable societies ostensibly established independent of national 
governments, even though they had a national orientation and character. As private, 
charitable agencies these institutions drew heavily on Christian and humanist 
ideologies of helping those in need. This religious-cum-humanist framework promoted 
relief as a humanitarian activity worthy of popular support and legitimised the 
provision of relief to all in need regardless of nationality or political affiliation. It also 
allowed relief to be given without questioning war itself, since fighting for ones 
liberties and freedoms has long been a Christian practice. Yet as institutions in a 
political system of nation-states, these charitable agencies depended on national 
governments for political authority to act in times of war; ironically, the Red Cross 
even worked directly under the auspices of national militaries. Clearly, national 
governments benefited greatly by the relief work of these agencies, both the care given 
to their militaries and the popular support generated for relief work.
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The success of this policy, however, also depended on perceived and real 
improvements in the care given to those injured during war. Deficiencies in military 
medical services and rapid advances in medicine and surgery generally focused 
humanitarian relief priorities on the medical and surgical care of war casualties. 
Medical and surgical care of individuals wounded during armed conflict was, 
therefore, one of the main activities of charitable relief agencies. The increasing 
effectiveness of medical and surgical practices had contributed greatly to the lead 
taken by medical doctors and surgeons in the healing professions generally, and health 
relief was no exception. Medical and surgical doctors, as the experts in health, also 
organised and managed health relief. Thus, since its inception, the content of 
international health relief policy and the organization and management of its practice 
has always been dictated and managed by the medical profession.
Despite strong links with health policies and practices generally, health relief was 
provided separately from on-going health services. Institutions providing health relief 
were not those providing health services as part of social welfare activities. 
Nevertheless, the continuing development of the practice of allopathic medicine and 
its adoption as the means for promoting health meant that health relief policy, like 
health policy generally, was synonymous with medical care.
New strategies of war employed in the first World War extended the scope and scale 
of health relief needed and instead of caring only for individuals wounded during 
armed conflict, health relief then aimed to maintain the health of entire populations 
by providing emergency and basic medical care as well as public health interventions 
for the control of epidemics of disease. Medical doctors continued to act as the experts 
who organized, guided and provided medical relief services, and health relief remained 
a sub-speciality of medical practice generally. Charitable or private organizations 
continued to act as conduits for international health relief, although governments of 
the recipient populations were increasingly involved in providing much of the care 
given through their own local or national health services. The vast scale of relief 
needed then led many agencies to advocate that governments accept responsibility for 
international health relief efforts in future.
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CHAPTER THREE 
The second World Wan 
establishing governmental structures for 
international health relief
3.1 Inter-govemmental institutions as conduits of international health relief
3.1.1 Legacies of the first World War (WWI)
The extensive destruction of European societies during and after the first World War 
(WWI) and the precedent set by the quasi-govemmental nature of the Commission for 
Relief in Belgium in providing massive relief in Belgium and northern France, led the 
Allies (primarily the governments of the US and Great Britain) to begin planning and 
preparing for the relief and rehabilitation of Europe early during the second World 
War (WWII). These early planning efforts were carried out by the Inter-Allied Post­
war Relief Committee and the US Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation between
1941 and 1943. But they were not immediately implemented. It was not until late in
1942 that the US Government first took steps to set up the new United Nations Relief 
and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) by appointing a director1,2,3,4. The 
UNRRA was subsequently established in November of 1943 by 43 nations. By 1944, 
widespread support in the US for relief for occupied Europe led both houses of the 
US Congress to approve a resolution urging the US Administration to actively promote 
such work.
However, initial attempts by UNRRA were hampered by bottlenecks in transportation 
within Europe, by changing governments in many European countries and by the 
chaos generated by millions of people on the move. The US President then undertook 
additional measures beginning in 1945 to assess needs, to negotiate relief provisions 
and to appropriate resources needed. Such measures included the involvement of the 
US and Allied Armies in organizing and distributing relief supplies, the establishment 
of a separate Famine Emergency Committee in the US Government for Western
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Europe under the chairmanship of Herbert Hoover in 1946 and the creation of the 
Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere (CARE) as a private charitable agency 
in the autumn of 1945 to distribute Army surplus food and contributions from other 
US charities5. Despite these additional efforts, UNRRA alone ended up working in 
25 different countries, mainly in central and eastern Europe but also in China, 
Ethiopia, Korea and the Philippines. During 1945 and 1946, at the peak of its 
operation, UNRRA employed 15 000 international and 35 000 local staff and spent 
nearly 4 billion US$D on aid, 90% of which came from the US, UK and Canada6.
3.1.2 The Health Committee of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration (UNRRA)
Although no specific mention is made of the health work of the Commission for 
Relief in Belgium, both the Inter-Allied Post-War Relief Committee and UNRRA had 
sub-committees to deal with health problems. Unlike the medical committee of the 
Inter-Allied Committee which was purely a planning forum which focused firstly on 
formulating a standard list of essential medical supplies for relief, the health 
committee of UNRRA undertook to revive national health services, to revise and 
administer existing international conventions for the prevention and control of 
communicable diseases, to supervise and provide health care for persons displaced by 
war - in centres, camps, and on-route to new or old homes, and to train health 
professionals in health relief and rehabilitation.
The health work of UNRRA has been described as one of its most successful and least 
controversial activities7. Its success was largely due to widespread governmental 
support: financially - the total expenditure for health was 168 million US$ between 
1943 and 1947; politically - 43 nation-states participated from the beginning and both 
existing international health organizations collaborated; operationally - by facilitating 
transportation and access to supplies and people; and legally - by formalising its status 
and rights in a multilateral agreement as well as in operating agreements with 
individual governments. Its success was also due, undoubtedly, to the substantial
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efforts of a number of charitable agencies who provided much of the care for people 
displaced by the war, for example, the Red Cross.
3.13 The International Office for Public Health
Yet again, health relief for post-war Europe could have been the responsibility of 
either of two existing inter-govemmental health organizations rather than UNRRA. In 
the first decade of this century, European and North American governments had 
created regional inter-govemmental organizations to prevent, monitor, control and 
study plague, cholera, yellow fever, typhus and smallpox (commonly known as the 
’big five’): specifically, the International Office for Public Health in Paris in 1907 and 
the Pan American Sanitary Bureau in Washington in 1902. The Paris Office was later 
designated the centre for the entire world with the office in Washington being the 
regional centre for the Americas. Other regional offices were established in 1926 in 
Singapore for the Far East (the Far Eastern Bureau of the League of Nations) and in 
Alexandria for the Middle and Near East (the Quarantine Council of Egypt).
Despite the creation of the Health Organization of the League of Nations in 1923, the 
’Office’ (as it has generally been called) retained responsibility for world-wide 
epidemiological intelligence work until the creation of the World Health Organization 
(WHO) following WWII. However, during WWII the Office was unable to carry out 
some of its activities and others were transferred to the regional office in Washington 
because of the occupation of Paris by the Germans and the proposal by the Germans 
to transfer the office to Berlin with the subsequent block on funds by the Allies in the 
temporary offices in London and New York. After WWII, possibilities to re-establish, 
let alone expand, the Office were quickly overwhelmed and subsumed by the 
movement to create one world-wide organization for health as part of the United 
Nations8.
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3.1.4 The Health Organization of the League of Nations
Unlike the Office which enjoyed the respect and support of all powerful governments 
in Europe and North America, the Health Organization of the League of Nations was 
handicapped since its creation because the governments of the US, Germany and 
Russia participated only sporadically9. Yet, there were serious health problems 
following WWI which required urgent action on an international scale, for example 
the typhus epidemic in Eastern Europe during 1919 and 1920. Not surprisingly a 
compromise was reached wherein the Permanent Committee of the Paris Office 
became the General Advisory Health Committee to the League’s Health Organization, 
and the Health Committee which planned and supervised the technical work of the 
League’s Health Organization was made up of 10 members elected by the Office, 6 
members elected by the League’s Council and 4 members chosen by the Health 
Committee itself.
This compromise enabled the Health Organization of the League to function, and work 
was subsequently undertaken in five functional areas10. Epidemiological intelligence 
services were carried out, first to manage the epidemic in Eastern Europe and later to 
deal with diseases which were not included in the international conventions, such as 
meningitis, polio, dysentery and enteric and scarlet fevers. Health care was provided 
for displaced persons. Technical studies were commissioned and conferences held in 
order to establish international standards, for example for the control and treatment of 
major diseases - such as malaria and cancer, for the classification of deaths and 
diseases, for the control of drugs - particularly narcotics, and for maintaining and 
promoting good nutritional status. Direct assistance was given to governments and, 
beginning in 1929 in China, this took the form of experts taking up residence in­
country to work with governments directly. Lastly, fellowships, publications and study 
tours were made available to educate health professionals primarily, but also the 
general public.
Clearly, the League’s Health Organization had the experience to provide relief in 
Europe during and after the WWII since it had cared for refugees and displaced
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persons, it had managed epidemics and epidemiological surveillance and it had advised 
and worked with governments. But, laudable though these activities were, their effects 
were limited early on by insufficient funding - the largest annual budget was only 414 
000 US$ in 1931, and later on by the loss of influence, prestige and membership of 
the League generally after 1936 when it was unable to prevent aggression and 
hostilities between member nations. Furthermore, WWII made communications 
difficult and, although some work continued throughout the war, the Health 
Organization's role after 1939 increasingly became one of collaboration with the Inter- 
Allied Post-War Relief Committee and the US Office of Foreign Relief and 
Rehabilitation11.
3.2 The United Nations (UNI: a forum for international health relief as a 
humanitarian activity of national governments collectively
The devastation of WWII was great; half of the total casualties were among civilians, 
with estimates of deaths ranging from 40 to 50 million people, mostly in Eastern 
Europe12. When hostilities ceased in 1945, more than 20 million soldiers, evacuees 
and refugees were on the move, food was desperately scarce and many political 
administrations were disorganized or inexperienced. In Tokyo, Warsaw, Budapest, 
Vienna and numerous other cities and towns, primarily in Eastern Europe and Japan, 
thousands of people faced famine and accompanying disease, such as tuberculosis, 
typhoid and dysentery13. Prospects of falling production in industry and increasing 
unemployment brought fears in the US, the economy least damaged by the war, that 
'there would be ushered in the greatest period of unemployment and industrial 
dislocation which any economy has ever faced’14. But these problems could be 
solved fairly rapidly if sufficient resources were made available to restore production 
in Europe, especially food, fuel and transportation.
Capitalist governments in the US and Western Europe were more concerned that the 
precedent of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917 during the chaos and hardship 
of WWI would be repeated. Organized labour had been strengthened, in many of the 
Allied countries before and during WWII and demands for improved social and
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economic conditions were increasing. The USSR emerged from the war with increased 
prestige, a strong industrial economy and extended geographical influence15. Under 
the banner of 'communism*, the USSR posed an alternate social order to people 
dissatisfied with previous regimes of fascism, periods of severe economic depression 
and the devastation of war.
Fears of postwar depression and social unrest resulted in postwar policies of the Allies 
which ensured the preservation and growth of capitalist ideologies and systems. As 
early as 1943, such policies were reflected in plans for the postwar monetary and 
trading system drawn up by the US Government. These plans were based on the 
central role of the US$ in the world economy and on reducing balance of payments 
and trade restrictions in order to secure access to raw materials and large markets for 
exports and investments abroad. Towards the end of the war, concerns within the US 
that rehabilitation in Europe might renew immediate economic competition led the US 
Congress to rule out any medium-term reconstruction aid as a role for UNRRA as well 
as to plan for its termination.
This in turn coincided with the formation of four other inter-govemmental 
organizations by the Allies, under the leadership of the US, between 1944 and 
194716. These organizations were the institutions through which global economic and 
social policies could be formulated and implemented, both for immediate relief and 
for the longer-term. Ostensibly, the United Nations Organization (UNO) was created 
to maintain international peace and well-being, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
to lend money in order to stabilise exchange rates and therefore the international 
economy, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or the 
World Bank) to lend money to re-build Europe as well as to develop poor nations, and 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to promote trade between 
nations 11. These inter-govemmental institutions were mainly concerned with 
ensuring a thriving world economy dominated by industrial powers in Europe and 
North America. The exception was the United Nations (UN). While economic issues 
were clearly of concern to the UN, its primary purpose was to maintain and promote 
international peace and well being. Within this broad mandate, three institutions were
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created between 1946 and 1947 which had roles in international health relief - the 
World Health Organization, the United Nations Children's Fund and the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
3.2.1 The World Health Organization (WHO)
At the end of WWII, there were three inter-govemmental organizations working in the 
health sector - UNRRA, the League of Nations and the Office. Neither the League or 
UNRRA were constitutionally or organizationally able to maintain peace or to promote 
the economic and social revival of European societies devastated by war. Similar to 
development efforts in poor countries today, economic and social concerns generally 
towered above those for health specifically and health was not included in the original 
draft for a new United Nations Organization18. But the relative inactivity of both the 
League's Health Organization and the Office during the war and the constitutional 
limits of UNRRA as a temporary organization solely for relief and rehabilitation were 
unsatisfactory mainly to doctors working within health ministries of national 
governments or health departments of existing inter-govemmental organizations. Thus, 
in the UN Conference on International Organization at San Francisco in 1945, the 
Brazilian and Chinese delegations succeeded in having health included as a concern 
of the UN. One world-wide health organization was to be created as a specialised 
agency under the Economic and Social Council of the UN. Subsequently, a 
constitution was drafted by a Preparatory Committee in New York in 1945, accepted 
by 62 nations in 1946 and implemented by an Interim Committee between 1946 and 
1948.
By the time the World Health Organization (WHO) convened its first World Health 
Assembly in 1948, its programme of work and methods for carrying out its 
responsibilities were fairly well-established. Not surprisingly most activities were 
inherited from its predecessors: conducting epidemiological intelligence work, 
formulating international standards, assisting government health services, sponsoring 
health education in its broadest sense and coordinating health research19. It also 
inherited a minor role in health relief, which at that time was primarily caring for the
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millions of refugees and displaced persons in Europe. In other words, health relief 
generally was one of the constitutional activities of WHO, but it was not a dominant 
or priority activity. Nor was the role and work of WHO in relief operations clearly 
defined and detailed. In fact, until the 1970s, health relief was not the specific 
responsibility of any one unit or division in WHO. Nor was it a line item in the 
annual budget20.
3.2.2 The United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (Unicef)
Similar to WHO, historical developments which led to the creation of a children’s 
fund within the UN go back many years. Governmental concern for the welfare of 
children was institutionalised around the turn of this century, largely in response to 
appalling conditions in overcrowded and poorly developed urban centres and to 
practices within industry which exploited child labour. In the US, for example, a 
Children’s Bureau was established in 1912 to advise the government on policies and 
legislation involving children21.
Concern for children affected by war, particularly those who had been abandoned or 
who had suffered emotionally, first became a priority relief activity during WWI. In 
fact, some private relief agencies were created during the war specifically to care for 
such children, such as the Save the Children Fund in 1919 and its international 
federation, the Save the Children International Union in 192022. Their work continued 
after the war ended, partly because some 4-5 million children in Europe were still 
homeless in 192023, and partly because they adopted a wider remit to care for 
children generally. Immediately after the war, the primary concerns of agencies 
working with children were to reunite homeless children with their families which was 
done in collaboration with the Red Cross, to resettle those children without homes or 
families which was done in collaboration with national governments and to restore and 
maintain good nutritional status which was done through soup kitchens and other food 
supplementation programmes in collaboration with UNRRA and charitable agencies.
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The continuation of this work was advocated by the Governing Council of UNRRA 
and by Ludwik Rajchman - the former head of the League of Nation’s health division 
and a renown Polish medical doctor and public health specialist-cum-diplomat. After 
having his involvement in WHO rejected by the WHO Interim Commission in 1946, 
Rajchman obtained support for a separate children’s fund from the US Children’s 
Bureau who helped write the proposal and lobby for support from the US Government 
generally and from the US State Department whose financial support was particularly 
essential24. Even so, the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (Unicef) was 
only established in 1946 as a temporary body (for three years) mainly for post-war 
reconstruction. The main tasks of Unicef were to help children and adolescents 
suffering from the war and to promote child health generally. Thus, Unicefs initial 
mandate retained a significant focus on relief and allowed more involvement in health 
generally. Its first programmes were in Europe where it provided supplementary food 
rations of mainly milk to 4.5 million children in some 30 000 locations in twelve 
countries. Similar to its sister organizations in the UN, such as the FAO and WHO, 
Unicef worked with national governments, mainly in Eastern European countries, to 
provide these services.
Unlike the other UN agencies which received their funds from member states as part 
of membership dues or which were required to seek approval from member states for 
the use of financial contributions, Unicef was free to receive voluntary contributions 
from any source and to spend these primarily as they thought best25. The UN 
Secretariat would provide staff and facilities, and other specialised agencies of the UN, 
in particular WHO, were to provide specialists, professional advice and technical 
support in order to keep staffing and resource requirements to a minimum26.
The relationship between Unicef and WHO was formalised in 1948 when Unicef 
requested technical advice from WHO on medical programmes. Although Unicef’s 
involvement in health programmes created tensions between the two organizations, 
Unicef’s participation was justified partly on the grounds that the immunization 
campaign against tuberculosis was an urgent post-war need and partly because WHO 
was unable to provide relevant supplies and services. Subsequent involvement in
66
health services for mothers and children and other mass campaigns against common 
diseases set a precedent for the involvement of both Unicef and WHO in international 
health programmes. WHO generally provided technical guidance and advice while 
Unicef contributed needed supplies or funds or both, and joint planning and 
administration of health projects was intended to be ensured by a Joint Committee on 
Health Policy which was set up in the summer of 1948.
3.2.3 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
Inter-govemmental organizations for refugee relief also had their beginnings in the 
work of private charitable agencies during WWI. At the end of the war, however, the 
workload and needs increased well beyond the capacities of the charitable agencies. 
The sheer numbers of Russian refugees was less of a problem than their lack of legal 
status. Thus, a group of private relief agencies appealed to the League of Nations, 
through the International Committee of the Red Cross, to take responsibility for 
defining the status of refugees, for coordinating assistance to them and for securing 
their repatriation or resettlement. This proposal was accepted by the League and a 
High Commissioner for Russian Refugees was appointed on two conditions: firstly, 
that the League had no responsibility for organizing and financing refugee relief and, 
secondly, that the work was temporary27. With private agencies to provide relief and 
the International Labour Organization to provide assistance with employment, this 
High Commissioner’s job was limited to legal and political matters.
However, some 200 000 refugees were still in need of assistance in 1928 and a new, 
independent and more comprehensive organization was created for refugees under the 
direction of the League with a seven year tenure, the International Nansen Office for 
Refugees. Through a Governing Body, this office continued to work closely with the 
International Labour Organization, private agencies, the Secretary-General of the 
League and the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees (IGCR). The IGCR was 
another inter-govemmental organization which had been created on the initiative of 
President Roosevelt of the US during the Evian Conference of 1938 to address the 
problems of refugees coming from Germany and Austria. It was headed by the High
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Commissioner for Refugees of the League and represented many governments within 
the Allied bloc.
Instead of resolving refugee problemsy however, the needs of refugees were increasing 
with the world-wide economic recession and the policies of the German Reich under 
Hitler. At the same time, the efforts of the Nansen Office were constrained by the 
admission of the Soviet Union to the League (which affected activities for Russian 
refugees) and the loss of prestige and influence of the League generally (following its 
inability to resolve conflicts between the Chinese and Japanese and the Italians and 
Ethiopians). This contributed to the amalgamation of the two High Commissioners’ 
offices from 1938-1946. Nevertheless, the creation of separate High Commissioners 
for Russian and German Refugees within the League illustrates that international 
assistance for refugees was dealt with on a group-by-group basis; national 
governments refused to agree on universal rights for refugees as well as international 
responsibilities to oversee their implementation.
During WWII, therefore, there were three separate inter-govemmental organizations 
providing relief for refugees and displaced persons, the High Commissioners of the 
League, the Inter-govemmental Committee for Refugees and UNRRA. While the 
League and the Inter-govemmental Committee for Refugees were principally 
concerned with establishing and ensuring legal rights for refugees as well as assisting 
them to find permanent settlement elsewhere, UNRRA along with over sixty private 
agencies provided a wide range of services for persons displaced by war.
The liquidation of the League in December of 1946 and of UNRRA and the Inter- 
govemmental Committee for Refugees in July of 1947 led to the creation of a new 
International Refugee Organization (IRO) as a temporary, specialized agency outside 
the new UN28. The foundation of the International Refugee Organization for three 
years was based on three principles. Firstly, refugee problems were ’international in 
scope and nature’. Secondly, .there should be no forced repatriation. Thirdly, 
repatriation should be pursued and assisted29. Interestingly, only 18 of the 54 
members of the UN joined the International Refugee Organization. Moreover, these
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18 were all allies of one another. The USSR and Comintern countries opposed the 
International Refugee Organization and advocated the repatriation of displaced 
persons, most of whom were fleeing from their countries into Western Europe. To 
encourage repatriation, they called for an end to international aid to refugees.
When the International Refugee Organization was created, the needs of refugees and 
displaced persons were great. The International Refugee Organization undertook to 
provide temporary relief activities for the ’care and maintenance’ of those in 
temporary accommodation, to move these people out of the countries of temporary 
asylum by repatriation or resettlement and to establish citizenship for refugees in order 
for them to have legal protection and rights as well as a means of earning a living. 
This required a massive operation of which health care was an integral part. A 
division of health was responsible for health care in camps or centres and on-route to 
new or old homes. In addition, the health division ensured and certified good health 
status of immigrating refugees. This division was headed by the former director of 
UNRRA’s health department, and close collaboration was maintained with WHO30.
Although the tenure of the International Refugee Organization was due to end in 1950, 
several needs of refugees remained. Most important was the lack of universally agreed 
legal rights and protection of refugees and displaced persons. In addition, there were 
still large numbers of refugees, mainly in Europe, who would not be absorbed into the 
communities where they took refuge, and other refugees were still coming from 
Eastern European countries. These concerns were acknowledged and in 1949 the UN 
decided to establish a High Commissioner for Refugees. However, this new High 
Commissioner was controversial and it took two years of debate before agreement was 
reached over the role, functions and organization of his office.
Larger political and economic interests of nation-states and their regional allies gave 
rise to at least three important conflicts which affected the mandate and structure of 
UNHCR31. Tensions between the East and the West grew during the latter half of the 
1940s, and by 1950 the US Congress vetoed the use of US funds for any international 
organization which included Iron Curtain countries. The US policy to give billions of
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US$ directly to Western European governments under the Marshall Plan further 
compounded the difficulties of obtaining US funds for UN work. Since the US 
Government had taken the lead in creating and funding the UN and its specialised 
agencies, this change in foreign policy from supporting the UN to supporting bilateral 
initiatives had serious financial repercussions for the UN.
In addition to the conflicts between East and West and between US funding for 
bilateral or UN activities, there was a growing difference of interest in and support for 
international material assistance for refugees between those countries hosting the 
refugees, for example in Western Europe, and those available only for resettlement 
overseas, for example the US and Australia. Obviously, the societies and economies 
of the former were strained by large numbers of refugees, but it was the latter who 
funded most of the material assistance which benefited both the refugees and their 
hosts. This became acute by 1950 when the overseas economies had their own 
sufficient labour markets following the return of soldiers and initial influxes of 
refugees immediately after hostilities ceased. It was the Western European countries 
which continued to need international help throughout the 1950s and well into the 
1960s for the care and maintenance of refugees while the countries of resettlement 
overseas were increasingly reluctant to fund such programmes or to accept additional 
refugees as immigrants.
Two functions for the High Commissioner were finally agreed: to provide international 
protection and to seek permanent solutions for refugees. Despite the possibilities for 
an extensive structure and programme of work these functions might suggest, UNHCR 
was to be a non-operational agency with only a small staff and limited funds. Direct 
services were to be provided mainly by governments and private agencies, but also by 
other inter-govemmental organizations. UNHCR’s role was to ensure that care 
provided was adequate and humane. Clearly, unlike the International Refugee 
Organization or UNRRA, the new UNHCR had no direct involvement in health relief. 
Similar to Unicef, UNHCR was to rely on WHO, national governments and charitable 
agencies for health care of refugees.
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3.2.4 The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 
(UNRWA), The United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA)
It would be much simpler if the above specialised agencies of the UN were the only 
inter-govemmental institutions working in international health relief operations. But 
they were not. The practice of setting up new organizations within the UN to deal 
with particular relief needs continued. Although the International Refugee Organization 
was established in 1947 and its successor the UNHCR in 1949, their preoccupation 
with refugees of WWII in Europe and the Far East led to the creation of two 
additional specialised agencies of the UN for Palestinian refugees in 1949 and Korean 
relief in 1950 - the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 
(UNRWA) and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA). Both 
were created on a temporary basis to provide international assistance to refugees of 
the Arab-Israeli and Korean wars.
3.2.5 The Council for Europe and the Inter-governmental Committee for 
European Migration (ICEM)
After Germany and Japan had been defeated, different political ideologies and 
economic interests of the Allied governments quickly divided the world into two 
power blocks, one centre being in the US and the other in the USSR - then the two 
greatest industrial and military powers in the world. The ensuing conflict, commonly 
known as the ’Cold War’, led to the creation of additional inter-govemmental 
organizations by the US and her allies: in Western Europe in 1948 and 1949 - the 
Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), in Latin America in 1948 - the Organization of 
American States (OAS), in South East Asia in 1954 - the South-East Treaty 
Organization (SEATO) and in the Middle East in 1955 - the Baghdad Pact. Similar 
alliances were established between the Soviet Union and her allies in Eastern Europe 
and China32. Within Europe, two inter-govemmental organizations were created to 
deal with problems created or exacerbated by the war, namely the Council of Europe 
and the Inter-govemmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM).
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The Council of Europe, which was formed in 1949 by nine Western European and 
Scandinavian governments, was particularly concerned with the inability of several 
European economies to absorb large populations of refugees and displaced ethnic 
groups since domestic economic resources were limited and possibilities for 
emigration were greatly reduced33. Their focus on these ’national refugees’ reinforced 
the prerogative and responsibility of national governments to manage assistance to 
refugees and persons displaced within their own countries; international assistance for 
refugees remained the concern of UNHCR, but only in collaboration with national 
governments. Concerns with excess populations also led to the creation of a separate 
agency to assist refugees and European nationals in migrating to other countries - the 
Inter-govemmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM). Obviously, ICEM also 
worked in close collaboration with UNHCR.
3 3  International health relief: a responsibility of governments collectively?
The vast and comprehensive needs for relief in Europe following the two World Wars 
and the associated implications for political and strategic alliances between nation­
states encouraged the direct involvement of national governments in relief operations. 
Subsequently, national governments set up their own institutions for relief collectively 
in addition to the private or charitable agencies. These inter-governmental 
organizations were able to draw resources from a variety of national governments, 
enhancing their income without taxing any one government excessively. Similarly, 
membership of several governments minimised the more overt political biases, 
facilitating the provision of needed care. And importantly, as institutions of 
governments collectively, these inter-govemmental organizations were able to provide 
relief on the scale needed - a scale far beyond the capacities of any existing private 
or charitable organization. Yet, these inter-govemmental organizations had similar 
characteristics to private or charitable agencies.
Firstly, many inter-govemmental relief agencies were transient since they were created 
for only one relief operation, for example, UNRRA and the United Nations Korean 
Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA). Others found additional on-going purposes or were
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succeeded by more permanent institutions in which relief was only one, usually low, 
priority, for example UNHCR and Unicef.
Secondly, inter-govemmental organizations engaged in relief varied immensely from 
each other. Variations in structures, purposes and forms together with the fluidity with 
which they were set up, altered, merged or discontinued created an image that they 
were separate from one another and, to a great extent, from national governments. 
Even today many consider the specialised agencies and funds of the United Nations 
supra-national organizations which are independent of national governments. The 
impression conveyed in relief operations, at first glance, was one of benevolent 
organizational anarchy.
However, many of these inter-govemmental institutions were created on the initiative 
of national governments or they were dependent on them for political authority or 
resources or both. Thus, the inter-govemmental agencies provided the legal and 
administrative structures for large-scale, international relief while private or charitable 
agencies mobilised popular opinion, support and resources and actually did they work. 
This then suggests that there was a coherent system for relief: one which was 
generated and controlled by the more powerful national governments, and one which 
did not interfere with existing economic and social policies for the longer-term.
This hypothesis is further supported by the separation, both institutionally and in 
practice, of relief from rehabilitation and development and by the focus of relief on 
acute survival needs only. Relief during and after the World Wars had expanded to 
include any activity or the provision of material goods which were essential for 
survival, and its provision had been made the responsibility of separate, often 
temporary or specialised institutions. Relief was a temporary, short-term, minimalistic 
activity which was isolated from social and economic rehabilitation and development.
International health relief was not exception; institutions providing international health 
relief were rarely those providing health services as part of national or international 
social welfare activities. Nevertheless, international health relief had expanded from
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caring for wounded soldiers to maintain entire populations. This was achieved by 
providing emergency and basic medical care as well as public health interventions for 
the control of epidemics of disease. These relief services continued to be organised 
and provided by medical doctors, usually under the direction of national or local 
governmental health authorities although they were often carried out by private or 
charitable agencies.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR): 
a recent and increasingly significant participant in 
international health relief policy formulation and practice
4.1 The 1950s and 1960s: extending health relief world-wide
Two changes since the second World War (WWII) have greatly influenced the 
evolution of the international health relief system; firstly, independence from colonial 
rule of countries in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean and Latin America beginning in the 
1950s, and secondly the re-emergence of disasters as an international priority in the 
1970s.
4.1.1 Independence from colonial rule
WW11 altered power relations between nation-states around the world. The US and the 
USSR quickly emerged as the two greatest military powers since the size and capacity 
of their armed forces greatly exceeded that of other warring nations. In contrast to 
these two, Western and Eastern European nations were devastated. They were now 
dependent on the US and USSR for economic aid to finance reconstruction and to pay 
off their war debts, and in the west for military support to prevent the spread of 
Russian dominated communism from the east. Not only were the Western European 
nations in a weaker position in relation to the US and the USSR, they were no longer 
in a position to maintain their rule in many colonies in Africa, Asia and the 
Caribbean.
Although the decline of Western European empires began early in this century with 
the break up of the German and Austrian empires following the first World War 
(WW1), it was not until after WWII that colonial rule in Africa, the Caribbean and 
Asia by Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Portugal was challenged 
successfully (Figure 4.1). Immediately after the war, Britain, France and the
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Netherlands in particular were less able to maintain their rule - they simply did not 
have the financial or military resources. Nor were they able to seek support from the 
US who openly disapproved of the imperialism of old Europe. Consequently, between 
1945 and 1957, many of their colonies were granted independence (Figure 4.2). In 
Asia, India and Pakistan became independent in 1947; Ceylon (Sri Lanka) and Burma 
in 1948; Indonesia in 1949; Malaysia in 1957; and Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in 
1954. In the Middle East, Jordan and Syria became independent in 1946; Palestine in 
1948; Libya in 1951; and Morocco, Tunisia and Sudan in 19561.
Many of the colonies which were granted independence soon after WWII had been 
self-governing for some time and most continued to have economic and political ties 
with Western Europe after independence. These links were formalised firstly through 
allegiances between individual European nations and their former colonies, for 
example the British Commonwealth of Nations and the French Union, and later 
through agreements between the West European community and newly independent 
nations collectively, for example the Lome Conventions of 1975, 1981 and 1985.
European assumptions that colonies in Africa and the Caribbean were incapable of 
self-government, because their economies were weak and their populations had poor 
levels of illiteracy and were ethnically diverse, were challenged violently in the 1960s 
(Figure 4.3). In addition to support from the US and the USSR, colonies struggling 
for independence were supported by newly independent nations who were an 
increasingly vocal and large group in international forums such as the United Nations 
(UN). World opinion was less important, however, than the growing strength of 
national liberation movements and the vast resources needed for their containment. For 
example, by the 1970s, Portugal (one of the last European countries to grant 
independence to her African colonies) was spending 40 per cent of its national budget 
on defense and security costs to suppress guerilla movements in her African 
territories2. Moreover, some Western European nations had been defeated despite 
extensive military efforts, for example the French in Indochina in 1954 (Figure 4.4).
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The emergence of newly independent nations throughout Africa, Asia and the 
Caribbean in the 1950s and the 1960s meant that membership of the UN swelled from 
51 in 1945 to 127 in 19713. The admission of these new states to the UN changed the 
character and focus of its work. It soon became a forum for these numerically greater 
but poorer nations of the world to make their needs and perspectives known. As relief 
and rehabilitation needs in Europe were met and as regional alliances divided Europe 
in support of either the US or the USSR, the vast economic and social problems of 
African, Asian and Latin American countries provided a new and endless raison d'etre 
for many of the specialised agencies of the UN, especially those which were set up 
originally on a temporary basis, including UNHCR and UNICEF.
4.2 UNHCR: providing selective or comprehensive refugee relief world-wide?
4.2.1 Refugee relief: a national or international responsibility?
4.2.1.1 Permanent or limited terms of office?
UNHCR was created in 1951 only after two years of debate in the General Assembly 
of the UN and after numerous compromises had been reached, mainly between the US 
and other nations. Although UNHCR was originally set up on a temporary basis to 
ensure international protection and settlement of refugees from WWII, several 
provisions in the original resolutions allowed UNHCR to take advantage of changes 
in global economic and political systems during the 1950s and 1960s to extend its 
purpose and existence indefinitely. For example, although the new High Commissioner 
for Refugees was originally given a limited term of three years, a provision was 
included in the resolution which allowed for extensions by the General Assembly. 
Possibilities for extending the life span of the organization later became important 
only because other provisions allowed the High Commissioner to expand his scope of 
authority to include other refugees and to provide material assistance for refugees and 
their hosts.
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4.2.1.2 Universal or group definitions of a refugee?
Determining which people qualified for help from the UNHCR was a significant area 
of debate and eventual compromise in the General Assembly. Refugees, displaced 
persons and stateless individuals were distinguished clearly from one another, and 
UNHCR was given responsibility for refugees and displaced persons who:
1) had already been designated refugees under the Constitution of its 
predecessor the International Refugee Organization (IRO), or other previous 
international agreements, or
2) were outside their country of nationality or habitual residence and were 
unable or unwilling to return to it because of a well-founded fear of 
persecution.
This broad definition represented a significant victory over those national governments 
led by the US who had fought for an ad hoc approach to refugees through definition 
by category. In other words, the US Government had wanted each group of refugees 
or displaced persons to be recognised only after their case had been debated in the 
General Assembly, similar to the first group of people under the mandate of 
UNHCR4. Clearly, they wanted to retain control over which groups of people would 
be assisted, in what ways, when and by whom. The inclusion of the second group, 
however, gave UNHCR the right to act on behalf of future refugees and displaced 
persons who met the criteria specified above somewhat independent of national 
governments.
4.2.1.3 Legal advocacy or material assistance for refugees?
Another way in which some national governments sought to limit the scope of the 
High Commissioner's influence was to restrict his responsibilities to those concerned 
with providing international legal protection. Yet again, other governments opposed 
such a limitation and extended UNHCR's responsibility to include 'seeking permanent
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solutions for the problems of refugees by assisting governments . . .  to facilitate the 
repatriation of such refugees, or their assimilation within new national communities’5. 
Having failed to eliminate more general assistance to refugees and their hosts as one 
of the functions of UNHCR, three other criteria were originally attached to this work 
by governments who wanted to restrict the work and influence of UNHCR.
4.2.1.4 International aid for individuals or groups of refugees?
UNHCR was to be a non-operational agency with a small staff and limited budget. In 
order to ensure that the office remained small and did not require (or have access to) 
large sums of money, UNHCR was to concern itself with groups of refugees rather 
than individuals. This, it was thought, would negate the need for an elaborate and 
expensive bureaucracy to assess individual claims as well as to address individual 
needs for help.
4.2.1.5 Independent action or ’operational partners’?
Another tactic to limit the size, costs and scope of UNHCR was to require that it work 
through governments, private charitable agencies or other specialised agencies of the 
UN in caring for refugees. Specifically, the High Commissioner was to seek 
permanent solutions by assisting governments, or with the approval of concerned 
governments by assisting private organizations. In addition to being an attempt to keep 
the office small and the scope of work restricted, this requirement reflected 
governmental concern that refugee relief remain under the control of national 
governments. The desire to keep refugee relief a national, governmental responsibility 
was also reflected in limitations on the financial resources of UNHCR. Only 
administrative expenses of the office could be paid for by the UN budget. All other 
work had to be financed by voluntary contributions. Yet initially, provisions were 
introduced by the US Government and accepted by the General Assembly which 
prevented the High Commissioaer from seeking additional funds from governments 
or individuals without the prior approval of the General Assembly. Thus, although 
compromises were reached which gave UNHCR the authority to promote longer term
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solutions for refugees and their hosts, the office lacked the resources, and the 
autonomy to seek additional resources, to do so.
At the end of the first year, there were 33 professional officers working with the High 
Commissioner in Geneva. By the end of 1953, UNHCR had a staff of 99 people, half 
of whom were professional officers and half secretarial personnel. In contrast with the 
first year, however, only 40 per cent were employed in the headquarters in Geneva. 
The remaining 60 per cent worked in branch offices set up in 11 countries: Austria, 
Germany, Greece, Italy Belgium, France, Great Britain, Columbia (for Latin America), 
the US and Hong Kong. This distribution of branch offices clearly reflects the initial 
emphasis on European and North American concerns after WWII. Similarly, 
membership in the first Advisory Committee, later renamed the Executive Committee, 
reflected European and American concerns at the end of WWII: overseas countries 
which were represented included Australia, Brazil, US, Israel and Venezuela; 
European countries represented were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of 
Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland, Turkey, UK and the Holy See6 (Table 4.1).
4.2.2 Refugee relief becomes an international responsibility
Over the next thirty years, nearly all of the restrictions initially placed on UNHCR’s 
size, budget and scope of work were removed or gradually reduced. For example, the 
High Commissioner’s term of office was renewed regularly beginning in 1953 and 
every five years thereafter; yet, his organization ostensibly remained a temporary one 
because it was subject to renewal by the General Assembly every 5 years.
4.2.2.1 Determining refugee status: The High Commissioner or the General
Assembly of the UN?
Perhaps the most significant change came in the early 1960s when the General 
Assembly passed resolutions which authorised UNHCR to assist refugees regardless 
of their legal position as refugees under UNHCR’s Statute. In other words, beginning 
with the Chinese refugees in Hong Kong in 1957 and Algerian refugees in Tunisia and
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Morocco in 1958, UNHCR was authorised to assist refugees who did not qualify in 
law for refugee status within the UN or who could not be brought under the UN 
mandate because of the political sensitivities of member governments. The General 
Assembly passed resolutions which gave the High Commissioner this authority 
generally in 1961 as well as the right to use emergency funds and voluntary 
contributions for such refugees. This meant that the High Commissioner, in 
consultation with his Executive Committee, was free to assist a much wider range and 
more vaguely defined group of refugees independent of the General Assembly of the 
UN.
4.2.2.2 Centralising decision-making for international refugee relief
Clearly, the selection of refugees to be assisted by UNHCR was now in the control 
of the High Commissioner and a select group of national governments who were 
represented on the Executive Committee. The first Executive Committee was 
established in 1951 and consisted of 15 representatives. Membership later expanded, 
mostly after 1960, to include other governments involved in major refugee migrations 
(Table 4.1). With few exceptions (for example, Namibia, Nicaragua and Yugoslavia), 
these governments had political and economic alliances with one another - few 
communist or socialist regimes associated with the USSR have been represented. 
Furthermore, even with the addition of 18 new members between 1960 and 1990, 
governments of wealthier nation-states, primarily located in Europe and North 
America, continue to occupy 50% or more of the positions on the Executive 
Committee (Figures 4.5 and 4.6).
4.2.2.3 From legal advocacy to comprehensive assistance
This shift in the selection of refugees for assistance from the UN to the High 
Commissioner and his Executive Committee was accompanied by a shift in the type 
of aid given by UNHCR. Previously, the absence of national and international legal 
instruments to guarantee basic human and political rights of refugees as well as a 
critical shortage of funds meant that during the 1950s the work of UNHCR focused
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TABLE 4.1
National Governments with membership on the Executive Committee 
______of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees1_____
YEAR
REGIONS
Europe
North
America Other2 Africa Asia
Latin
America
19513 Austria USA Australia Brazil
Belgium Israel Venezuela
Denmark
Fed Rep 
Germany
France
Italy
Switzerland
Turkey
UK
Holy See
19554 Greece Iran Colombia
Netherlands
Norway
1957 Canada
1958s Sweden
Yugoslavia Tunisia China
1963 Algeria Lebanon
Madagascar
Nigeria
Tanzania
1967 Uganda
1979 Finland Lesotho Japan Argentina
Morocco Thailand Nicaragua
Sudan
Zaire
1982 Namibia
Somalia1988 Pakistan
88
YEAR Europe North
America
Other Africa Asia Latin
America
TOTAL 16 (37%) 2 (5%) 2 (5%) 12 (28%) 6 (14%) 5 (12%)
1. Source: UNHCR (1990) Information paper. Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, 18 pp.
2. Other high income economies
3. UNHCR Advisory Committee established in 1951.
4. UNREF Executive Committee established in 1955.
5. Executive Committee of UNHCR established in 1958.
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Figure 4.5
National governments with membership on the 
Executive Committee of UNHCR 1990: regional distribution
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Figure 4.6
Governmental membership on the Executive Committee 
of UNHCR according to economic classification* in 1990
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*According to the World Bank Development 
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on encouraging and assisting national governments in Europe to establish laws to 
protect refugees. Services and material assistance for refugees throughout Europe after 
WWII were provided by national and local governments and by charitable 
organizations, with their own funds or with funds from other governments channelled 
bilaterally or through UNHCR. UNHCR’s main preoccupation had been to protect and 
find new homes for refugees in Europe. This was not successfully completed until the 
late 1960s; camps in Europe were only closed in 1966, and some refugees still 
required financial or legal assistance after they had been resettled. It was not until 
1971 that UNHCR reported that none of the remaining 650 000 refugees in Europe 
required further assistance from the UN7.
However, in the 1960s the greatest and most urgent needs of refugees of concern to 
UNHCR were in Africa and Asia and were basic. Assistance was, therefore, usually 
material and often did not include a legal component since many of these refugees 
were not given legal refugee status under UNHCR’s Statute. This practice of giving 
material assistance to a more disperse group of refugees contributed to the expansion 
of branch offices from 15 in 1962 to 34 in 1971. It also accounted for the work of 
more than half of the 350 staff by 19708. Thus, during the 1960s and especially the 
1970s, UNHCR increasingly became an inter-governmental organization which 
organised and managed aid from wealthier nations in North America and Western 
Europe for basic relief for refugees and their hosts - nearly all of whom now lived in 
poorer countries in Africa and Asia, and to a lesser extent in Latin America.
4.2.2.4 Financing international refugee relief
But material assistance required money. During the 1950s and 1960s, UNHCR 
developed a system for obtaining voluntary contributions from governments and 
private sources in addition to its UN budget for administrative expenses which ranged 
from only 2.5 to 5.4 million US$ annually between 1963 and 19719. Although the 
need for voluntary contributions was first recognised when UNHCR was created and 
a special refugee fund had been established, an appeal could only be made for 
emergency aid. Furthermore, the response to these emergency appeals in the early
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1950s was so poor that the High Commissioner felt it ’had made him what might be 
called an international beggar’10. It was not until 1954 that the General Assembly 
authorised the High Commissioner to appeal for funds to finance temporary care and 
permanent solutions of refugees generally, and not until 1961 that the General 
Assembly authorised the High Commissioner and the Executive Committee to 
determine the use of such funds independently. But like the selection of refugees, fund 
raising by the High Commissioner was to be done with the approval of his Executive 
Committee. In addition, an emergency fund, initially of not more than 500 000 US$, 
was created in 1957 to meet acute needs. It too was to be used by the High 
Commissioner under the direction of the Executive Committee.
Other funds were donated for specified purposes. Many of these were administered as 
trust funds, for example, between 1956 and 1972 nearly 40 million US$ were donated 
to UNHCR special trust funds. Thus, the lack of financial support from governments 
which plagued UNHCR in the early 1950s began to disappear in the 1960s when the 
focus and nature of its work changed to meeting the basic needs of refugees and their 
hosts in poorer countries. Some 85 governments contributed to UNHCR in 1971 in 
comparison with only 50 in 1966. Voluntary contributions from governments totalled 
between 2.6 and 4.6 million US$ annually between 1959 and 1970, excluding special 
trust funds. Voluntary contributions from private sources during the same period 
totalled between less than 100 000 US$ to 1.5 million US$ annually11.
4 3  The 1970s: international relief as an aid priority
Colonial independence was not followed by periods of peace and prosperity as had 
been hoped. Instead, national unity was soon followed by ethnic and tribal tensions. 
In light of the gap between stated goals for equitable growth and available resources 
to meet these goals12, the leaders of these increasingly fragile nations sought for 
better concessions on trade and aid with northern states. They did this firstly by 
forming regional groups, such as the Organization for African Unity in 1963, as well 
as political groups, such as the non-aligned movement in 1955 and the Group of 77 
in 1963. Given their numerical weight in international forums, these blocs of southern
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states then pressed for reforms, for example through the UN Conference on Trade and 
Development in 1964 and the Lome Conventions of 1975, 1981 and 1985.
Heightened attention worldwide to the longer-term problems of underdevelopment was 
accompanied by a greater awareness of the persistent and erosive character of 
disasters. The civil war between Nigeria and Biafra of 1967-1970 marked the 
beginning of a new era for international relief; it was the first large scale disaster of 
the 1970s which was publicised by television throughout North America and Europe. 
It was immediately followed by a cyclone and civil war in East Pakistan (1970-1971), 
civil war in southern Sudan and severe drought and famine in Sub-Sahelian Africa 
(1973-75). These experiences were catalytic in defining disasters as a distinct area of 
international concern which demanded more attention by international aid agencies13.
Thus, disasters again became a priority of international aid organizations. Beginning
in the 1960s, many such organizations created special offices or departments solely
for the problems created by disasters and associated needs for relief (Tables 4.2 and
4.3). While the humanitarian needs caused by disasters were acute and extensive, this
was not the primary reason for institutional concern.
’More pragmatically, however, the more such suffering was presented to the 
public in the developed world, the greater was the pressure on institutions with 
relevant roles and resources to respond. Disaster relief - the way in which an 
organization could mobilize its responses - became linked even more than in 
the 1950s to the way that an organization was assessed by potential supporters. 
Disasters provided organizations, non-governmental and inter-governmental 
organizations alike, a battlefront over which they could wave their institutional 
banners. Increasingly, it became important not only to be in the forefront of 
relief . . . .  where the cause was popular, but also to be seen to be there. The 
resources that organizations possessed to pursue their longer-term goals and to 
ensure their very survival and growth were intertwined with the new attention 
that disasters were receiving.’ 14
Along with the creation of separate offices or departments for relief within existing 
institutions, new organizations were also formed specifically for relief. Within the UN 
system, two agencies were set up in the 1960s and 1970s which reveal organizational 
relationships and characteristics similar to those of their predecessors. The World Food 
Programme (WFP) was set up jointly by the UN and the Food and Agriculture
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TABLE 4 2
Disaster units in United Nations Organizations
Organization
U n it/
function Date
Food and Agriculture 
Organization
Office for Special Relief Operations 
(arose out o f the Office for Sahelian 
Relief O perations-1973)
1975
United Nations 
High Commissioner 
for Refugees
Emergency Office 1980
United Nations Children’s Fund Office of the Emergency Operations 
Coordinator
1971
World Food Programme Emergency Unit 1975
World Health Organization Emergency Relief Operations Office 1974
United Nations Development 
Programme
Role o f Resident Representatives to 
coordinate relief operations on 
country, level designated in 
U N  Res. 2816 (XXVI) December
1971
United Nations Disaster 
Relief Office
Main activity to mobilize, direct and 
coordinate relief activities of 
U N  system as stipulated by 
UN  Res. 2816 (XXVI) December
1971
Pan-American Health 
Organization
Emergency Preparedness and 
Disaster Relief Coordinator
1977
United Nations Office of the 
Coordinator for Special 
Economic Assistance
Concerned with economic 
emergencies threatening economic 
viability o f member states
1977
* Copied from Kent (1987), page 52.
95
TABLE 43
T a b le  2.3 Disaster units established in major donor governm ents
Country Name of unit & ministry DateEstablishcc
Belgium Section C-25, Service Catastrophes Naturclles 
Service du Conflnancemcnt et de TAide d’Urgence 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1971
198:
Canada International Humanitarian Assistance Division, 
Canadian International Development Agency
1971
Denmark DM-1-DANIDA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
[Disaster relief was part of DAN IDA’s main role 
when it was established in 1962. DM-1 resulted 
from reorganization which took place in 1986]
1962/8<
France La Cellule d’Urgcncc et Veillc, Ministry of 
Cooperation
198'
Great Britain Disaster Unit, Overseas Development 
Administration
197<
Netherlands Emergency and Humanitarian Aid Section, 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
19T.
Norway Coordination of Disaster Relief Section, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs
Sweden Section for Emergency JRelief Assistance, Swedish 
International Development Authority
\9T.
Switzerland Directorate for Cooperation Assistance and 
Humanitarian Aid, Federal Department of Foreign 
Affairs
197:
United States Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance, Agency 
for International Development
1964
West Germany Section 301, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1978
* Copied from Kent (1987), page 53.
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Organization in 1963 to provide food for relief and development. Yet like many of the 
agencies before it, the World Food Programme (WFP) soon devoted most of its 
resources and efforts to development because of the institutional security such a focus 
provided15.
In contrast, the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator (UNDRO) 
was set up by the UN Secretariat to coordinate the array of UN agencies involved in 
relief work in 1971. The creation of a UN Disaster Relief Coordinator occurred only 
after a decade of negotiation and compromise between the UN Secretariat who were 
keen to improve the image, work and support base of the UN generally but were 
unwilling to take on additional roles beyond those they already had, while the 
specialised agencies of the UN themselves were unwilling to relinquish responsibility 
for such an increasingly profitable and popular area of work. Major donor 
governments were reluctant for the UN to take a leadership or coordinating role which 
might override their authority or autonomy - either as donors or recipients of relief 
aid. To a lesser extent, many of the charitable organizations saw a need for greater 
coordination but had their own coordinating bodies or close relationships with other 
specialised UN agencies involved in relief.
This resulted in the creation of an agency which was given very limited resources. For 
example, the UN Disaster Relief Coordinator’s trust funds were increased in 1982 to 
provide a higher ceiling for responding to individual disasters; yet an allocation of 
only 50 000 US$ at most would only be, in practice, a symbolic gesture16. 
Furthermore, it was only after seven more years (and several devastating disasters) that 
an agreement was reached with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
which gave the UN Disaster Relief Coordinator an organizational structure for 
responding to individual disasters: Country Resident Representatives of the UN 
Development Programme (UNDP) were to be the disaster coordinators in each 
country, acting on behalf of the UN Disaster Relief Coordinator. Even then, the UN 
Disaster Relief Coordinator had little, if any, independent operational ability. Instead, 
it was confined to a role of clearing information which would then be used (or 
ignored) by other organizations - within the UN system, the charitable sector or aid
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organizations of individual national governments. Gearly, the UN Disaster Relief 
Coordinator was another agency for relief whose work was tightly controlled; but this 
time, measures to control its work were supported and enforced by the array of actors 
already working within the international relief system.
The establishment of these various institutional structures specifically for relief did not 
mean, however, that the obvious links between disasters and development were 
addressed by the international community. In fact, the creation of separate units or 
agencies maintained the political distinction between relief and development - between 
socioeconomic development and immediate survival. For refugees, relief aid was 
available only in cases of acute, political persecution. Refuge from systematic, 
economic exploitation was excluded. In other words, it excluded the masses of poor 
and powerless people in the southern states17. Refugee relief continued to avoid 
underlying socioeconomic issues.
Nevertheless, this did not result in less work for refugee relief agencies. On the 
contrary, the massive influx of nearly 10 million Bengalis into India in the early 1970s 
and several hundred thousand Indochinese throughout Southeast Asia later that decade 
were indicators of the magnitude of refugee populations and displacements yet to 
come. They were followed by massive movements - nearly continuously - during the 
1980s, for example, the Afghans in Iran and Pakistan, the various Ethiopian ethnic 
groups in Somalia and Sudan, and the Mozambicans in Malawi and Zimbabwe. All 
generated unmeasurable suffering, added to the economic, social and political 
complexities facing southern nations-states and created space for aid agencies to 
assume substantial roles in international relief.
43.1 The beginnings of bureaucracy
Despite an increasing and substantial workload throughout the 1960s, primarily in 
Africa, it was not until the 1970s that UNHCR expanded and reorganised itself as a 
large bureaucracy. Beginning with the mass migration of some 10 million refugees 
from Bangladesh into India in 1971, UNHCR’s staff, budget and programmes of
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assistance grew astronomically. By 1980 its staff had tripled, totalling some 1000 of 
whom one third were based in Geneva, and its programmes of assistance cost over 
250 million US$ in comparison with just over 8 million US$ ten years earlier. The 
main office in Geneva had been reorganised in 1972 by geographical regions of the 
world, and branch offices which had previously been staffed by only one professional 
officer were enlarged18.
This expansion did not, however, alter substantially the way in which UNHCR 
worked. By the end of the second World War nearly all of the principal organizations 
involved in international relief had well-defined and well-established roles. Not 
surprisingly, as one of the specialised agencies of the UN, UNHCR’s main roles were:
1. to encourage and assist host governments to care for refugees, especially to 
promote long term solutions, such as settlement or repatriation, and
2. to elicit and channel aid from other governments and private sources for 
these purposes.
Despite the shift from Europe to poorer countries in the South in the 1960s and 1970s 
and the increasing emphasis on general aid, UNHCR did not get involved in providing 
services or material assistance directly. Instead, it was an institutional structure 
through which the needs of refugees and their hosts could be assessed and made 
known to wealthier nations and through which aid from those nations was channelled 
for relief of selected groups of refugees. Thus, in a review of programmes for refugees 
in some 20 countries in Africa and Asia before 198019, the main activities of 
UNHCR were:
a) to assess the need for and desirability of international assistance for refugees 
and their hosts,
b) to work directly with host governments for the acceptance and 
implementation of internationally supported programmes of assistance for 
refugees,
c) to collect and disperse funds for such programmes,
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d) to monitor and disseminate information on refugee needs and internationally 
supported relief programmes, and
e) to elicit and support the involvement of national governments, private 
charitable agencies and other specialised agencies of the UN in refugee relief 
programmes.
In addition, UNHCR worked with governments to obtain agreements which allowed 
either repatriation or permanent settlement in neighbouring countries. Direct care was 
given through existing governmental or charitable services and programmes or through 
additional projects set up by governments or charitable agencies especially for 
refugees.
4.4 The 1980s: UNHCR engages in health relief
4.4.1 Health relief as a priority activity of UNHCR
Although UNHCR was by definition a relief agency, the changes in the environment 
in which relief needs were created and responded to had a great impact on the 
organization. The prominence and visibility of relief work, as well as the vast 
resources available to support it, led UNHCR to compete for an expanded role in 
refugee relief, including health care - but not substantially until the 1980s. In general, 
the agency then expanded its role in two directions: firstly in their involvement in 
acute or emergency relief work, and secondly in providing technical and materia] 
assistance for relief and rehabilitation. Both of these areas included a role in health 
relief.
Beginning with the newly formed Emergency Unit of UNHCR in 1980 and continuing 
with the Technical Support Unit since 1983, health and nutritional relief became 
distinct priorities of UNHCR’s head office in Geneva. The Emergency Unit 
immediately undertook three activities for refugee health relief: the creation of an 
Emergency Health Kit, the production of a manual for UNHCR staff on the
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management of refugee relief operations and the establishment of standing 
arrangements for rapid assessments of refugee health and nutritional needs.
4.4.1.1 An emergency health kit
In 1980, the Emergency Unit requested the Office for Emergency Relief Operations 
of WHO to assist with these three activities20. It was agreed that WHO would draw 
up a standard list of basic drugs and supplies which would be needed in emergencies 
in order to stock supplies in advance. WHO used the funds for this work to pay the 
Refugee Health Group in the Ross Institute of the London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine to prepare such a list. The list was eventually published in the form 
of a paperback book by WHO21, and a kit which contained three months supplies of 
drugs and equipment was packaged and stored by Unicef’s office in Copenhagen, 
Denmark. Subsequently, the Emergency Unit of UNHCR also agreed to contribute 
financially to a manual on the health needs of refugees which was being prepared by 
the London School in collaboration with WHO which was eventually produced as a 
book on Refugee community health care22.23.
4.4.1.2 Assessing health and nutritional needs in emergencies
WHO suggested that arrangements for the rapid epidemiological assessment of health 
and nutritional needs of refugees be made with the Centres for Disease Control (CDC) 
of the US Government's Public Health Service directly since they had gained 
considerable expertise in this area, firstly in the Nigerian civil war of 1967-197024 
and more recently in the Cambodian crisis of 197925,26,27. Consequently, 
negotiations were carried out directly between CDC and UNHCR. An institutional 
agreement in which CDC provided epidemiological experts to carry out such 
assessments for UNHCR who funded most of the expenses incurred was reached in 
principal in 198128,29 but was not formalised in a Memorandum of Understanding 
until 198930. Thus, CDC was one of the first agencies outside of the UN system to 
act directly as a resource of health expertise and personnel for UNHCR.
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4.4.1.3 Guidelines on refugee health care for UNHCR
Concurrently, the Emergency Unit convened meetings of various professionals to draft 
management guidelines for staff of UNHCR to use in refugee relief operations, which 
were eventually published in 198231. All of the principal sectors were included, and 
health and nutrition were no exception. Those professionals who contributed to these 
technical guidelines for refugee health relief represented the most prominent 
governmental, UN and charitable organizations involved in refugee relief or in health. 
These included WHO and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) as the 
global and American inter-governmental organizations responsible for health and 
nutrition, the Centres for Disease Control (CDC) as the public health agency of the 
US Government - who was and is the largest contributor to UNHCR’s resources, the 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine which had technical experts in 
tropical public health - some of whom were developing expertise in refugee health 
issues, and the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Oxfam UK, Save the 
Children Fund and Medecins Sans Frontieres, France as the largest, better organized 
and most widely known charitable agencies providing health care for refugees.
The main reason for involving such a wide range of agencies was to ensure the 
acceptance of the manual and its practices internationally32. In other words, to 
generate an international support base for the technical standards and activities 
proposed as well as a role for UNHCR in determining and carrying out such practices. 
Clearly, the involvement of health professionals from internationally renown 
institutions, such as WHO, the Pan American Health Organization, and the London 
School, enhanced the credibility and global acceptance of the technical contents of the 
proposed guidelines. The involvement of the most important donor government and 
several popular and active charitable agencies ensured support for the implementation 
of such practices. Moreover, acceptance of this manual by these agencies implied an 
acceptance of UNHCR in the process of determining and carrying out refugee health 
policies and practices. It was in this way that UNHCR formally entered the 
international health relief policy arena.
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4.43. Building their own expertise in refugee health relief: medical doctors and 
nutritionists as staff members of UNHCR
Shortly after the Emergency Unit was formed, UNHCR created another unit in 1981 
to provide the technical expertise needed in programmes giving material assistance. 
By 1986 this Technical Support Unit was made up of eight professionals: a rural 
settlement specialist (Head), an agronomist, an agricultural planner, a water 
development expert, a health and nutrition adviser, a physical planner, an income- 
generating expert and a socio-economist33. Three of these professionals were senior 
officials seconded to UNHCR by other agencies within the UN system, including the 
health and nutrition adviser who had been seconded from the Office for Emergency 
Relief Operations of WHO since 1983. UNHCR gave funds to WHO to cover all costs 
associated with this post.
4.4.2.1 International guidelines for refugee health care
Between 1983 and 1987, the health and nutrition adviser gave technical advice to 
several different refugee programmes and undertook to rewrite the guidelines on health 
and nutritional care. As before, he convened a group of experts from the most 
important agencies in the international relief or health sectors. Many of the same 
agencies participated, namely WHO, CDC, the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC), the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (LORCS), the 
Refugee Health Group of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, 
Medecins Sans Frontieres France and Save the Children Fund UK. In addition, two 
consultants were invited to contribute, one who had previously worked for UNHCR 
in several different relief operations and another who was at the School of Public 
Health at the University of California at Los Angeles (which had been involved in 
refugee health care since the early 1980s). Other key agencies were invited to review 
drafts and make comments for change or modification, for example the Pan American 
Health Organization and Oxfam UK. Also similar to the first guidelines, this edition 
focused on technical standards and interventions, but in much greater detail. So much 
detail that the three tomes totalled nearly 500 pages altogether34,35,36. Yet, neither
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the first or second versions addressed policy issues, such as finance, organization of 
health services or human resource management. However, unlike its predecessor, the 
revised version was intended for more general use and was not limited to staff of 
UNHCR. Although the work first began in 1986, drafts were not circulated until 1987. 
A final version has not yet been produced of the general health and selective feeding 
guidelines. The essential drugs policy was finalised and published in 198937.
4.4.2.2 Other standard kits or guidelines for international use
In addition to advising individuals working in refugee relief programmes and drafting 
new guidelines for international use, the health and nutrition adviser supported the 
creation of an emergency immunization kit together with Oxfam UK and WHO, a 
practical guide for the use of disinfectants in refugee camps and a video on the 
management of supplementary feeding programmes as well as a review of the 
emergency health kit jointly with WHO38.
4.4.2.3 Appointing national or local refugee health coordinators
The effects of these various activities undertaken by UNHCR within the international 
health relief community since 1980 would have been limited to one of generating and 
disseminating expert advice unless additional personnel were appointed within 
UNHCR country programmes to put these decisions into practice. Not surprisingly, 
UNHCR then looked to obtain financial and political support for appointing national 
health or nutrition coordinators within UNHCR itself39. This was less easy since it 
clashed openly with management by national government officials who had a 
sovereign right to such a role and by WHO who had a history of and mandate for 
providing advisers to national governments in the field of health. To a lesser extent, 
it created conflict with some charitable agencies who had been running many of the 
internationally supported refugee health programmes for several years; some of these 
agencies were not keen for UNHCR to take over decision making within countries or 
individual refugee health programmes.
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A coordinator for refugee health services within the UN system was first appointed 
at national level in Thailand in 1979. This position began as a series of consultancies 
To study, promote and establish emergency and other health measures in refugee 
camps and surrounding populations’40. It was requested by the UNHCR office in 
Thailand in response to the emergency created by a large and continuing influx of 
Cambodians. The request was made to WHO who then proceeded to recruit a medical 
doctor with funding from UNHCR, firstly for 2 and then 3 months and later 
throughout 1980, 1981, 1982 and half of 1983. The arrangement was then 
discontinued and a public health nurse took over the work with funding from one of 
the charitable organizations working in the programme.
The reasons for WHO’s disillusionment with this arrangement are not clear. Other 
health coordinators were later appointed by WHO in Somalia (1981), Pakistan (1983), 
Sudan (1985), Ethiopia (1985), Iran (1986) and Afghanistan (1988); only those 
appointments in Somalia, Pakistan and Iran were joint with UNHCR. In fact, WHO 
had requested in 1982 that the Thai post be a full-time position, funded by UNHCR. 
Perhaps the administrative procedures for consultancies were cumbersome or the dual 
lines of accountability too contentious. Perhaps the incumbent’s recommendations 
were taken to heart - that the coordinating committee of the charitable agencies could 
provide the leadership and coordination which was needed along with a public health 
nurse to monitor public health concerns and advise UNHCR’s programming officers 
on technical issues. For whatever reasons, terminating this position was consistent with 
WHO’s historical involvement, or rather non-involvement, in the medium- or long­
term, in relief (see chapter five on WHO which follows).
UNHCR’s inability or unwillingness to change the agreement probably reflected their 
own financial uncertainties, in other words, that their budget was planned and 
approved on a yearly basis only. In addition, they had only recently begun to address 
technical issues within their own institution; at that time, for example, they did not 
have a health or nutritional professional on their staff. Clearly, UNHCR needed to 
ensure that health and nutritional programmes were effective. Their renewal of the 
contract and continued funding for the post were evidence that they were satisfied
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with the arrangement. The withdrawal of WHO in 1983 did not change this. Instead 
of working with WHO, UNHCR then arranged for one of the charitable agencies to 
second a public health nurse to them for health and nutritional expertise. Such a shift 
reflected in part growing collaboration between UNHCR and charitable agencies more 
generally41.
Thus, it was WHO which provided technical experts on secondment to UNHCR 
initially. Later these coordinators were either professionals seconded from charitable 
agencies (with funding from UNHCR) or professionals employed by the programming 
section of UNHCR itself. UNHCR first employed their own professionals for country 
programmes in 1984 for eastern Sudan. Similar to the coordinator in Thailand, health 
coordinators in Pakistan and Somalia were originally employed by WHO or charitable 
agencies; it was not until 1986 and 1987 respectively that UNHCR created their own 
positions for these coordinators42. UNHCR has since appointed their own health 
coordinators in Malawi (1987) and Ethiopia (1988), for example. Or they have 
continued to rely on charitable agencies to second these coordinators or other health- 
related professionals to them, for example in the Philippines and Malawi or in the 
regional offices in Pakistan and eastern Sudan43. The charitable agencies who are 
assisting UNHCR in this way are many of the same ones who worked closely with 
UNHCR in drawing up their standards and guidelines, specifically Medecins Sans 
Frontieres France and Save the Children Fund UK.
Increasing, rather than decreasing, health and nutritional problems among refugees 
under UNHCR’s care and the global publicity given to many of these problems, 
eventually contributed to the appointment of additional health and nutritional 
professionals in the head office. Additionally, in 1987 the new High Commissioner 
promised to improve the performance of UNHCR’s technical assistance and 
particularly singled out health care (which was not surprising since he previously 
worked for the International Committee of the Red Cross). In fact, shortly after he was 
appointed, the Technical Support Unit was promoted to the level of section which 
reported directly to the Deputy High Commissioner within the Office of the High 
Commissioner. The scope of the work of the Technical Support Services was also
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expanded in 1988, incorporating the Emergency Unit and Social Services44. Pressure 
to improve their health and nutritional aid and support for an expanded technical role 
from the new High Commissioner were two factors leading to the appointment of a 
nutritionist and a second public health doctor in 1987. With a full time staff of three 
and the availability of funds for consultants, the work of UNHCR in health relief 
expanded.
4.43 UNHCR: a coordinator and manager of refugee health relief?
4.4.3.1 Influencing national policies and practices for refueee health
The most notable expansion was in missions undertaken for health and nutritional 
concerns (Figure 4.7). A health or nutritional component was part of some 51 missions 
to 24 different countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America during the 1980s. Although 
most were undertaken by health and nutrition professionals in only 16 (1/3 or 31%) 
were health concerns a part of more general assessments (Figure 4.8). The majority 
of missions were carried out in Africa where the largest refugee population was 
situated (Figure 4.9). Table 4.4 shows that of the 24 countries visited in Africa, Asia 
and Latin America, at least half were visited only once. An analysis of those countries 
visited twice or more (Appendix IV) illustrates that most of the missions to these 
countries were carried out by different professionals, for different purposes or among 
different groups of refugees. Thus, they too could be counted separately since there 
was no purposeful link between them. In only five countries, (5/24 (21%), Honduras, 
Indonesia, Mexico, Philippines and Somalia, were at least two of the visits undertaken 
by the same person among the same group of refugees. It is not possible, therefore, 
to conclude that UNHCR’s head office had regular, consistent or frequent contact with 
more than a few individual refugee relief operations.
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TABLE 4.4
Location of technical missions of UNHCR Geneva 
which included a health component, 1980 - 1989
Number of missions undertaken by country
One Two Three Four Five Six
Algeria Indonesia Malawi Ethiopia Honduras Philippines
Cameroon Rwanda Zaire Pakistan Sudan
China Thailand Mexico Somalia
Costa Rica
Djibouti
Iran
Malaysia
Sri Lanka
Tanzania
USA
Yemen
Zimbabwe
TOTAL 12 3 3 3 2 1
Figure 4.7
Technical missions of UNHCR Geneva which included 
a health component, 1980-1989
16 
14 
12  
10  
8 
6 
4 
2 
0
Number of missions
’80 ’81 ’82 ’83 ’84 ’85 ’86 ’87 ’88 ’89
Year
109
Figure 4.8
Professional composition of technical missions of UNHCR 
Geneva which included a health component, 1980-1989
Health/nutrition
Economic
Multi-sectoral
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Figure 4.9
Health related missions of UNHCR Geneva 
by geographical region, 1980-1989
Africa
26
Latin America
14%
E Asia/SE Asia
S Asia/Middle East 
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Despite the seemingly ad hoc nature of these technical health missions, there is near 
uniformity in the type of recommendations made. Not surprisingly, many were 
technical in nature. In other words, specific activities, interventions or technical 
standards were recommended for use in one third of the missions (Figure 4.10). Most 
of these recommendations were consistent with the activities and interventions being 
promoted worldwide under the banner of Primary Health Care. The most frequent type 
of recommendation, however, made some comment on the management of refugee 
health services. In particular, attention was given to which organization should be the 
lead agency or coordinator. Appendix V classifies each recommendation for the 
management and organization of refugee health services according to its orientation - 
whether it addresses the relationship between refugee and national health services, 
roles of foreign professional and agencies other than UNHCR or roles specifically for 
UNHCR. Figure 4.11 summarise these recommendations numerically, highlighting the 
preoccupation with who manages refugee health programmes and UNHCR’s 
preference for management by European, North American or international agencies. 
In other words, what might be labelled as UNHCR’s territorial concerns for an 
expanded and clearly defined role in international refugee health relief led them to 
promote, and at times insist (when they held the purse strings), that they or an agency 
of their choice be the lead or coordinating body in a given refugee health operation. 
Not only were they providing technical support and guidance, UNHCR was now 
lobbying for an active role in determining refugee health policy and practice at both 
international and national levels. This shift from ’non-operational’ roles to more active 
participation in all aspects of refugee relief operations appeared to be a more general 
one. For example, since 1983 in Sudan UNHCR has had to ’try’ to remain 
operational45.
4.4.3.2 Enhancing their credibility in refugee health care
The strength and potential success of the efforts of UNHCR’s head office to promote 
and obtain a leading role in refugee health care depended in large part on the 
perceived credibility of the organization to carry out the work successfully. Thus, 
whether staff were employed by UNHCR or were consultants (Figure 4.12) was only
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Figure 4.10
Recommendations for health care made by technical 
missions of UNHCR Geneva, 1980-1989
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Figure 4.11
Management recommendations of UNHCR health missions*: 
Strengthening national or foreign management of refugee health?
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Figure 4.12
Employment status of personnel undertaking health 
related missions for UNHCR Geneva, 1980 - 1989
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one important consideration. Of greater concern was their professional qualifications. 
Nearly all of these missions were undertaken by a medical doctor who had additional 
training in public health (Figure 4.13). Those which dealt specifically with food and 
nutrition issues were increasingly carried out by nutritionists during the latter half of 
the decade. It is clear that the use of medical doctors primarily, and nutritionists to a 
lesser extent, enhanced the credibility of the technical recommendations given as well 
as lending legitimacy to UNHCR as the organization under whose aegis this work 
could be managed. Of course the latter was enhanced greatly by the employment of 
three professionals, two public health doctors and one nutritionist, on a full time basis 
at the head office as well as the appointment of national health coordinators since 
1984.
4.4.4 Moving beyond an advisory role
4.4.4.1 Centralised procurement of drugs and medical supplies
UNHCR’s efforts to create a role for themselves in refugee health relief extended 
beyond the giving of expert advice and guidance world-wide and for national 
programmes. Beginning in 1984, the first health and nutrition adviser recommended 
that the procurement of drugs and medical supplies for at least 4 country programmes 
be carried out by the Procurement Unit of UNHCR’s head office in Geneva. Clearly, 
this gave UNHCR control over the types, quantities and quality of medicines used in 
country programmes. Such a practice gave UNHCR the ability to enforce their own 
drug policies, since UNHCR usually paid for drugs and medical supplies in refugee 
relief operations.
4.4.4.2 Proposing international standards for refugee health care
There are other indications that UNHCR’s health unit wanted to take the lead role in 
refugee health relief generally. The first was the publication of health and nutritional 
standards and activities in firstly the quarterly newsletter of the Emergency Section 
beginning in 198746 and later in the newsletter of the Technical Support Service
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Figure 4.13
Professional qualifications of personnel undertaking 
health related missions for UNHCR Geneva, 1980-1989
MD and public health 34
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beginning in 1988. This activity is further evidence of their efforts to formulate 
standards generally and to distribute them widely.
Secondly, the health unit wrote separate documents for developmental plans of the 
unit47,48. The language used in the developmental plan of 1987 in particular 
highlights the central issue of power or control that accompanies leadership positions. 
For example, this plan states that ’the main objective of .. training activity is to 
improve the ability of UNHCR officers to exercise adequate control over 
implementing agencies’49. In fact, in that plan priority training activities were 
targeted to UNHCR programme officers and heads of offices. Similarly, training 
activities for technical staff aimed to ’standardise training . . that reflect UNHCR 
health policy and can be used by their main partners for their own in-house 
training’50. Moreover, they go on to propose that the health unit ’be given authority 
to recommend for or against the assignment (or the continuation) of an agency in a 
given programme’51. Clearly, their ability to do so would be limited by the financial 
and political autonomy of the agencies concerned. But since UNHCR is often used by 
donor governments as a conduit for funding, such a proposal potentially increases 
substantially the control UNHCR’s health unit would have over the work of other 
agencies, especially national ones dependent on international sources of aid.
4.4.4.3 Co-sponsoring international conferences on refugee health care
The health unit also undertook to sponsor international conferences on important 
health or nutritional problems, such as Nutrition in Times of Disasters in 1988 jointly 
with the Sub-Committee on Nutrition of the UN Administrative Committee on 
Coordination and WHO52 or Health Care for Displaced Persons and Refugees: an 
International Symposium which was organized primarily by Georgetown University 
and the Refugee Policy Group in the US in 198853. These two conferences aimed to 
review key issues and problems in the provision of general food rations or health 
services generally respectively among refugee or displaced populations. Both 
conferences attracted participants from most of the prominent relief and health
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organizations and both were used to produce statements54 or recommendations on the 
practice of health and nutritional relief which would then be accepted worldwide.
4.4AA  Initiating international policies for refugee health care
Efforts by this health unit to establish a leadership role for UNHCR in health relief 
also extended to international policy creation and practice. In 1988 and 1989, the head 
office in Geneva issued two policy statements concerning health and nutrition. The 
Deputy High Commissioner first detailed UNHCR's position on the problem of AIDS 
among refugees and steps to be taken for its prevention and control as well as for the 
protection of individual human rights in 198855. A second policy was proposed in 
1989 against the use of powdered milk in refugee camps - a controversy that has been 
and still is raging56. Both of these statements differed markedly from previous health 
and nutritional guidelines in that each tackled political issues as well as technical ones, 
often unpopularly. In addition, both statements have been widely publicised, the AIDS 
policy, for example, being promoted during the conference at Georgetown and the 
policy on milk powder was discussed by the Sub-Committee on Nutrition of the 
Administrative Committee on Coordination of the UN. This practice implies that these 
strategies were meant to be adopted globally.
4.4.5 Coordinating refugee health care: a role for UNHCR or WHO?
4.4.5.1 Joint or independent health policies?
In contrast with most of these activities which were carried out in collaboration with 
other agencies, the publication of the Essential Drugs Policy in 1989 was done 
independently of WHO - even though WHO had worked out a detailed policy and 
programme for essential drugs from 1984 onwards. This happened despite the joint 
production of the first version (the Emergency Health Kitl in 1984, a joint review of 
the Emergency Health Kit in 1986 which was carried out by the London School57 
and a second evaluation in 1987 of the same by the Drug Action Programme of WHO. 
In fact, WHO has since published The New Emergency Health Kit in 199058.
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Clearly, collaboration was beneficial but had its limits; UNHCR now appeared to be 
working independently, even in direct competition mainly with WHO, Unicef and 
charitable agencies, for the leading role in refugee health relief internationally.
4A.5.2 Collaboration or competition for roles in refugee health relief?
Moreover, there are more fundamental issues which were raised in a memorandum of 
understanding between UNHCR and WHO in 198759. In this memorandum, 
consideration is given to ministries of health as potential ’operational partners to be 
employed by UNHCR’. Such employment could mean that UNHCR intended to make 
policy, plan, monitor and evaluate refugee health care leaving ministries of health and 
other operational partners solely to implement UNHCR programmes - with little, if 
any, involvement in the management of refugee health services. Similarly, the role of 
WHO now appears to be limited mainly to providing technical advice, primarily in 
refugee health projects which are to be integrated within national services. Since 
health relief for refugees is often established separately from national health services, 
and since UNHCR increasingly has its own professional health staff, such a limited 
role may, in fact, exclude WHO.
Interestingly, the negotiation and agreement for this understanding occurred at a time 
when WHO was not in a position to provide an alternative. In contrast with UNHCR 
whose overall expenditure increased since 1983 (Figure 4.14), beginning in 1986 and 
continuing in 1987, the US Government paid only a fraction of its financial dues to 
WHO60. For a variety of reasons, including 1) general dissatisfaction among the 
Reagan Administration with the work of the UN agencies generally, 2) resentment 
among some members of Congress over their lack of influence within WHO 
proportional to their financial contributions61 and 3) the adoption by WHO of policies 
and activities in conflict with US economic interests - regarding pharmaceuticals and 
tobacco for example, the loss of up to 25% (or 63 million US$ in 1986-87 alone) of 
their regular budget and additional monies for specific programmes (or 8 million US$ 
annually) meant that WHO lacked the resources to carry out the work itself.
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Figure 4.14
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4.5 Rationalising responsibility for refugee health relief: UNHCR or WHO?
There are advantages in support of more independent and direct action by UNHCR. 
For example, appointing national coordinators jointly with other organizations meant 
that individuals were accountable to two agencies with very different mandates and 
organizational characteristics. Similarly, organising services in collaboration with other 
agencies meant that planning and managing such services engaged two separate 
bureaucracies. This often resulted in a duplication of administrative work, such as 
reporting or seeking approval for programme goals, objectives, methods and reviews. 
Clearly, it also meant that policies, plans, methods of work and evaluations had to be 
agreed by two separate bureaucracies and that competition ensued over decision­
making authority. This was time consuming and often led to conflict, confusion or 
simply lengthy delays. The assignment of responsibility to one agency only was 
clearly advantageous generally, but even more so during an emergency when needs 
were acute.
But should UNHCR be the agency to take responsibility for the coordination and 
management of refugee health care? Could or would WHO take this responsibility?
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The World Health Organization (WHO): 
a surprisingly insignificant participant in 
international health relief policy formulation and practice
5.1 1948 - 1975: opting for a symbolic or substantial role in international
health relief?
The World Health Organization’s (WHO) involvement in health relief generally and 
refugee relief particularly has been sporadic and limited. This can be understood partly 
by the definition of an ’emergency’ or ’disaster* which was adopted by the 
organization, partly by its mandate and the structure of the organization and partly by 
the financial resources available to it.
5.1.1 Defining health relief: the prevention and control of epidemics of disease
The WHO was created as a permanent institution to promote ’the attainment by all 
peoples of the highest possible level of health’1. Health was similarly defined very 
broadly as ’a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and no; merely 
the absence of disease or infirmity’2. The Constitution further specified that 
governments were responsible for the health of their peoples. Such far reaching goals 
were to be achieved in 22 distinct ways, one of which was ’to furnish appropriate 
assistance and, in emergencies, necessary aid upon the request or acceptance of 
Governments’3. Despite this constitutional basis for a substantial role in health relief, 
WHO chose in 1948 to adopt a narrow and technical definition of emergencies 
requiring relief and to give assistance which was very limited in scope, quantity and 
duration.
Given that there were several other agencies within the UN system which specialised 
in relief, such as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration 
(UNRRA), the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (Unicef) and the United
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Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and that the resources needed 
for relief were vast, as well as the fact that the primary concerns of the organization 
were with on-going health priorities, such a practice was not questioned at the time 
or during the first twenty-five years of the organization’s existence. Moreover, a 
special programme of advisory and demonstration services was set up for countries 
facing the rehabilitation of their health services immediately following the second 
World War, subject to the approval of the World Health Assembly and the provision 
of needed funds by individual member governments4.
Although the constitution of WHO established a role in relief (Articles 2,28 and 58), 
it did not define clearly an emergency or disasters; nor the way in which the 
organization should respond. It was the First World Health Assembly (WHA) who 
defined emergencies as epidemics of disease and relief as the provision of supplies 
and services5. WHO was to be the first source of assistance to countries experiencing 
an epidemic which required international help. This definition of an emergency is a 
medical one, and the solution a technical one. Both have their base in allopathic 
medical practice which emphasises the control and cure of disease and the use of 
pharmaceuticals as the core therapy. They also reflect the traditional concern of inter­
governmental health organizations with epidemics of disease since the 1800s.
5.1.2 Limited finances for providing emergency medical supplies
It was on the basis of this concern with epidemics that WHO initially provided 
medical supplies to several governments coping with problems of flooding, 
earthquakes or other acute disasters. Over time, however, medical supplies were 
provided in response to disasters regardless of the actual existence or imminent fear 
of an epidemic. Such assistance was given increasingly in the 1960s and 1970s (Figure 
5.1). In most cases, requests were made by government health authorities directly to 
the Director-General who used funds from the Working Capital Fund to purchase 
needed medical supplies for the government concerned. The funds used were later 
reimbursed by recipient governments. In some cases, the Director-General used money 
from the Executive Board Special Fund which was subsequently reimbursed by either
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the regular budget the following year or by funds given to WHO by UNRRA at the 
close of its operations. These were the only sources of funding for emergencies which 
were originally established within WHO. Both had limited sums available for 
emergencies and both required reimbursement.
In the majority of relief efforts undertaken by WHO between 1948 and 1975, 
including responses to refugees, famine and war (Figure 5.2), the provision of medical 
supplies was a substantial component, often the only one, of aid given (Figure 5.3). 
This meant that emergency relief within WHO was dealt with by the Director- 
General’s office and the Medical Supply Service. There was no individual, unit or 
department with specific responsibility for relief.
The practice of providing medical supplies during emergencies was not, however, 
limited to epidemics or acute disasters. Figure 5.2 shows that WHO was often 
involved in relief efforts for refugees and populations affected by civil war or famine. 
There are several interesting practices currently in use in refugee health relief which 
can be traced back to these early relief operations. Firstly, WHO has continued to give 
priority to the provision of medical supplies as relief aid (Figure 5.4). In most cases, 
this was the only type of assistance given, similar to relief for epidemics or natural 
disasters. This implies that WHO did not discriminate by type of emergency and 
instead responded in a somewhat standard fashion. Secondly, WHO’s involvement in 
relief for refugees, famine or war was usually at the initiative of other agencies within 
the UN who needed help in assessing needs, planning responses and overseeing relief 
work (Table 5.1). Although WHO’s constitution allows it to initiate a response, there 
were no cases of it doing so during that period. Instead, WHO involvement was at the 
request of other UN bodies who provided the financial resources to support such 
involvement.
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TABLE 5.1
The work of the ERO office of WHO, 1980-1989: 
Types of international health relief activities and 
the lead agency responsible for their implementation
LEAD
AGENCY>
ACTIVITY
ERO,
WHO/HQ
WHO,
other
office
UN agency/ 
ICRC
CCs* of 
ERO 
WHO 
/HQ
Others Not
known
TOTAL Total
1980-1985
Total
1986-1989
Publication 4
m 2
1
[1]
0 0 0 0 5
(5%)
2 -40% 
(7%)
3 -60% 
(4%)
Training i 34
[9]
4
[9]
12 0 0 51
(53%)
18 -35% 
(69%)
33 -65% 
(47%)
Meetings
/Consulta­
tions
7 9 4 0 2 3 25
(26%)
0 25 -100% 
(36%)
Technical 
evaluation or 
standard
2
[2]
1 1
[1]
4 1 0 9
(9%)
3 -33% 
(12%)
6 -67% 
(9%)
Management
support
1 0 5
[3]
0 0 0 6
(6%)
3 -50% 
(12%)
3 -50% 
(4%)
TOTAL 15
(16%)
45
(47%)
14
(15%)
16
(17%)
3
(3%)
3
(3%)
96 26
(27%)
70
(73%)
Total 1980 - 
1985
3 -20% 
(12%)
10 -22% 
(38%)
4 -29% 
(15%)
9 -56% 
(35%)
0 0 26
(27%)
Total 1986 - 
1989
12 -80% 
(17%)
35 -78% 
(50%)
10 -71% 
(14%)
7 -44% 
(10%)
3 -100% 
(4%)
3 -100% 
(4%)
70
(73%)
1. Collaborating Centres
2. Numbers in brackets indicate activities undertaken between 1980-1985
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Figure 5.3
Type of assistance given by WHO for relief 
between 1948-1975
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5.13 Opting for an advisory role
Thirdly, in addition to medical supplies, WHO often provided technical advice and 
management support through the secondment or recruitment of health professionals 
to other agencies within the UN. In the Middle East, WHO retained responsibility for 
appointing and supervising senior health officials who worked for the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), but in Korea, these 
officials worked exclusively for the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency 
(UNKRA) after 1951. In both of these examples, these health officials were 
administratively responsible to another agency within the UN system which was set 
up specifically for a particular relief effort and not to WHO. This was also true in the 
relief operations for refugees during the 1960s and 1970s which were managed by 
UNHCR. Thus, throughout the first two and one half decades, WHO mainly provided 
technical support to governments and other UN organizations managing relief 
operations. This was true not only for the provision of material goods but also for the 
placement of health professionals as advisers or managers of health relief services. 
WHO did not set up their own organizational structure for health relief; nor did they 
retain responsibility or accountability for health relief in most cases.
53  1975 - 1980: organising to meet growing demands for relief
53.1 Creating a separate unit for Emergency Relief Operations
WHO’s policy of limited involvement in health relief was first challenged in the 
1970s, partly by newly independent governments of poorer countries who increasingly 
faced natural disasters, refugees, famine and war as well as rehabilitation needs 
following independence, partly by other agencies within the UN system whose role 
and involvement in relief were growing in response to large, devastating disasters in 
these countries and partly by governments in Europe and North America who were 
establishing geopolitical and economic links with these newly independent countries. 
Similar to other agencies within the UN, donor governments and private charitable
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agencies who created specialised relief cells or departments for relief from the early 
1960s throughout the 1970s, WHO then responded by creating a separate office for 
Emergency Relief Operations (ERO) in 1974.
Responsibility for Emergency Relief Operations was originally assigned to one 
medical doctor in the Division of Coordination (DOC) at headquarters in Geneva in 
the autumn of 1974. This doctor was also responsible for assistance to national 
liberation movements recognised by the Organization for African Unity (OAU). In 
order to support this officer, a task force of 6 representatives from relevant 
departments was created. One of the task force members was from the medical 
supplies service - the department most involved in emergency assistance to date. 
Beginning in July of 1975, the officer who was responsible for Emergency Relief 
Operations reported directly to the Director-General and was, thus, attached to his 
office. At the same time, a management survey was carried out of the work of WHO 
in relief between 1970 and 19756.
5 2 2  Maintaining a supportive role
This survey found that WHO’s relief work was limited to the provision of medical 
supplies (which occupied half of each working day of one medical supply officer) and 
the provision of technical advice (either directly or through the recruitment of health 
personnel for other agencies within the UN system). Both of these roles explain the 
original designation of an officer in the Division of Coordination as responsible for 
relief work. The main priorities of the Division of Coordination revolved around 
liaison with other organizations, especially within the UN system but also with non­
governmental organizations. The organizations for which WHO procured supplies and 
provided technical advice frequently included the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA), the United Nations Children’s Emergency 
Fund (Unicef), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Disaster Relief Office 
(UNDRO) (which was created in 1972), the United Nations Environmental 
Organization (UNEO) and the League of Red Cross Societies (LORCS). Even the
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establishment of a separate, specialised office did not, therefore, mean that WHO was 
prepared to undertake responsibility for health relief operations. Instead, it tried to 
strengthen its ability to provide technical advice and supplies to other agencies within 
the UN system or, in the case of natural disasters, to national governments.
5.23 Continued financial dependency
This arrangement did not require additional finances on a large scale since WHO 
could then continue to rely on the use of reimbursable funds within the organization 
or on funds provided by other organizations of the UN (for example, trust funds 
managed by UNDRO, UNHCR, FAO and UNEO). Similar to the United Nations 
Secretariat which established a separate fund of 100 000 US$ per annum for relief in 
1965, with a maximum contribution of 20 000 US$ for any single disaster, WHO 
eventually established a special account for ’disasters and other natural catastrophes’ 
in 1975 within the Voluntary Fund for Health Promotion7. Yet by the end of 1975, 
this account had less than 200 000 US$ in it8, indicating the limited size of donations 
by governments in support of, as well as the limited possibilities to practice, 
independent responses for relief by WHO. Thus, the practical impact was generally 
symbolic9.
53  1980 -1985: conferring legitimacy to health relief activities carried out by
other organizations
Although the medical officer responsible for Emergency Relief Operations first 
proposed that WHO extend its involvement in relief to include disaster prevention, 
preparedness and rehabilitation in December of 197710, it was not until the 1980s that 
such work began. Even then, WHO was slow to expand its role in health relief. 
Although WHO has responded to three times as many individual disasters (Figure 5.1) 
in Africa, Asia and Latin America (Figure 5.5) since 1975, assistance given continued 
to be mainly in the form of medical supplies and equipment and, to a lesser extent, 
technical advice (Figure 5.4). Yet, similar to the period between 1948 and 1975, the 
types of disasters to which WHO responded included a mix of those traditionally
137
Figure 5.5
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types of disasters to which WHO responded included a mix of those traditionally 
grouped as natural or man-made but refugees continued to be one of the groups most 
frequently needing relief (Figure 5.6).
53.1 Forging links with other agencies engaged in international health relief
In contrast with aid given for individual disasters which did not change significantly, 
the office for Emergency Relief Operations began to involve themselves in 
international health relief activities in the 1980s - but especially after 1985. They 
participated in 3 or 4 international activities on average per year between 1980 and 
1985 (Figure 5.7), including publications, training activities, technical evaluations, 
global guidelines and meetings, conferences and expert consultations. During the first 
half of the 1980s, the office for Emergency Relief Operations of WHO was the lead 
or responsible agency in at most 3 of the 15 (20%) international activities in which 
they participated (Table 5.1). All of the other activities were organised by the regional 
offices of WHO in Europe and North America, by UNHCR’s head office in Geneva 
and by two academic centres in Europe which were designated in 1980 and 1984 as 
official collaborating centres of WHO - the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology 
of Disasters (CRED) at the University of Louvain in Belgium, and the Refugee Health 
Group (RHG) of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine in the United 
Kingdom respectively. Of the three activities credited to Emergency Relief Operations 
before 1985, two were concerned with the production of the first emergency health kit 
whose design had been initiated by UNHCR in collaboration with the Refugee Health 
Group of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. In practice, WHO 
initiated only one activity in international health relief between 1980 and 1985.
There are several conclusions which can be drawn about the role of WHO during this 
period. Firstly, the office for Emergency Relief Operations unit continued to provide 
medical supplies and technical advice for disaster relief upon the request of national 
governments or other agencies within the UN. In addition to responding to requests 
for medical supplies or technical advice for individual disasters (Figure 5.4), they
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Figure 5.6
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Figure 5.7
WHO’s participation in international 
health relief activities*, 1980-1989
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number of activities
advised the regional offices of WHO in Africa, Asia, the Eastern Mediterranean and 
Western Pacific on five occasions during the early 1980s. In contrast with this 
technical supply and advisory role, the office for Emergency Relief Operations 
established relationships with other organizations involved in health relief 
internationally, independent of a specific disaster. This marked the beginning of more 
active participation by WHO in international health relief policy creation and practice.
5.3.2 A guiding or rubber stamping role?
However, before 1985, collaboration with the Pan American Health Organization 
(PAHO), the regional office of WHO for Europe, UNHCR, the Centre for Research 
on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) at the University of Louvain in Belgium 
and the Refugee Health Group (RHG) of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine in the United Kingdom was usually initiated by these agencies and not 
WHO (Table 5.1). Similarly, it was these agencies who carried out technical analyses, 
drew conclusions and made recommendations on future standards and practices of 
health relief. One reason for including WHO in these activities was to influence 
international health relief policy by gaining the approval and support of WHO for their 
proposals and work. WHO’s participation, often in the form of co-sponsorship, was 
a means of legitimising the activities and status of other agencies involved in 
international health relief policy formulation and practice.
Not only did these agencies seek to influence the policies for and practices of health 
relief generally, they specifically sought to influence the policies and practices of 
WHO since it had been designated as the lead agency in international health. Given 
that these agencies had quantitatively and qualitatively more experienced personnel 
and substantia] financial resources for their work, as well as their own institutional 
backing and support from constituencies in common with WHO, it is not surprising 
that they were successful in determining most of the international work of WHO in 
health relief: during the first half of the 1980s WHO initiated, at most, only one of the 
international activities in which they participated.
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Nevertheless, WHO’s official mandate for international health meant that the work of 
the agencies was often promoted under WHO’s name and that the final standards and 
technical products were published or produced by WHO, not the agency which 
initiated and carried out the work. An example of the latter practice was the 
production of the first emergency health kit (which was designed by the Refugee 
Health Group of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine at the request 
of UNHCR). An example of the former practice was the training courses run by the 
collaborating centres which were promoted partially as WHO activities. Even though 
the technical content of health relief policy was decided by a variety of institutions, 
the formal expression of the technical standards and practices was often done by or 
through WHO. WHO, therefore, had a role not only to legitimise the activities and 
work of other organizations involved in international health relief but to legitimise the 
standards and practices which they proposed for global use. This did not entail, 
however, that WHO develop an interest or an ability to play an extended and 
independent role in health relief themselves. Thus, the relationships between WHO and 
these agencies were of benefit to both parties.
5.4 1985 - 1990: bidding for a leading role
The only activity in the early 1980s which the office for Emergency Relief Operations 
initiated and carried out independently, (the drafting of guidelines for country 
representatives), gives one clue or reason for WHO’s extended involvement in health 
relief during the following four years, namely a change in personnel. In 1985 a senior 
medical officer who had been working as an advisor in Primary Health Care and 
refugee health relief in Somalia and Pakistan was appointed to be the responsible 
officer or head of Emergency Relief Operations.
5.4.1 Strengthening WHO’s response in health relief operations
During his tenure, WHO extended its role in health relief both within WHO itself and 
within the international relief system (Table 5.1). Unlike previous years, WHO was 
involved in 70 activities concerned with international health relief between 1986 and
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1989, in sheer numbers a doubling from the first half of the 1980s (Figure 5.7). Not 
only did the overall scale of involvement change, but there was a definite shift in 
priorities. Instead of participating in and co-sponsoring activities initiated and carried 
out by other agencies within the UN system and academic centres - which accounted 
for one half of WHO’s international relief work between 1980 and 1985, priority was 
given to initiating and promoting health relief within WHO itself. This meant that 
training became one of the main components of the Emergency Relief Operations 
programme of work. However, in contrast with the years before when training was 
organised and carried out primarily by the two academic collaborating centres for 
health professionals generally, training was now organised and conducted by the office 
for Emergency Relief Operations for regional and country offices of WHO. The most 
important change in WHO’s work during these five years was in their efforts to 
strengthen their own responses at regional and country levels.
5.4.2 Garnering support for a leading role
5.4.2.1 WHO as a centre of expertise
Concurrently, the office for Emergency Relief Operations began to establish an 
independent role in international health relief within the international relief system. 
This was most apparent in their participation in international meetings, conferences 
and expert consultations which was the other priority activity along with training 
(Table 5.1). In fact, the office for Emergency Relief Operations initiated and convened 
one third (8/25) of these meetings. Thus, WHO began to lobby for support for their 
own place in relief work, similar to other prominent organizations before them. The 
meetings and informal consultations which were convened by the office for 
Emergency Relief Operations brought together two groups of actors which influenced 
what WHO could and would do. Firstly, representatives from other departments within 
WHO were invited. Most came from units concerned with prominent diseases 
associated with disasters or with public health practices and the organization of health 
services - for example, the food aid programme, malaria action programme, nutrition, 
communicable diseases, media service, control of diarrhoeal diseases, environmental
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health, global epidemiological surveillance and health situation assessment, human 
resources management and information systems support. Clearly, support from these 
units strengthened the scientific basis and legitimacy of technical standards and 
practices for health relief as well as the internal acceptance and support for 
involvement of WHO in relief.
5A.2.2 Forging links within the international aid regime
The second group of organizations which were invited and consulted included other 
inter-governmental and charitable organizations involved in relief, technical 
organizations of donor governments and academic institutions. By bringing these 
different agencies together, the office for Emergency Relief Operations garnered 
international support for their own work as well as establishing WHO as a potential 
leader and coordinator of health relief internationally.
Organizations within the United Nations
The Regional Office of WHO for the Americas is a part of The Pan American 
Health Organization (PAHO). PAHO is an independent (inter-governmental) 
organization based in the US with its own sources of funding which was able to 
establish itself as a leading agency in relief for natural disasters during the 1970s and 
1980s. In response to numerous natural disasters during the 1950s and 1960s, in the 
US in particular, a new speciality developed within medicine for disaster relief. 
Detailed knowledge of natural disaster characteristics as well as the effects on health 
and health services, contributed to the creation of a separate unit for emergency 
preparedness and response in PAHO in the late 1970s. This unit has been led by a 
former member of the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), 
and has generated several technical evaluations and standards for health relief 
associated with natural disasters as well as training courses and conferences for 
national health officials in preparing for and managing relief. During the first half of 
the 1980s, for example, it published a series of manuals on disaster relief and health, 
such as Emergency vector control after natural disaster. Epidemiological surveillance
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after natural disaster and Environmental health management after natural 
disasters11,12.13.
The Regional Office of WHO for Europe was the first regional office outside of the 
Americas to conduct workshops and training courses on health relief at regional and 
country levels. While not a regional activity, the first course in health relief was 
organized in Belgium in 1980. Regional workshops were then held in 1981 and again 
in 1984. In the interim, a regional meeting was convened to discuss disaster relief and 
preparedness. It was during this first European regional meeting on health relief that 
guidelines for health relief were first proposed by the Italian Government. Thus, the 
European regional office was the first to provide the organizational umbrella under 
which the Italian Government could fund and carry out such work. These guidelines 
were modified and finally published jointly with the League of Red Cross Societies 
in 1989 as a book on Coping with natural disasters: the role of local health personnel 
and the community14.
There were only two other agencies within the UN with whom WHO established an 
extended working relationship in international health relief policy and practice, in 
comparison with those agencies for whom it provided advice and supplies generally. 
These agencies were Unicef and UNHCR. Their roles and activities are discussed 
separately elsewhere.
Private charitable organizations
Oxfam UK, Save the Children Fund UK and the League of Red Cross Societies 
were three agencies actively working in international health relief who established an 
extraordinary consultative relationship with WHO. All had considerable experience 
and were formulating their own standards of practice for health relief. For example, 
the League of Red Cross Societies first published an International disaster relief 
manual in 195915; additional guidelines were produced in the 1970s, for example the 
Red Cross disaster relief handbook16. Oxfam UK was one of the first charitable 
agencies to produced their own Practical guide to refugee health care in 198317. In
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each case, these guidelines not only provided technical ideals, but they also articulated 
roles for the charitable agencies themselves and other foreign organizations, such as 
the UN, as well as promoting ways in which relief aid should be given. Importantly, 
these agencies had substantial popular backing and their own resources. They were an 
important source of support for WHO, both in providing relief directly and in 
generating support for WHO’s work in setting standards for practice and management. 
In addition to collaborating with WHO, these agencies were also working closely with 
UNHCR in providing relief for refugees.
Academic centres
The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) is a unit within 
the School of Public Health of the University of Louvain. It was established in 1973 
in response to growing awareness of disasters and the need to analyze their effects on 
the health and nutritional status of entire populations. Initially the centre collaborated 
with PAHO since PAHO’s director of Emergency Relief Operations was formerly a 
staff member of the centre. In 1979, collaboration with the office for Emergency 
Relief Operations of WHO in Geneva was initiated by the centre when they requested 
co-sponsorship of their first international course on health relief. The centre 
subsequently requested recognition of their relationship and support for their work 
from WHO.
In 1980, the centre became the first Collaborating Centre to the office for Emergency 
Relief Operations of WHO in ’the epidemiology of natural disasters’. Even though 
such status also included financial support from WHO, the money was given to WHO 
by the Government of Belgium who had funded the centre since its foundation. Thus, 
the centre did not place demands on the limited financial resources of WHO but 
instead brought in additional funds as well as expanding the work carried out under 
the aegis of WHO. The centre has offered a course on health relief in Belgium in 
collaboration with WHO first in 1980 and again in 1988 and 1989. In addition, they 
have assisted in country workshops in Botswana, Mozambique and Indonesia in 1987 
as well as providing consultants for Emergency Relief Operations on a number of
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occasions. They have also developed early warning and management systems for use 
by WHO, among other technical evaluations and consultations.
The Refugee Health Group (RHG) was a unit in the London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine of the University of London. It was first set up in 1979 by staff 
who had previously worked in refugee relief in Ethiopia. Collaboration with WHO 
was initiated by the group in 1980 when it informed WHO of its forthcoming course 
on refugee community health care. Co-sponsorship of this annual course began in 
1981, and the group was named another Collaborating Centre to the office for 
Emergency Relief Operations of WHO in 1984 for ’the health of refugees and other 
displaced communities’. In the interim, the group undertook to edit a book on Refugee 
community health care jointly with the head of the office for Emergency Relief 
Operations18. They helped WHO to co-sponsor a workshop on the Educational 
aspects of health in disasters in cooperation with the Council of Europe in Strasbourg 
in the spring of 198219 In addition they designed an emergency health kit for 
UNHCR which was then produced by WHO and Unicef20. During the following four 
years, the group reviewed the literature on mental health of refugee and famine 
populations21 and undertook an evaluation of the Emergency Health Kit for 
Emergency Relief Operations. Staff of the group also acted as consultants for WHO 
in Pakistan (1981 and 1985), Lebanon (1983), Tanzania (1984), Ethiopia (1984,1985, 
1986, 1987), Botswana (1986), Lesotho (1986) and Sudan (1987). The group ended 
its relationship with the office for Emergency Relief Operations of WHO as a 
Collaborating Centre in 1988. The group was funded primarily by a large research 
grant from the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation; a small sum was also provided by 
WHO for work done for the office for Emergency Relief Operations.
The Centre for Emergency Preparedness and Response at the Public Health 
Institute in Kuopio, Finland was named an official collaborating centre to the office 
for Emergency Relief Operations in 1988. Since 1985, this institute expanded its 
involvement in disaster relief, specialising in technological disasters. Similar to other 
centres, the Finnish centre has provided consultants for individual disaster relief 
operations, prepared training courses for national and international health professionals
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and produced guidelines on technical interventions for health relief. Similar to the 
Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), the Centres for 
Disease Control of the US Government (CDQ and the centre within the Italian 
Government, the work of the Finnish centre in health relief is funded largely by their 
own government.
On occasion other centres were invited to participate in international health activities 
sponsored by WHO, such as the University of Geneva, the Tulane Medical Centre, 
the European Centre for Disaster Medicine and the Asian Institute of Technology.
Technical agencies o f donor governments
The Centres for Disease Control of the US Public Health Service has been involved 
in disaster relief since the 1950s. As the national public health authorities in the US, 
CDC was first involved in disaster relief within the US, occasionally assisting in relief 
abroad. But beginning with the Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970, the Centres extended 
their involvement in international health relief substantially. During that civil war, the 
Centres sent more than 25 medical doctors with additional training in epidemiology 
to assist relief efforts. The Centres were subsequently involved in relief for the 
earthquake in Peru (1970) and the floods and civil war in Bangladesh (1972)22.
The Centres have always liaised with WHO; their services are often provided to WHO 
as a bilateral contribution. There is little evidence, however, to suggest that the 
Centres worked closely with the office for Emergency Relief Operations before 1985. 
In contrast with this infrequent and ad hoc liaison, the Centres regularly participated 
in many of the international health relief activities during the 1980s, especially after 
1985. Thus, it is not surprising that in 1988, they set up their own unit for Emergency 
Preparedness and Response which was designated as a Collaborating Centre for the 
office for Emergency Relief Operations of WHO. This collaborating centre specialises 
in epidemiological assessment and surveillance for disaster relief. Their first 
contribution as a collaborating centre has been to draft a protocol for rapid health 
assessments in response to disasters23. They will no doubt continue to provide
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consultants for individual relief operations as well as producing technical evaluations 
and guidelines.
The Centre for Disaster Preparedness and Management at the Corporation for 
Development of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Government of Italy has been 
actively involved in international health relief activities since the early 1980s. They 
were the first group to propose that guidelines be written for health relief and to 
undertake writing these guidelines which were published in 1989 jointly with the 
League of Red Cross Societies as a book on Coping with natural disasters: the role 
of local health personnel and the community24. Much of their work has been with the 
Regional Office for Europe of WHO, supporting training courses, regional meetings 
and drafting WHO/EURO Guidelines on action to be taken at the time of disaster in 
1987.
In 1987, this centre was named a collaborating centre to the office for Emergency 
Relief Operations in Geneva with responsibility for supporting global training 
activities, publications and the production of guidelines as well as supporting particular 
programmes or activities in individual countries. The most significant programme 
which the Italian Government supports is the Pan African Centre for Emergency 
Preparedness and Response25. This WHO regional centre serves all of Africa from 
a base in Addis Ababa in Ethiopia and is financed by the Italian Government. The 
Italian Collaborating Centre has specific responsibility for supporting this African 
centre by providing staff, funds and supplies. In addition, the Italian Government 
supports comprehensive emergency preparedness and response programmes for some 
countries in South East Asia, Africa and Central America.
The meetings which were convened by WHO provide the most direct evidence of the 
prominent organizations involved in health relief internationally. By prominent is 
meant that in practice these were the agencies which were determining and 
disseminating the technical standards and components of health relief policy. Despite 
the office for Emergency Relief Operations willingness and efforts to expand then- 
own involvement in this process after 1986, there is little evidence that they were able
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to take the leadership or a coordinating role internationally. Instead, they became yet 
another organization actively determining technical standards and practices for health 
relief, often in competition with other agencies - for example, UNHCR.
In fact, the change in name in 1985, from Emergency Relief Operations to Emergency 
Preparedness and Response (EPR), reflected the nature of their international work 
which continued to emphasize the provision of expert advice, usually through the 
production or legitimisation of technical standards or guidelines for international use. 
This role is clearly illustrated in a working paper prepared by the office for 
Emergency Preparedness and Response in 1989. In this paper, an organogram 
illustrates the intended structure of communications within WHO for health relief 
purposes (Figure 5.8J26. This diagram places the office for Emergency Preparedness 
and Response at the centre, accurately reflecting the role it often plays in conferring 
legitimacy and in providing expert advice. On the other hand, any attempt to use this 
model for leadership channels or the implementation of relief activities would be a 
gross overestimation of WHO’s role in policy formation and practice. Instead, an 
earlier organogram adopted by the office for Emergency Relief Operations in 1981 
more accurately portrays WHO as one of many organizations involved in international 
health relief (Figure 5.9)27.
5.43  Organizational constraints to a leadership role in health relief
Laudable though it was to attempt to expand their work in international health relief, 
WHO did not generate sufficient additional resources or create structures which would 
allow an extended role in relief management. Nor did they extend their scope of work 
to include the day-by-day running of a relief operation. Thus, WHO was simply not 
in a position to take the leadership or coordinating role. Nor would they be able to do 
so in future. There are several indicators within WHO itself which support such a 
conclusion.
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5.4.3.1 Insufficient members of staff
Within WHO itself, the office for Emergency Relief Operations lacks the human 
resources, finances and authority to coordinate international health relief efforts. Since 
its inception in 1975, the office for Emergency Relief Operations has never been 
staffed by more than four people, which included two secretaries. Although up to three 
additional professionals have been attached to the office for Emergency Relief 
Operations as Associate or General Professional Officers with funding from individual 
donor governments, and other professionals have been brought in as consultants, a 
core staff of only two prevents the allocation of sufficient time and effort to 
coordinate continuously the work of a variety of organizations dispersed throughout 
Europe and North America in addition to strengthening relief responses of WHO 
offices at country, regional and global levels.
5.4.3.2 Insufficient funds
Not only does the office for Emergency Relief Operations lack the human resources 
needed for a leadership role, it lacks sufficient funds - even for its current programme 
of work28. In the programme plan for emergency preparedness and management 
between 1986 and 1989 inclusive, a budget of 3 286 000 US$ was thought to be 
needed to cover only international health relief work29. Yet the regular budget 
available to Emergency Relief Operations within WHO was less than 300 000 US$ 
per year or 800 000 US$ for the four years in question: only 24% of the total 
requested. Clearly, additional contributions were essential for the work which was 
undertaken during this period. Nevertheless, the extra-budgetary contributions of 
individual donor governments were small in comparison to the need, ranging between 
98 000 and 400 000 US$ in 1986, for example. Furthermore, these extra-budgetary 
contributions were uncertain and, thus, their generation required the ongoing attention 
of core staff of Emergency Relief Operations.
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5.4.3.3 Centralised decision-making and bureaucratic procedures
The last constraint within WHO itself was a lack of authority and limited access to 
authority to take decisions about health relief. Although the office for Emergency 
Relief Operations had been attached to the Director General’s office shortly after its 
creation, ten years later in 1985, the office was made a part of the Division of 
Coordination (DOC) once again. Such an organizational structure prevented direct 
access to the Director General’s office and, instead, added an additional layer of 
bureaucratic procedures and processes to decision making for relief within WHO. 
While important, the extra time and work which was involved in a decision making 
process that encompassed additional levels or units of authority and specialisation, it 
was less of a problem than the lack of direct access to the Director General.
The Director General of WHO has vast power over the work of the organization as 
well as being the organization’s link with other agencies of the UN, donor and 
member governments and the public at large. The Director General not only appoints 
staff and acts as the secretary to the Executive Board, he prepares and approves the 
annual programme of work and budget - relatively independently. Similar to the staff 
of WHO who prepare and propose the annual work plans and budgets, the Executive 
Board can examine, discuss and even question the proposed plans, but authority to 
approve it rests with the Director General. Yet, while the Director General directs the 
work of both the staff of the organization itself and the Executive Board, he does not 
depend heavily on either one for his power base. Nominations for the Director General 
position are put forward by members of the Executive Board who elect one whose 
name is then submitted to the World Health Assembly. Thus, the staff of the 
organization, while being accountable to him, are excluded from the election process 
(which is limited to representatives of member governments). Similarly, while the 
Executive Board controls the election process, they have no responsibility for the staff 
and work of the organization directly. The Director General, therefore, has a central 
power base from which to take and enforce decisions.
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More routine decisions must be processed through a structure which is complex and 
whose membership changes from year to year. Unlike UNHCR which has a relatively 
simple decision making structure consisting of an elected Executive Head and an 
Executive Board made up of permanent member governments, there appears to be an 
incestuous and complex set of relationships between the leadership of the Health 
Assembly, the various committees of the Health Assembly, the Executive Board and 
the Director General despite an ostensibly democratic election procedure. Since each 
member nation-state can send three delegates to the Health Assembly, several 
committees have been formed to expedite the selection and work of the Health 
Assembly, the Executive Board and the Director General.
The Committee on Nominations is central in the electoral process. At the beginning 
of each Health Assembly, the President of the Health Assembly submits a list of 24 
members to form a Committee on Nominations. Any member of the Health Assembly 
can add to this list which is then voted upon by the Health Assembly as a whole. This 
newly elected Committee on Nominations in turn proposes nominations for the offices 
of President and five Vice Presidents, for the chairs of the Main Committees and for 
the members of the General Committee. In suggesting nominees, the Committee on 
Nominations is to take the geographical representation in particular and the personal 
experience and competence of individual delegates into account. The Health Assembly 
then votes on these proposals, electing a President and Vice Presidents, who together 
with the Director General constitute the Secretariat of the Health Assembly, as well 
as the members of the General Committee and chairs of the Main Committees. As 
already stated, it is the President who then suggests nominees for the Committee on 
Nominations the following year.
There are currently two Main Committees of the Health Assembly which discuss and 
vote on the various agenda items, dividing them into programme or budget matters 
and administrative, financial or legal matters. Originally there were five Main 
Committees in 1948 but this was reduced to three in 1942 and two in 1950 in order 
to streamline and consolidate the work of the Health Assembly. Members chairing 
these committees are also members of the General Committee, in addition to the
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President, Vice Presidents and other delegates of the Health Assembly up to a total 
of 24 members. The President of the Health Assembly convenes this General 
Committee which plans the meetings of the various committees and the Health 
Assembly in detail in consultation with the Director General. In addition, the General 
Committee submits a list of members, indicating preferences, to the Health Assembly 
for membership on the Executive Board. Similar to the offices of President, Vice 
Presidents’, chairs of the Main Committees and membership on the Committee on 
Nominations, this list is then voted on by the Health Assembly. Thus, there is a 
somewhat circular and closed structure within which key leadership positions are 
filled. This is true despite the appearance of a democratic electoral system, since 
nominees are in general determined by smaller, related groups.
5.4.3.4 Dependency on powerful national governments
The Executive Board originally consisted of 18 members with a tenure of three years; 
currently it is made up of 31 members, each of whom has a three year tenure. Every 
year one third of the membership changes and no member government can be re­
elected while serving on the Executive Board. Nevertheless, an informal agreement 
was reached when WHO was first set up amongst the ’Big Five’ - the United States, 
United Kingdom, Soviet Union, China and France - that each would only be off the 
board for the one required year between three year terms30. The Executive Board 
meets twice each year to consider the programme of work and budget prepared by the 
Director General. Yet, it cannot amend the Director General’s proposals directly. It has 
several committees which consider individual activities, such as malaria control, 
relationships with other organizations, such as Unicef and charitable agencies, and 
administrative processes, such as financial audit and outstanding contributions. Similar 
to the Health Assembly, it is managed by a Chair and three Vice Chairs and the 
Director General acts as secretary.
Despite an emphasis on an equitable geographic representation among member 
governments, wealthy governments in Western Europe and North America have had 
disproportionately high representation. This can be seen in an analysis of their Gross
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National Product (GNP) per capita in 1990 according to the World Bank31, their 
geographical location and their financial contribution to the annual, regular budget of 
WHO of member governments who have been elected to serve on the Executive 
Board. Figure 5.10 summarises the numbers of low, lower-middle, upper-middle, high 
and nonmember income economies represented on the Executive Board as well as the 
number of seats they occupied (since some countries have occupied more than one 
seat). Clearly, while low and lower-middle income economies are numerically the 
largest group of countries represented on the Executive Board (88 or 60%), higher 
income economies occupied one half of the positions or seats on the Executive Board.
This contrast is most stark between low income economies who occupied two seats 
each on average and high income economies who occupied 3.5 seats each on average 
(Table 5.2). Another way of looking at this is to graph the number of countries elected 
to the Executive Board according to the total number of seats they occupied. Figures 
5.11 and 5.12 show several differences between lower and high income economies. 
Firstly, less than five lower income economies were elected to the Executive Board 
more than three times, and none were elected more than seven times; most lower 
income economies were elected to the Executive Board only once or twice (69%) over 
the past 40 years. In contrast, six high income and nonmember economies have been 
elected six or more times - up to 12 times for two countries (the US and UK). 
Obviously, the informal agreement has been modified in response to changing political 
relationships. For example, Canada and Japan have both been represented more 
frequently than China. Thus, while the proportional representation of economies on 
the Executive Board is almost equal to their distribution in the world generally (Figure 
5.13), higher income economies occupied disproportionately higher numbers of seats 
or positions on the Board than their numbers would suggest. Thus, they had a more 
regular or continuous presence in decision making processes throughout the past forty 
years.
Figures 5.14 and 5.15 summarise the distribution of member governments elected to 
the Executive Board and the seats they occupied according to geographical regions of 
WHO. Figure 5.14 in particular highlights the high proportion of both countries
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Figure 5.10
Low, middle, high and nonmember economies* 
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Figure 5.11
Continuity of representation on the Executive Board 
of WHO of lower income economies*, 1948-1989
Number of countries
10
1 1.5 2 2.5  3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7
Number of elections to the Board
—  LOW H“ LOWER-MIDDLE
*Low income economies generate <500 USD 
GNP per capita; lower-middle income 
econom ies generate 500-2200 USD
160
Figure 5.12
Continuity of representation on the Executive Board 
of WHO of higher income and nonmember economies, 1948-1989
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Figure 5.13
Regional representation on the 
Executive Board of WHO, 1948-1989
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Figure 5.14
Countries represented and seats occupied on the 
Executive Board of WHO by region, 1948-1989
EURO
31
7%
AMRO
25
AFRO 17% 
61
SEARO
10
SEARO 8% 
31
EMRO 16% 
59
WPRO 10% 
35
AFRO 29% 
43 AMRO 22% 81
EURO 27% 
99
WPRO 9%
EMRO 16% 
24
Regional distribution of countries 
represented on the Board.
Number of seats occupied by countries in 
the regions on the Board.
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Figure 5.15 
Governments with membership on the 
Executive Board of WHO, 1948-1989
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TABLE 5.2 
Average number of seats occupied by 
low, lower-middle, upper-middle, high and nonmember economies 
represented on tbe Executive Board of WHO
ECONOMY
SEATS
OCCUPIED
NUMBER OF 
COUNTRIES
AVERAGE SEATS 
PER COUNTRY
LOW 93 47 2.0
LOWER-MIDDLE 96 41 2.3
UPPER-MIDDLE 47 19 2.5
HIGH 108 31 3.5
NONMEMBER 22 8 2.8
TOTAL 366 146 2.5
TABLE 53  
Average number of seats occupied on the 
Executive Board of WHO by countries 
contributing < 1%. 1 - 9.99% and 10+ % of 
tbe annual, regular budget
CONTRIBUTION
SEATS
OCCUPIED
NUMBER OF 
COUNTRIES
AVERAGE SEATS 
PER COUNTRY
< 1 % 273 130 2.1
1 - 9.99 % 66 13 5.1
10 + % 27 3 9.0
TOTAL 366 146 2.5
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represented from the European and American regions (38%) and seats occupied by 
them (49%). This figure further suggests that the high proportion of seats occupied by 
the American and European regions is at the expense of Africa since the Eastern 
Mediterranean, South East Asian and Western Pacific regions account for the same 
proportion of seats as countries. This conclusion if further borne out in Figures 5.16, 
5.17 and 5.18 in which most African countries (93%) are clearly shown to have been 
elected only once or twice. These figures also indicate that countries within the 
American and European regions had the most regular or continuous presence on the 
Executive Board - a finding consistent with the analysis by economy since the highest 
income economies are located mainly in these regions.
Lastly, member governments which have been represented on the Executive Board 
were analyzed and summarised in Figure 5.19 according to their financial contribution 
to the regular, annual budget of WHO32. The three countries currently contributing 
10% or more of the regular budget (Japan, US and USSR) occupied 27 seats (7%) or 
9.0 seats per country on average (Table 5.3). Of the 14 countries contributing between 
1 and 10%*, 13 occupied 66 or 18% of the seats on the Executive Board or 5.1 seats 
per country on average. The majority of countries represented on the Executive Board 
contributed less than 1% of the annual budget; although they occupied 273 or 75% of 
the seats, they occupied only 2.1 seats per country on average. Again, wealthy 
governments who are able to make larger contributions to the annual budget, mainly 
in Europe and North America, were found to have a disproportionately high 
representation - more frequently and regularly than their numbers would suggest.
Similarly, an analysis of member governments who have not been elected to the 
Executive Board further substantiates the above findings and reinforces the conclusion 
that the most powerful nation-states in the world are those that are most frequently 
and regularly represented in WHO's decision making bodies. The Ukrainian SSR is
1 Including: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, France, German Democratic Republic, 
German Federal Republic, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukrainian SSR and 
the United Kingdom.
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Figure 5.16
Continuity of African and Eastern Mediterranean
representation on WHO’s Executive Board, 1948-1989
Number of countries within the region
30
25
20
1 2 3 8 9 10 114 5 7
Number of elections to the Board
— AFRO “t-EMRO
AFRO - African region;
EMRO - Eastern Mediterranean region.
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Figure 5.17
Continuity of South East Asian and Western Pacific
representation on WHO’s Executive Board, 1948-1989
Number of countries within the region
1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7
Number of elections to the Board
— SEARO WPRO
SEARO - South East Asia region;
WPRO - Western Pacific region.
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Figure 5.18
Continuity of American and European representation 
on WHO’s Executive Board, 1948-1989
Number of countries within the region
1
1
9 10 11 121 2 3 4 5 7
Number of elections to the Board
AMRO +  EURO
AMRO - American region;
EURO - European region.
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Figure 5.19
Governments with membership on WHO’s Executive Board:
financial contributions* to the annual, regular budget
< 1 %
130 89%
10+ %
1-9% 
13 9%
Number of governments elected to member­
ship on the Board, n=146.
273 75%
10+ % 
27 7%
1-9%
66 18%
Seats occupied on the Board by these 
governments, n=366.
*Those contributing < 1%, 1 - 9.99% and 
10+ % of the annual, regular budget.
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the only country contributing more than 1% of the annual budget which has not been 
a member of the Executive Board. All other governments who have not had 
membership contributed less than 1% of the budget. Likewise, although the largest 
proportion of countries not represented are from the American (34%), Western Pacific 
(31%) and European (16%) regions (Figure 5.20), within the Americas it is only 
countries south of the US who have been excluded; within Europe, it is only the very 
small countries which have not been elected to the Executive Board; being made up 
of 23 small islands, it is not surprising that the Western Pacific region had several 
members who have been excluded from membership on the Executive Board.
5.5 Rationalising responsibility for international health relief within the UN;
UNHCR. WHO or Unicef?
5.5.1 UNHCR?
Holbom33 describes the way in which the various components of the UN system 
worked with UNHCR, including WHO: the seconding of experts, exchanges of 
information and documents, mutual representation at meetings, joint fund raising 
efforts and the provision of technical advice, equipment or other materials. In health, 
this meant that until UNHCR created their own institutional expertise in health relief 
in the 1980s WHO was often asked to assess refugee health needs, to plan refugee 
health services, to advise on the suitability of sites chosen for settlements and to 
determine what assistance should be provided internationally - usually in the form of 
money or material goods. There are at least four issues which suggest that UNHCR 
may not be the most suitable organization to take over these roles and to provide the 
leadership in refugee health relief programmes.
Firstly, the mandate to advise and assist governments in the provision of health care 
lies with WHO, not UNHCR. Historically, WHO has been asked to provide the 
technical expertise directly or indirectly. Furthermore, increasing evidence of the long-
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Figure 5.20
Regional distribution of WHO member nation-states*
and those not represented on WHO’s Executive Board
AMRO 36 20%
EURO 36 20%
AFRO 44 25%
Notknown^mi031% 
SEARO 11 6%
WPRO 23 13%
AMRO 11 34%
SEARO 1 3 
AFRO 1 3°/.
Not known* 4 13
EMRO 24 13% EURO 5 16%
Member nation-states of WHO according 
to geographical regions, n=178
Regional distribution of countries which 
are not represented on the Board, WHO
♦Includes: Holy See; Vatican City; UK and 
French Overseas Territories
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term or developmental nature of refugees since tbe 1970s suggests that short-term, 
temporary responses are not appropriate, lending support for WHO, as a 
developmental agency, to take responsibility for refugee health relief.
Secondly, the role of medical or nutritional advisers in UNHCR appears to have been 
somewhat loosely defined. The primary duties focus on monitoring UNHCR funded 
programmes34, specifically budgeting, and writing and reviewing reports and 
proposals. In addition, they provide technical advice to programme coordinators and 
other senior staff members of UNHCR. Yet, their professional advice is not 
necessarily translated into policy or even guidelines. As we have seen earlier, such 
decisions are made in the head office by senior staff in conjunction with the Office 
of the High Commissioner who confers with the Executive Board. Even on more 
practical issues, technical staff usually have to seek the approval of the regional 
bureaus in the head office or the programme coordinators of national or regional 
offices.
Thirdly, UNHCR’s practice of renewing employment contracts on a yearly basis and 
the use of different organizations to second health professionals has meant that the 
continuity and quality of staff has varied. Depending on charitable agencies in 
particular to provide expert advisers does not ensure, or at times even suggest, that 
staff with appropriate training and experience will be appointed. This is especially 
relevant for management since experience in the management of health or relief at 
national or regional levels is very different from directing individual projects for a 
charitable agency. Moreover, unlike the first health and nutrition adviser in UNHCR’s 
head office and the first Senior Health Coordinators in Thailand, Somalia and Pakistan 
who were senior members of WHO’s staff, recent health or nutrition advisers have 
been appointed at junior levels35, limiting their authority within the institution itself 
as well as the possibilities for recruiting highly experienced and qualified personnel.
Lastly, national governments have the sovereign responsibility for health care of those 
living on its territory, at least according to WHO’s Constitution. As such, it should 
have the authority to establish and enforce policies and to coordinate the various
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agencies and activities. UNHCR as the source of funds is able to direct, to some 
extent, the activities of recipient organizations. They are not, however, in a position 
to be the main coordinating body in refugee health. This is the responsibility of the 
government and advising governments on health issues is the role of WHO. And most 
important, they have no jurisdiction over separately funded programmes.
SSJ2 WHO?
However, within WHO itself, a very narrow paradigm for perceiving and defining 
problems to be tackled, a complex and entrenched bureaucratic structure through 
which decisions are taken and acted upon, and a rigid dependency on donor 
governments for financial resources will continue to sabotage any meaningful efforts 
to provide relief.
Even though the Emergency Unit has tried to extend its concerns beyond epidemics 
of disease which are associated with disasters, WHO’s expertise more generally and 
their input to disasters specifically remains much the same. In response to disasters, 
WHO continues to purchase and distribute very limited quantities of drugs or other 
medical supplies for governments, and they continue to provide technical advice to 
governments or other UN agencies. Even their more recent involvement in establishing 
global standards for health relief is consistent with a limited focus, addressing 
primarily only the needs for technical, medical care. Such a focus on medical care 
ignores the underlying determinants of health, many of which are now being addressed 
by other agencies - for example needs for water supplies and sanitation facilities 
which are being constructed by Unicef. Unless WHO can expand its scope of work 
beyond traditional medical activities, there is little evidence that they could lead the 
way to improving health and well-being in circumstances where environmental factors 
are central.
Despite the Emergency Unit’s efforts to play a leading role in some of the most 
recent, large relief operations, for example for Afghanistan, their involvement 
continues to depend on others. Mainly for money. Two professional staff members
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will not be able to be involved directly in field work; nor will they be able to 
undertake time-consuming roles within the international relief community. Similarly, 
an annual budget of less than one million US dollars will cover only a few, smaller 
projects. Thus, WHO’s involvement will continue to depend on requests from or the 
support of other governments or UN agencies who will fund their participation. This 
will continue to preclude long-term planning and on-going involvement since they will 
need to raise the required resources repeatedly. Furthermore, the funds which have 
been secured are minuscule for the magnitude of needs which already exist, let alone 
those which will inevitably be generated in future. WHO simply lacks the resources 
to make more than a symbolic gesture of good will in relief.
Those familiar with WHO are acutely aware that even with a more flexible mandate 
and vast resources, WHO’s ability to respond to disasters efficiently and effectively 
is questionable. Not only do decision-making procedures within headquarters take time 
but they are vulnerable to the interests and influence of many parties; this is even 
more true for relations with regional offices which enjoy a high degree of autonomy 
and often resources. Sheer bureaucracy which ’comes to live too greatly for itself, 
multiplying special units according to bureaucratic whim, so that the sight of the wood 
is lost in the trees’ was recognised in WHO nearly two decades ago36. Hence, the 
establishment of direct lines of authority for relief within WHO, which minimise delay 
and outside influence, is unlikely.
The lack of support within WHO itself for a leading role in health relief must surely 
reflect a lack of support for such a role by its donors. Dependency on a few, powerful 
national governments means that support is often only forthcoming when it furthers 
donor interests.
5.53 Unicef?
Clearly, WHO appears to be in a weak position to undertake an expanded role in 
international health relief. Even the most recent attempts (since 1990) of the newly 
created Emergency Unit to keep pace with other organizations who are formulating
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and implementing health relief policy have done little to alter more fundamental 
limitations on WHO’s contribution. Moreover, the more traditional roles of the past 
no longer apply; the creation of separate units for relief and for health within other 
organizations within the UN negates the need for WHO to participate in the ways they 
have previously. Similarly, many other organizations are increasing able to provided 
the resources needed for health relief operations. Unicef in particular has often 
contributed money, medical supplies, drugs, vaccines or special equipment for 
government or charitable health services for relief. Mass migrations within nation­
states has often led Unicef to adopted a leading role in associated relief operations. 
Perhaps Unicef, which has a mandate covering both health and relief, is better suited 
to take responsibility for international health relief for refugees.
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CHAPTER SIX 
The United Nations Children’s Fund (Unicef) 
the ideal organization to take the leading role 
in international health relief policy formulation and practice?
Unlike the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) whose 
organization, funding and work changed relatively little when they first shifted their 
activities to countries in the southern hemisphere during the 1950s and 1960s, the 
indefinite extension of the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund 
(Unicef) mandate in 1953 formalised marked changes institutionally1. Changes have 
occurred in the organization of Unicef, its funding and its focus. It has grown from 
a small centralised agency based in North America and Europe in the 1950s to one 
managed largely by regional and national offices in 128 countries and territories 
world-wide in 19902. From an annual budget of less than 10 million in the early 
1950s its finances exceeded over 800 million US$ in 19903. And importantly its focus 
shifted from working primarily in emergency relief to addressing problems confronting 
children’s well-being in the longer-term.
6.1 The 1950s: from relief to development
This transformation was greatly facilitated in the 1950s by a mandate for child health 
generally and international health policies which gave priority to eradicate tropical 
diseases through mass campaigns - with vaccines, drugs or pesticides, for example. 
These campaigns were similar to relief work in many ways. The widespread 
application of a vaccine, drug or pesticide in a population for an intense period of time 
meant that programmes to eradicate or control common diseases in the tropics were 
thought to be needed only in the short-term since only one treatment or limited 
applications were required4, and they were visibly popular and thought to be highly 
effective and beneficial.
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Successes following the world wars in Europe, particularly in eradicating malaria in 
southern Europe after the second World War (WWII), the development of new and 
cheaper drugs, vaccines and other compounds as well as improved communication and 
transport systems were sufficient justification to extend campaigns to newly 
independent countries. Together with the newly created alliance of central and eastern 
European states with the USSR and the new People’s Republic of China headed by 
Mao’s communist government in 1950 which limited further relief and rehabilitation 
work in these countries, growing concern for global eradication of common diseases 
meant that Unicef’s involvement in disease control or eradication shifted from 
emergency programmes in Europe to endemic problems in the southern hemisphere 
as early as 1949 (Table 6.1). Thus, by 1953 the word ’emergency’ was dropped from 
UniceFs name even though the acronym was retained5.
Not only did the priority given to mass campaigns facilitate a smooth transition to 
working in health development, but the high costs associated with such campaigns 
made Unicef’s participation somewhat of a necessity. The limited financial resources 
of WHO in the 1950s and the 1960s, whose primary income came from assessed 
contributions which grew from a total of only 13.4 million US$ to 49.8 million US$ 
between 1958 and 19676, together with restrictions on its extra-budgetary fund-raising 
meant that the provision of supplies and equipment by Unicef was a much needed 
contribution. For example, by the latter half of the 1960s WHO spent one-sixth of its 
total budget on malaria control only7. The need for UniceFs support and the priority 
given to the campaigns within Unicef itself was reflected in the allocation of nearly 
one-half of their budget, 12.2 million of 25 million USS annually, to these campaigns 
by the end of the 1950s8.
Short-comings with this approach were, however, becoming more and more apparent. 
For example, the potency, sensitivity and specificity of vaccines, tests and treatments 
were in question, and the immunity of disease organisms and vectors was much 
greater than had previously been thought. Nevertheless, Unicef had also involved 
themselves in other health and nutrition activities, such as the supply of hospitals,
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TABLE 6.1
UnicePs participation in m iu  campaigns 
to control or eradicate diseases, 1947-1952
YEAR FOCUS TARGET
GROUP
LOCATION CONTRIBUTION
1946-50 malnutrition young
children
Europe, China Supplied dried milk, fats, 
grains
1948-49 tuberculosis all ages Europe Supplied vaccines; 
supported medical teams 
to screen and treat
1948-49 syphilis all ages Europe Supplied penicillin
1948-49 training health 
personnel
middle-school
graduates
China Supplied drugs, 
equipment, funds
1948-50 malnutrition refugees Palestinian Supplied foods, blankets, 
other essentials
1948 general child 
health, diseases
children Israel Sent X-ray units, drugs, 
vaccines
1949 tuberculosis all ages Egypt* syria»
Lebanon, India, 
Israel
Supplied vaccines, drugs
1949 malaria all ages India, Pakistan, 
Thailand
Supplied DDT
1949 yaws all ages Haite,
Indonesia,
Thailand
Supplied drugs, vaccines, 
vehicles, equipment, 
costs of training and 
salaries of experts
1949 malnutrition children Latin America Supplied powdered milk, 
equipment, supplies
1950 tuberculosis all ages Latin America Supplied tuberculin 
tests, vaccines and 
supported medical teams
1950 malaria all ages eight Carribean 
countries
Supplied DDT
1950 syphilis all ages eight Carribean 
countries
Supplied penicillin
1950 yaws all ages Carribean Supplied penicillin
1950 mother and child 
health care
mothers and 
children
Carribean Supplied equipment for 
facilities and factories for 
vaccines
1952 trachoma all ages Morocco,
Taiwan
Supplied eye ointments
1952 Leprosy all ages Nigeria Supplied drugs
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health centres and training institutions, the production and distribution of milk locally, 
the establishment of child feeding programmes, the training and supply of midwives 
and other health workers, and planning within national, regional and district health 
authorities.
In 1963, health programmes accounted for 60% of all programme allocations9. 
Furthermore, by the beginning of the 1960s, Unicef began to broaden the scope of 
their work to include education and community development more generally. But it 
was not until the end of the UN’s first development decade that Unicef was recognised 
primarily as a developmental rather than a humanitarian agency. For example, it was 
not until 1972 that Unicef first began to report to the Second Committee of the 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) on Economic and Financial Questions rather 
than the Third Committee on Humanitarian and Social Affairs10.
6.2 The 1960s: re-thinking an exclusive focus on development
6.2.1 The challenge of more frequent and severe disasters
By the mid-1960s, Unicef had successfully extracted themselves from relief work 
generally, spending less than 2% of their budget on emergency aid (Figure 6.1) and 
sending only 7% of their donations of goods overseas for relief11. But this position 
was viewed with ambivalence by those experiencing disasters and the devastating 
consequences for their daily lives, by field staff who saw firsthand the vast and urgent 
needs for relief assistance, by the general public who were horrified and moved to 
action as media coverage became more routine and vivid, by staff based at the head 
office who were pressured by supporters and donors to take action, and often by host 
and donor governments who were encouraged by their constituencies to take part in 
managing or supporting relief efforts.
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Figure 6.1
Unicef expenditure on emergency aid as a 
percentage of total programme expenditure, 1947-1985
Percentage, total programme expenditure
80 
60 
40 
20
1940 1950 1960
Decade
1970 1980
Source: Black 1986, pg 494
♦Excludes expenditure for rehabilitation
of facilities damaged during emergencies
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6.2.2 Opting for a role in rehabilitation and reconstruction
Beginning with the earthquake at Agadir Morocco in 1960 and continuing throughout 
the crisis associated with colonial independence in the Congo in 1960-62, the 
increasing prominence of disasters influenced Unicef to articulate an alternative policy 
for relief. In 1965, the Executive Board decided that Unicef would participate mostly 
in rehabilitation and reconstruction of permanent services for mothers and children 
following disasters12, thereby avoiding the diversion of scarce resources for 
emergencies - whenever possible13. This policy was consistent with decisions taken 
in the following years to reduce their involvement in disease control programmes and 
to increase their support for basic health services14.
6.23 Capitulation: Unicef s unique role in relief
But this policy was immediately challenged by severe drought and famine in the 
Indian States of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh in 1965-66, the civil war in Nigeria from 
1967-70 and the civil-cum-regional conflict in Vietnam. The constraints inherent in 
addressing needs in such polarised and acutely political environments meant that 
Unicef s response built upon their experiences in China and the Middle East in 1948, 
consolidating a strategy for their involvement in future relief efforts throughout the 
1970s and 1980s.
6.2.3.1 Relief based on tacit understandings only
Firstly, the clause in Unicef s mandate which ensures the provision of aid to all 
children regardless of, among other things, nationality or political beliefs was used to 
justify relief in the absence of an invitation from the recognised government of the 
country in question. This meant that Unicef was not held to the standards set for other 
agencies of the UN which required official consent in recognition of sovereignty. 
Instead, Unicef worked for a tacit understanding whereby the lack of an invitation did 
not impede its relief workls. Not surprisingly, this meant that Unicef often worked
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to provide relief on both sides of armed conflict and that it was often able to work in 
areas where other agencies of the UN could not.
6.2.3.2 Close collaboration with the Red Cross and charitable agencies
Secondly, such a position was somewhat similar to that adopted by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and Unicef collaborated closely with them in 
responding to armed conflicts. This collaboration was largely built upon the 
acceptability of the Red Cross in, as well as its ability to respond to, such crisis and 
Unicef’s willingness to strengthen and support their efforts. During the Nigerian civil 
war for example, relief supplies from Unicef were channelled primarily through ICRC. 
More generally, Unicef established forums through which they created and maintained 
close relationships with a variety of charitable organizations; this is evident, for 
example, by the NGO-Unicef Forum and its production of the newsletter Ideas Forum 
on a monthly basis.
6.2.3.3 Logistical expertise
Thirdly, similar to its collaboration with WHO in programmes for health development, 
Unicef* s main contribution to relief operations continued to be the provision of needed 
supplies and material goods. For example, UniceFs Procurement and Assembly Centre 
(UNIPAC) in Copenhagen became the main purchasing and sending agency in the 
Nigerian relief operation. In many ways UniceFs involvement ensured that logistical 
considerations - which are so essential to any relief effort where scarcity is a 
fundamental concern - were addressed. It also meant that the seemingly less glamorous 
procurement and dispatch of substantial quantities of needed goods was undertaken.
6.2.3.4 Operational capacities
Lastly, Unicef became operational in some circumstances, for example in re-building 
Biafra after the war. Unlike most agencies within the UN system which are confined 
to working through governments or charitable agencies for both relief and
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development, exceptionally great needs and the lack of administrative infrastructure 
led Unicef not to only provide needed goods for Biafra’s reconstruction but to take 
responsibility for their distribution and use, relatively independent of the government
or other agencies. Thus, Unicef also set a precedent for setting up its own programmes 
in response to disasters similar to the Red Cross or the charitable agencies.
6.2.3.5 Ability to raise funds
There were at least two other factors which influenced the way Unicef responded to 
these disasters. Since it was first set up after WWII, Unicef has relied on voluntary 
contributions for its work. Only the office requirements and core staff of the head 
office were funded by the UN Secretariat. All other costs had to be covered by 
voluntary rather than assessed contributions from governments, private organizations 
or individuals. As a result of this funding scheme, Unicef quickly set up an extensive 
network of support groups, largely through national committees, which generate funds 
and lobby governments and private organizations to support Unicef. Initially funding 
was uncertain, but over the years there has been a steady increase in Unicef s annual 
income - excluding special appeals for major relief efforts (Table 6.2). The existence 
of such an extensive network of supporters meant that Unicef had greater flexibility 
in seeking additional funds than most agencies within the UN system. This enabled 
it to respond quickly to disasters and to raise needed funds on its own initiative.
This ability to seek additional funds was particularly important because the creation 
of a fund for emergency relief in 1969 authorised the Executive Director to draw only 
100 000 US$ for any given crisis. Even with the allowance for a further 100 000 
US$16, such funds would hardly cover anything but the most basic and initial response. 
In other words, the emergency fund of Unicef was similar to those created within the 
UN Secretariat, UNHCR and WHO during the same period - very small in comparison 
with the needs and total expenditures (Table 6.3). Later it was possible to use other 
programme funds for emergencies, either when the on-going programme could not be 
continued or when relief needs were urgent.
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TABLE 63  
Emergency aid given by UNICEF 
1948-I9651
YEAR COUNTRY TYPE OF DISASTER2 VALUE OF 
RESPONSE3
1948 Middle east refugees, Palestinian around 15 million US$, 
1948-53
1952 Egypt.
Jordan
refugees not known
1952 Brazil,
India
drought not known
1952 Philippines volcano not known
1953 India, Korea, 
Pakistan, Japan
drought and famine, war 1 722 000 US$
1953 Greece earthquake 100 000 US$
1953 Japan floods, typhoon 132 000 US$
1954 India food shortages 900 000 US$
1954 Iraq floods 53 000 US$
1954 Tanzania drought and famine 120 000 US$
1954 Haiti hurricane 115 000 US$
1955 Pakistan floods 15 000 US$
1955 India (stocks) 51 000 US$
1955 Korea (feeding programme) 628 000 US$
1955 Maldives hurricane 15 000 US$
1956 Pakistan floods 594 000 US$
1956 Korea (feeding programme) 800 000 US$
1956 Japan crop shortages 28 000 US$
1956 India (drug stocks) 55 000 US$
1956 Port Said evacuation 110 000US$
1956 Austria, Hungary evacuation 700 000 US$
1957 Jordan (feeding programme) 363 727 US$
1957 Egypt refugees 22 677 US$
1958 Tunisia refugees not known
1960 Congo independence, famine 536 000 US$
1960 Mauritius cyclones 55 000 US$
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YEAR COUNTRY TYPE OF DISASTER2 VALUE OF
1960 Pakistan cyclones 647 045
1960 Chile earthquakes 356 000 US$
1960 Iran earthquakes not known
1960 Morocco earthquakes 300 000 US$
1960 Mauritania drought, food shortages 31 000 US$
1960 Jordan (feeding programme) 373 000 US$
1960 Morocco refugees not known
1960 Tunisia refugees 207 000 US$
1960 Korea not known 109 000 US$
1960 Somalia not known 78 082 US$
1961 Congo famine prevention 471 000 US$
1961 Morocco refugees 216 000 US$
1961 Tunisia refugees 402 500 US$
1961 Jordan (feeding programme) 242 000 US$
1961 British Honduras hurricane 105 000 US$
1961 Vietnam floods 85 500 US$
1962 Iran earthquake not known
1962 Somalia flood not known
1962 Algeria resettlement of refugees not known
1962 Philippines cholera epidemic not known
1962 Jordan (feeding) not known
1962 Chile not known not known
1962 China not known not known
1962 Congo rehabilitation 1 370 000 US$
1963 Yugoslavia earthquake NK
1963 Carribean hurricane NK
1963 Algeria NK NK
1963 Cuba NK NK
1963 Haiti NK NK
1963 Jordan NK NK
1963 Korea NK NK
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YEAR COUNTRY TYPE OF DISASTER2 VALUE OF
D r C D A K I C P J
1963 Morocco NK NK
1963 Trinidad and 
Tobago
NK NK
1963 Uruguay NK NK
1964 Cuba hurricane NK
1964 Haiti hurricane NK
1964 Trinidad and 
Tobago
hurricane NK
1964 Costa Rica volcano NK
1964 Vietnam typhoons, floods NK
1964 Jordan NK NK
1964 Korea NK NK
1964 Uruguay NK NK
1964 Congo rehabilitation 549 000 US$
1965 Jordan (feeding programme) NK
1965 Vietnam NK NK
1. Source: UN (1948-1965) Yearbook of the United Nations. Lake Success, New York, USA: United 
Nations, Department of Public Information
2. NK - not known
3. NK - not known
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6.2.3.6 Timely and authoritative decision making processes
Not only was Unicef able to mobilise vast resources for relief more quickly and 
independently than other agencies of the UN, the small size of the organization and 
the dynamic and outgoing role adopted by its Executive Directors meant that decisions 
were taken at the highest levels, avoiding lengthy delays. In particular, the Executive 
Director was personally involved throughout these relief operations, negotiating 
directly with the authorities concerned as well as overseeing the planning and response 
of the organization itself. Relief coordinators who were based on site were often 
appointed, but they too were accountable directly to the Executive Director. 
Obviously, this increased the flexibility with which responses could be made since 
they were authorised and supported at the highest levels. Clearly, decision making 
processes within Unicef meant that lengthy bureaucratic procedures and managerial 
indifference were avoided.
63  The 1970s: organising for a role in relief
The need to respond more formally to disasters was incorporated in the organization 
in 1971 with the creation of an Office of the Emergency Operations Coordinator. 
Nevertheless, the policy did not change. Unicef continued to use around 5% of its 
annual budget in the 1970s to respond to several, relatively small disasters each year 
(Figure 6.1), as well as appealing for additional funds to participate in the larger, 
widely publicised international relief operations. For example, it responded to the 
cyclone and tidal wave in the Bay of Bengal in 1970, the civil war in East Pakistan 
in 1971, the millions of Bengali refugees who fled to India in 1971-1972, the war and 
reconstruction in Indochina and the massive drought and famine in the Sahel in 1972- 
75.
6.4 The 1980s: adopting a low profile
It was not until the repressive regime of Pol Pot in Kampuchea came to an end in 
1979 that Unicef again took on an extensive and leading role in a relief effort17 - a
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role nearly identical to that adopted in the Nigerian civil war relief effort. Yet their 
involvement was again quickly replaced by rehabilitation and on-going programmes 
in the various countries of the region as early as 1981. The conclusion of Unicef’s 
relief programme for Kampuchea brought to an end one of the most stormy and 
difficult times for the organization - operationally, financially and politically18.
At that time, the Executive Director proposed that Unicef avoid, whenever possible, 
the role of lead agency19 - a decision successfully followed throughout the remainder 
of the 1980s. They then returned to supporting individual components of relief and 
rehabilitation programmes on a smaller scale. But during the 1980s, more frequent and 
devastating disasters meant that some 10% of the programme budget was spent on 
emergency aid during the first half of the decade, or 177.2 million US$ (figures 6.1 
and 6.2). For example, for the Afghan refugees in Pakistan, the Ethiopian refugees in 
Somalia, the famine in much of Africa in 1983-86 and civil wars in Angola, Ethiopia, 
Liberia, Mozambique, Somalia, Sri Lanka and Sudan.
6.5 The 1990s: resisting pressures to adopt a more influential role in relief?
The end of the 1980s were characterised by the need for several massive relief and 
rehabilitation operations. The UN appealed for funds to mount multi-agency, multi­
sectoral operations in many regions of the world, such as for Afghanistan (Operation 
Salaam), southern Sudan (Operation Lifeline) and southern Africa (Children on the 
Frontline). Moreover, the 1990s were designated as the International Decade for 
Natural Disaster Reduction. The declaration of war by several North American, 
European and Middle Eastern nations against Iraq, massive flooding in Bangladesh, 
widespread famine and escalating armed conflict in many African nations, a large 
earthquake in the Philippines and global pollution and environmental degradation were 
only a few of the widely publicised and better known tragedies which marked the 
beginning of the 1990s. The severity of these disasters and their consequences again 
made relief a priority on many political agendas.
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Figure 6.2
Unicef expenditure on emergency aid* 
in millions of US$, 1947-1985
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Source: Black 1986, p. 494 
‘ Excludes rehabilitation expenditures 
for facilities damaged in emergencies.
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6.5.1 Strengthening relief capacities within Unicef
Once again, Unicef was asked to improve its response. Similar to the creation of the 
emergency unit in 1971, Unicefs strategy focused on strengthening their own 
capabilities with little change in policy. Thus, in 1990 a Director for Emergency 
Programmes was appointed, a regional office for Africa was created and a strategy 
was outlined for Unicef policy and practice in the 1990s20. The remit of the new 
Director was 1) to ’rationalise, streamline and improve Unicef response capabilities 
to the needs of women and children caught in emergency situations and 2) to enhance 
Unicef support of overall United Nations efforts aimed at facilitating the provision of 
humanitarian assistance to all civilians caught in such situations’.
6.5.2 Maintaining a supportive role
These objectives highlight the perceived need and donor support for Unicef to involve 
themselves further in relief and rehabilitation, as well as a decision to maintain their 
existing policy not to take the lead role in international relief efforts. In specifying 
tactics to achieve these goals21, nearly all (12/13) of the measures identified aimed 
to improve Unicefs capacity institutionally, for example to prepare and support staff 
in managing emergency programmes and to mobilise resources for such work. Priority 
continued to be given to rehabilitation and development with emergency programmes 
being linked or converted quickly to them. Furthermore, Unicef support would be an 
integral component of a UN response, in other words under the direction of the UN 
or other designated lead agency.
6.6 Planning relief for forced migrations: rhetoric or reality?
Within this context, Unicef also articulated a position for working for people displaced 
by war, famine or other life-threatening events. In the strategy for the 1990s, the plight 
of millions of refugees and people displaced within their own countries was 
recognised and an action plan was written for the African continent22. A further 
statement was issued in 1991 following an agreement to collaborate between the
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Executive Director of Unicef and the High Commissioner of UNHCR23. They agreed 
that for some refugees, mutually supportive programmes would be set up in the fields 
of ’water and sanitation, primary health care including im m unizations and basic 
education’.
While the implications of this agreement and plan for refugee health will only be 
clarified in time, the possibilities most likely range from no change in policy or 
practice to a leading role in refugee health relief. The likelihood of these positions 
maturing in future can best be evaluated by looking briefly at the way in which Unicef 
works - both in relief and development, by the competition for such roles - both by 
other agencies of the UN and charitable organizations, and by the support available 
for this work - both in their decision-making bodies and donor network.
6.6.1 Precedents for an expanded role
6.6.1.1 Supply and logistical capacities
Since its inception, the transfer of primarily material or financial resources, and to a 
lesser extent knowledge and skills, has been the main form of aid provided by Unicef. 
This has been true in both emergency and on-going health programmes. Its origins lie 
in aid given to European nations after WW1I which was based on the assumption that 
such inputs would enable governments to rebuild and restore their societies within a 
few years time24. The subsequent application of this approach to development in 
poorer countries has since been discredited, as it fails to address underlying problems 
of poverty or to facilitate and enhance processes leading to self-reliance - 
economically, politically, culturally or socially. By nature, it is short-term and a factor 
in continued dependency unless there are simultaneous efforts to address limits to self- 
reliance. Moreover, the provision of resources which have been developed within the 
culture and economy of industrialised nations means that by its nature aid imposes a 
western way of doing things on its recipients. Notwithstanding these limitations, this 
approach is characteristic of relief aid. If such an approach continues to be adopted, 
Unicef would appear to be an ideal agency for filling this role in relief operations.
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6.6.1.2 Meeting basic needs for resources
The ability and willingness to provide such resources has several implications for 
Unicef. Firstly, it facilitates and enhances the welcome given to Unicef, especially 
when resources are needed or desired. Together with its policy of providing relief 
without official consent from the government concerned, Unicef is in a position to 
work in some areas of conflict where other agencies of the UN cannot or where 
charitable agencies are unable to provide the vast resources needed.
6.6.1.3 The power of the purse
Secondly, being a provider of resources empowers Unicef to make decisions about 
how these resources will be used. In other words, it could be used to justify a leading 
role in decision-making and management. Such a leadership role is potentially 
strengthened when other agencies working in the area of relief or health lack similar 
resources - which is currently the case with UNHCR and WHO. Hence, it would 
appear that Unicef could take a leading role in refugee health relief.
6.6.1.4 Meeting resource needs: a core component of relief
Lastly, Unicefs willingness and proven abilities in handling the logistics of supply 
and distribution of large quantities of goods enhances - what might be called - 
Unicefs candidacy. This is an essential task, frequently neglected or underdeveloped 
by other relief organizations. Thus, Unicefs existing structure could be an important 
asset in any relief operation.
6.6.1.5 Timely and authoritative administration
Not only does Unicefs Procurement and Assembly Centre (UNIPAQ provide a 
somewhat unique structure within the UN system for the rapid distribution of non-food 
supplies, Unicef’s general administrative procedures enhance local decision-making 
and response within policy priorities agreed at the highest levels. Despite the existence
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of two head offices in New York and Geneva, six regional offices in Africa (2, 33%), 
Asia (2, 33%), Latin America (1,17%) and the Middle East (1,17%) and field offices 
in 128 countries in Africa (44, 34%), Asia (34, 27%), Latin America (35, 27%), the 
Middle East and North Africa (15, 14%) and Central and Eastern Europe (<1%)^, 
administrative costs were less than 10% of total expenditure until the early 1980s 
when they accounted for 11% of all expenditure26. In 1990, administrative costs were 
9% of all expenditure27.
The conclusion that low administrative costs are indicative of fewer bureaucratic 
complexities and procedures is further supported by the distribution of three out of 
every four staff members in field offices, rather than in regional or head offices28. 
Moreover, in reporting on their involvement in major relief operations during the past 
40 years, no mention has been made of decisions processed through regional offices. 
Instead, decisions were based on needs which were determined on-site together with 
an assessment of the international context by the Executive Director and other senior 
staff in the head office. Communications between field staff and senior officials were 
direct, thereby avoiding lengthy delays, managerial indifference or political 
interference within Unicef itself. This institutional ability to take action quickly and 
with authority would be essential for leading or coordinating relief efforts.
6.6.2 A lack of support for an expanded role?
So why has Unicef consistently gone to great lengths to avoid a significant focus on 
relief? Surely, fears about their ability to manage an expanded role and the 
acceptability of this depend largely on the attitudes and support of their donors.
6.6.2.1 Widespread popular support
Since Unicef is the only UN agency to receive funds directly from the public, it is 
interesting that most of this money comes through 33 national committees which are 
based in high income economies (Figure 6.3) or in Europe (Figure 6.4). These national 
committees work primarily within industrial societies, especially those affiliated with
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Figure 6.3
Countries with Unicef National Committees 
by economic classification* 1990
High in com e 2 2  
67%
Lower-m iddle in com e 3  
9%
N on m em b ers 3  
9%
U pper-m iddle in com e 5 
15%
Source: Unicef (1991) Unicef at 40 
*World Bank Development Report 1990
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Figure 6.4
Unicef National Committees by geographical region in 1990
W estern  Europe 19 58%
Africa 1 3%  
Middle E ast 1 3%
A sian 1 3%
^  South Pacific 2  6% 
North Am erican 2  6%Eastern Europe 7  21%
Source: Unicef (1991) Unicef at 40
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the political views, policies and practices of the USA since WWII (79%). Although 
the publicity and general support which is elicited by these committees can influence 
decisions taken - both within Unicef itself and by major donors, non-governmental 
income has accounted for only a quarter or less of total income (Table 6.2). 
Furthermore, sales of greeting cards have been a significant proportion (44% between 
1947-1985) of this contribution throughout the past forty years29.
Non-governmental contributions totalled an estimated 198.7 million US$ in 1990 or 
24% of all income. Of these non-governmental contributions, the largest donations, of 
10 million US$ or more, came from only seven countries where there are national 
committees, including the USA (32.1 million), West Germany (23.5 million), the 
Netherlands (20.7 million), France (18.6 million), Japan (15.9 million), Switzerland 
(13.3 million) and Canada (11.9 million). The contributions of these societies 
accounted for 68% (136/198.7 million US$) of all non-governmental income or 17% 
of all income30.
6.6.2.2 Dependency on powerful governments
The main source of income is national governments, accounting for three-quarters of 
the annual budget (Table 6.2). Similar to non-govemmental income to which the US 
group has been the largest contributor31, the Government of the US has been the 
largest governmental contributor to the regular budget. In the 1950s, the US 
Government provided over 60% of all governmental contributions to the regular 
budget; this proportion declined gradually and ranged between 15-20% in the 
1980s32. In 1990, for example, of the contributions from 119 governments or inter­
governmental organizations, such as the European Economic Community and the Arab 
Gulf Fund, the contribution of the US Government accounted for 17% of all 
governmental contributions to the regular budget (65.4/394.1 million US$), 13% of all 
governmental income (77/608 million US$, including supplementary or emergency 
funds) or 9% of total income (77/821 million US$)33.
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Other governments which have made large contributions are also representative of 
wealthy countries located primarily in North America and Europe, including Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, 
USSR and West Germany. In 1990, these governments together with the US 
Government (who accounted for 11% of all governmental donors) provided 94% of 
all governmental contributions to the regular budget or general resources, 89% of all 
governmental contributions to supplementary or emergency funds, 92% of all 
governmental income (general resources and supplementary or emergency funds) or 
68% of all income34.
Only seven of these main donors (from USA, Sweden, Italy, Norway, Finland, USSR 
and Japan) contributed 20 million US$ or more to the regular budget, accounting for 
72% of governmental contributions to the regular budget or 56% of total income for 
the regular budget. Six of these main donors (from Sweden, Canada, Denmark, 
Netherlands, Norway and the USA) provided 10 million US$ or more for 
supplementary or emergency funds, accounting for 73% of governmental contributions 
to such funds or 55% of total income for these funds. Large donations for 
supplementary or emergency funds meant that in 1990 the Government of Sweden 
made the largest governmental contribution overall, some 119.2 million US$ for 
general resources and supplementary or emergency funds, accounting for 20% of 
governmental income or 15% of the total income (Appendix VI).
Not surprisingly, the governments of these same countries greatly influence policies 
and practices through membership on Unicef s Executive Board. The first Executive 
Board was nominated by the Economic and Social Council of the UN to serve for 
three years35. The indefinite extension of Unicef s mandate in 1953 followed a 
reorganisation of the Executive Board in 1951. At that time, national governments who 
were members of the Social Commission of the Economic and Social Council were 
made ex officio members of Unicef s Executive Board. An additional eight members 
were nominated with due regard to geographical distribution and major donor and 
recipient governments36. This brought the original, annual membership to 26. In 
1990, there were 41 members - 9 each from Africa and Asia, 12 from Western Europe
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and other areas, 6 from Latin America, 4 from Eastern Europe and one seat which 
rotated between the regions.
Unlike UNHCR's Executive Committee which consists of permanent member 
governments, one-third of Unicef s Executive Board changed each year as member 
governments completed their three year term of office. Although this is nearly 
identical to the Executive Board of WHO, the occupation of two-thirds of the 
membership by a commission of the Economic and Social Council (the body to which 
both Unicef and WHO are accountable) is unique.
Between 1946 and 1989,107 governments have been members of Unicef s Executive 
Board (Figure 6.5). Of these governments, nearly three-quarters come from the poorer 
regions, such as Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. However, Figure
6.6 shows that the governments from poorer regions occupied only half of the seats 
available on Unicef s Board. In other words, they had only half of the votes. 
Similarly, the distribution of high, upper-middle, lower-middle, low and nonmember 
economies (Figure 6.7) shows that governments of poorer countries account for nearly 
three-quarters of all governments represented. Again, however, these governments only 
held less than half of the seats available (Figure 6.8). In other words, governments of 
higher income economies or of countries located in North America, Europe or the 
South Pacific occupied over twice as many seats or had twice as many votes per 
country as those of poorer economies (Table 6.4).
Figures 6.9 and 6.10 further highlight that not only did wealthier, northern based 
governments have more votes, but that their representation was more continuous. None 
of the African governments and less that half of the Asian (46%), Latin American 
(44%) or Middle Eastern (14%) governments were elected to the Executive Board five 
times or more. In contrast with infrequent nominations, more than half of the 
governments of higher income economies were elected five times or more (on average 
62%). Furthermore, one-third of these governments were elected more than ten times - 
accounting for 71% of all governments elected so frequently. The other four
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TABLE 6.4
Ratio of seats occupied by national governments 
on Unicers Executive Board between 1946-1989 
according to their economic status and regional location
ECONOMIC
STATUS
NUMBER OF 
COUNTRIES
NUMBER OF 
SEATS
AVERAGE 
SEATS PER 
COUNTRY
HIGH 21 162 7.7
UPPER-
MIDDLE
16 52 33
LOWER-
MIDDLE
28 112 4.0
LOW 35 92 2.6
NONMEMB
ER
7 34 4.9
TOTAL 7 34 4.9
REGION NUMBER OF 
COUNTRIES
NUMBER OF 
SEATS
AVERAGE SEATS 
PER COUNTRY
AFRICA 39 67 1.7
ASIA 14 82 5.9
LATIN
AMERICA
18 73 4.1
MIDDLE EAST 7 19 2.7
SUB-TOTAL 78 241 3.1
WESTERN
EUROPE
15 115 7.7
EASTERN
EUROPE
10 56 5.6
NORTH
AMERICA
2 28 14.0
SOUTH PACIFIC 2 12 6.0
SUB-TOTAL 29 211 73
SUB-TOTAL 107 452 42
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Figure 6.5
Regional representation of governments with
membership on the Executive Board of Unicef, 1946-1989
Africa 39  36%
Latin Am erica 18 17%
fortl erica
A sia 14 13%
Middle E ast 7  7%
Eastern Europe 10 9%
W estern Europe 15 14%
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Figure 6.6
Seats occupied on the Executive Board 
of Unicef by region, 1946-1989, n=452
Latin A m erica  7 3  16%
Africa 6 7  15%  A
M id d les E a st  19  4% S ou th  P acific  1 2  3%  
North A m erica  2 8  6%
W e ste r n  E u rop e 1 15  25%  E a stern  E u rop e 5 6  12%
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Figure 6.7
Income status* of governm ents with membership
on the Executive Board of Unicef, 1946-1989
U p p er-m id d le  15%  
16
L ow er-m idd le 26%
N o n m e m b e r  7%
L ow  33%  
3 5
*Based on the World Bank Development  
Report for 1990
208
Figure 6.8
Seats occupied on the Executive Board of Unicef 
by income status* of member governments, 1946-1989
H igh 36%  
162
U p p er-m id d le  12%  
5 2
L ow er-m idd le 25%  
112
N o n m e m b e r  8%  
3 4
Low  20%  
9 2
*Based on the World Bank Development  
Report for 1990
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Figure 6.9
Representation of lower income economies
on Unicef’s Executive Board, 1946-1989
Number of elections  
Africa +  Asia ^  Latin America "D' Middle East
Number of governments
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Figure 6.10
Representation of higher income economies
on Unicef’s Executive Board, 1946-1989
Number of governments
3.5
3 -
2.5
1 -
0.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Number of elections 
Eastern Europe +  Western Europe North America ■t> South Pacific
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governments to enjoy such continuous representation were Brazil, China, India and 
Pakistan. Thus, the majority of governments who represented the recipients of Unicef 
aid (77/107, 72%) were elected five times or less, while a small minority - mainly 
their generous donors - (12/107,13%) had a continuous influence on decision-making.
There is little historical evidence that influential donor governments would support an 
extended role in relief. Moreover, Unicef s recent policy not to take the leading role 
in relief operations suggests that to carry on as they had done in India, Nigeria, the 
Sahel and Indochina was an equally unacceptable proposal. Plans to adhere to this 
policy are clearly stated in the strategy paper of 1991 in which the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) country representatives or other coordinators 
appointed by the Secretary-General of the UN are identified as the leaders within the 
UN system37. The strategy paper further states that Unicef prefers that needs 
assessments and special appeals for resources also be carried out as part of an effort 
by the UN system more generally. In brief, Unicef no longer appears to be willing to 
initiate and follow through relief work independent of the UN system.
Similarly, proposed mechanisms for funding relief activities remain the same as they 
have been throughout the 1980s. There are six different mechanisms for securing 
funds. Four of these mechanisms draw upon the regular budget or general 
resources38. Firstly, field representatives may divert up to 25 000 US$ in funds and 
supplies from existing programmes for an emergency. Such a diversion must be agreed 
to by the government concerned, but it does not require the approval of the head 
office. Secondly, resources for regular programmes can be reallocated but only when 
approval has been given by both the government concerned and the head office. In 
1990, these two uses of regular programme resources for emergencies accounted for 
only 3% of all expenditure on emergencies39. Most of these emergency projects 
(11/15, 73%) were valued at less than 100 000 US$.
Thirdly, there is an Emergency Reserve Fund of 4 million US$ annually in the regular 
budget for meeting ’requirements in relatively minor situations or to meet initial
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operations in larger emergencies while additional resources are being sought’40. In 
1990, 17 projects were funded from this reserve, accounting for 10% of all 
expenditure on emergencies. Somewhat similar to the emergency projects funded by 
diverting or reallocating regular resources within a country, most projects funded from 
the reserve (14/17,82%) were valued at 500 000 US$ or less. However, unlike the use 
of country programme funds, the use of reserve funds requires a proposal from the 
field which must then be approved by both the emergency unit and the concerned 
geographical section in the head office.
Lastly, the Executive Board may approve the use of other regular resources when 
other funds are insufficient to meet acute needs or when ’the situation is of major 
international concern’41. But surely these funds would be zealously guarded by the 
programmes concerned and, again, only relatively small sums of money would be 
made available. Not surprisingly, no mention is made of such funding of emergency 
projects in 199042.
Obviously, any substantial involvement in relief requires that other resources are 
solicited in addition to the regular budget. Special Purpose Contributions can be 
sought by the Executive Director without prior approval from the Executive Board - 
but only for ’specific emergency assistance projects’43. Supplementary Funds, 
however, must be approved by the Executive Board and are usually generated for on­
going relief or rehabilitation programmes. Projects funded by the latter are often listed 
under regular programmes rather than emergency assistance.
In 1990, Special Purpose Contributions accounted for 86% (30.6/35.7 million US$) 
of all emergency expenditure44. Most contributions (9/14) were for projects valued 
at one million US$ or more; four such projects were valued at more than 3 million 
US$. Furthermore, these contributions were also used to replenish any over-spent 
funds from the Emergency Reserve Funds, totalling 2 226 266 US$ in 199045. 
Similar to the regular budget of which 74% is provided by national governments, at 
least three-quarters of all supplementary and emergency funds were contributed by 
national governments in 199046. In fact, 86% of emergency resources were provided
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by governments in 199047. Thus,funds to engage in any meaningful relief work 
require that special appeals be made, primarily to national governments in Europe and 
North America.
6.7 Responsibility for refugee health relief: a responsibility of governments 
collectively or civil societies?
Within the UN system, Unicef appears to be the ideal candidate for managing health 
relief. Well-established practices of working with only informal or tacit agreements, 
of making decisions and commitments at the highest levels of authority, of distributing 
needed resources quickly, and of actively participating in some relief and rehabilitation 
programmes are unique characteristics so essential to any meaningful relief effort. But 
such optimism is counter-balanced by similarities with relief undertaken by UNHCR 
and WHO. Similar to WHO, Unicef routinely provides only relatively small sums of 
money or other material goods in response to disasters. Only a very few permanent 
personnel, organizational structures and resources have been created for relief work. 
Similar to UNHCR, relief work by Unicef is only undertaken for the shortest period 
of time possible. Substantial participation by Unicef in relief has been limited to crises 
which affect large numbers of people, which were widely publicised and patronised 
by the international media and which furthered the interests of the main donors.
Any significant participation in relief was, therefore, exceptional; Unicef was engaged 
in relief on an ad hoc basis and their work was limited to meeting only immediate 
needs - largely through the transfer of massive quantities of material goods. Moreover, 
Unicefs relief policy for the 1990s continues to be one of restraint. In spite of 
increasingly widespread and acute needs throughout much of the world, or growing 
fears of financial and political bankruptcy for health relief work by UNHCR and 
WHO, Unicef appears to plan not to undertake roles and commitments in large-scale 
relief efforts, at least not outside of responses made by the UN more generally. This 
is true even though Unicef has several organizational characteristics which enable it 
to intervene in a timely and effective manner. Unicef shares other organizational 
characteristics with UNHCR and WHO which limit its ability to do so in practice. In
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particular, dependency on powerful national governments for its political and financial 
resources constrain opportunities to take advantage of fewer bureaucratic procedures, 
impressive logistical capacity, widespread popular support for a role in relief. Instead, 
institutional survival requires that roles undertaken enhance the organizations growth 
and political status within the political and economic environment in which it exists.
Clearly, the complexities of relationships between nation-states as well as those 
between interest groups within the individual societies which have an interest in inter­
state interactions influence greatly the environment in which inter-governmental 
organizations work. Coupled with the sensitivities inherent in any conflict and 
associated relief operations, less official conduits of aid for relief may well be 
preferred by governmental authorities. Have private, charitable organizations built 
upon the traditional roles of the Red Cross to initiate, organise and provide health 
relief?
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Beyond altruism: an expanded role for charitable 
organizations in the provision of foreign aid
7.1 Charities and WW1I: responding to military strategies
Similar to many of the wars before, urgent needs for relief during the second World 
War (WWII) quickly engaged existing charitable organizations and stimulated the 
creation of new ones. On the eve of the first World War (WWI) 344 European and 
North American charitable agencies were engaged in some form of activity overseas. 
But during the first year of WWII alone, 362 new relief agencies registered under the 
Neutrality Act of 19391, and between 1939 and 1941 (the two year period of US 
neutrality in WWII) 545 charitable agencies based in the US registered with the US 
Government to undertake relief work abroad2. Kent3 quotes lower figures for the 
formation of new charities between the beginning of WWII and 1949 - only 192. 
Regardless of the exact numbers, the two World Wars clearly stimulated the formation 
of many new charities whose first responsibilities were for relief.
7.1.1 Supporting governmental strategies of war
Unlike previous years when the US Government rarely provided financial subsidies 
to charitable agencies, during the first few years of WWII nearly 30% of all aid sent 
abroad by US charities came from the US Government. Nevertheless, these financial 
contributions were less significant than legal tools in linking the work of these 
charities with the war objectives of the US Government. Legal regulation of the 
overseas work of charities became firmly established with the creation of the War 
Relief Control Board by President Roosevelt in July of 19424. This Board was given 
responsibility for monitoring the overseas work of all non-profit organizations, for 
registering them and coordinating their fund-raising efforts, and even for merging or 
eliminating agencies for greater efficiency5. Moreover, in order for the US to be
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credited with the work of these agencies, the Board put pressure on agencies to 
incorporate the word ’American’ into their names.
The result of the Board’s efforts led to reduced administrative expenditures by these 
charities - from 10.6% in 1942 to 4.8% in 1944, and to a smaller number of agencies 
sending aid abroad - from 545 in 1939, to 223 in 1942, to 61 in 19456. This did not, 
however, mean that the value of aid sent by charities overseas declined. On the 
contrary, these agencies were sending a total of 1.4 billion US$ abroad annually in 
1945 compared with 615 million US$ in 19417. In order to ensure continued support 
for private foreign aid after the war ended, 19 US charities agreed to form a federation 
in 1943, the American Council of Voluntary Agencies (ACVAFS). The creation of this 
federation was initiated largely by the Board so that the charities would continue to 
work in a coordinated way with the US War Department and the United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) who would continue to have 
jurisdiction over them.
7.1.2 Opposing governmental strategies of war
In contrast with charities based in the US whose work was increasingly linked with 
foreign policies of their government, some new European charities disagreed with the 
policies of their own governments. The Ecumenical Aid Service (CIMADE) was 
established in France in 1939 by protestant churches to assist refugees of Nazism. 
Over the coming years, it protested against the Vichy Government’s treatment of 
captives and it assisted Jews in avoiding deportation to Germany. Similarly, the 
Oxford Famine Relief Committee (OXFAM) which was set up in England in 1942 
opposed the British Government’s policy of total war which called for a blockade of 
countries under Nazi rule, ruling out aid to their civilians. Despite refusal of their 
petition, the Committee supported the Greek Red Cross in caring for civilians under 
siege. The efforts of these two agencies are thought by Smith8 to have set the 
precedence for European and Canadian charities to be involved in wider domestic 
political movements which dissent from official policies for the third world.
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In an analysis of the roles played by charitable organizations based in the North 
Atlantic region in the provision of private foreign aid, primarily since the end of 
WWII, Smith9 separates those originating in the US from those based in Europe and 
Canada. In brief, his analysis focuses on differences in the societies within which 
these organizations were formed. In so doing, he highlights that these agencies are 
institutions of civil society and he concludes that their work serves largely to maintain 
the status quo of existing power relationships. Thus, his work provides a useful, even 
essential, perspective of the context within which charitable agencies contribute to the 
formulation of international health relief policy and its practice. Furthermore, his 
framework allows the vast literature on charitable organizations to be put into the 
context of the provision of foreign aid generally. Within such as analysis, charitable 
aid for refugees can then be better understood1.
7.2 The 1950s: partners in furthering foreign policies
7.2.1 Cosy companions? Private Voluntary Organizations and the US 
Government
In order for US charities, commonly known as Private Voluntary Organizations 
(PVOs) in the US, to continue to provide relief overseas following the end of armed 
conflict in 1946, President Truman appointed representatives from PVOs and the 
Government to act as an Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid to the 
Department of State. Agreements were reached through this Advisory Committee 
which ensured that detailed financial and operational reports of PVO activities 
overseas would continue to be provided to the Government, now voluntarily. In return, 
PVOs became eligible to receive governmental monies and goods; the supply of food 
and other essential commodities and money for transporting them abroad continued
\  Unless otherwise indicated, the information about the general work of PVOs and 
NGOs during the 1950s and 1960s is based on: Smith BH (1991) More than altruism. The 
politics of private foreign aid. Princeton, New Jersey, USA: Princeton University Press, 284
pp.
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to be given by the Government to PVOs for relief during the years immediately 
following the end of WWII.
Interest in continuing and strengthening a cooperative relationship between the PVOs 
and the US Government were mutual. PVOs wanted an expanded role for themselves 
in working abroad and they needed government subsidies to do so. The US Congress 
was keen to improve and maintain a positive, highly visible image of the US in order 
to generate domestic support for foreign assistance programmes; foreign assistance 
programmes were thought to further US security interests in checking Soviet 
expansion - primarily in Europe but also as many colonies achieved independence, as 
well as economic interests in establishing alliances with these newly independent 
countries10. Furthermore, for the most part PVOs were free to bypass other 
governments and inter-governmental organizations. This was desirable to those who 
felt that the policies and practices of the inter-governmental agencies were unduly 
biased by inputs from the Soviet Union and her allies or by those who viewed 
recipient governments as corrupt or inept.
This close relationship between PVOs and the US Government was strengthened in 
the 1950s, firstly by the establishment in 1949 of a programme for technical assistance 
for economic development in foreign nations which incorporated cooperation between 
the Government and PVOs11, and secondly by the creation of the US Technical 
Cooperation Administration in 1950 which was set up to coordinate longer-term 
foreign aid to the newly independent nations. Between 1952 and 1956, 917 million 
US$ were given by the Technical Cooperation Administration to private organizations 
for technical aid overseas; over one-half of this was granted to non-profit service 
organizations. Not surprisingly, these grants were for countries considered within US 
foreign policy to be security priorities and conditions were attached. For example, 
PVO programmes had to be non-sectarian and free of any proselytising activities. Host 
governments had to request a PVO’s service and the PVO must coordinate their work 
with other technical aid given through US bilateral programmes. The extent and 
success of this cooperation can be seen in the creation of the US Peace Corps of the 
Department of State in 1961, largely on the basis of the work of volunteers in
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education, housing, health, sanitation and agriculture which had been coordinated by 
church-affiliated PVOs since 1953 under the International Voluntary Service.
Pressures on the US Congress to maintain domestic prices of agricultural products led 
to one of the most important events in the history of PVOs. The passage of the 
Agricultural Trade, Development and Assistance Act in 1954, most commonly known 
as Public Law 480, authorised expanded distribution of surplus food overseas. PVOs 
were then able to expand their food distribution programmes since greater quantities 
and varieties were available and since domestic and sea transport cost were paid by 
the Government. By 1956, 610 000 tons of food had been shipped overseas by PVOs 
compared with only 140 000 three years previously.
7.2.2 Promoting a more humane image of Europe: Non-governmental 
Organizations and post-colonial European foreign policy
Several new charities were also created in Europe and Canada immediately after 
WWII. Similar to PVOs who were subsidized by the US Government to provide 
assistance for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Europe after WWII, European 
and Canadian charities, commonly known as Non-governmental Organizations 
(NGOs), were also subsidized by their governments during the same period, but not 
on the same scale as in the US. Nor were these subsidies increased over the decade.
Unlike the US Government which had food surpluses and monies for its shipment 
overseas, European governments lacked resources generally, including food. Moreover, 
relief for the developing world could be administered through colonial administrations; 
this was especially desirable since it allowed ruling governments to keep control 
during the time when movements for independence were growing. Unlike the US 
Government which created the Technical Cooperation Administration in 1950, many 
European governments did not create separate agencies for foreign aid to developing 
countries until the 1960s - when many countries had already achieved their 
independence and others were close to doing so. Furthermore, the political priorities 
in Europe differed greatly from those of the US; at home, concerns were not
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dominated by fears of communism, and abroad, European nations were looking for 
ways to maintain their influence in their former colonies rather than in establishing it.
The lack of significant governmental support to NGOs did not mean that they did not 
continue or attempt to expand their efforts, but rather that they did so with private 
funding. Even before Europe had recovered economically from WWII, several NGOs 
had begun to work overseas, especially in areas where colonial links were strong. 
Fighting in China, India, Israel and Pakistan, for example, engaged British and French 
NGOs in relief work in the late 1940s. Throughout the 1950s, NGO involvement in 
overseas relief operations expanded, partly in response to the urgent needs associated 
with the process surrounding independence and partly as a means of maintaining the 
links between Europe and their former colonies. The work of the NGOs not only 
maintained a European presence in these newly independent nations but it helped to 
create a new and different image of Europe, a more humane one. Thus, as in the US 
experience, the overseas work of the NGOs was seen by their own governments to be 
furthering foreign policy objectives.
7.2.3 An enlarged focus on the provision of technical and welfare aid
The processes associated with attaining national independence were often characterised 
by strong feelings of nationalism. For many charities, this required a shift in focus in 
order to ensure that they would continue to be relevant and useful in newly created 
nation-states. This was especially true for those with religious affiliations since many 
had acted as the educational, social and cultural means through which European 
policies had been promoted and legitimised during colonial times. Thus, many of the 
new relief agencies which were set up during and after WWII by the churches, such 
as Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Catholic World Service (CWS) and Lutheran 
World Relief (LWR), were organised as service agencies for all needy people 
irrespective of their religious beliefs. These agencies were not controlled by church 
boards as the older missionary societies had been and priority activities stressed 
training for technical skills development, disease control programmes and improved 
agricultural techniques, for example. In the US, these church-affiliated agencies came
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to dominate the field of voluntary foreign aid quickly, and between 1946 and 1953 
they administered nearly two-thirds of US Governmental assistance to PVOs.
73  The 1960s; An expanded role for charitable agencies in the provision of 
foreign aid
73.1 PVOs and the exportation of the American dream
During the 1960s, the first Development Decade of the UN, the central role of food 
in aid provided by PVOs was consolidated when foreign policy gave priority to 
development. Public Law 480 was amended in 1961 to allow PVOs to use surplus 
food for development and by the end of the decade PVOs had distributed some 20 
million tons of food, bringing the total since 1954 to over 30 billion. By the early 
1970s, food aid accounted for nearly two-thirds of all contributions from the US 
Government to PVOs. However, over 90% of food sent abroad was distributed by only 
two agencies throughout the 1960s and 1970s - Cooperation for American Relief 
Everywhere (CARE) and Catholic Relief Services (CRS)12.
Three other developments of equal, yet more subtle, importance also occurred in the 
1960s. Mass violations of civil and political rights stimulated the formation of a new 
group of organizations, in Europe as well as the US, which aimed to promote and 
protect human rights13. Some of these new PVOs/NGOs adopted a global clientele, 
such as Amnesty International in London, The International Federation of Human 
Rights in Paris and The International League for Human Rights in New York. 
National offices or affiliates were often created within individual countries, and several 
groups of intellectuals, professionals and political activists within their own countries 
set up their own national agencies. These newly formed human rights organizations 
had a distinct and well-defined concern - governmental abuses of personal security, 
discrimination and basic rights to participate in political processes. Their role was one 
of investigating, monitoring and publicising the nature and number of individual 
violations.
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Over the years, however, this narrow conception of human rights would be challenged, 
especially by nationals of developing countries who increasingly paid more attention 
to the structures and systems of power which led to violations - including social, 
economic and cultural rights. Nevertheless, throughout their history, none of these 
organizations have engaged in struggles for social, economic and political rights of 
groups of people, including refugees. Nor would this gap be filled by their peers who 
provided social and economic assistance: these latter agencies frequently avoided any 
association with ’human rights’ since many thought it could hinder their work. 
Moreover, several of the Human Rights organizations have been denied charitable 
status in law, for example Amnesty International in Britain14, presumably because of 
the overtly political nature of their work.
The Civil Rights Movement and the passage of the Economic Opportunity Act in 1964 
also generated concern among prominent US Congressional leaders that various 
institutions of civil society, such as trade unions, cooperatives and other social or 
community organizations, be adequately involved in government sponsored 
programmes. Legislation was then enacted in 1966 and 1967 to assure ’maximum 
participation in the task of economic development on the part of the people of the 
developing countries, through the encouragement of democratic, private and local 
governmental institutions*15. This legislation reflected different interests: those who 
wished to strengthen private organizations and initiatives, those who wished to 
promote and support local democratic processes (both domestic and abroad) and those 
who wished to ’promote stable and responsible governmental institutions at the local 
level’16.
PVOs were identified as one of the key mechanisms through which these goals could 
be achieved. Even in countries where US bilateral assistance was limited or did not 
exist, PVOs ’could become an American sponsored and locally recognized substitute 
for a US public foreign aid program and could help directly in advancing Title IX 
goals’17. Furthermore, ’the US might... choose to dissociate itself from a regime by 
withdrawing or sharply curtailing its presence, including aid, but.might seek to 
maintain NGO activities as a connection with the national Title IX allies who some
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day might change the country’s direction’18. Clearly, the potential for PVOs to 
promote the foreign policy objectives of the US was recognised by governmental and 
other influential leaders in US society. Moreover, the emphasis on private initiatives 
and democratic processes reflected the history and ideology of the US, leading Smith 
to conclude that they were aiming to export the American dream.
1 3 2  NGOs as advocates for social justice
Although both PVOs and NGOs established close relationships with the United 
Nations, this was especially prominent with many European NGOs. Often 
collaboration with the UN acted as a catalyst for generating greater interest and 
support for their own work among European publics and private institutions. 
Beginning with the United Nations Appeal for Children in 1948 to support the newly 
created United Nations International Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and continuing with 
the Food and Agriculture Organization’s (FAO) Freedom From Hunger Campaign in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s to support their programmes for the alleviation of 
hunger, NGOs made use of these events to educate European publics about the 
problems facing the developing world. In so doing, they generated support for both 
the UN agencies and themselves.
In the case of the Appeal for Children, NGOs kept a share of the funds raised. In the 
case of the Freedom From Hunger Campaign, their rewards were more substantial. In 
addition to boosting their fund-raising efforts, the focus on hunger quickly shifted 
attention away from short-term solutions, such as feeding, to longer-term measures for 
the alleviation of poverty. This emphasis on political causes led to the creation of new 
NGOs and enlisted new supporters for existing ones. Many of these supporters had 
been members of Freedom From Hunger Campaign committees and were active in 
trade unions, political parties, professional associations and church groups. Many 
NGOs then began to call for more just and equitable policies towards the developing 
world. In support of these political objectives, several engaged in education campaigns 
at home, and development became the priority instead of relief. Thus, many NGOs
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became part of political movements in their own societies, together with other labour, 
political, social and religious groups.
Pressures on European governments to provide more aid to developing countries began 
to mount in the latter half of the 1950s. In 1954, the US Congress passed the Mutual 
Security Act which requested European governments to increase their programme of 
assistance to developing countries in order to prevent further advances of communism. 
In 1960, the creation of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) by national governments in the Northern Atlantic region incorporated a 
Development Advisory Group, renamed the Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) in 1961, partly in response to demands of the US Government that European 
nations expand their aid to developing countries. These requests coincided with a 
period of economic growth in Europe as well as an acceleration in the granting of 
national independence in much of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Expanding foreign 
aid programmes to these new nation-states was appealing to European governments 
who wanted to maintain their economic and political influence and to inter­
governmental organizations whose membership was increasingly dominated by these 
new countries. Subsequently, a resolution was passed by the UN in 1963 which not 
only called for more aid but specifically endorsed the work of the NGOs, both 
overseas and at home, and governmental subsidies to NGOs began to increase.
The rapid demise of colonial rule during the 1960s also brought increasing pressure 
on many churches to expand their assistance programmes to address the 
socioeconomic needs of members in the developing world. In response to calls from 
new member churches in Africa, the World Council of Churches proposed in 1958 
that all North Atlantic countries send 1 per cent of their individual incomes as aid to 
the developing world. This resolution was adopted by the General Assembly of the 
UN three years later. Within the churches, influential committees, such as the Second 
Vatican Council, individual leaders, such as the Pope, and returning missionaries 
supported similar movements for more just policies towards the developing world. In 
response, new NGOs were created with private funds raised during special church
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collections exclusively to meet socioeconomic needs, for example in the Netherlands 
and West Germany.
7.4 PVOs and NGOs in refugee relief: An essential institutional link in the 
new international health relief system
7.4.1 Caring for European refugees
It is difficult to document the exact numbers, names and histories of charitable 
organizations involved in refugee relief during WWII since their formation and 
involvement was often a fluid process. Moreover, analytical historical accounts of their 
combined work are very limited, excepting the numerous descriptions which focus on 
developing different categories or classifications of them. Original records which must 
be available are widely dispersed, addressing the work of individual agencies only.
Lador-Lederer, in a review of international NGOs in 1963, used European refugees as 
a case-study to show the types of NGOs which were involved and the ways in which 
they worked with each other and inter-govemmental organizations19. Even though he 
only gives a sketchy and poorly documented account, he does list 58 agencies who 
were members of the Standing Committee of Voluntary Agencies Working for 
Refugees (SCAWR) or who were interested in international migration (NGOIM). The 
Standing Committee was formed by NGOs working under the umbrella of the United 
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), originally only a dozen 
or so agencies in 1944. It was given consultative status with the Economic and Social 
Council of the new UN as well as with the Executive Committees of many specialised 
agencies of the UN, for example UNHCR. Such status meant that the Committee was 
able to send representatives to observe meetings of the Council and its committees, 
to review and comment on the provisional agenda of such meetings, to express views 
on subjects of concern to both the Council and the agencies and to gain access to 
documentation of the UN and to meetings and conferences of mutual concern20.
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Lador-Lederer’s list of member agencies is reproduced in Table 7.1. It does not 
represent all NGOs working in relief at that time since many well known agencies are 
not included, for example Oxfam, national Red Cross societies and Quaker groups. 
However, his list of agencies does highlight that nearly all these private charitable 
agencies were based in North America or Western Europe (56/58), many were 
affiliated with religious groups (26/58) or aimed to help targeted groups of people 
(such as persecuted ethnic groups, children or women) and several were international 
in focus or composition (29/58). Moreover, more than half still existed in 1989 and 
were listed in UNHCR’s directory of NGOs (29/58)21.
Lador-Lederer’s list also illustrates the beginnings of a new development in the 
organization of charitable or private agencies internationally. At least one-third of 
those agencies on his list were new organizations formed after WWII by groups of 
agencies. For example22, the World Council of Churches was formed in 1948 as a 
cooperation of over 280 Protestant, Anglican and Orthodox Churches. The Lutheran 
World Federation was founded in 1947 as an association of Lutheran Churches. 
Caritas International was established in 1950 as a federation of Catholic organizations 
involved in charitable or social work. These examples of some of the most prominent 
international charitable agencies in refugee relief work also highlight the religious base 
of many of the oldest and most well-established agencies. Such large global bodies not 
only facilitated fund raising, greater representation among governments and inter­
governmental organizations and increased international support for the work of 
member agencies individually, these new organizations provided an institutional 
structure through which charitable agencies could actively participate in formulating 
international relief policies and putting these policies into practice. This institutional 
structure would be more firmly established for charitable agencies as a whole a decade 
later when members of the Standing Committee, those interested in migration 
(NGOIM) and other individual agencies joined together in 1961 to form the 
International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA).
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Table 7.1
Charitable organizations working in the field of 
international migration and refugee relief, 196323
NGOIM: Non-governmental organizations interested in international migration 
SCAWR: Standing Committee of Voluntary Agencies Working for Refugees
AGENCY 
Name and location
NGOIM SCAWR
l.Agudas Israel World Organization X
2.Aide aux Israelites victimes de guerrel, Brussels X
3 American Federation of International Institutes X
4American Friends Service Committee, Philadelphia X X
5.American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees, New 
York
X X
6.American Joint Distribution Committee, New York - 
Paris
X X
7.American Polish War Relief, Geneva X
8.Brethren Service Commission, Geneva X X
9.Catholic International Union for Social Service X
lO.Church World Service X
11.Commission of the Churches on International 
Affairs
X
12.Common Council for American Unity X
13.Consultative Council of Jewish Organization, New 
York
X
14.Coordinating Goard of Jewish Organizations, New 
York
X
15.Emigratiesticking van de KNBTB X
16.Friend’s World Committee for Consultation X
17.Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society X X
18.International Catholic Girls Society X
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AGENCY 
Name and location
NGOIM SCAWR
19.1nternational Catholic Migration Commission, 
Geneva
X X
20.1ntemational Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva X
21.International Confedration of Free Trade Unions X
22.International Conference of Catholic Charities, 
Rome
X
23.Intemational Council of Catholic Charities X
24.Intemational Council of Women X
25.Intemational Federation of Agricultural Producers X
26.Intemational Federation of Christian Trade Unions X
27.1ntemational Federation of Friends of Young 
Women
X
28.1ntemational Labour Assistance, Brussels X X
29.1nternational Legal Assistance X
30.1nternational Relief Committee for Intellectual 
Workers, Geneva
X X
31.International Rescue Committee, Geneva X X
32.Intemational Social Service, Geneva X X
33.International Union for Child Welfare X
34.Jewish Agency for Paliestine, Jerusalem-Geneva X
35.Lutheran World Federation, Geneva X X
36.National Catholic Welfare Conference, Geneva - 
New York
X X
37.0euvre de Protection des Enfants Juifs, Paris X
38.Pax Romana X
39.Refugee Service Committee for Greece, Athens X
40.Secours Catholique X
41.Secours International de Caritas Catholica, Brussels X X
42.Service Social c’Aide aux Immigrants, Paris X
232
AGENCY 
Name and location
NGOIM SCAWR
43.Swiss Aid to Europe, Berne X X
44.Swiss Central Office for Aid to Refugees, Zurich X
45 .Tolstoy Foundation, Munich X
46.Unitarian Service Committee, Massachusetts X
47.United HIAS Service, Paris-New York: see #17 X X
48.United Lithuanian Relief Fund of America X
49.United Service for New Americans, New York X
50.United Ukrainian American Relief Committee, 
Munich
X
51.World Alliance of YMCA/YWCA (World’s 
YMCA/YWCA Service for Refugees)
X X
52.World Assembly of Youth X
53.World Council of Churches, Geneva X X
54.World Jewish Congress, Geneva - New York X
55.World ORT Union, Geneva X X
56.World OSE Union, Paris X X
57.World Union of Catholic Women’s Organizations X
58.World University Service, Geneva X X
Total = 58 agencies 46 32
7.4.2 Locally based agencies in the developing world extend their services to 
refugees
With the exception of Palestinian refugees in the Middle East who were initially cared 
for by charitable agencies, for example the American Friend’s Society which look full 
responsibility for refugees in Gaza in 1949 at the request of the UN24, most 
charitable agencies which worked with refugees in the 1950s and 1960s did so in 
Africa where the largest concentration of refugees were living. Instead of ushering in
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peace and prosperity, independence from colonial rule was frequently accompanied by 
the creation of borders which divided ethnic, cultural and social groups, by a shift in 
power to yet another foreign force or by mass violations of human rights as conflicts 
between different groups flared up. Together with liberation and separatist movements 
or newly sparked armed conflicts within nations, Africa housed the largest, growing 
refugee population in the world. There were an estimated 400 000 in 1964 and nearly 
1 million three years later when the Nigerian civil war erupted, displacing 4.5 million 
civilians in only a years time. Thirty-five of 41 African nation-states hosted refugees 
by 1968, 11 of which were located in the Sahel. Furthermore, these Sahelian nations 
frequently hosted refugees from more than one country simultaneously.
Concerns were understandably growing and this focused attention within governments 
and the UN on Africa25. The UN, through the Economic Commission on Africa 
(UNECA) and the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), together with the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation in 
Sweden consequently sponsored the first African conference on the legal, economic 
and social needs of refugees in 1967. Important outcomes of this conference included 
the adoption of the OAU Refugee Convention of 1969 and the creation of the OAU 
Bureau for the Placement and Education of African Refugees to coordinate assistance 
to African refugees26.
Charitable agencies, while not participating in the 1967 conference, played a key role 
in the delivery of care. Most who aided refugees were associated with Christian 
religions based in Europe or North America. In fact, the church-based agencies were 
perceived as the only African institutions working to solve the practical problems of 
refugees27. Many were linked to missions and had programmes extending beyond 
religious schooling to developing primary school education and health services for the 
communities in which they worked. These agencies were, therefore, often the first to 
help refugees. Their knowledge of local languages and customs as well as good
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relations with many governments and the existence of on-going social programmes in 
education and health meant that some were ideally suited to expand their services to 
include refugees or to set up new ones. Others, whose infrastructure and programme 
of work could not easily accommodate a large number of additional beneficiaries, 
often provided an entry for larger denominational agencies who could then set up 
relief and resettlement services specifically for refugees.
In many of the programmes for refugees during the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s, it 
was the latter group - the international denominational agencies - which acted as the 
implementing or ’operational partner* of UNHCR28. As such, the Lutheran World 
Federation (LWF), Catholic Relief Services (CRS), World Council of Churches 
(WCC), Caritas, YMCA and Quaker organizations took responsibility for the 
management and implementation of a variety of programmes for refugees in Africa, 
ranging from running hospitals and first aid stations to clearing land for agricultural 
settlements. In addition, most provided funds, materials and personnel from their own 
resources, even for programmes run by governments or other local charitable 
organizations. The All Africa Conference of Churches (AACC), with support from the 
World Council of Churches, set up an Ecumenical Programme for Emergency Action 
in Africa in 1965 to meet the basic and longer-term needs of refugees through existing 
church and governmental structures29. The Lutheran World Federation even created 
separate national organizations specifically to manage and provide services for 
refugees in Tanzania and Zambia under an agreement with UNHCR and the 
governments concerned.
The other charitable agencies most involved in refugee health relief during that period 
were the Red Cross societies. The League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 
which had been founded in 1919 *to encourage and promote the establishment and 
cooperation of duly authorized charitable national Red Cross organizations having as 
purposes the improvement of health, the prevention of disease and the mitigation of
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suffering throughout the world’30 had provided extensive assistance and leadership 
in relief efforts in Europe during and after WWII. It was, therefore, often asked by 
UNHCR to work in African refugee programmes. For example, in Burundi (1962-63 
and 1972), the Central African Republic (1969), Senegal (1965-66), Tanzania (1963- 
64), Togo (1962), Uganda (1972) and Zaire (1961-64)31.
African Red Cross societies were also significant providers of care, though usually in 
collaboration with either the League or another national society from Europe or North 
America. However, in practice the Red Cross was not the most suitable partner for 
UNHCR since its mandate was limited to short-term relief and did not include longer 
term rehabilitation or resettlement. Near the end of the 1960s, therefore, the League 
and UNHCR agreed that other agencies would be asked to assist in resettlement or 
rehabilitation schemes for refugees32. Thus began the decline of the Red Cross from 
a leading role in refugee health policy formulation and programme implementation33 
since it was unable or unwilling to adapt to the changed context in which refugee 
relief was needed and provided. Nevertheless, continuing and growing needs for 
disaster relief led the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies to establish a 
Steering Committee for Disasters in 1972, jointly with charitable organizations playing 
key roles in health relief, including Caritas International, Catholic Relief Services, 
Lutheran World Federation, Oxfam UK and the World Council of Churches. This 
Committee provided a forum through which information was exchanged and published 
and the spirit of cooperation was fostered34.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Growth or partnership?
Charitable organizations as ’the most vital component 
of the whole aid network’1 in the post-colonial era1
8.1 The 1970s: Strengthening and consolidating partnerships with
governments and inter-governmental agencies
8.1.1 Private Voluntary Organizations and the ’New Directions’ mandate
Although the proportion of Private Voluntary Organization (PVO) income provided 
by the US Government had risen substantially from 10.5% in 1953 to 20.2% in 1964 
and to 27.5% in 1973, in 1972 PVOs received only 1.5% of the budget of the US 
Agency for International Development (USAID). Concerns for greater popular 
participation in development programmes were followed in the early 1970s by 
criticisms of foreign aid policies and practices by many scholars as well as growing 
opposition to prolonging the involvement of the US in the Vietnam War. Within this 
political context, Congressional leaders attempted to refocus foreign aid priorities on 
economic and humanitarian assistance as well as an expanded role for PVOs. In 1973, 
a ’new directions’ mandate was formulated for US development assistance which 
matched closely the stated realm of PVO expertise.
’Private and voluntary organizations and cooperatives ... embodying the 
American spirit of self-help and assistance to others to improve their lives and 
income, constitute an important means of mobilizing private American 
financial and human resources to benefit poor people in developing countries. 
The Congress declares that it is in the interest of the United States that such 
organizations and cooperatives expand their overseas development efforts 
without compromising their private and development nature. The Congress 
further declares that the financial resources of such organizations and 
cooperatives should be supplemented by the contribution of public funds for
\  Similar to the previous chapter, unless otherwise referenced, the information in this 
chapter has been taken from: Smith BH (1991) More than altruism. The politics of private 
foreign aid. Princeton, New Jersey, USA: Princeton University Press, 284 pp.
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the purpose of undertaking development activities in accordance with the 
principles set forth in the [Foreign Assistance Act]'.2
Despite the potential for these shifts in policy to be interpreted by some as promoting 
socialist movements or encouraging poorer people to put pressure for a redistribution 
of wealth, the aims of this legislation were to generate renewed confidence among US 
and foreign publics as well as the Governments of recipient countries that US foreign 
aid emphasized the alleviation of poverty and more equitable economic development. 
In other words, it was not to be seen as a means for interfering in others' political 
affairs. In 1974, the Office for Private and Voluntary Cooperation was created within 
USAID specifically to work with PVOs, and throughout the remaining years of that 
decade government funding of PVOs expanded, accounting for 38.95% of total PVO 
income and for 14.3% of the USAID budget in 1982. In 1981, this amounted to more 
than 700 million USS3. Moreover, since 1973 USAID has made funding commitments 
for up to three years, facilitating more stable financial planning.
Increased governmental funding for PVOs was essential for continued growth within 
individual agencies as well as in the PVO sector as a whole. Between 1973 and 1983, 
private contributions to PVOs fell sharply, from 1.6 billion US$ to 1.36 billion USS - 
a decline of 19.5% in real value. As a percentage of Gross National Product (GNP), 
private contributions for foreign assistance fell from 2.01% in 1972 to 1.83% in 1981. 
Moreover, nearly two-thirds of private donations to PVOs were given to the largest 
PVOs, leaving smaller agencies to compete for small sums. For many PVOs, the 
administrative costs associated with intensive fund-raising efforts may well have offset 
the gains of funds raised privately.
8.1.2 Non-governmental Organizations and the evolution of a Basic Human 
Needs strategy
At the end of the 1960s, student movements in Europe took up various foreign policy 
issues, and aid to developing countries became a more central concern in many 
debates. Unlike similar movements in the US during the 1960s which were somewhat
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narrowly focused on discriminative practices and mandatory conscription during the 
Vietnam War, movements in Europe during the late 1960s and early 1970s were 
overtly ideological with many left perspectives gaining in popularity. For example, 
some Catholic and labour groups in France broke with the Catholic Church in order 
to support fairer trade policies, the suspension of the sale of arms to developing 
countries and the end of privilege for former colonies and territories. Moreover, 
centre-left parties held power in several European countries which were sympathetic 
to Third World causes, for example in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Great Britain, The 
Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. Many centre-right parties also felt that more help 
should be given to developing countries.
Yet, aid as a percentage of GNP from countries with membership in the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) had been declining, from 0.42% 
in 1967 to 0.29% in 1973. Widespread poverty and low levels of expenditure on 
foreign aid prompted a series of initiatives throughout the 1970s which called for 
profound changes in existing economic and political policies of wealthy nations 
towards their peers in the developing world. These initiatives had their origins in 
Europe and all went far beyond the ’New Directions’ mandate in the US, emphasising 
’equity, equality, sovereignty, interdependence, common interests and cooperation 
among all’4. Nonetheless, economic considerations remained the central concern5. 
Calls for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) by the UN General Assembly 
in 1974 stimulated extensive discussions by the UN in 1974, the Club of Rome in the 
same year, the OECD in 1975 and 1977, the International Labour Organization in 
1976 and the Brandt Commission in 1978. Many of these discussions, however, failed 
to end with concrete agreements on a way forward or they failed to be specific and 
realistic enough to have any impact in practice.
There were, nonetheless, distinct effects on aid practices. Many European governments 
increased aid to Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) along with some inter­
governmental organizations. The Government of the UK, for example, set up a 
Disaster Unit within the Overseas Development Ministry (ODM) in 1974 to work with 
prominent NGOs, especially members of the Disaster Emergency Committee - a joint
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effort of some of the main NGOs since 1963 to lobby for greater support6. In 
response to the New International Economic Order, the UN established a Non­
governmental Liaison Service (UNNGLS) in Geneva in 1975 to support networking 
and information services by NGOs as well as their programmes for development 
education and policy advocacy7. The European Economic Community (EEC) created 
a NGO Liaison Committee in 1976 when they began to co-fund NGO projects. In 
1979, co-funding was extended to include domestic educational activities about 
development issues and the provision of food and emergency aid8; by 1983 the EEC 
provided 13 million Ecu for emergency aid and 24 million Ecu for development, 
excluding food aid which had a separate budget of 52 million Ecu. Overall, public aid 
which was channelled through NGOs increased dramatically, 425% in constant value, 
from 160 million US$ in 1973 to 680 million US$ in 1983. The percentage of NGO 
income from governments rose from 16% to 36% during the same period.
8.1.2.1 Targeting basic needs
This interest in supporting NGOs was an outcome of at least five developments. 
Firstly, the 1977 policy paper of the OECD, Development Cooperation for Economic 
Growth and Basic Human Needs, gave priority to programmes which met basic 
survival needs of the poor in developing countries. Like PVOs who were thought to 
be best placed to carry out the ’New Directions’ mandate, NGOs were thought to be 
better suited to meet Basic Human Needs (BHN) because of their ability to engage in 
technical and welfare programmes at local levels and because widespread beliefs held 
that they carried them out more efficiently (not necessarily democratically)9 than 
inter-governmental or bilateral agencies.
8.1.2.2 Generating popular support
Secondly, governmental grants were thought to encourage NGOs to continue and 
expand their fund-raising efforts among private individuals and institutions. Privately 
donated aid was seen as a means for increasing the total amount10, but more 
importantly the impact, of foreign aid without additional cost to governments. In 1981
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European NGOs sent over 600 million US$ abroad from their own resources; private 
donations accounted for more than 90% of the total income of 42% of NGOs surveyed 
in 1982 while contributions from national governments provided less than 10% of the 
total income of 72% of agencies surveyed11.
8.1.2.3 Achieving goals for national expenditures on aid
Thirdly, this also helped governments in achieving higher percentages of expenditure 
on aid - set at 0.7% of GNP in 1971. Aid as a percentage of GNP which was sent 
through NGOs in 11 European countries rose from a low of 0.034 (in the UK) in 1973 
to 0.25% (in Switzerland) in 1982; total aid to developing countries by NGOs in five 
European countries (Belgium, Finland, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden) accounted 
for more than 10% of official development assistance during the same year12.
8.1.2.4 Extending national influence abroad
Fourthly, by the end of the 1970s, NGOs were working in over one hundred countries; 
to match such widespread influence independently, governments would have had to 
set up many new missions and offices overseas - a costly undertaking. Lastly, NGOs 
themselves were lobbying for governmental subsidies since the economic crises 
associated with dramatic rises in the price of oil in 1973 and again in 1978 had 
reduced the rate of growth in private donations.
8.2 The 1980s: the decade of Private Voluntary Organizations and Non* 
Governmental Organizations13
8.2.1 The apolitical face of PVOs: Focusing on disaster relief and health care
The evolution of PVOs in US society has been characterised since the second World 
War (WWII) by increasingly close cooperation with and support from the US 
Government. The links between PVOs and their Government, however, go beyond 
financial dependency. During the 1980s, many of the characteristics of US society
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which had contributed to an expanded role for PVOs in foreign aid programmes led 
to the emergence of disaster relief and health care as favoured overseas activities for 
PVOs.
8.2.1.1 Avoiding political associations
While the US Government was preoccupied with using food surpluses to expand the 
market for domestic agricultural products and with supporting programmes in 
countries where alliances were thought to further security and economic interests, the 
US public was in favour of aid which was more technical in nature and which relieved 
suffering immediately14. Surveys in the 1970s and 1980s found that US citizens were 
ignorant about development issues and that, unlike their European counterparts, few 
PVOs had initiated campaigns to educate their own public before the mid-1980s. 
Widespread ignorance and disinterest in a society without any significant following 
for more left political perspectives meant that many PVOs avoided associating 
themselves with political activities and causes. Those which were engaged in 
programmes with political overtones down played this work in their public image. 
Thus, PVOs failed to attract individuals actively working for change in political 
policies and practices; nor did they establish links with politically active organizations.
Instead, many tailored their aid programmes, or at least their presentation to the 
public, to emphasise disaster relief and health care activities, which were favoured by 
over 70% and 60% respectively of US citizens in surveys carried out in 1972 and 
1986. Educational efforts by PVOs among their own public in general did not 
incorporate political analyses or explanations; rather, they drew upon more emotional 
or sentimental responses to urgent needs, such as images of stark starvation15. The 
provision of governmental funds since 1981 for education of the US public in 
development issues reinforced these tendencies by prohibiting the presentation of 
politically partisan views.
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8.2.1.2 Fostering governmental support
Like their efforts to influence public perceptions, efforts by PVOs to influence 
governmental policies have been somewhat narrow in scope. Despite attempts by the 
American Council of Voluntary Agencies (ACVAFS) and Private Agencies in 
International Development (PAID - a federation of many of the new and smaller 
agencies) in 1983 to advocate (unsuccessfully) for a separation of economic and 
military assistance16, collective efforts of the American Council for Voluntary 
International Action (INTERACTION - formed in 1984 by the merger of the 
American Council of Voluntary Agencies (ACVAFS) and Private Agencies in 
International Development (PAID)) or attempts by individual agencies to influence 
governmental policies have been limited in scope. Priority has often been given, for 
example, to lobbying for increased governmental subsidies for PVOs or greater 
flexibility in governmental regulation of PVO activities17. Concern for their own 
institutional preservation and growth appears to have been paramount.
8.2.1.3 Documenting their successes and comparative advantages
Substantial governmental funding of PVOs in the 1980s has had at least three 
additional benefits for PVOs which have further consolidated and expanded their roles 
in foreign aid programmes. Firstly, governmental requirements for evaluation of 
existing projects and the provision of resources needed to carry them out have enabled 
PVOs to document empirically their achievements. Despite controversy about the 
quality or scope of review of evaluations undertaken18, evidence has been gathered 
that not only are some of their programmes technically sound but that PVOs have 
comparative advantages over governmental and inter-governmental organizations. Even 
the identification of weaknesses has benefited PVOs, by highlighting faults in project 
designs and institutional needs for better project management, for example. The 
correction of such weaknesses promises greater success, generating more support for 
both solving existing problems and continuing modified programmes.
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8.2.1.4 Scaling up
Secondly, scaling up governmental funding has allowed PVOs to develop their 
professional capabilities and to undertake larger and more complex programmes. This 
has been accompanied by management by professionals and by involvement in more 
diverse activities. In creating a new social role for professionals, Cumper19 concluded 
that it was possible because of the expanding resources and spheres of influence. In 
turn, leadership by professionals reoriented charitable agencies towards further 
expansion, but at the expense of traditional administrators. Current conflicts between 
administrative and professional staff in most charities may well indicate an on-going 
struggle for power within the agencies, rather than a clear decision in favour of one 
or the other.
Thirdly, greater professional characteristics and access to vast resources has enabled 
some PVOs to work with recipient governmental agencies, for example ministries of 
health. Without large sums of money and technical expertise, collaboration with PVOs 
in the delivery of national social services would not be taken seriously by receiving 
governments or by aid agencies of donor governments.
8.2.1.5 Working within governmental restrictions
Disadvantages are obvious. At times, certain countries have been excluded, such as 
Cuba, Nicaragua, North Korea and Vietnam. Other countries in less need have instead 
been targeted, for example Israel and Egypt received over one-half of USAID’s total 
assistance budget in 198020. The types of projects have similarly been limited, for 
example the reliance on food aid in order to create markets for US grain and dairy 
products precluded some projects to promote local agricultural growth. Relationships 
with local and national colleagues were often strained as a result. Some PVOs have 
refused governmental funds in principal, such as OXFAM America, the American 
Friends Service Committee and World Neighbours21, or for selected countries or 
projects. Others have made their concerns known to government officials. Yet, they 
do so with a government which has not hesitated in the past to impose legal or
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financial restrictions to ensure that PVO activities are compatible with foreign policy 
objectives. Congressional legislation has been used to prevent shipment of seeds and 
tools to Nicaragua, for example, and official approval of other PVO aid to 
’blacklisted* countries has been excessively delayed22. Many other PVOs have 
slowly, but surely, assimilated the views and policies put forward by their 
Government.
8.2.2 Advocates for development: NGOs as important players in domestic 
politics
In contrast with US PVOs which placed disaster relief and technical aid foremost on 
their institutional agendas, NGOs in Europe and Canada continued to give 
developmental needs highest priority throughout the 1980s. In so doing, they continued 
to espouse more overtly political objectives than their US counterparts. One effect was 
an increasing emphasis on programmes rather than individual projects as well as the 
need to advocate for more just policies, both nationally and internationally23. One of 
the key strategies adopted by NGOs was to educate their own publics about the 
structural injustices in the global political economy which underlie poverty. Unlike 
PVOs which did not substantially engage in domestic educational campaigns before 
the mid-1980s, most NGOs had made significant efforts to do so in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. Later in the 1980s, for example, British NGOs took up the need to 
resolve conflicts in Central America as well as the need to reschedule or write off 
mounting foreign debts in many developing countries24.
Their efforts built upon a long history of colonial associations with the developing 
world25. These efforts were made in a political context which highlighted the links 
between conditions in developing countries and the policies and practices of 
industrialised nations: for example, fluctuating terms of trade, widespread civil and 
international armed conflict, growing populations, extensive movements of large 
groups of people and mounting stresses within an international financial system 
plagued with a debt crisis26. To Cumper’s list, the varied components of macro- 
economic structural adjustment programmes need to be added, especially growing
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support for privately organised and managed initiatives27. Understandably, by the 
mid-1980s, surveys found that most Europeans (60%-80%) attributed poverty to global 
injustices which sanctioned the exploitation of people living in the developing world 
by industrial countries or wealthy elites within their own societies.
The focus on development was not only supported by well-educated and professional 
segments of European publics28 but also by other private organizations who had links 
with political groups or who were themselves advocating political change. Many of 
the latter were officially represented on governing boards, influencing the direction 
taken by NGOs. The adoption of more politically determined strategies was also 
influenced greatly by the political orientation of staff members. Unlike staff of PVOs 
who had previously held positions in business or other PVOs, or who had worked for 
the US Government, executives of NGOs rarely came from backgrounds in 
government or business. Instead, many had significant academic experience and they 
maintained close links with institutions specialising in development issues. Others had 
been active in political movements - especially those with leftist perspectives. Those 
who worked for church-based NGOs frequently had served as missionaries in 
developing countries. In general, previous experience which gave greater attention to 
the politics of development engendered more critical attitudes and awareness among 
NGO executives and staff. Thus, many NGOs are characterised by their political 
convictions about development policies and their ability to sway segments of public 
opinion in support of their views.
8.2.2.1 Generating substantial funds privately
The popular appeal of NGOs grew and along with it financial contributions from a 
variety of sources. For example, donations from private sources which were used 
overseas by NGOs in countries with membership on the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) totalled over 4 billion US$ in 198629, an increase of 100% from 
figures quoted by Burnell30 for 1980. Yet, these private grants comprised a mere 5 - 
15% of official development assistance from DAC countries31 and over half came 
from the US32. Unlike van Heemst’s33 findings in 1982 in which private donations
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constituted a very large proportion of NGOs income, Burnell quotes a much lower 
figure of just over one-half for the top 400 charities in Britain in 1991. Nonetheless, 
256 million US$ in the UK alone was a significant sum in 1989, especially when 
compared with 34 million US$ in 1970 and 120 million US$ in 198034.
8.2.2.2 Collaboration with inter-govemmental agencies
Inter-governmental organizations also set up or expanded closer cooperation with 
NGOs. In 1979, for example, the DAC of OECD met with the International Council 
of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) in the Erst of a series of meetings which eventually 
led to permanent arrangements for consultation between NGOs and their governments 
in some member countries. The World Bank set up a liaison committee in 1982 and 
has since employed NGOs as advisors or subcontractors on some of its projects35. 
Specific guidelines for collaborating with NGOs were later written by the Bank in 
1988. Similarly, NGOs have been recognised as ’an integral part of [European] 
Community policy in the field of development cooperation’36, and by the late 1980s, 
nearly 10% of the European Commission’s funds for development cooperation were 
spent through NGOs. By 1987, 2500 development projects in over 100 countries were 
implemented by more than 300 NGOs which were co-funded by the European 
Commission37.
8.2.2.3 Expanded governmental support
Concurrent with continued growth in private and inter-govemmental support, European 
and Canadian Governments increased their grants to NGOs. Some did so substantially, 
such as the Governments of Belgium, the Netherlands and West Germany who gave 
their NGOs 6% of official development assistance in 1985; others were less generous, 
such as the Governments of France and the UK who gave less than 2% of their 
official development assistance to NGOs in the same year38. Like USAID, many 
approved grants for several years and some provided block grants which could be used 
at the discretion of the NGO. Similar to PVOs, governmental funding Jed to improved 
evaluation of NGO projects, highlighting lower costs associated with NGO
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programmes, some success in reaching the poorest, the value of raising awareness 
among local participants, and improvements in health services, water supplies and 
subsistence food production.
NGOs continued to be seen by their governments as alternate channels of influence 
abroad39. In countries governed by repressive regimes, aid sent through NGOs was 
viewed as a symbolic gesture of support to the people. Somewhat similarly, NGOs 
were a vehicle through which support could be given to liberation movements without 
challenging official policies. In some regions, such as Central America, aiding NGOs 
helped to create an image of Europe which was independent of US objectives40 - 
again without challenging official policies.
In cases where official development policies may have detrimental effects on 
minorities, an NGO’s presence and their provision for basic needs may be seen on the 
one hand to counter-balance unwanted consequences, for example, macro-economic 
structural adjustment policies and large scale commercial development of 
environmental resources. On the other hand, they may also be the means through 
which official policies of foreign entities may be influenced, including those of 
governments. Similar to their US peers, NGOs have increasingly been viewed as a 
means to promote private initiatives - not only abroad but at home in a climate of 
conservative policies stressing private mechanisms, even for aid41. Ideologically, 
NGOs are thought to be tangible evidence of the merits of liberal societies and 
democratic polities42. NGOs also provide additional eyes and ears, gathering 
information about local events and perceptions which may not be readily accessible 
otherwise. The private and autonomous status of NGOs in law served as a buffer for 
European governments.
At home, the political character of NGOs and their appeal to significant segments of 
European and Canadian societies has meant that they have played an equally important 
role in domestic politics43. Governmental co-funding of NGOs has allowed parties 
in power to meet popular and opposing party demands that aid be given to the poor 
in developing countries. Enthusiasm within official circles for the Joint Funding
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Scheme in Britain was so great that the budget quadrupled between 1981-82 and 1989- 
90, and 70% of it was given in the form of block grants to selected NGOs by 198744. 
Thus, in Britain, the Government met demands for aid at very low cost - only 0.27% 
of official development aid in 1983; during the 1980s, the UK Government’s aid fell 
both in real terms and as a percentage of GNP, from 0.44% in 1977 to 0.31% in 1989. 
Moreover, the increasing use of government-assisted volunteers enabled the Overseas 
Development Administration of the UK to reduce the number of publicly financed 
technical cooperation personnel, from over 17 000 in 1970 to just over 3000 in 
198845.
Governmental support for NGO projects in particular countries, for example those 
excluded from bilateral assistance or those known to abuse human rights, may be used 
to appease those who oppose official policies of isolation or preferential treatment of 
selected regimes. Others claim that supporting NGOs is a way in which governments 
have avoided giving greater priority to the needs of developing countries and the 
commitments it would then entail. Despite a substantial following, supporters of 
overseas aid are a minority in many countries and NGOs are one way in which their 
demands have been satisfied46.
8.2.2.4 Responding to governmental incentives and punitive measures
But like the US Government which has used legal and financial restrictions to control 
PVO activities abroad, European governments have also used incentives and punitive 
measures to direct the overseas work of NGOs. For example, the Overseas 
Development Administration (ODA) of the UK Government has kept close watch on 
certain projects and has delayed approving others, especially in Nicaragua, Korea and 
Vietnam. Governmental grants have been diverted from troublesome NGOs to those 
with more compatible views, for example diminished grants to Oxfam in Belgium and 
the UK for their work among Palestinians or their attempts to inform and mobilised 
the British public respectively. Governmental grants have also been limited to certain 
types of projects or to certain countries. For example, only 22% of grants to NGOs 
from the Belgian Government between 1976 and 1981 were for projects to mobilise
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and raise awareness among local people47; the UK Government prefers to fund 
projects in countries which are members of the Commonwealth and has, at times, 
denied funding for work in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Guatemala and 
Vietnam48.
Tax exemptions are confined in Britain and Canada, for example, to only those 
agencies which do not engage in politically partisan activities49 and they can be 
withdrawn at any time. Governmental funding of a project or NGO can also be 
withdrawn or refused. Lastly, the option to fund directly local development 
organizations in developing countries has been experimented with by US Foundations, 
governmental aid agencies and the World Bank, for example50; this poses the 
possibilities of a new set of relationships which may render many roles of NGOs 
superfluous, especially since such local organizations have proliferated in recent years 
more rapidly and extensively than their counterparts in Northern Atlantic countries51.
However, these mechanisms have been used most often in more subtle ways since 
there is little evidence that the work of NGOs is significantly affecting opinions in 
societies at home or abroad. The lack of widespread popular criticism of foreign 
policies has meant that NGOs have only influenced change in less prominent issues 
or at the margins of fundamental policies. Moreover, the political orientation of many 
NGOs has been countered in recent years by the emergence of new NGOs with 
opposing points of view. For example, the creation of Medecins Sans Frontieres 
(MSF) in France provided the means to denounce left-wing criticisms which were 
articulated by older, leftist NGOs - by a peer rather than by the Government who was 
the target of much of the critique. Thus, French NGOs have become obvious and 
significant players in various domestic political battles. Not only did this allow 
officials to distance themselves from some sensitive issues, but it divided the NGO 
community, weakening its ability to lobby government and other powerful institutions 
effectively.
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83  The new and pivotal role of relief for institutional growth; making the
most of the sensational
83.1 Refugees and displaced persons: a uniquely political disaster
Similar to previous decades, Africa continued to host the largest concentration of 
refugees and displaced persons throughout the 1970s. By 1981, one of every two 
refugees in the world were African and more than five million of them were living in 
Africa52. During the 1970s forced migrations took place on an unprecedented scale, 
beginning with the tragedies surrounding the civil war between the Federal 
Government of Nigeria and the Regional Government of Biafra and continuing with 
the fight for an end to white rule in southern African nations and the severe famine 
in the Sahelian countries between 1972 and 1975.
The Nigerian civil war, Bangladesh’s cyclone and war of independence and the famine 
in the Sahel invoked the largest relief operations since WWII. They illustrated the 
highly political nature of forced migrations and any attempt to aid those affected by 
them. Partly because of their highly charged character and partly because newly 
developed technologies enabled them to be publicised instantaneously around the 
world, attempts to provide relief were dominated by the political interests of those 
involved, challenging previous practices of giving responsibilities for relief to official 
bodies - especially those affiliated with governments53. This not only created the 
possibilities for charitable organizations to expand their roles in relief, it actively 
encouraged them to do so. This was true partly because of their non-governmental 
image and partly because no single agency had been able to provide relief in a timely 
and equitable way, especially to both sides of warring factions. As a result, refugee 
relief would become a pivotal activity for the growth and well-being of the charitable 
sector during the 1970s but especially during the 1980s.
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83.2 Beyond the frontline: Charities as partners in official policy making 
processes for refugee relief
Unlike the first African conference on refugee affairs in 1967 which was an 
undertaken by governmental and inter-govemmental bodies, the second conference was 
proposed, prepared and attended by charitable agencies working with African refugees. 
It was the All Africa Conference of Churches (AACQ which called for a Consultation 
on the Rights and Problems of Refugees in Independent Africa in 1977 and which 
formed a planning committee for it together with the International University 
Exchange Fund, the Lutheran World Federation, the World Council of Churches and 
the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.
Recognising the need for governmental support and subsequent action, the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU), the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 
(UNECA) were then invited to sponsor the Pan-African Arusha Conference on the 
African Refugee Problem. The Tanzanian Government subsequently hosted this 
conference in 1979, when estimates for the previous year (1978) placed the current 
refugee population in Africa above 4 million and when UNHCR alone had spent 54 
million US$ to assist more than 23 African nations to care for them. Of the 37 
charitable agencies which attended this conference, only four were genuinely African 
and, like nearly half of the other agencies participating, they were affiliated with 
Christian churches. Some organizations were primarily funding agencies and others 
had more narrowly defined interests in refugee relief, such as the Ford Foundation, the 
Danish and Norwegian Refugee Councils and Amnesty International54. Irrespective 
of the particular interests of individual agencies, their collective efforts to organise and 
participate in the conference laid the foundations for a new role in the policy making 
arena of refugee relief.
8 3 3  Justifying refugee relief on the basis of need
Growing concerns about the numbers and plight of refugees were, unfortunately, well 
founded. The advent of the 1980s was marked by the creation of millions of new 
refugees in each continent of the developing world. Vivid images of people on the 
verge of death or forced into exile began in 1979 with the horrors of famine, torture 
and systematic oppression in Cambodia and continued in 1980 and 1981 with the 
escalation of armed conflict between the Soviet-allied Government and US-backed 
rebels in Afghanistan, the defeat of the US-supported Somali forces attempting to 
reclaim the Ogaden from the Soviet-backed Government of Ethiopia, and the 
devastation from scorched earth policies, widespread torture and violence by the US- 
backed regime in Guatemala against rebel groups and Indian communities in rural 
areas. These four crises generated the largest officially recognised refugee populations 
in their respective continents of Africa, Latin America, South Asia and Southeast Asia 
in the 1980s.
Needs were desperate and acute, and global publicity evoked responses from all. 
During a visit to the Philippines in 1981, Pope John Paul II said that ’of all the human 
tragedies of our day, perhaps the greatest is that of refugees’55. Unlike those 
displaced during struggles for colonial independence in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
numbers of people who were displaced forcibly and the period of time they required 
care and assistance rose at a staggering pace. By 1981, estimates placed the global 
refugee population at over 8 million and the number of additional people displaced 
over 4.5 million56. The nature of the wars, armed conflicts and violations of human 
rights from which many of the officially recognised refugees in particular had fled, 
together with the interests of others in exploiting their exile for political purposes57, 
meant that it was unlikely that they would be able to return to their homes in the 
foreseeable future. Increasingly lengthy periods of asylum were compounded by the 
large numbers of people fleeing as a group58. Hundreds of thousands, even millions, 
of an ethnic, political or religious group of people seeking refuge together was 
increasingly widespread.
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83.4 Aiding refugees confers International recognition
Similar to the Nigerian civil war and the famine in the Sahel in the 1970s, the highly 
political nature of these refugee crises in early 1980 was again evident. Sir Robert 
Jackson, for example, said of relief efforts in Cambodia, ’no humanitarian operation 
in this century has been so totally and continuously influenced by political factors’59. 
In fact, Coles60 observed that the Indochinese conflict made refugees an ’in’ cause 
among wealthy nations for the first time since the cold war. In support of this analysis 
she noted that the second granting of the Nobel Peace Prize to UNHCR came in 1981; 
the first such award was granted in 1954. Not surprisingly, the charities were quickly 
and prominently engaged in these relief operations.
No doubt the efforts of the charitable agencies in the relief operations in the late 
1970s and early 1980s in particular influenced their role in the first International 
Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA I). Held by the United 
Nations and the OAU in Geneva in 1981 in response to concerns about the African 
refugee problem raised by the General Assembly of the UN, this conference provided 
a forum through which charitable agencies were acknowledged and accepted by 
official institutions as legitimate and equal participants in not only international relief 
operations but also development programmes more generally. According to Michael 
Harris , a former director of Oxfam UK’s Overseas Department, the first International 
Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA I) ’was a major breakthrough 
in the recognition of NGOs.’61
The important roles played by charitable agencies in caring for refugees was 
acknowledged most readily by recipient governments. In 1981, for example, the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) Council of Ministers requested ’a meeting of 
all the charitable agencies having refugee programmes in Africa in order to develop 
a coordinated strategy and map out further action’62. This meeting was again 
organised by many of the same organizations; the OAU, UNHCR and UNECA 
represented African Governments and the UN while Caritas International, Catholic 
Relief Services, the International Council of Voluntary Agencies, Lutheran World
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Federation and World Council of Churches/All African Conference of Churches 
represented the charitable sector.
The numbers of agencies which took part in this meeting was larger and their 
particular roles in refugee relief were more varied than before. This was partly because 
needs were so great and partly in preparation for the second International Conference 
on Assistance for Refugees in Africa (ICARA II) which was being planned for the 
following year. There were 68 charitable agencies which attended this meeting along 
with six agencies of the UN and several branches of the OAU. Of these 68 agencies, 
only half were explicitly affiliated with churches. Like before, others were funding 
agencies or had a particular concern, including a growing interest by academics. At 
least 8 participants represented research or consulting institutions. In contrast, there 
were only two governments represented, Canada and the US, although the 
Commonwealth Secretariat also participated.
83.5 Working for, with or instead of agencies of the UN?
Like African Governments, specialised agencies of the UN also sought to strengthen 
their links with charitable agencies. In 1983, the United Nations Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) hosted its first annual 
consultation with charitable agencies. In the second such consultation in 1984, 30 
agencies participated, representing organizations affiliated with churches, universities, 
unions, refugee councils and international movements for migration, development and 
relief. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the 
Near East (UNRWA) stated reasons for creating and continuing this liaison highlighted 
the valuable role of the charitable agencies in publicising the needs of refugees and 
in raising increasing sums of money for their own programmes as well as those of the 
UN63. Similarly, close relationships were established between the special Office for 
Emergency Operations in Africa (OEOA) of the UN and charitable agencies during 
the relief effort for the famine in the Horn of Africa between 1984 and 198664. Like 
other UN agencies, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian 
Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and the special Office for Emergency
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Operations in Africa (OEOA) responded not only to popular recognition of charitable 
agencies as key partners in refugee relief but also to pressures from the charitable 
agencies themselves for greater influence in the policy process65.
The extent to which refugee relief was recognised as a particular speciality of 
charitable agencies became clear in 1984 when the second International Conference 
on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA II) concluded that they were best suited 
to implement most of the newly proposed developmental projects, worth 362 million 
US$, which were needed to care for refugees and their hosts66. This was especially 
significant since this new developmental approach and related projects had been 
designed and proposed mainly by the UN, both UNHCR and the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP). Clearly, donor governments were also in favour 
of an expanded and significant role for the charitable agencies in refugee relief.
83.6 International recognition brings substantial profits ...
Several analysts67 have concluded that until the end of the 1970s, charities 
experienced stagnant or slow growth in their income, but beginning with the 
emergency in Cambodia, there has been a ’spectacular rise in income’68. In Britain, 
the plight of the Indochinese led charities to increase their expenditure overseas by 
76%, or 54% in real terms69. For example, the media’s publicity of Oxfam’s success 
in negotiating an agreement with the Cambodian Government in 1979 generated 
widespread and generous popular support, especially since the UN and the Red Cross 
had been unsuccessful so far and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the UK 
Government opposed official aid for the Cambodian regime. Between 1979 and 1981, 
charitable contributions of 110 million US$ in total were sent to Cambodia. Nearly 
half of it was channelled through a consortium of 32 charitable agencies led by Oxfam 
who provided one-third of aid given by the consortium70.
While this represented a substantial sum of money for these charitable agencies, it 
accounted for only an estimated 10-15% of aid sent71. Similarly, charitable aid for 
refugees in Somalia, which totalled 20 million US$ at the end of 1981, was only 8%
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of the estimated 230 million US$ sent overall. Estimated expenditures on Afghan 
refugees in Pakistan during 1980-1981 amounted to 250 million US$, less than 3% of 
which came from charitable contributions72. Clearly, charitable donations for relief 
have been substantial sums for the charitable sector but they amount to only a small 
proportion of the resources expended overall. In 1980, for example, the ten largest 
contributions for assisting refugees through five UN agencies totalled 461 million 
US$. Even though the United States gave more than double the actual amount of any 
other nation, 11 other countries donated more per capita. Nevertheless, less than 20 
million US$ or 4% was raised voluntarily73.
Increased levels of spending abroad by charitable agencies were maintained throughout 
the mid-1980s by additional income raised in response to famine in Ethiopia and many 
other Sahelian countries. This disaster brought an increase of 163% in the voluntary 
income of charitable agencies in real terms74. For example, aid from US PVOs to 
Africa totalled some 800 million US$ at the end of 1986 compared with 486 million 
two years earlier75. In the UK, Oxfam’s income more than doubled following appeals 
in 1985, from some 20 million pounds sterling in 1983-1984 to over 51 million76.
The availability of large sums of money for relief continued to characterise disaster 
relief throughout the 1980s. For example, in the fiscal year for 1988-89, the Overseas 
Development Administration of the UK Government gave 30 million pounds sterling 
to UK NGOs for disaster relief, caring for refugees and distribution of food aid; just 
one year earlier, when severe famine displaced hundreds of thousands of people in the 
Horn of Africa, 33 million pounds sterling had been granted to the Disasters 
Emergency Committee for refugees alone. Despite declining income in the years 
immediately after this famine, UK charities again expanded their overseas expenditures 
in response to new disasters at the end of the 1980s - in Bangladesh, Ethiopia and 
Sudan, for example77.
Other authors78 reinforce the importance of disasters in raising funds by pointing out 
that mass campaigns generate the largest sums; covenants, legacies, gifts and 
employee income deduction schemes raise smaller amounts. Hence, charities
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dependence on the mass media. In fact, this dependence is greatest on journalists and 
broadcasters since their own publicity efforts reach only a limited audience, many of 
whom already give support, and since publicity in the mass media is extremely costly 
otherwise. In some countries, legal restrictions prevented NGOs from advertising 
through the mass media independently, for example, the use of television was only 
granted to NGOs in Britain in 199079. Thus, even though there have been widespread 
calls in recent years for more realistic and just presentation of the context and nature 
of refugee relief needs, the ’pornographic’80 presentation of developing country 
peoples in emergencies has in fact been at the heart of the dramatic growth in the 
charitable sector during the 1980s.
This financial reality facilitated the emergence of ’the charities’ charities’81. 
Beginning in 1984 when drought, famine and armed conflict threatened the lives of 
millions of people in the Horn of Africa, new organizations were set up to raise 
money for charitable agencies to respond to acute needs. Band Aid, for example, 
raised over 100 million pounds sterling worldwide between 1984 and 198882. 
Similarly, Comic Relief raised some 70 million pounds sterling, primarily from their 
’red nose’ days in 1987, 1989 and 1991. Drawing largely upon the concerns of 
entertainers, fund raising campaigns mounted by these two organizations have reached 
much larger audiences, especially groups previously untapped - such as children, 
teenage youth and entertainers themselves. Both have also tried to raise awareness 
among the general public, succeeding impressively in making the problems and needs 
widely known but less so in conveying an understanding of the underlying issues. 
Nonetheless, they are a further expression of the charitable sector’s expanding role in 
relief, both as participants themselves and as a means for generating more resources 
for the sector as a whole.
83.6 . . .  and growth
Not only did existing charities benefit financially from their expanding role in refugee 
relief, but each new influx of refugees enabled new charities to be set up. Evidence 
that the charitable sector has grown as a result of refugee relief is somewhat
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speculative. But growing numbers of charities involved in the developing world, and 
the central role of relief in expanding their roles and influence in international aid, 
have been well documented. In the UK, for example, Burnell83 cites the creation of 
only nine new charities with an overseas focus over the 200 years preceding this 
century in contrast with the establishment of between 11 and 36 such agencies in each 
decade since WWII.
The numbers of charitable agencies engaged in aiding refugees has grown 
phenomenally during the 1980s. Official policy dialogues about African refugees only 
engaged charitable agencies as equal participants in 1979, when 37 of them attended 
the second Pan-African Conference on the African Refugee Problem. Four years later, 
the number of charitable agencies participating in similar meetings had nearly doubled 
(68). A survey of 289 charitable agencies was undertaken by the International Council 
of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) in 1984 which found that at least 98 agencies were 
working with African refugees84. During the 1980s, the number of agencies 
collaborating with UNHCR increased five-fold; from only one-hundred or so agencies 
in the early 1980s85, the Liaison Unit with Non-governmental Organizations of 
UNHCR listed 546 agencies in their directory in 198986. Of these 546 agencies, less 
than a quarter (119, 22%) were based in the developing world and many of them were 
affiliated with Christian churches. Nearly two-thirds (330,60%) had their headquarters 
in one of seven countries: Switzerland (88,16%), US (69,13%), UK (46,8%), France 
(40, 7%), Germany (32, 6%), Canada (29, 5%) or Belgium (26, 5%). Apparently, the 
growth in the size of the charitable sector engaged in refugee relief occurred mainly 
in the wealthy societies of the North Atlantic region.
Moreover, it occurred sporadically with each new influx of refugees engaging the 
services of a wider range of existing agencies, such as those working with a particular 
group - women or children, with a particular issue - human rights or migration, or in 
a particular region - the Middle East or Africa. A new influx also generated the 
formation of new charitable agencies, for example the Comite medical beige pour les 
refugies en Somalia, the Comite national d’entraide franco-vietnamien. franco-
262
cambodgien. franco-laotien. the Ecumenical relief and development group for Somalia 
and the Afghan medical aid.
The opportunities for institutional growth which are created by new groups of 
internationally publicised refugees has also meant that many charitable agencies will 
insist on taking part in the relief operation. In nearly all of the large relief operations 
undertaken for refugees in the 1980s, ’the extent of international competition between 
charitable agencies has been such that no one charity is indispensable’87. This 
competition has been interpreted by some as ’simply a recent manifestation of the 
scramble for Africa’88. However, if the financial gains, widespread popularity and 
expanding spheres of influence continue to grow at the astonishing pace of the 1980s, 
the scramble is surely not for Africa, but for the benefits at home from being involved 
in refugee relief in the developing world.
83.7  . . .  and greater influence
As their popularity and resource base grew, the spheres of influence of charitable 
agencies in refugee relief also expanded. Although the preservation of life and the 
maintenance of health had always been a significant part of refugee relief operations, 
health became a central focus for many charitable agencies during the 1970s but 
especially during the 1980s. Oxfam, for example, created a specialised unit for health 
in 1979 together with units for emergency relief and technical assistance89. Other 
agencies, like Save the Children Fund UK, recruited health professionals as permanent 
members of staff at their headquarters. Some agencies which were set up by health 
professionals continued to require their presence on boards of trustees or within the 
offices of senior management. For example, in 1991 eight of the 12 senior posts in 
Medecins Sans Frontieres France were filled by medical doctors who had worked 
previously for them in developing countries90. The importance of having expertise 
in health can be seen in individual relief operations; the majority of charitable 
agencies in any given refugee relief effort will be providing some assistance in the 
health sector.
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Suggestions for improving the quality of health relief provided for refugees in the 
developing world began to appear in the academic literature after the Nigerian civil 
war91. However, it was not until the 1980s that the charitable agencies began to 
articulate their own strategies and guidelines for refugee health care independently. 
The publication of its Practical guide to refugee health care in 1983 put Oxfam UK92 
on par with UN agencies93 and academic centres94 who were promoting their own 
strategies worldwide for providing health care in refugee camps in the developing 
world. It was soon joined by other charitable agencies, such as the All Africa 
Conference of Churches who put together a Handbook for refugee workers in 198395 
and Medecins Sans Frontieres Belgium who produced their own guidelines in 198796.
The fact that many of those responsible for putting these documents together had 
worked closely together, individually and institutionally, did not diminish the impact 
of these documents in official circles. The charitable agencies now had considerable 
expertise and they had the power base within the international relief system to put 
forward alternative strategies for meeting the health needs of refugees. Their efforts 
to formulate their own policy statements and practical guidelines further enhanced 
their role in advising policy makers within governmental and inter-govemmental 
organizations. Thus, charitable agencies were no longer auxiliaries in policy dialogues; 
instead they were often taking the leading role. They were widely recognised not only 
for the health services they provided directly among refugee communities, but also for 
their growing expertise in which interventions should be given priority and the 
technicalities of carrying them out.
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CHAPTER NINE 
International health relief: 
a nefarious use of humanitarian resources?
Both World Wars, but especially the second, prompted more active involvement in 
international health relief by both national governments and organizations having their 
roots primarily in civil society throughout the western world. Inter-govemmental 
organizations and private, charitable agencies became the primary means through 
which the concerns and interests of individual groups within these societies which 
were affiliated with armed conflicts and relief operations were expressed.
9.1 Private, charitable organizations
9.1.1 Essential providers of refugee health relief
The Second World War engaged charitable organizations as essential partners in the 
provision of international health relief for refugees. This role has been largely 
overlooked by most analysts who are preoccupied with identifying descriptive 
categories or normative protocols for charitable agencies. Their focus reflects but fails 
to acknowledge the infinite types of agencies which exist at any moment and the 
fluidity with which they are formed, merged or disbanded. The stated and covert 
purposes of these organizations, their sources of funding and ideological and political 
support, the types of activities they engage in or the services they render, and the 
organizational structures they adopt all vary widely; this suggests that descriptive 
categories are somewhat superfluous. Instead, an understanding of the relationships 
which these organizations have with national governments, general publics and other 
organizations within the societies where they work is more enlightening.
Beginning with the Red Cross in the latter half of the nineteenth century and the 
Commission for Relief in Belgium (CRB) during the first World War charitable 
organizations have traditionally been labelled as ’non-governmental ’ or 'private,
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voluntary*. Yet these organizations have been dependent on their own national 
governments for their very existence - legally, financially and politically, and most 
have incorporated and practised only those policies determined or approved by these 
same governments. Direct governmental influence, however, has usually been 
transmitted only at the highest levels of appointments and decision-making. The lack 
of official governmental representation on the staff of individual agencies and their 
lack of involvement in the day-to-day management of agency affairs or relief 
operations has enhanced an image of organizational autonomy. Such an image was 
consistent with the emphasis given to promoting the charitable nature of the work 
which in turn generated substantial support from the public at large or from individual 
groups within society. Furthermore, most relief workers and middle managers of 
charitable agencies were civilians volunteering their time and services or working for 
very low wages. Those who were unable to volunteer directly, were often kept 
informed by the media - at that time through radio and press - or were involved in 
frequent, ad hoc campaigns for donations - of money, food or clothing, for example. 
To the general public, donors and recipients alike, these organizations were non­
governmental or private, and they were seen to be earning the support and respect of 
governments and inter-govemmental organizations through their charitable, hard work.
Inter-govemmental organizations and national governments not only controlled the 
financial, legal and political environment within which these agencies existed, they 
depended on these organizations to set up and manage refugee relief programmes. 
Without these agencies, the bureaucratic and diplomatic machinery of inter- 
govemmental organizations would have had little effect in practice. Similarly, 
disorganized and inexperienced governments could not have undertaken the work 
themselves, neither in many European countries during and after the second World 
War, or in many developing countries during and immediately after wars of 
independence. While national governments and inter-govemmental organizations paved 
the way for international relief work by negotiating political and legal agreements, by 
securing enormous sums of money and quantities of material goods and by setting 
general policies and often individual standards of practice, it was the charitable 
agencies who actually did the work. Charitable agencies, and their newly formed
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international organizations, were an essential institutional link which ensured that relief 
policies were put into practice.
9.13, Motivated by compassion or self-interest?
Despite the emphasis on resettlement and repatriation schemes for refugees in Africa 
during the 1950s and 1960s, as well as stated preferences by international aid agencies 
to be involved primarily in longer-term assistance programmes for development since 
the late 1960s, refugee relief not only remained an important activity of charitable 
organizations throughout the 1970s and 1980s but it increasingly became the means 
through which the growth and well-being of the charitable sector was ensured. 
Arguments put forward in support of a continued and expanded role in refugee relief 
have almost always been based on increasing demand. In particular, the growing 
numbers of people seeking refuge and the increasingly lengthy period of time they 
require assistance has risen on a large scale throughout the 1970s but especially the 
1980s.
But surely, the logical extension of this demand-driven rationale begs many questions: 
most importantly why such relief is needed in the first place, why temporary periods 
of asylum which follow are increasingly prolonged and which responses are most 
appropriate given the ’temporarily permanent’1 status of most refugees. Even though 
obvious requirements for lasting solutions have led many specialists and agencies to 
advocate for a developmental approach in caring for refugees, refugee relief has been 
undertaken in isolation from development programmes and within what many would 
consider an out-dated framework of providing welfare services temporarily. The 
contradiction between the rhetoric of refugee relief and the reality of its provision, 
together with the pivotal role of relief in the growth of the charitable sector over the 
past two decades, suggest that the appeal in aiding refugees lies primarily in the 
supply-side of the equation.
Engaging in refugee relief operations is a strategy which guarantees the charitable 
sector substantial popular and governmental support, particularly within Europe and
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North American societies. This is true because the provision of relief for refugees 
addresses the concerns of both the general public who want to help for humanitarian 
reasons - genuine or tinged by guilt or other self-interests, and governments who want 
to promote and protect the political and economic interests of their societies. The act 
of seeking asylum by thousands or millions of an ethnic, social or political group 
brings to light conflicts with existing groups in power - within their own societies and 
those which act as hosts to them as well as within societies with which they have 
political and economic links. Aiding refugees thus becomes an arena where struggles 
for power, nationally and internationally, are played out. The uniquely sensitive and 
complex nature of any action taken in such circumstances means that official bodies 
may be more constrained in the scope and form of their responses. In combination 
with the vivid and far reaching publicity of the horrific and life-threatening conditions 
of those seeking refuge, an institutional space is created which allows charitable 
agencies to play a much needed and significant role.
In undertaking to fill this institutional gap, charitable agencies benefit enormously. Far 
greater than the satisfaction of helping those in need, huge sums of money, favourable 
publicity, access to new groups of people and geographical areas and opportunities for 
greater decision-making responsibilities make refugee relief a highly profitable market 
for the charitable sector. Moreover, these benefits have only begun to be exploited. On 
the one hand, for example, the phenomenal success of entertainers in raising funds 
from the general public has only been institutionalised in the form of the charities’ 
charities in the latter half of the 1980s. On the other hand, only a small proportion of 
governmental funds for relief have been channelled through charitable agencies to date 
although there is growing interest within governmental aid agencies to support 
charitable agencies.
Similarly, charitable agencies have only begun to exercise their voice in policy-making 
dialogues, and their responsibilities have increasingly extended beyond the provision 
of direct care among refugee communities, incorporating the planning, organization 
and management of health services for refugees locally, regionally and nation-wide. 
Charitable agencies are now able to offer technical, professional and managerial
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expertise on par with, if not better than, that made available through bilateral and 
multilateral structures.
9.13 Roles played by charities in refugee health relief
No wonder every book or article which considers the characteristics and roles of the 
charitable sector contains a distinct and substantial discussion of its roles in relief, and 
particularly relief for refugees. Even though only a few of these analyses consider the 
reverse: in other words the role of relief in the growth and well-being of the sector. 
Notwithstanding analytical biases towards a demand driven rationale for relief, these 
trends convey a general picture of what can be expected in any given relief operation 
for a group of refugees.
Firstly, many charitable agencies will be involved; the charitable sector will be 
represented by not one or two agencies but by tens or hundreds. Secondly, there will 
be many well-established agencies and there will also be agencies created specifically 
for the crisis at hand. Thirdly, most agencies - new and older - will have their base 
in the political and economic links of societies in the North Atlantic region with those 
of either the refugees or their hosts. While several will be affiliated with Christian 
churches, few will be an expression of concern by nationals of affected groups living 
abroad2.
Fourthly, many agencies will have a role in the health sector because of its popularity, 
and therefore profitability, with donor publics and governments. Fifthly, most 
charitable agencies will provide care directly but some will also be involved in 
planning and managing health programmes which cover large geographical areas or 
which care for refugees nation-wide. In such a capacity, charitable agencies will not 
necessarily be acting as auxiliaries to governments or UN agencies but as equal 
partners or competent competitors.
Sixthly, new federations or forums for collaboration may be set up by several 
charitable agencies in an effort to negotiate and strengthen their role vis-a-vis
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governmental and inter-governmental organizations. Seventhly, some agencies may 
bypass bureaucratic procedures and diplomatic protocol when entering an area where 
refugees have come to set up their own system of services or to co-opt state 
structures3; in so doing they will be exploiting a period of intense social disruption, 
their humanitarian raison d ’etre, current publicity of urgent needs and widely accepted 
notions that the international community has responsibility for refugees to enhance 
their own institutional growth.
Thus, eighthly, unlike many on-going health programmes in the developing world 
which are run by charitable agencies in cooperation with local governments or 
community groups, health services for refugees may well be planned, managed and 
financed independent of national health authorities or local practitioners. In so doing, 
charitable agencies may assume responsibilities normally assigned to governments or 
private providers of care.
9.1.4 Integral participants in the international refugee health regime
The creation of separate, temporary health services for refugees by charitable agencies 
is another stark reminder that these organizations are institutions of civil societies in 
Western Europe and North America. They are elite institutions which are often 
managed by intellectuals, activists or naive but well-meaning citizens of western 
societies. Consequently, they are isolated from their constituencies at home and abroad 
culturally or socially or both. Their composition and the type of work they undertake 
reflects domestic political debates at home about foreign policies, including those for 
aid - developmental and relief. This reality can hardly be disputed for relief given the 
US Secretary of State’s announcement in 1976 that ’disaster relief is becoming 
increasingly a major instrument of our foreign policy’4.
Charitable agencies are an integral structure within the supply-side of the international 
aid system - the so called ’private arm’, together with key donor governments, inter­
governmental agencies and general publics of western societies. Multiple agendas are 
pursued through charitable agencies but they are unlikely to be the source of radical
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reforms, partly because they do not challenge differentiations of social class and partly 
because their presence and efforts alleviate pressures for fundamental change. Thus, 
charitable agencies enhance political stability at home and abroad, maintaining the 
status quo5. No doubt most charitable agencies will continue to try to get in on the 
act in order to ensure their own institutional growth and well-being.
9J2 Specialised agencies and funds of the United Nations
9.2.1 Supra-national powers or dependent on governments?
Contrary to popular beliefs today that the UN is a supranational organization for world 
peace and prosperity, the UN is one of many inter-governmental organizations set up 
by powerful governments in North America and Western Europe originally in response 
to the relief and rehabilitation needs created by the second World War. Many different 
agencies were created under the aegis of the UN to deal with a wide range of concerns 
associated with restoring a thriving capitalist economy after the war, from economic 
interests (for example the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD or the World Bank) and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI)) to social and cultural issues (for example, 
the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Education, Social and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO)). In founding various, largely autonomous agencies 
within the UN system, national governments in North America and Western Europe 
were careful to safeguard their own economic and social interests.
Extensive governmental influence has always been present as evidenced in 1950 by 
the Soviet Union’s perception of the United Nations as another of the many 
institutions dominated and used by the US and Western Europe for their own interests 
when Mao’s communist government was refused recognition by the UN. In response, 
the Soviet Union and Eastern European nations boycotted the UN, but not for long. 
The absence of the Soviet Union’s delegate during the Korean War led to the 
endorsement by the UN of the position and activities of the US and her allies6. 
Opportunities to use the UN to sway world opinion were greatly increased with the
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addition of 87 new nation-states to the UN by 19557 from the poorer, but rich in 
resources, southern hemisphere. Thus, the UN increasingly became a forum not only 
to influence world opinion but to gamer support for policies which benefited particular 
nation-states. Not surprisingly, the Soviet Union and her allies renewed their 
membership in 1955.
92 2  Dependency mechanisms
The creation of several specialised agencies within the UN and the creation of 
separate, additional inter-governmental organizations reflected the unwillingness of 
national governments, primarily of the US, to relinquish control over the activities of 
inter-governmental organizations. By restricting the political authority and scope of 
inter-governmental agencies as well as their resource base, powerful national 
governments were able to manipulate and control the work of the individual inter­
governmental organizations to benefit their own political and economic interests. They 
did this in several ways.
One way was to limit the responsibilities or tasks of an agency, which meant that 
separate or temporary agencies were established for individual issues or concerns. This 
technique has continued in relief with, for example, the creation of the United Nations 
Border Relief Operation (UNBRO) to manage relief for Cambodians living along the 
border between Thailand and Cambodia since 1982s and the Office for Emergency 
Operations in Africa (OEOA) to coordinate relief in the Horn of Africa between 
January 1985 and October 1986. Such narrowly defined mandates prevented individual 
agencies from getting involved in issues beyond those agreed to by member 
governments. Control over the work of the agencies was further enhanced by 
organizational structures and protocols which gave powerful governments considerable 
influence in policy-making processes. For example, establishing executive committees 
or boards for policy-making which consisted of a few key member governments, 
appointing certain nationals as heads or executive directors, or requiring an agency to 
obtain the approval of the General Assembly on proposed policies and programmes 
of work.
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The general independence of the agencies from one another and from the UN Security 
Council, General Assembly and Economic and Social Council allowed national 
governments to exert their influence within each individual agency (divide and rule) 
as well as to fragment the power base of the UN, preventing it from becoming a 
supra-national institution capable of imposing and enforcing its own policies among 
member nations. Economic dependency, mainly on the US, for the enormous sums 
required to run the Secretariat and the specialised agencies and funds and to pay for 
their work, further enhanced the position of certain national governments. In fact, 
according to Duke9, the UN Secretariat has borne the largest proportion of the 
financial shortfall since the late 1980s; it too depends on only 14 of some 102 member 
governments for 84% of its regular budget. Thus, the UN was a forum for European 
and North American governments primarily to negotiate policies on a wide range of 
subjects, to initiate and sponsor joint activities and to gamer international support for 
their own policies and positions.
The pattern of creating short-lived, all-purpose and fully-resourced organizations for 
acute relief needs, such as the Commission for Relief in Belgium and the United 
Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), and of replacing these 
organizations very quickly with numerous other inter-governmental ones for the 
longer-term development of specified sectors or areas of concern, such as the 
specialised agencies of the League of Nations and the UN, highlights the political 
sensitivity of relief work. In order to maintain greater control over economic and 
social policies and practices in the longer-term, national governments isolated relief 
from development. They limited relief to meeting only basic survival needs for no 
more than a few years.
Within the UN, for example, the four agencies originally designated substantial 
mandates and roles in relief - the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), the United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (Unicef), the 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) and the 
United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) - were set up on a 
temporary basis for three years. Furthermore, the actual implementation of relief
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programmes was often left to charitable agencies which ensured, for the most part, 
that they were small in scale, limited in scope, short in duration and targeted to groups 
in alliance with donor nations. Such practices allowed national governments to ensure 
that many acute needs were met or were at least seen to be being met and that relief 
did not interfere with longer-term economic and social policies.
9J23 Strategies for surviving and thriving politically
Masked by humanist ideology, current advocates for a developmental, or longer-term, 
approach to relief work are naive, at best. By exclusively stressing the very real and 
inseparable links of disasters, relief and development in the lives of individuals and 
societies and the logical demand for more coherent approaches to relief and 
developmental aid, they ignore political realities which benefit from separating relief 
as a minimal set of activities for survival in the short-term and development as the 
longer-term growth and functioning of economic and social systems in the world. 
Instead, thoughtful consideration of these realities enables the roles adopted by these 
inter-governmental institutions in refugee health relief to be understood.
For example, Unicef s determination not to undertake any significant role in relief, in 
spite of increasing devastation and destitution associated with disasters, would 
otherwise be puzzling because of their past successes and organizational assets which 
are essential for making timely responses. Unlike the policies of Unicef which appear 
to acknowledge limited donor support for an extended role in relief, WHO’s 
involvement in relief is further constrained by its adoption of excessive and complex 
bureaucratic procedures as well as a narrow framework for defining acceptable work. 
Similarly, UNHCR is only able to plan and budget on an annual basis, limiting their 
interventions to ad hoc and temporary activities in the shorter-term. Within WHO and 
UNHCR, professionals responsible for health relief often lack authority within their 
own organization to influence policy and its practice; partly because of their position 
within the organization, partly because of decision-making procedures and, often, 
because they lack previous experience or relevant qualifications in health relief. 
Moreover, all three agencies lack sufficient financial resources in their regular budget
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to initiate substantial relief efforts independently. Yet, surely these organizational and 
financial constraints could be remedied if there was the will and commitment to do 
so. Herein must lie the explanation for the failure of these agencies to consider relief 
needs seriously within existing mandates, structures and programmes of work, in 
particular what stifles aspirations or efforts to improve their responses.
There are other similarities in the organization and practice of health relief by 
UNHCR, Unicef and WHO which highlight equally disturbing tendencies. In response 
to increasingly frequent and destructive disasters since the late 1960s, most agencies 
within the UN system have set up their own units for relief. UNHCR, Unicef and 
WHO were, obviously, no exception. Between 1971 and 1981, each created a separate 
unit for relief. Moreover, UNHCR which had previously concerned itself with legal 
and advocacy issues, set up a separate unit to expand and incorporate contributions 
from the more technical specialities in 1981, including health and nutrition in 1983. 
Clearly, relief has been distinguished and separated from ’development’, even though 
such a distinction makes no sense for those experiencing disasters and their 
repercussions, or for those working to reduce vulnerabilities which underlie needs for 
relief in the first place. There must be benefits for some groups from this seemingly 
illogical policy.
9.2.4 Symbolic gestures or substantial contributions?
Furthermore, in the head offices of all three agencies, health relief has been a 
responsibility of only one, two or at most three permanent staff members. Regular 
financial resources for relief generally have also been minimal, currently ranging 
between only one million US$ per year in the case of WHO and twenty million US$ 
per year in the case of UNHCR for global needs; most funds for relief have been 
raised through special or additional appeals. Given the certainty with which these 
agencies have been confronted with increasingly vast relief needs, there has 
consistently been a lack of regular resources which would enable the agencies to 
respond quickly and independently.
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Nevertheless, meagre resources for relief, which are planned for and approved on a 
regular basis, have allowed the agencies to respond routinely, but in a very limited 
way. Firstly, disasters which have generated responses routinely have most often been 
those classified as ’natural’ and whose effects are relatively circumscribed. For 
example, earthquakes, hurricanes and floods have routinely generated one-time 
donations or loans from the agencies whose value ranged between only tens and 
hundreds of thousands of US$.
On the other hand, responses to ’man-made’ disasters, such as war and famine, or 
those which have generated widespread devastation and destitution, such as flooding 
in Bangladesh, have depended on obtaining additional support, including vast sums 
of money, material goods or services. Thus, their responses to these disasters have 
been on a somewhat ad hoc basis even though all three agencies have consistently 
engaged in relief where needs were widely publicised by the international media. The 
agencies have consistently distinguished between ’natural’ and ’man-made’ disasters, 
and have responded more routinely to natural disasters in contrast with their seemingly 
uncertain, yet consistent and often extensive involvement in responding to ’man-made’ 
disasters.
Secondly, the responses of the agencies has often been limited to the provision of 
expert technical advice or the provision of material goods. In other words, they were 
often asked which goods or interventions were most needed and appropriate and to 
help provide resources whenever possible, for example drugs and other medical 
supplies. Although they frequently carried out assessments of health and nutrition 
needs and service requirements - initially, as part of on-going planning exercises or 
in anticipation of terminating relief programmes, additional funds were usually 
obtained for this. Similarly, the convening of expert committees to determine 
international standards or the organisation of training courses in preparation for future 
relief are examples of international relief efforts which were also usually funded 
through special or additional appeals. Nevertheless, these activities sought to improve 
international responses to relief needs within the framework of providing material 
goods or emergency services or of recommending technical interventions, for example,
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the creation of emergency kits for essential drugs and immunization campaigns, the 
organization of emergency medical screening, first aid and referral or the 
establishment of special feeding programmes and mass vitamin supplementation. 
Policies of the agencies have emphasized only the technical aspects and immediate 
material needs of health relief operations.
9.2.5 Complementary and competitive roles in refugee health relief
Like the charitable agencies, consideration of the work of the specialised agencies and 
funds of the UN over time and within the larger political and economic environment 
conveys a scenario of what can be expected from these inter-governmental 
organizations in any refugee health relief operation.
Firstly, several specialised agencies and funds of the UN will be involved. UNHCR, 
Unicef and WHO will be among those participating even though their roles may differ 
by place and time. Some conflicts and the relief efforts associated with them will lead 
to the creation of organizations specifically for that particular crisis, although this 
tendency is less likely within the UN than within the charitable sector since 
acceptance and support for such an organizational response by many governments 
collectively is less easily secured. Those with on-going terms of office and those 
created for specific relief needs will be dependent on wealthier governments in Europe 
and North America for their political and financial authority.
Fourthly, UNHCR, Unicef and WHO will all have a role in refugee health relief 
services, partly in carrying out their stated mandates and partly in response to the 
popularity of such services among prominent donor publics and governments. Their 
involvement will be primarily in planning, managing and financing health relief 
programmes, especially at national and regional levels. Only rarely will these 
organizations become involved in the provision of health care directly. They will, 
therefore, be in close contact with the charitable agencies which will be providing 
much of the care and governmental health authorities which ostensibly have 
responsibility for health within the geographical areas of concern.
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The international nature of refugee relief may well mean that existing governmental 
health services or responsibilities for them will be co-opted by these inter­
governmental organizations individually or collectively. Thus, refugee health services 
may be planned, managed and financed independent of national health authorities. 
Along with charitable agencies, the UN may then assume responsibilities for health 
which are often assigned to governments or private providers of care.
The governmental and global membership of the UN may isolate those working for 
it from their constituencies culturally or socially or both. Yet, in spite of their 
international composition, their work will reflect political and military policies of the 
wealthier governments in Europe and North America, which encompass those for 
developmental and relief aid. Multiple agendas will be pursued through these inter­
governmental organizations which act as the official structure within the supply-side 
of the international system of aid for refugee health relief. Thus, their own institutional 
growth and well-being will be enhanced through their participation in refugee health 
relief.
WHO is likely to provide expert advice, either to government health authorities or 
other agencies within the UN system. In light of WHO’s mandate to work with 
national governments, it would be surprising to find it collaborating closely with 
charitable agencies except through national health authorities or other UN agencies. 
Advice may be given in the form of internationally recommended technical standards 
of care, lists of drugs, supplies or equipment which will be needed, recommended 
priorities for interventions among displaced populations or the secondment of senior 
health professionals to support the organization and management of care on a daily 
basis. These advisory services will, however, no doubt be subject to the perceived 
need for them among donor governments and other UN agencies who must finance 
their provision. The lack of financial and human resources may well be the 
fundamental constraint to additional initiatives or prolonged participation by WHO - 
by the head, regional and country offices alike.
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UNHCR is likely to initiate and fund the provision of health care throughout a refugee 
relief operation. The recent employment of health professionals as programme officers 
in the head office and within specific national or regional operations will create an 
image at the very least and a foci of power at most for decision-making and 
management. UNHCR may well be the authority for making policy, planning and 
managing health services for refugees. The extent to which this is true will depend 
less on the contributions of other UN agencies and more on the roles adopted by 
private, charitable agencies and concerned national governments - especially those 
supporting the programmes.
Regardless of their role in managing refugee health services, UNHCR will be a 
significant provider of resources. While the yearly programming cycle precludes any 
commitment or preparation beyond a year or two at a time, special appeals made by 
it will generate the vast resources needed to create a system of medical services for 
large refugee populations. Despite an ability to raise considerable quantities of money, 
human and material resources as well as widespread popular support for relief efforts, 
the temporary involvement of UNHCR may well mean that consideration of longer- 
term health needs and the features of sustainable and appropriate systems of care will 
be neglected. Instead, acute survival needs will be given priority, even focused upon 
exclusively.
Such an approach together with UNHCR’s efforts to play a more significant role in 
the formulation of health policies for refugees may also mean that UNHCR supports 
private, charitable agencies from Europe and North America in setting up and offering 
health services at the expense of national and local organizations. UNHCR may well 
act as financier of refugee health programmes which are established and run by the 
charitable sector, either in collaboration with national or local authorities or in 
isolation from them. The efficiency with which foreign charities can put together a 
response, arrive with needed resources and manage services acceptable to donors may 
well lead UNHCR to rely almost solely on them. This may especially be true where 
national health systems are bureaucratic, lethargic, grossly under-resourced or poorly 
developed (encompassing most low and middle income economies). Obviously, this
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will compliment and enhance a focus on the provision of services for acute, survival 
needs in the immediate future.
Unicef is likely to involve itself in selected programmes or activities rather than the 
organization and management of a system of health services generally. Its ability to 
provide needed supplies quickly, in good condition and of acceptable quality will 
undoubtedly lead it to provide supplies for health care, such as drugs and vaccines. 
Their ability to divert existing funds or to raise additional monies quickly will almost 
certainly lead Unicef to finance programmes of particular interest to it, most likely 
those they fund on an on-going basis for children - for example, immunization 
activities.
Unicef has always collaborated with national governments and charitable agencies. 
Thus, they may support the involvement of either in relief programmes, especially 
when needs are acute or when the agency or governmental department specialises in 
the provision of care which is a priority for Unicef.
The involvement of UNHCR, Unicef and WHO will vary with time within a given 
relief effort. This will reflect shifting priorities within the organizations themselves, 
pressures and support from donors for them to be involved or withdraw and the extent 
to which private, charitable contributions to relief meet existing needs, either 
collectively or independently.
9 3  From clinical medicine to public health
Refugee health relief continues to consist of technical measures which are designed 
and justified within a medical model, even though they now emphasise public health 
interventions. Similar to clinical medicine, public health had its origins in the 
industrial revolution and in the efforts of national governments to control fatal 
epidemics of diseases, such as cholera and plague, which raged through Europe in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Public health was, as a result, also preoccupied 
with preventing and controlling diseases - primarily in cities or along main trading
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routes. Like the provision of medical care, public health then became a social welfare 
activity of national governments in the latter part of the nineteenth century. In 
particular, public health aimed to improve environmental sanitation, housing and 
nutrition within nation-states, while international public health was organised as inter­
governmental collaboration in quarantine practices to control the spread of the ’big 
five’ diseases - cholera, plague, yellow fever, typhus and smallpox.
Following the advent of the germ theory of disease and the rapid advances in medical 
sciences generally around the turn of the century, public health increasingly became 
a sub-speciality of scientific medicine. In addition to overseeing environmental 
sanitary and housing improvements, public health doctors began to provide basic 
medical advice and care under the name of preventive medicine. This distinction 
between preventive and curative medicine was an attempt by those medical doctors 
who specialised in public health to establish a separate, credible area of work in 
comparison with private general practitioners. In England, for example, such a 
distinction was very real politically since salaried public health doctors working for 
local governments posed a threat to the professional and financial autonomy of private 
medicine10. Yet there was clearly considerable overlap in the work of clinical and 
public health doctors. This became apparent in England, for example, in the 1930s 
when public health departments took over the management of some hospitals, which 
meant that public health doctors managed a wide range of medical services within a 
large geographical area.
93.1 Priority public health interventions
Public health has matured since the second World War, assuming a leading role within 
the planning and management of health services. Since the 1970s when entire 
populations in poorer countries needed health relief, for example in southern Sudan, 
northern Ethiopia or among Afghans in Pakistan and Iran, health relief increasingly 
looked to the discipline of public health for leadership. At first, this new focus of 
health relief on public health was included under the ’basic needs' concept originally 
promoted by the International Labour Organization in the 1970s. It was further
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developed within the concept of Primary Health Care which was promoted by WHO 
and Unicef in the 1980s. Seven community health interventions in particular were 
identified and given priority in both policies and practice. These interventions are 
likely to dominate the content of health relief policies in any given relief effort for 
refugees, including:
1. Environmental improvements: adequate shelter, sufficient water supply, 
disposal of refuse, sanitation systems.
2. Nutritional activities: general and selective food rations, vitamin or 
mineral supplements.
3. Epidemic control: vaccination programmes, vector control, medical 
screening.
4. Basic medical care: essential drugs for common diseases, provision of 
medical centres and clinics.
5. Epidemiological assessment and surveillance: cross sectional surveys, 
record keeping and reporting by services.
6. Security measures: location of settlements, international protection, 
monitoring and advocacy.
These priorities continued to emphasise the provision of technical or material 
interventions, and they have increasingly been articulated in the form of guidelines. 
Most of the main agencies, whether they be within the UN system or the charitable 
sector, have produced their own set of technical standards or guidelines11 advocating 
these interventions as priorities. Thus, health relief no longer limits intervention to 
emergency and basic medical care but gives increasing attention to the most common 
health needs of entire populations. This means that, like health services within
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industrialised countries, medical doctors with additional training in public health now 
provide the organizational and cultural leadership in health relief operations.
9.3.2 Maintaining roles in meeting acute needs only
In spite of the focus on population-wide health needs, the provision of leadership and 
care principally by international relief agencies suggests that current approaches still 
fail to consider issues related to the provision of health services in the longer term as 
well as the problems created for the host societies and governments. Moreover, giving 
priority to technical interventions which continue to be justified within a medical 
paradigm suggests that it also fails to address underlying social, economic and political 
determinants of poor health and nutrition as well as strategies for the organization of 
self-care in the longer-term. Thus, it would appear that health relief continues to be 
provided temporarily for immediate needs; interventions act as stop-gap measures 
which will inevitably reinforce the need for themselves as well as development.
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CHAPTER TEN 
Health relief for Afghans in Pakistan, 1978-1982:
Planning and organising a national refugee health service
10.1 Introduction
10.1.1 Country Background
The Islamic Republic of Pakistan is a relatively new nation-state located in the 
northwest of the Indian sub-continent. Pakistan has common borders with Afghanistan, 
India and Iran as well as a coastline on the Arabian Sea (Figure 10.1). The population 
of Pakistan is multi-ethnic and was estimated to be 96.2 million in 19851. The main 
ethnic/linguistic groups are Punjabi and Sindhi: 79% reported Punjabi or Sindhi as 
their mother tongue in 1961. The rest of the population belong mostly to the Baluch 
and Pathan ethnic/linguistic groups - estimated to be 16% in 19612. The majority of 
the population live in the eastern provinces of Punjab and Sind; only a relatively small 
proportion live in the provinces of Baluchistan and the North West Frontier or in the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Thus, it is not surprising that the latter are the 
most poorly developed areas of the country. The proportion of the population living 
in urban areas has remained relatively the same since 1965 with over 70% living in 
rural areas3.
The gross national product per capita was US$ 380 in 1985 with an average annual 
rate of growth estimated at 2.6% between 1965 and 1985. Though the majority of the 
population live in rural areas, only 55% of the working population is employed in 
agriculture: 16% are employed in industry and 30% are employed in service 
organizations. Furthermore, industry produced a larger proportion (48%) of the gross 
domestic product (GDP) than agriculture (25%) in 1985. This contrasts with 
production in 1965 when agriculture contributed 40% and industry 34% of the GDP 
which suggests a greater degree of industrialisation than before4.
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Most of the health status indicators for Pakistan are typical of a poor country. Infant 
and child mortality rates were 115 and 16 per thousand and life expectancy at birth
was 52 and 50 years for males and females respectively in 1985s. Leading causes of 
illness, disability and death are those commonly associated with poverty, such as 
diarrhoeal diseases, malaria, nutritional deficiencies and complications during 
pregnancy and birth. Despite these indicators of poor health and nutritional status, the 
World Bank6 estimated that health received only 1.1% of central government 
expenditure in 1985.
10.1.2 Afghan refugees in Pakistan
10.1.2.1 The Baluchis and Pathans: refugees in their own lands?
The influx of Afghan refugees and the responses of the Federal and Provincial 
Governments of Pakistan are most easily understood in the context of the historical 
development of the Baluch and Pathan ethnic groups7. Both the Baluchis and Pathans 
are ancient peoples with histories going back over 2000 years. They were originally 
settled further north and west than their current locations in southeastern Afghanistan 
and Iran and western Pakistan (Figure 10.2). Despite attempts by the Persians, Sindhis, 
Afghans, Sikhs, Moguls and British to subjugate the Baluchis or Pathans since the 
13th century, permanent or complete control has eluded them all. In addition, rivalries 
among the various clans, especially the Baluchis, has limited efforts to create and 
maintain tribal unity.
The influx of Afghan refugees and the responses of the Federal and Provincial 
Governments of Pakistan are most easily understood in the context of the historical 
development of the Baluch and Pathan ethnic groups8. Both the Baluchis and Pathans 
are ancient peoples with histories going back over 2000 years. They were originally 
settled further north and west than their current locations in southeastern Afghanistan 
and Iran and western Pakistan (Figure 10.2). Despite attempts by the Persians, Sindhis, 
Afghans, Sikhs, Moguls and British to subjugate the Baluchis or Pathans since the 
13th century, permanent or complete control has eluded them all. In addition, rivalries
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among the various clans, especially the Baluchis, has limited efforts to create and 
maintain tribal unity.
The fiercely independent nature of these people has always been recognised by the 
Federal Government of Pakistan. Beginning in 1947 during the creation of modem 
Pakistan, some of the Baluch and Pathan tribal areas were given semi-autonomous 
status. This status continued in 1955 although parts of Baluchistan (British) and the 
North West Frontier Province (NWFP) were absorbed into the single province of West 
Pakistan. With the restoration of the separate provinces of Baluchistan, the North West 
Frontier, Punjab and Sind in West Pakistan in 1970, the semi-autonomous tribal areas 
of the Baluchis were combined as Provincially Administered Tribal Areas with British 
Baluchistan into the province of Baluchistan. The tribal areas of the Pathans in the 
North West Frontier, however, remained separate and were grouped together for 
administrative purposes by the Federal Government to form the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (Figure 10.3). Thus, throughout the history of 
Pakistan, many of the Baluchis and Pathans have retained their relatively independent 
status. Moreover, administrative groupings within the provinces of Baluchistan and 
North West Frontier and the international boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan 
artificially divide peoples with shared kinship and ethnic identity.
The exact size and distribution of the Baluchis and Pathans in Pakistan is largely 
unknown. Estimates have been based primarily on three census counts undertaken in 
1951,1961 and 1972. The Baluch population was estimated at 2.8 million or 3.5% of 
the total population of Pakistan in 1979. Most (over 57%) were living in the provinces 
of Punjab and Sind as minorities. Moreover, large numbers of Pathans, Punjabis and 
Sindhis residing in the province of Baluchistan meant that ethnic Baluchis are also 
likely to be a minority in the province of Baluchistan. The Pathan population was 
estimated in 1979 to be at least 12 million people or 15% of the country’s population. 
Thus, they are a much larger group than the Baluchis and are a majority in the North 
West Frontier, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and parts of Baluchistan.
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FIGURE 103
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The size of the Pathan group and their control over the Federally Administered Tribal 
Areas, much of the North West Frontier and parts of Baluchistan has been of 
particular concern to the Federal Government of Pakistan because of the movement 
for a separate Pathan state, "Pashtunistan", since the creation of Pakistan9. The call 
for Pashtunistan was most recently put forward in 1976 by Abdul Ghaffar Khan in an 
attempt to mobilise Pathan popular opinion for the Khudai-Kidmatgars organization. 
An independent Pathan state, or alternatively the incorporation of the Pathans in 
Afghanistan (where Pathans are the single largest group in the country and probably 
half of the population), was supported at that time by the Afghan Government in 
Kabul10: one reason for giving support was Afghanistan’s need for access to the 
Arabian Sea.
Between 1947 and 1949, the Afghan Government voted three times in favour of 
Pashtunistan. In addition, they voted against Pakistan’s application to the UN, their 
parliament declared the Durrand and other Anglo-Afghan boundary agreements null 
and void, and they supported tribal dissidents who tried to form a Pashtunistan 
Government. Again in 1955, sympathy for Pashtunistan was expressed by the Afghan 
Government and leaders of the Soviet Union in response to the formation of a single 
province in West Pakistan. Support for Pashtunistan was most recently given by 
Daoud Khan’s regime during 1973-78; this regime also supported the creation of a 
’Greater Baluchistan’ in addition to a separate Pathan state.
10.1.2.2 Seeking refuge from civil war
Refugees from Afghanistan first arrived in Pakistan following the overthrow of King 
Zahir Shah by Mohammad Daoud Khan in 1973. However, they did not begin to 
arrive in substantial numbers until Daoud Khan was assassinated in April 1978 during 
a Marxist coup. Daoud Khan’s new Communist regime had embarked upon an 
ambitious programme of reforms of land tenure and the rights of women which were 
perceived by the rural population as a threat to the Islamic basis of their society. Thus, 
these reforms provoked intense opposition and the emergence of armed resistance11. 
Subsequent to Daoud Khan’s fall, a revolutionary council was formed and headed by
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Nur Mohammad Taraki in Kabul for the newly established Democratic Republic of 
Afghanistan. In September 1979, the Taraki Government was overthrown by Prime 
Minister Hafizullah Amin. The Amin Government began to strengthen military 
capacity in Kabul and the northern areas of Afghanistan, and sporadic fighting began 
between government forces and rebel groups. Nevertheless, the Amin Government 
only survived three months and in December 1979 Parcham leader Babrak Karmal 
took over the presidency with the help of the armed forces of the Soviet Union12.
10.1.2.3 Seeking refuge among sympathetic hosts
The most dramatic influx of Afghans into Pakistan occurred after the Soviet 
intervention, with some two million Afghans arriving during 1980 and 1981 (Figure 
10.4). Most of the Afghans (80%) who fled into Pakistan concentrated in the North 
West Frontier, with the rest settling primarily in Baluchistan. Only a small number of 
people settled in the Northern Areas (between 1 and 2%). This distribution of the 
refugees reflects the asylum and hospitality provided to near and distant kin in Pathan 
culture.
Afghans crossed a disputed international border to seek asylum among kindred in 
lands long familiar to them. Peshawar, the capital of the North West Frontier, was 
previously known as the winter capital of Afghanistan. Afghans sought refuge in 
Peshawar and other villages close to the border where they were first assisted by local 
people. The welcome and assistance given to them by local people was not only a 
reflection of shared kinship and ethnic identity, but it was also an expression of shared 
opposition to the political conditions from which they were fleeing13.
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10.2 1978 - 1980: Organising relief for Afghans as refugees in Pakistan
10.2.1 Responsibilities of the Federal Government: organising the distribution of 
essential goods
The Federal Government first began providing relief to Afghans in September 1978 
through the Disaster Preparedness and Relief Cell of the Cabinet Division of the 
Federal Secretariat (Figure 10.5). This relief cell had originally been set up in the 
early 1970s following the cyclone in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and the 
extensive relief operation which was subsequently required14. The responsibilities of 
the Disaster Preparedness and Relief Cell were to co-ordinate the logistics of relief 
activities of relevant ministries and departments of the Federal Government and the 
international community: for example, by receiving donations and arranging the 
storage and transport of supplies. Efforts by the Disaster Preparedness and Relief Cell 
were primarily intended to augment those of the Provincial Governments which were 
responsible for making policies and plans for disaster relief as well as implementing 
relief activities.
Relief supplies, such as food, tents and money, were first sent by the Disaster 
Preparedness and Relief Cell to relevant federal ministries in the autumn of 1978 in 
response to requests from local administrators. In addition, other relevant federal 
bodies were informed as well as representatives of the United Nations who were 
working in Pakistan. Within the Federal Government, the States and Frontier Regions 
and Kashmir Affairs (SAFRON) Division became the focal point since it was 
responsible for the political and military administration of the geographical areas in 
which Afghans were settling. The Disaster Preparedness and Relief Cell continued to 
be involved in the relief programme for Afghan refugees until the spring of 1980 at 
which time responsibility for coordinating the logistical aspects of the programme was 
assumed by the newly established Chief Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees 
(CCAR) within the States and Frontier Regions and Kashmir Affairs Division15.
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FIGURE 10.5
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This separate Commissionerate, the CCAR, was first established as a temporary 
organization solely to co-ordinate relief for Afghan refugees and, thus, its 
responsibilities were similar to those of the Disaster Preparedness and Relief Cell but 
specific to the Afghan programme. The Chief Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees 
(CCAR) was headed by a Chief Commissioner who was assisted by two-to-three 
Programme Officers, one of whom was a medical doctor16. Thus, the role of the 
Federal Government in managing health relief was initially limited to one of logistical 
co-ordination of donations, storage and transport of medical supplies and equipment 
and of medical cover provided by government hospitals.
10.2.2 Responsibilities of the United Nations: securing needed resources
In April 1979, the Federal Government asked the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Programme (WFP) of the United Nations 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to assist Afghan refugees in Pakistan. 
Subsequently, two missions were sent to Pakistan in May and August of 1979. In 
response to their findings, an initial donation of US$ 190 000 was made from the 
Emergency Fund of the High Commissioner for Refugees. These funds were used to 
procure and distribute 1194 tents in the North West Frontier and 4868 blankets in 
Baluchistan. A plan for a more comprehensive programme of assistance was written 
in August 1979 by officials of the UNHCR and Provincial and Federal Governments. 
This UNHCR Humanitarian Assistance Programme to Afghan Refugees in Pakistan 
provided for some 185 000 refugees during the coming year, between 1 October 1979 
and 30 September 1980, at a cost of US$ 10.3 million17. An official agreement to 
this programme of assistance was signed by the UNHCR and the Government 
following approval by the Executive Committee of the UNHCR in October 1979. 
Officials of the WFP also took part in the missions undertaken by UNHCR in 1979. 
Based on the recommendations of these missions, the Federal Government submitted 
a request for food assistance to the Director General of the Food and Agriculture 
Organization on 13 December 1979, and approval was granted on 20 December 1979 
for food commodities valued at US$ 5 383 000.
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The on-going influx of Afghans into Pakistan following a third coup-de-etat in 
Afghanistan in December 1979, and the subsequent intervention by the Soviet 
Union18, led the UNHCR to revise their programme of assistance. In January 1980 
the High Commissioner launched an international appeal for US$ 55 million to cover 
the relief needs of the Afghans in Pakistan during 1980. Similar to the contribution 
of UNHCR, the WFP programme of assistance was expanded several times bringing 
the total contribution in 1980 to US$ 39 882 900. Under the agreement which WFP 
had with UNHCR, the WFP was responsible for the co-ordination and monitoring of 
all food commodities donated to the UNHCR Humanitarian Assistance Programme to 
Afghan Refugees in Pakistan™.
1023  Responsibilities of the Provincial Governments of the North West Frontier 
and Baluchistan: organising and managing health relief
Although the Federal Government took responsibility for securing and distributing 
needed supplies, it was the Provincial Governments of Baluchistan and the North West 
Frontier which undertook to organise, manage and implement health care for the 
refugees in the autumn of 1979. Responsibility for health care of Afghan refugees was 
first given as an additional task to a Deputy Director of Health Services in the 
Provincial Health Department of the North West Frontier in October 1979 (Figure 
10.6)20. Health care for the refugees at that time was provided by existing 
government health facilities to which the Afghans were given access, such as 
hospitals, rural health centres, clinics and dispensaries. Early in 1980 the first plans 
for a comprehensive refugee health programme were drawn up by the Provincial 
Health Department of the North West Frontier in collaboration with the World Health 
Organization (WHO) which had been working in Pakistan since the 1950s, the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) which had begun to assist 
Afghan refugees in October 1979 and the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund 
(UNICEF) which had also been working in Pakistan for several years21.
The plan for the North West Frontier called for a separate ’Health Directorate’ within 
the Health Department to manage and implement the refugee health programme.
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However, this Health Directorate for Afghan refugees in the North West Frontier was 
not approved by the States and Frontier Regions and Kashmir Affairs of the Federal 
Government until September 1980. Furthermore, it was then established within the 
newly formed Provincial Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees in the Home 
Department and not the Health Department as had originally been planned. Unlike 
health, the education programmes, veterinary services, income generation schemes and 
skills training projects were initially implemented by the relevant departments within 
the Provincial Government Health was the only social sector in which a separate 
administrative structure was created for refugee services. Furthermore, it was the first 
sectoral programme to be established within the Provincial Commissionerate for 
Afghan Refugees.
The decision to establish a separate management structure within the Home 
Department was influenced by several factors. Firstly, there was a rapid and 
continuing increase in the number of refugees; the Afghan population in Pakistan 
increased from 100 000 in September 1979 to 400 000 in December 1979 and reached 
one million in mid-1980 - approximately 100 000 new arrivals each month which 
continued throughout 1980. Secondly, the health needs and potential problems 
associated with this rapid increase in population quickly exceeded the capacity of 
existing health services. Thirdly, assistance from international organizations placed 
additional managerial demands on the Provincial Governments. Lastly, urgent and 
growing needs for relief required that lengthy bureaucratic procedures and political 
processes within government be bypassed. For example, health officials needed to be 
able to recruit and discipline workers hired temporarily as well as to control the use 
of donated funds and supplies. The creation of a separate structure for refugee relief 
generally, and health relief specifically, was one way government officials created and 
protected their autonomy to make decisions quickly and to use available resources to 
carry them out.
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10.2.4 Establishing health services for the refugees: curative care or community 
health?
Throughout the formation of the Refugee Health Directorates to set up and manage 
separate health services for the refugees, a system of ’basic health services’ was 
developed to provide curative care and disease control activities in the refugee 
villages. Until 1980 Afghans were given access to existing government facilities. With 
over 400,000 Afghans registered in January 1980 and a continuing influx of some
100,000 per month since October 1979, the plans for a comprehensive refugee health 
programme early in 1980 called for22:
mobile teams staffed by a medical doctor, paramedic and lady health visitor 
(LHV) to visit the refugee villages on a regular basis.
dispensaries staffed by a paramedic and lady health visitor to be located in the 
refugee villages.
Afghan women to be employed as ’female scouts' to screen for health 
problems in the villages and refer people to the dispensaries and mobile teams.
malaria control activities and im m unizations to be provided by the relevant 
provincial departments.
a health centre to be set up in Peshawar with an outpatient department, 25 beds 
for more serious cases and minor operating facilities.
10.2.4.1 Basic curative services: management bv refugee. Pakistani or foreign 
health personnel?
With the exception of ’female scouts’, these components of the refugee health 
programme were first implemented in 1980. Ten mobile teams and 15 dispensaries 
were set up in 1980 by the Health Department in Baluchistan to cover the 249,424
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registered refugees living there23. Forty mobile teams and 88 dispensaries, of which 
20 teams and 42 dispensaries were provided by the Refugee Health Directorate, had 
been established in the North West Frontier by the end of 198024. The use of mobile 
teams and dispensaries in the villages reflects the priority given to medical care and 
the need to provide such care for large numbers of refugees, many of whom were 
initially living with family or friends or were scattered throughout the countryside. 
Organized settlements for the refugees were established early in 1980 in order to 
discourage integration with the Pakistani people, and consequently long-term 
settlement in Pakistan, and to facilitate the distribution of relief services. These 
settlements which were to accommodate 500 families or 5000 individuals led to the 
inclusion of dispensaries in addition to mobile teams in the plans for refugees health 
care25. Moreover, the use of mobile teams and dispensaries was consistent with the 
national disaster plan which specified the use of existing government health facilities, 
mobile first aid teams and dispensaries on-site for health relief26.
These health units in the North West Frontier were originally employed by UNHCR 
on an exceptional basis, and as a short-term measure, until the Refugee Health 
Directorate was established in September 1980. Medical doctors for these teams were 
initially recruited from the Society for Doctors and Other Health Professionals outside 
o f Afghanistan which had been formed by Afghans living in the North West Frontier 
who were associated with moderate Islamic political parties27. These interim 
arrangements did not work well since there was no co-ordination between refugee 
medical teams and local health authorities, drugs were not re-supplied to the teams, 
living facilities were not provided for the doctors and payment of salaries was often 
delayed. In addition, this society of Afghan health professionals had proposed that 
they be responsible for the management of all Afghan health staff with the 
Government and UNHCR providing salaries, equipment and supplies. This proposal 
was unacceptable to government officials who felt that management of the refugee 
health programme was the prerogative of the Government. Thus, the society was 
dissolved when health staff were employed in November 1980 by the Refugee Health 
Directorate directly.
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In addition to the UN agencies which were already working in the country (WHO and 
UNICEF) or which had begun to assist the Afghan refugees in 1979 (UNHCR and 
WFP), several charitable agencies began to provide basic health services for the 
Afghans in 1980. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Medecins 
Sans Frontieres (MSF) France were two of the first foreign charitable agencies to take 
part in providing health care for the Afghan refugees. In keeping with its mandate, the 
ICRC concentrated on organizing the provision of first aid and medical and surgical 
care for those wounded during armed conflict. MSF sent a small team to assess needs 
in January of 1980 and their findings and recommendations concurred with 
governmental plans to provide care through mobile teams. However, MSF 
recommended that the mobile teams be staffed by two medical doctors, one male and 
one female, as well as two nurses; it is unclear whether they envisaged that foreign, 
Pakistani or Afghan nationals would fill these positions. Nevertheless, MSF and two 
other French medical aid organizations, Aide Medicale Internationale (AMI) and 
Medecins du Monde (MM), choose to work in Afghanistan where they established 
permanent clinics staffed by two medical personnel who rotated every four or six 
months. Since these agencies had no permanent base in Pakistan and since they 
maintained a discreet silence about their route into Afghanistan, these agencies were 
officially ignored by Pakistani authorities28.
Notwithstanding the decision of the three French medical aid organizations to work 
in Afghanistan instead of Pakistan, by the end of 1980 there were ten charitable 
agencies financing and supervising 21 mobile teams and 24 dispensaries for Afghans 
in Pakistan29. In Table 10.1 it can be seen that six of the ten charitable agencies were 
based outside of Pakistan, with five being registered in Europe or North America and 
one in Saudi Arabia. Only four agencies were Pakistani; one was a charitable agency 
set up by Pakistanis, one was affiliated with branches of Protestant churches whose 
head office was in the US, one was a branch of a US charitable agency and the other 
one was affiliated with a political party of the Islamic faith. Two of the agencies 
registered in Europe were managed and staffed primarily by Afghans; both of these 
organizations were formed in response to the recent influx of Afghans into Pakistan 
and at least one had close links with one of the Afghan political parties. In addition
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TABLE 10.1
Charitable agencies providing basic health services 
for Afghan refugees in 198030
AGENCY COUNTRY OF LEGAL 
REGISTRATION
SERVICES PROVIDED
North West Frontier
International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC)
Switzerland 4 mobile teams
Inter-Aid Committee Pakistan/United States of 
America
2 mobile teams
CARE-Pakistan Pakistan/United States of 
America
Potable water supply
International Rescue 
Committee
United States of America 4 mobile teams; 20 
dispensaries
Save the Children Fund United Kingdom 1 mobile team; 3 
dispensaries
Union Aid for Afghan 
Refugees
West Germany 2 mobile teams
Pakistan Medico 
International
Pakistan 2 mobile teams
Austrian Relief Committee 
for Afghan Refugees
Austria 2 mobile teams; 1 health 
clinic
Edara Ahya-ul-Uloom Pakistan 1 mobile team
Saudi Arabian Red Crescent 
Society
Saudi Arabia 2 mobile teams
Baluchistan
Pakistan Medico 
International
Pakistan 1 mobile team
10 Agencies 7 Countries 21 mobile teams; 24 
dispensaries o r clinics; 
one water supply project
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to providing care directly, some of the foreign agencies seconded medical doctors and 
nurses to the sub-offices of UNHCR in Peshawar and Quetta. For example, one nurse 
assessed the nutritional status and needs of the refugees and a medical doctor advised 
officials in charge of the programme in the North West Frontier.
10.2.4.2 Sophisticated medical and surgical care: setting up separate facilities or 
building capacity in existing centres?
A health centre for Afghan refugees was set up by the Health Department of the North 
West Frontier in Peshawar in May of 1980 with funds from UNHCR. But it only 
offered basic care on an outpatient basis and it only functioned for four months. 
Similar to many of the mobile teams and local dispensaries, this health centre was 
staffed by medical doctors who were members of the Society for Doctors and Other 
Health Professionals outside o f Afghanistan. Disputes with provincial health 
authorities over salaries and managerial responsibilities contributed to the early closure 
of this centre31.
Beginning in 1981, some foreign and local charitable agencies and several Afghan and 
Pakistani political parties began to establish separate referral facilities and specialty 
services for the Afghans, mainly in Peshawar in the North West Frontier. These 
hospitals were funded and managed by organizations other than the Government of 
Pakistan and UNHCR, and they were set up specifically to care for Afghans wounded 
during armed conflict. Not surprisingly, many were associated with particular political 
parties of the Afghan Mujahideen who were at war with their own Government. For 
example the Society for Doctors and Other Health Professionals outside o f 
Afghanistan set up their own hospital to care for those wounded in conflict, ill 
members of their party, other supporters and their families32. Support from the 
Government of Pakistan to these hospitals was limited at that time to the provision of 
some ambulances to transport patients from the border areas to the hospitals. Instead, 
provincial health authorities and officials of UNHCR were concerned mainly with 
providing basic medical care through mobile teams and local dispensaries and, to a
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lesser extent, with enabling existing governmental hospitals in the districts and regions 
to extend their services to Afghans in need of care.
10.2.4.3 Disease control: extending national programmes
Control activities for malaria and tuberculosis and vaccination programmes were high 
priorities in the health plans and services of Pakistan and vertical programmes were 
well-established. For example, malaria control activities first began in the 1950’s as 
part of the WHO malaria eradication programme. The inclusion of these activities in 
the refugee health programme was a logical extension of national and international 
health priorities and services. Thus, specific measures to control priority diseases were 
promoted and initiated mostly by the Government, with support from WHO and 
UNICEF.
Beginning in 1980, spraying of insecticides and testing samples of blood for the 
malaria parasite were begun among refugees living in the North West Frontier by the 
Provincial Malaria Control Programme of the Health Department. From the beginning 
and continuing throughout the refugee health programme, the percentage of blood 
samples in which the malaria parasite was found was higher among refugees than the 
local populations (Table 10.2)33. These Endings led many people to believe that the 
refugees might increase the incidence of malaria, either as a result of increased foci 
brought by Afghans since many were coming from malarious areas of Afghanistan or 
of epidemics within non-immune communities since many camps were located in 
malarious areas of the North West Frontier. Furthermore, publication of these findings 
in the local and international press created additional pressure to implement control 
measures. Spraying insecticides prior to, and after, the season of transmission and 
screening for cases by collecting samples of blood were common components of both 
programmes in addition to the treatment of cases by staff in the mobile units and 
dispensaries. With funds from UNHCR, these activities were implemented in the 
camps by separate mobile teams and staff of the provincial disease control 
programmes. These plans for malaria control among Afghan refugees were written in 
both Baluchistan and the North West Frontier during 198134.
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TABLE 10.2 
Malaria prevalence among Afghan refugees and 
local Pakistani populations in the North West Frontier
Afghan refugees Local population
Year
Total
examined
Number
positive
Prevalence
(%)
Total
examined
Number
positive
Prevalence
(%)
1979 12156 235 1*9 583824 1815 0-3
1980 52464 2562 4*9 612580 1982 0-3
1981 177537 11255 6*3 601508 3987 0*7
1982 268083 18087 6*8 603602 4437 0-7
1983 51843 4761 9*2 569819 5357 0-9
1984 131615 20808 15-8 667188 9558 1-4
1985 183725 40820 22-2 488490 17111 3*5
1986
(Jan. to July)
114470 27326 29-1 252561 12661 5-0
Source: Provincial office of Malaria Control Department and Project Directorate of Health for Afghan refugees NWFP.
Similar to malaria control, vaccines against cholera and typhoid were first given to the 
refugees early in 1980 by the Provincial Expanded Programme of Immunizations (EPI) 
of the Health Department. Later in that year, the vaccines given were changed to those 
against diphtheria, pertussis, tetanus, polio and measles in accordance with 
international standards. With support from UNICEF, the Provincial EPI Programme 
in the North West Frontier established vaccination centres for refugees in five tribal 
agencies and four settled districts, and in Baluchistan mobile teams were formed. 
Despite organizational differences, an evaluation of the programme in December 1980 
found that vaccinations were provided mostly on an ad hoc basis in response to 
reported outbreaks35. These crash programmes were creating a tremendous burden 
on the provincial programmes since coverage in the local and international press 
necessitated prompt responses to reported outbreaks among the refugees and, thus, 
local staff and supplies were being diverted to care for the refugees. In addition, ad 
hoc services lacked continuity which made follow-up visits and doses difficult to 
provide. As a result of the evaluation, separate mobile vaccination teams were then 
formed, beginning in 1981, by the Health Department in Baluchistan and the Refugee 
Health Directorate in the North West Frontier.
Unlike vaccinations and malaria control activities, tuberculosis control was not 
organised as a separate programme in isolation from basic curative care due to the 
nature of the disease and its control. Responsibility for diagnosing and treating cases 
(the main control measures) was given to the staff of mobile units, dispensaries and, 
later, basic health units. However, the lack of laboratory facilities for sputum analysis 
and systems to follow-up suspected and confirmed cases greatly limited the 
effectiveness of the programme. The lack of laboratory facilities was equally a 
problem for malaria control, a priority of which was detection of cases through testing 
samples of blood. These problems were highlighted in an evaluation of the refugee 
health programme generally by WHO mid-198136. In this evaluation, the additional 
problems of a somewhat haphazard implementation of insecticide spraying and low 
coverage of vaccinations were also noted.
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103 1981 - 1982: Organising a national health service for Afghan refugees
103.1 Management - a governmental affair
103.1.1 Planning for refugee health care nation-wide
In response to the request of the Provincial Government of the North West Frontier 
in 1980 for a separate administrative structure for the health relief programme for the 
Afghan refugees, the Federal Government not only gave approval but expanded and 
formalised the organization at national, provincial and district levels. On 17 December 
1980, the President issued a Directive (No 57/1/CMLA) regarding the administration 
of Afghan refugee camps. In this Presidential Directive, the organization of health 
services for Afghan refugees was established to include37:
NATIONAL LEVEL One Director of Health Services within the Chief
Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees (CCAR), the States and 
Frontier Regions and Kashmir Affairs Division of the Federal 
Government. This Director was to arrange for, and centrally 
control, medical supplies and equipment. Distribution was to be 
conducted by the Provincial Health Directorates for Afghan 
Refugees.
PROVINCIAL One Project Director for Health within the Provincial
LEVEL Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees. The Director was to be
assisted by two Deputy Directors.
DIVISIONAL Divisional hospitals were to be expanded by 30 beds.
LEVEL Additional staff were to be hired.
DISTRICT/TRIBAL Existing staff at the district and tribal agency
AGENCY LEVEL level were to be reinforced and used for the supervision and
co-ordination of the refugee health programme in their
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respective areas. Separate medical facilities were not to be 
established within the districts and tribal agencies. Honoraria 
were to be given to health staff.
VILLAGE LEVEL Refugee villages were to be provided with dispensaries which
included five inpatient beds, an ambulance for transporting
emergency cases to referral facilities and residential
accommodation for staff. The medical officer of the dispensary 
was further designated as the health officer of the camp.
10.3.1.2 Establishing federal and provincial structures
Subsequently, in February 1981, a Director of Medical Services was appointed in the
Chief Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees (CCAR)38 and a Deputy Director of 
Health Services of the Health Department in Baluchistan was given responsibility for 
refugee health care. Unlike the Health Directorate for Afghan refugees in the North 
West Frontier, the Directorate in Baluchistan was initially established within the 
Health Department in October 1981. However, there were problems in managing the 
refugee health programme in Baluchistan as a result of this arrangement which were 
similar to those encountered in the North West Frontier, including39:
government procedures for recruiting and terminating health staff were lengthy 
processes which caused delays in filling posts and in disciplining staff.
dual accountability of staff to the Health Department and the Refugee Health 
Directorate weakened the authority of the Refugee Health Directorate largely 
because the Health Department could offer career positions in future.
procedures for requesting and obtaining funds from the Government were also 
lengthy processes which caused delays in getting financial approval for 
projects and in paying bills.
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The resulting delays in implementing some health activities in Baluchistan and the 
poor quality of many of those which had already been initiated led to the relocation 
of the Refugee Health Directorate in the Provincial Commissionerate for Afghan 
Refugees of the Home Department at the end of 1981 - similar to the organization in 
the North West Frontier. Thus, by the end of 1981 both Provincial Governments which 
were hosting Afghan refugees had assumed responsibility for managing and 
implementing refugee health services, and they had created separate political and 
administrative structures within their Home Departments to do so.
10.3.1.3 Planning for management of the refugee health programme locally
The need for separate supervisors within the districts and tribal agencies was first 
suggested in January 1981 by the foreign Medical Advisor to the UNHCR Sub-office 
in Peshawar in response to delays and difficulties in implementing the planned health 
activities, namely the provision of dispensaries and basic health units in the camps and 
the implementation of the immunisation, malaria control and sanitation programmes. 
During 1980/81 problems with District Health Officers and Agency Surgeons had been 
encountered by the Refugee Directorate for Health. Moreover, responsibility for some 
2 million refugees as well as one million local Pakistanis was felt to be an 
unreasonable task for the regular government health officials40. Furthermore, it was 
no longer possible for the Project Director of Refugee Health to continue to supervise 
personally and co-ordinate the medical officers and other staff of the refugee health 
programme which had expanded to cover 1, 148 746 refugees living in 11 different 
districts and tribal agencies.
Initially, field supervisors were proposed to be attached to the District Health Officer 
or Agency Surgeon but responsible to the Refugee Directorate for Health. The foreign 
Medical Advisor to UNHCR originally suggested the use of foreign staff but this was 
never discussed with the Project Director of Refugee Health. In August 1981, the 
Project Director of Refugee Health and UNHCR agreed to request six Field 
Supervisory Medical Officers (FSMO) in an attempt to exercise greater control over 
staff of the refugee health programme. Specifically these Field Supervisory Medical
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Officers (FSMOs) were to oversee the tuberculosis control, malaria control and 
immunisation programmes.
103.2 Creating a permanent medical service for Afghan refugees
The distribution of mobile teams and dispensaries was revised in the spring of 1981 
in order to comply with the Presidential Directive which stated that one dispensary in 
a permanent structure was to serve 10,000 people. In addition, a medical doctor was 
to be a regular staff member of each dispensary. The first criteria mirrored the national 
health plan for 1976-1981 which called for one basic health unit (BHU) for every
10,000 persons41. However, this national plan specified that staff of basic health units 
were to be paramedical rather than medical doctors. Placing doctors in national basic 
health units was first recommended in November of 1981 by a special committee 
appointed by the President to investigate the surplus of medical doctors. Thus, 
beginning in 1981 and to a greater extent during 1982, the number of dispensaries in 
refugee villages was increased and medical doctors were increasingly employed in 
them, thereby upgrading them to basic health units. By the end of 1981, the Refugee 
Health Directorates in Baluchistan and the North West Frontier were providing 10 and 
31 (61%) of the 61 (10 and 51 respectively) mobile teams as well as 15 (75%) and 
74 (65%) of the 134 (20 and 114 respectively) dispensaries for Afghan refugees42.
The implementation of this policy was not without difficulty. The main problems were 
in recruiting and retaining staff, particularly medical doctors and women - both doctors 
and lady health visitors - since there were shortages of these workers in both 
Baluchistan and the North West Frontier despite a nation-wide surplus of medical 
doctors. In the North West Frontier, for example, some 150 posts for physicians, 
particularly those for women, and 80 posts for lady health visitors were vacant at that 
time. In addition to shortages of health staff within the provinces generally, frequent 
vacancies in refugee health positions were due to insufficient and unacceptable 
accommodation facilities in rural areas, frequent delays in payment of salaries and 
inadequate supervision. In order to overcome some of these problems, specific
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personnel polices were adopted regarding the employment and remuneration of health 
workers in the refugee camps.
10.3.2.1 The lack of a career structure for health staff
A group of Pakistani physicians which offered to work for the refugee health 
programme in the North West Frontier in May 1980 requested that their work with the 
refugees be considered as a secondment from the Provincial Government. Their 
request was refused for at least two reasons. Firstly, such a system had been 
unsuccessfully tried in Baluchistan. The system of taking staff on deputation from the 
Provincial Department of Health created confusion about accountability since staff 
answered to both the Health Department and the Refugee Directorate for Health in the 
Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees. This undermined the authority of the Refugee 
Directorate for Health, making control of staff difficult since they responded primarily 
to the Health Department. Initially, the Director of Refugee Health of the North West 
Frontier, and later the Director of Refugee Health of Baluchistan, felt that control over 
staff was essential to implement the programme successfully. Thus, senior health staff 
of the refugee programme continued to be appointed by the Health Department, but 
the Field Supervisory Medical Officers (FSMOs) and staff of the basic health units 
were later hired and supervised directly by the Refugee Directorates for Health 
beginning in 1980 in the North West Frontier and in 1985 in Baluchistan.
Secondly, graduates of medical doctor and lady health visitor training programmes 
which were subsidised by the Government were required to work in provincial health 
facilities for between six months and three years following completion of their 
training. This work was not recognised as government service. Thus, neither work in 
the refugee health programme nor work as an obligation for training was recognised 
as government service. There was, however, an agreement with the Health Department 
in the North West Frontier that lady health visitors could defer their two year 
obligation while working for the refugee health programme.
319
10.3.2.2 Hardship living conditions
Insufficient or inadequate accommodation was a problem less easily solved than levels 
of salaries. The lack of accommodation facilities was most serious for female staff 
who in Pakistani culture must live separate from men and preferably not on their own. 
Obviously, the difficulty in recruiting and retaining female staff was most acute in 
remote areas, such as Baluchistan and the tribal agencies in the North West Frontier. 
The possibility of constructing separate accommodation facilities was considered and 
rejected in the North West Frontier in 1982. It was felt that the provision of separate 
accommodation facilities was too costly and unnecessary given the compensatory 
increase in salary43. In Baluchistan, accommodation facilities were provided to some 
extent in the basic health units; there were few other options since many of the camps 
were a considerable distance from Pakistani villages and towns.
10.3.2.3 Compensating for the lack of career opportunities and poor living 
conditions: financial incentives
From the beginning of the refugee health programme, the Project Director of Refugee 
Health in the North West Frontier (at that time a Deputy Director for Health Services 
in the Health Department) requested that higher salaries be paid to staff working with 
the refugees. A financial incentive was felt to be necessary to recruit and retain health 
staff because:
the demands of the job were felt to be greater than in government posts or 
private practice. The refugees were located in remote areas which required that 
staff live in areas away from the conveniences of more developed villages and 
towns and away from family and friends. In addition, many refugees were 
living in the tribal agencies where the safety of staff could not always be 
guaranteed. Lastly, the Afghans had different cultural beliefs and practices 
regarding health which required different approaches by health staff.
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unlike the health programme of the Provincial Government, accommodation 
was not provided for health staff working with the refugees. (Some 
accommodation facilities were provided in Baluchistan since many camps were 
a considerable distance from Pakistani villages and towns.)
there were no career possibilities in the refugee health programme; all posts 
were temporary and work with the refugees was not credited towards 
government service.
there was a shortage of health staff
A financial incentive was intended to compensate for these disadvantages of working 
in the refugee health programme. The Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees in the 
North West Frontier referred this request to the Provincial Department of Finance 
which recommended that approval be sought from the Federal Government. 
Subsequently, the request was referred to the States and Frontier Regions and Kashmir 
Affairs which requested approval from the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of 
Finance rejected salaries in excess of those paid for government service in September 
1980. The Commissionerate persisted in their request for the above reasons to which 
the Federal Government finally agreed in 1981. Although the Project Director of 
Refugee Health initially requested a monthly salary of rupees 6000 for medical 
officers, the salary was set at rupees 4500 per month - three times the salary for 
medical officers in the government health service44. Monthly salaries for other health 
staff were also higher than their counterparts in the government health services.
10.3.2.4 National staff as care-givers: Restrictions on foreign personnel
Despite the many difficulties faced by the Government in recruiting and retaining local 
staff in the refugee health programme from 1981, the Government maintained a policy 
that limited foreign personnel to working in settled areas, in other words in districts 
rather than tribal agencies. Prior to that time, several international agencies were either 
working in, or had proposed to work in, tribal agencies. However, one foreign staff
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member of an inter-governmental organization did not abide by the agreement the 
agency had with the Government. Due to associated security problems, the Federal 
Government, upon the recommendation of officials of the provincial refugee 
programme in the North West Frontier, barred all foreigners from working in the tribal 
areas in July of 1981. In future, foreign workers and agencies were to finance and 
supervise medical teams of Pakistan and Afghan nationals in settled areas; the 
Government would provide services in the tribal agencies. As a result, foreign 
personnel of the International Committee of the Red Cross were re-assigned to 
Peshawar (from Kurram and North Waziristan Agencies) and the Austrian Relief 
Committee and the International Rescue Committee were reassigned to cover Mardan 
and Kohat Districts rather than Bajour and Dir Tribal Agencies respectively.
Another result of the increasing involvement of foreign health staff in relief efforts for 
the Afghans, both in Afghanistan and Pakistan, was a growing concern among 
government officials for national security. Further restrictions were then placed on 
foreign personnel which limited them to administrative or advisory roles: they were 
not to be working in the refugee villages and they were not to be providing basic care 
directly. Similar to the requirement that foreigners work only in settled districts, this 
restriction was also established because of concerns for security by the Government. 
In addition to these restrictions, all health staff earning more than rupees 1500 per 
month were required to obtain security clearance from the Federal Government as well 
as consent from the Provincial Refugee Health Directorates to work in the refugee 
health programme45. These practices limited the roles and activities of international 
staff and ensured, to some extent, that services provided by international agencies 
complimented those provided by the Government.
10.4 Comment
The escalating influx of hundreds of thousands of Afghans into Pakistan between 1979 
and 1981 was followed by a massive relief operation. The initial relief effort was 
distinguished by national and international policies which recognised all Afghans as 
refugees, entitling them to national and international assistance. Relief activities were
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initiated for a relatively small number of refugees, less than five per cent of the 
refugee population registered with the Government and UNHCR in 1988. Though 
several thousand people in need pose obvious problems for governments to provide 
for their food, shelter and other basic needs, they also create additional political 
concerns. Large numbers of refugees may be seen as a threat to internal order by 
national governments. The independent nature of Pathans, which had previously been 
expressed in the movement for a separate Pathan state, the considerable degree of 
autonomy enjoyed by Provincial Governments in Pakistan and the existence of a 
majority of Pathans in the North West Frontier and Baluchistan meant that the arrival 
of several hundred thousand additional Pathans as refugees had the potential to upset 
the already delicate, and at times strained, relationship between the Federal 
Government and the local governments and people of the North West Frontier and 
Baluchistan. Thus, there were concerns for domestic political stability which 
incorporated the effect of several thousand refugees on ethnic composition, 
employment markets and scarce environmental resources. Clearly, it was not in the 
interest of the Federal Government to ignore the needs of the refugees and their local 
hosts.
The arrival of several thousand refugees may also pose a threat to national security, 
particularly when there is potential for armed conflict between the government from 
which the refugees are fleeing and either the government hosting the refugees or the 
refugees themselves. These fears were partially realised but not until February and 
March of 1987 when refugee villages were bombed by aircraft of the Afghan 
Government’s military forces46. Host governments may fear infiltration by agents of 
the opposing government under the guise of being refugees or they may fear 
retaliation from the opposing government for hosting active rebels - both of which 
may undermine government structures and services as well as support for the 
government by local people. For example, some attributed the frequent bombings of 
local businesses, government offices or public markets to agents of the Afghan 
Government’s secret intelligence service, KHAD. Similarly, the threat of refugees on 
the national security of host governments is of concern to other states, particularly 
those who have strategic interests in the country. Thus, although large numbers of
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refugees are a humanitarian concern, their effect on existing relationships within and 
between nation-states may be of equal, if not greater, political concern to host and 
allied governments.
Governmental relief activities for Afghans were first initiated in 1978 by local 
government authorities. Relief priorities centred on meeting basic needs for water, 
food and shelter. The activities undertaken were extensions of existing or previous 
relief programmes; they were organised and implemented through an existing relief 
structure, namely the Disaster Preparedness and Relief Cell of the Cabinet Division. 
Clearly, previous experience with, and preparedness for, disasters affects contemporary 
responses of governments - both the priorities and organization of relief provided. 
However, a lack of resources and a poorly developed relief organization led to the ad 
hoc distribution of food and other supplies in practice.
Very early on policies designated the Government of Pakistan as the institution 
through which health relief would be provided for the refugees. Inevitably, health 
relief for the refugees was initially provided by existing health facilities or extensions 
of existing services. Yet in Pakistan, rural health services lacked sufficient resources, 
were poorly developed or did not exist at all in the areas where the refugees settled. 
Nonetheless, in the plans for relief, Afghans were initially given access to rural health 
centres, clinics and dispensaries. Many of these facilities lacked supplies and personnel 
or were frequently closed; they were inadequate to meet the needs of local people, let 
alone thousands of refugees. This meant that health care was provided on an ad hoc 
basis in practice and was insufficient to address the health problems of the refugees.
Additional policies were then formulated which authorised the creation of a separate, 
parallel system of health services nation-wide in which decision-making and 
managerial responsibilities were granted to governmental health and political 
authorities. The creation of the refugee commissions allowed refugee health care to 
either be the responsibility of these commissions or the Ministry of Health. In 
Pakistan, a somewhat unusual arrangement was adopted with a combination of military
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and government health officials being seconded to national and provincial refugee 
commissions respectively for refugee health care.
Choosing to place the management of refugee health care in the refugee commissions 
was a response to urgent needs for relief which required that bureaucratic procedures 
and lengthy political processes within government be bypassed. In other words, 
officials in charge of refugee health care chose to work within the organization which 
offered them greater autonomy. They needed to be able to recruit, retain and discipline 
health workers and to obtain and control the use of funds and other supplies. Thus, 
in Pakistan, the creation of a separate directorate for refugee health care was one 
mechanism through which the autonomy to make decision, and to control the 
resources needed to implement them, was made available.
Curative allopathic care, both medical and surgical, was the priority and efforts were 
made to make it widely accessible through the use of mobile teams and facilities sited 
locally. The priority given to curative medicine and disease control in Pakistan clearly 
mirrored health priorities in national disaster plans and health services. These were 
also the health relief priorities of many charitable agencies and inter-governmental 
organizations which were involved in the Afghan relief effort. Thus, medical and 
surgical care as priorities were supported by the United Nations, charitable agencies 
and host and donor governments alike.
The Government was supported in these roles by specialised agencies of the United 
Nations and both foreign and domestic charitable agencies. UNHCR provided vast 
financial resources to set up and maintain a system of refugee health services. Unicef 
gave money, vaccines and other supplies so that immunization and water would be 
accessible to the Afghans. WHO advised the Government on disease control strategies, 
primarily for malaria and tuberculosis, but relied on UNHCR to secure the resources 
needed to put them into practice. Foreigners were excluded from positions in 
management and in the provision of care directly; Pakistani medical doctors were 
enticed with higher pay and other benefits both to staff and to manage the refugee 
health services within districts and refugee villages. Thus, charitable agencies provided
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resources for mobile teams and clinics to care for the refugees in their villages; in 
addition, some seconded professionals to advise UNHCR on the organization and 
management of curative services or community health concerns, such as nutrition. In 
so doing, each of these agencies, as conduits for international aid, undertook roles 
traditionally held by them in refugee relief operations. But in Pakistan, they initially 
did so under the skilled leadership of Pakistani authorities and within policies and 
plans determined by them.
To understand why Pakistanis were able to take and enforce leadership at all levels 
of the health relief operation is beyond the scope of this analysis since any meaningful 
explanation would need to delve deep into Pakistan’s recent and colonial past. Policies 
of key donors and other political allies would also need to be explored in detail. 
Notwithstanding the short-comings of reviewing historical influences more 
superficially, at least two factors made a notable contribution. Firstly, throughout their 
recent and colonial past, Pakistan officials have gained considerable expertise in 
providing political leadership. They were skilled in dealing with the different interests 
and complexities which characterise a multi-ethnic society as well as pressures exerted 
from abroad - both near and far. Thus, their leaders were very much aware of the 
circumstances within which events occurred as well as the implications for existing 
balances of power. This was no small feat since groups with vested interests were 
many and varied, ranging from the two most powerful governments in the world to 
local factions of the Islamic faith.
Secondly, Pakistani officials were skilled in planning and organising public services. 
With a long exposure to allopathic systems of medical care, Pakistan not only had 
extensive systems of public and private health facilities when the Afghans first arrived, 
they had a surplus of some 10 000 medical doctors who were unable to find work. 
The need to consider the interests of the medical profession weighed heavily on both 
public health authorities who not only were members themselves but who genuinely 
supported medical doctors in the leading role as legitimate providers of health care, 
and political officials who could ill afford to lose the support of one of the most 
wealthy, politically-active and influential groups in society. Thus, in addition to their
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concerns for the well-being of the Afghans, their ability to plan and organise a 
separate system of health services based on the practice of allopathic medicine by 
medical doctors also ensured the well-being of the medical profession’s position 
within the health sector in Pakistan.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
Closing the gaps between planning and practice: 1982 - 1984
The presence of some 2.5 million Afghans in Pakistan at the beginning of 1982 
enhanced coverage of their plight in the international press. Together with waning 
interest among western publics in other groups of refugees - particularly in Indochina - 
who also fled in large numbers at the end of the 1970s1, the Afghans became an 
increasingly common focus of concern among the international community. This 
created additional pressures on the Government of Pakistan in particular to not only 
plan and organise needed care but to provide it in practice.
11.1 Basic allopathic care and disease control: consolidating governmental 
responsibilities
11.1.1 From ad hoc to routine service provision: establishing basic health units
Despite a continuing increase in the numbers of mobile teams and local dispensaries 
throughout 1980 and 1981, the coverage of health services among the Afghan refugees 
fell short of the targets established in the Presidential Directive. With some two 
million refugees in the North West Frontier at the end of 1981, 200 teams or 
dispensaries were needed in that province alone and more Afghans continued to arrive 
each month. In order to better cope with the rapidly increasing refugee population, 
mobile teams were converted or reassigned to work in dispensaries and dispensaries 
were upgraded to basic health units. By the end of 1982, the Provincial Governments 
of the North West Frontier and Baluchistan were providing 85 (66%) and 40 (89%) 
of the 164 (129 and 45 respectively) basic health units for Afghan refugees. Two years 
later, at the end of 1984, they were operating 95 (70%) and 47 (90%) of the 191 (139 
and 52) basic health units for the refugees. Additional basic health units and sub­
health units (those without medical doctors on the staff) were created in the following 
years when newly arrived Afghans needed care, and in 1984, the basic salaries of all 
health staff were reviewed and increased in order to maintain a financial incentive.
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Both Provincial Governments continued to be assisted by foreign and domestic 
charitable agencies. In 1984, UNHCR and the Government of Pakistan reported that 
18 agencies were providing basic or specialty health care for the Afghans in addition 
to those providing hospital services (Table 11.1). Ten of these agencies supported 
basic health units; others provided first aid or other specialty services, such as eye 
care, and a few focused exclusively on raising and dispersing funds. Only one of the 
agencies listed below gave its sole support to medical relief efforts inside Afghanistan 
(Figure 11.1). The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan began to fund and supply six 
clinics inside Afghanistan which were being set up and run by the Society for Doctors 
and other Health Professionals outside o f Afghanistan in 1982 - 1983. Divisions 
within this union of doctors, who were members of the alliance of moderate Islamic 
and political resistance parties, however, prompted the Swedish Committee to work 
with individual medical doctors and other paramedical personnel instead of the union 
or the parties. By 1984, the Swedish Committee had supported 44 medical doctors, 67 
other trained health professionals and 383 paramedical personnel2.
Even though the Swedish Committee was the only agency on the official list which 
was working exclusively in Afghanistan, other agencies began to support relief work 
inside Afghanistan in 1983 - particularly those from the United States of America 
(US). Following a visit to Pakistan by the Vice President of the US (George Bush) in 
May of 1984, US and Pakistani policies which restricted the involvement of groups 
from the US were reversed. Previously, fears of Soviet charges that such groups were 
fronts for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the US Government and desires 
by the Carter and Reagan administrations not to portray the conflict as a confrontation 
between the Soviet Union and the US had led the Governments of Pakistan and the 
US to restrict the involvement of US groups in relief efforts. Aid for relief which 
came from the US Government, and amounted to one-third of all resources provided, 
had been channelled primarily through the United Nations3. Such a large contribution 
was consistent with previous patterns of foreign assistance received by Pakistan more 
generally; between 1951 and 1960, when Pakistan was creating its own national
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Figure 11.1
Health services provided for Afghans in Pakistan 
by charitable organizations, 1984
Basic services 
10 56%
Relief in Afghanistan 
1 6%
Material donations
Disease control
First aid
Not known 
3 17%
Services offered
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TABLE 11.1
Charitable agencies recognised by Pakistani authorities 
for providing health care for the Afghans in 19844 
(excluding hospital services)
AGENCY COUNTRY OF LEGAL 
REGISTRATION
HEALTH SERVICES 
PROVIDED
North West Frontier
Austrian Relief Committee 
for Afghan Refugees
Austria 2 basic health units
CARITAS Pakistan Pakistan/Holy See donations of food and 
other material goods
German Agency for 
Technical Cooperation
West Germany not specified
Inter Aid Committee Pakistan/United States 7 basic health units
International Committee of 
the Red Cross
Switzerland first aid posts
International Rescue 
Committee
United States 6 basic health units
Islamic African Relief 
Agency
Sudan not specified
Italian Cooperation for 
Development
Italy management and funding 
of tuberculosis control 
programme (NWFP)
Kuwait Red Crescent 
Society
Kuwait 3 basic health units
Norwegian Refugee 
Council
Norway not specified
Pakistan Red Crescent 
Society
Pakistan 1 basic health unit; 
specialty care
The Salvation Army United Kingdom 3 basic health units
Saudi Red Crescent 
Society
Saudi Arabia 8 basic health units
Save the Children Fund United Kingdom 3 basic and sub- health 
units; training
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AGENCY COUNTRY OF LEGAL 
REGISTRATION
HEALTH SERVICES 
PROVIDED
Swedish Committee for 
Afghanistan
Sweden not specified
Serving Emergency Relief 
and Vocational Enterprises 
(SERVE)
United Kingdom eye clinic
Union Aid for Afghan 
Refugees
West Germany 17 basic and sub- health 
units
Baluchistan
Action International Contre 
La Faim
France 2 basic health units
Inter Aid Committee Pakistan/United States 3 basic health units
International Committee of 
the Red Cross
Switzerland 2 first aid posts
Pakistan Red Crescent 
Society
Pakistan not specified
Saudi Red Crescent 
Society
Saudi Arabia 3 basic health units
Puniab
Austrian Relief Committee 
for Afghan Refugees
Austria sanitation
18 Agencies 14 countries 58 basic and sub- health 
units; first aid; specialty 
care; funds; information
character and system of government, the US Government contributed nearly four-fifths 
of all foreign assistance - over 75% of which came in the form of surplus agricultural 
commodities5.
Thus, only one of the 18 charitable agencies officially recognised in the relief effort 
in Pakistan was registered as a charity in law in the US (Figure 11.2). Although one 
charitable agency was set up in the US which subsequently sent medical supplies in 
support of relief efforts inside of Afghanistan beginning in 1983, it did not receive any
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Figure 11.2
National base of charitable organizations 
providing health care for Afghans in Pakistan, 1984
Western Europe 11 
61%
USA 1
6%
M. East/E. Africa 3 17%
17%
Country of registration in law
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support from the US Government, financially or politically, until 1984. Nor did it 
establish a base in Pakistan. In 1984 other charitable agencies from the United State 
began to set up relief programmes for Afghans living in Afghanistan from a base in 
Pakistan. For example, the International Medical Corps first sent teams of American 
medical personnel to Afghanistan in 1984. Notwithstanding the significant potential 
of this change in policy, the number of charitable agencies actively involved in relief 
programmes for the Afghans - in Pakistan and Afghanistan - remained relatively small 
at the end of 1984.
11.1.2 Extending services to new arrivals in Mianwali District in the Province of 
Punjab
The pressure of some 2.5 million Afghans and the continuing arrival of thousands 
more led the Provincial Governments of the North West Frontier and Baluchistan to 
advocate a policy limiting further settlement in these provinces by newly arriving or 
unregistered Afghans in 1982. The Federal Government then established a policy to 
settle new refugees in Mianwali District of the Province of Punjab. Mianwali was 
located in close proximity to the North West Frontier - it had been a part of the North 
West Frontier until 19016. Although Mianwali was administered as part of the 
wealthy province of Punjab, the sites selected were located in an area subjected to 
stifling heat, 125 F or 54 C, during the summer months. This eventually led the 
refugees to migrate to cooler regions of tribal agencies during this season each year. 
Employment opportunities were scarce in Mianwali and the stony scrub-land was 
infertile, offering few hopes for agricultural initiatives or even the production of 
needed materials for firewood. Furthermore, all land was owned privately by peoples 
of different ethnic groups, languages and customs7. Despite these unfavourable 
conditions, an agreement was finally reached between the Government and UNHCR, 
and the first groups of Afghans to be settled there arrived in 1982.
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Overall responsibility for Afghans in the Punjab was first given as an additional task 
to the Commissioner for Sargoda Division - the geographical area in which the 
refugees were located - who was answerable to the Home Secretary of the Provincial 
Government. The Commissioner for Sargoda Division involved seven departments of 
the Provincial Government in planning, building and staffing these new refugee camps. 
The departments for Highways, Education, Health and Small Industries took part in 
the relief effort less extensively than those for Housing and Physical Planning, Public 
Health Engineering and Revenue. Although an Administrator had been appointed in 
Mianwali District to work in the refugee programme, the Commissioner for Sargoda 
Division specifically requested the Deputy Commissioner of Mianwali District to be 
involved in the relief programme. The Deputy Commissioner had access to all 
Departments in the District Government, including the District Health Office which 
was initially requested to provide staff and supplies for a dispensary in the camp.
A Director of the refugee health programme was first appointed by the Provincial 
Health Department in 1982. However, the post was vacant four months later in spring 
1983. It is likely that the first Director was a provincial health official who was given 
the responsibility for health care for Afghan refugees as an additional task, since a 
separate Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees was not established until mid-1983 - 
six months after the refugees were settled in Mianwali District. When the post was 
filled in October 1983, the Director was a member of the Commissionerate for Afghan 
Refugees in Lahore. Like the Director in the North West Frontier, he was responsible 
to the Commissioner for Afghan Refugees in Punjab and the Director for Medical 
Services of the CCAR in Islamabad. Also similar to the health programme of the 
North West Frontier refugee relief effort, the health programme in Punjab was the first 
sectoral programme to be established in the Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees in 
Punjab.
Health care for the Afghan refugees arriving in Mianwali in early 1983 was carried 
out by officials of the District. A transit centre was initially established for registration
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of the refugees before moving to Kot Chandna camp and one dispensary was set up 
in the camp by health staff who were seconded on a temporary basis from the District 
Health Office. Furniture, equipment and drugs were supplied by the District Health 
Office with some assistance from the Pakistan Red Crescent Society. The medical 
officer and other health staff also formed a mobile team in the afternoons to provide 
curative services at the transit centre and to other areas of the camp. From March 
1983, separate out-patient clinics had been established for males and females and 
tuberculosis patients were being registered and treated. Immunisations were being 
provided by a team from the District Health Office 4 days per week. Malaria control 
activities had not been started and laboratory facilities had not been established.
11.13 Strengthening management by the Provincial Governments
11.1.3.1 Setting up a system for local supervision
Between 1980 and 1982, problems with staff of the District Health or Agency Surgeon 
Offices, poor communications with the camps and the continuing influx of refugees, 
had led the Government and UNHCR to agree that separate field supervisors would 
be responsible for refugee health in a given district or tribal agency8. Between 1982 
and 1983 the first ten Field Supervisory Medical Officers (FSMO) were appointed in 
the North West Frontier to oversee the refugee health programme in 16 districts and 
tribal agencies. Unfortunately, the delays in establishing the Refugee Health 
Directorate in Baluchistan also affected the establishment of supervisory posts in the 
districts and tribal agencies. These posts were not approved in Baluchistan until 1983 
at which time there was a lack of medical officers with sufficient experience: it was 
not until 1984 that Field Supervisory Medical Officers (FSMOs) began to be appointed 
for the 5 districts and tribal agencies of Baluchistan which hosted Afghan refugees.
Since the Afghan refugee health programme in Punjab was much smaller, no Deputy 
Directors, Field Supervisory Medical Officers (FSMOs) or supervisors for disease
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control programmes were appointed. The responsibilities of the Director were 
comprehensive since he was expected to spend half of his time in the field. This 
arrangement proved to be inadequate, largely because of the distance between Lahore 
and Mianwali (approximately a 7 hour drive). Subsequently, one of the medical 
officers in Kot Chandna camp was appointed as FSMO in 1984. Thus, it was not until 
the end of 1984 that separate organizations for the management of refugee health 
services had been established, and were fully functioning, in the provinces of the 
North West Frontier, Baluchistan and Punjab (Figure 11.3).
11.1.3.2 Grappling with the need to coordinate disparate health activities
Central to many of the problems faced by the Provincial Governments in attempting 
to set up and manage health services for the Afghan refugees was a lack of 
coordination of the various components of the refugee health programme. In order to 
facilitate better coordination, an external evaluator recommended to WHO in 19819 
that a post for a Senior Health Coordinator be created and based from the office of 
the Chief of Mission of UNHCR in Islamabad. This post was to be a special 
programme of the WHO Emergency Relief Operations Unit in Geneva, similar to 
relief programmes for refugees in Somalia and Thailand. In addition, provincial health 
advisors were to be appointed and based in the sub-offices of UNHCR in Peshawar 
and Quetta. The latter suggestion was not new since medical doctors and nurses had 
been seconded to the sub-offices by charitable agencies since 1980.
A staff member of WHO was subsequently appointed as the Senior Health Coordinator 
for WHO/UNHCR in the spring of 1982. This new post for a Senior Health 
Coordinator was funded by UNHCR even though he was recruited on the staff of 
WHO and placed on secondment from WHO to UNHCR. Within these arrangements 
he was accountable to the Country Representative of WHO in Islamabad as well as 
the Chief of Mission of UNHCR in Islamabad. His duties were similarly divided, 
incorporating an advisory role to government officials of the refugee health
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programme in formulating health policies and plans and a consultative role to UNHCR 
on the technicalities of health matters10. In addition, he was designated as a focal 
point for coordinating the various organizations involved in the refugee health 
programme.
Based upon earlier evaluations and his own observations, the Senior Health 
Coordinator suggested strategies for the refugee health programme generally in 
October of 1982 which partially aimed11:
1. "To provide a full range of basic health services, both preventive, promotive 
and curative, in the basic health services outside refugee villages for 
specialised medical care."
2. To integrate "all vertical projects ... within the refugee health service structure, 
including malaria control and immunisations. This would mean demolishing 
separate teams in the refugee villages to form one team, on district level 
annexing the mobile teams as part of the Field Supervisory Medical Team and 
rationalising their activity."
3. "Preparing and introducing adequate community involvement ..., increasing 
collaboration with the traditional health workers among refugees and training 
different categories of health workers".
4. "Standardizing to the extent possible the service structure, staff, salaries, 
supplies and equipment in the health units."
Many of these strategies restated policies first established in the Presidential Directive 
of 1980. However, these strategies expanded and further developed existing policies 
as well as stating new directions. Moreover, they were a policy statement of the 
inter-governmental agencies mostly closely involved in the refugee health programme,
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WHO and UNHCR, and specifically in its finance and management. These strategies 
were presented and accepted during the first health workshop of the refugee health 
programme held in Islamabad in November 198212.
11.1.3.3 Integrating disease control programmes
Obviously, the greatest impact of these strategies was on the disease control 
programmes. As a result, one vaccinator was appointed in each basic health unit, and 
field supervisors for immunizations were appointed in each district and tribal agency; 
mobile vaccination teams were discontinued in 1983 and 1984 in the North West 
Frontier and Baluchistan respectively. Simultaneously, the provincial Refugee Health 
Directorates, with funds from UNHCR, assumed responsibility for procuring, storing 
and distributing vaccines and supplies. Vaccines and related supplies had previously 
been provided by the Provincial EPI programmes with support from UNICEF. In 
addition, the provincial health official responsible for vaccination of Afghan refugees 
became a deputy director in the Refugee Health Directorate of Baluchistan. These 
changes brought improvements in coverage though not until 1984 and 1985. Even then 
drop-out rates between the first and second doses and between the second and third 
doses remained high, for example 50% and 66% respectively in the North West 
Frontier in 198413.
Integration of the malaria control programme into the refugee health services was also 
begun in 1983 along with immunizations, but was not completed until 1984. By the 
end of 1984, 34 laboratories had been established throughout Baluchistan and the 
North West Frontier specifically for the refugee health programme14. This greatly 
facilitated diagnosis, treatment and follow-up of cases of both malaria and tuberculosis 
by the basic health units. Similar to immunizations, field supervisors for malaria 
control were appointed at that time in each district and tribal agency and the 
provincial officials in charge became deputy directors in the Refugee Health 
Directorates.
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Beginning in 1983, tuberculosis control was also established as a separate priority 
programme with the appointment of a deputy director in the provincial Refugee Health 
Directorates. Shortly after the post for a deputy director was created, a bilateral 
agreement was signed with the Government of Italy for the Italian Corporation for 
Development to organize and manage the study, diagnosis and treatment of 
tuberculosis among Afghan refugees and local populations living near the camps in 
the North West Frontier. Specifically, they were to train local health staff, to promote 
and organize health education activities, to provide drugs, supplies and equipment 
which were needed and to provide salaries for staff employed full-time in tuberculosis 
control15. Similarly, a consultant from WHO trained refugee health staff and 
organized tuberculosis control activities in Baluchistan during 1984 with special 
funding from the Arab Gulf Programme for the United Nations Development 
Organization (AGFUND)16.
11.1.3.4 Setting technical standards
During the establishment of the tuberculosis control programme, basic strategics and 
guidelines were written by the Senior Health Coordinator of WHO/UNHCR, in 
collaboration with the Director of Medical Services of the Chief Commissionerate for 
Afghan Refugees, the provincial refugee health officials and officials of the relevant 
national programmes in order to standardise control activities. These guidelines 
restated the priority activities, namely to diagnose and treat cases presenting at the 
basic health units and to prevent tuberculosis in children by vaccination with BCG17. 
Similar guidelines were written at the same time for malaria control and immunization 
activities which also restated priority activities as previously described18. These plans 
were distributed to all of the basic health units as well as district and provincial 
supervisors.
Clearly, efforts were made to establish an infrastructure through which all health 
services for the Afghans could be managed. Yet, the many layers of management
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personnel and the employment of numerous staff who were responsible for a limited 
number of tasks raises questions about the effectiveness and efficiency of such a 
bureaucratic empire. Notwithstanding the apparent confusion over the need for an 
infrastructure instead of a focus on formulating policies, many of the measures taken 
during these two years consolidated power in the refugee health programme as 
opposed to the Provincial Departments. Not only were responsibilities clearly defined 
and controlled by officials of the refugee health programme, but technical standards 
were now determined by them independently. Despite these achievements, the failure 
to formulate both broad and specific policies which encompassed the organization and 
management of all health services provided for the refugees created opportunities for 
foreign agencies to expand their roles in order to better meet their own interests.
11.2 Hospital services and community health: expanding roles for foreign 
interests
11.2.1 Meeting the needs of those at war
The decision to give priority to basic medical care rather than sophisticated treatments 
was first articulated in writing by the Senior Health Coordinator of WHO/UNHCR in 
October of 1982. In his report on field visits to the North West Frontier, Baluchistan 
and Punjab, existing hospital facilities which were outside the refugee villages would 
be relied on for specialised medical and surgical care. This policy did not, however, 
go on to specify who was responsible for these services; nor did it detail which 
interventions were needed, which should be given priority or how they might best be 
made available to the majority of refugees. Instead, initial plans focused vaguely on 
expanding and strengthening existing district and provincial hospitals.
In Baluchistan, for example, funds were made available by UNHCR in 1981 for the 
construction and running of 10 bed wards in four district and tribal agency hospitals. 
The funds for these wards were in addition to those provided for the supply of
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medicines and equipment to hospitals caring for the refugees. The construction of the 
wards was not begun until March and April of 1982 and was therefore not completed 
until mid-1982. Similarly, the refugee health plan for Baluchistan in 1982 included the 
construction of 10 bed wards for children in Pishin District and Sandeman Provincial 
hospitals. These efforts were supplemented by a French charitable agency which 
provided for two additional wards. The contribution of this agency allowed funds from 
UNHCR to be used for two wards in Dalbandin, Chagai District, which were to be 
completed by March 1983.
During the visit of the Senior Health Coordinator of WHO/UNHCR and the Director 
for Medical Services of the Chief Commissionerate in Islamabad to the refugee health 
programme in Punjab in March 1983, the plans prepared by the provincial and district 
officials for the expansion of the health services were reviewed. These plans included 
the construction of a health centre by the Public Health Engineering Department which 
was to be of hospital standard and was to be located outside the immediate refugee 
village and areas of planned expansion. This hospital was given low priority by the 
Senior Health Coordinator of WHO/UNHCR and preference was given to the 
expansion of one of the basic health units in the camp to form a central health unit 
if referral services were needed. Instead, the Kalabagh Civil Hospital was designated 
as the primary referral centre for Afghan refugees due to its close proximity to Kot 
Chandna camp and 24 beds were set aside for secondary referrals in the District 
Hospital in Mianwali. Financial and material assistance was donated by UNHCR to 
the Government for the services provided by these hospitals.
Shortly after this mission, a proposal was submitted by the Punjab branch of the 
Pakistan Red Crescent Society to provide 3 basic health units and hospital services 
within Kot Chandna camp. Funding was requested for the duration of the programme 
from UNHCR. UNHCR responded that funding was available for 1983 but the 
Pakistan Red Crescent Society would be expected to secure their own funding from 
1984 onwards since such a take-over by the Pakistan Red Crescent Society was
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thought to negate the need for a governmental programme in Punjab. The negotiations 
which followed became tense and complex. Subsequently, the Pakistan Red Crescent 
Society gave priority to providing hospital services. Consequently, the 
Commissionerate for Afghan refugees in Punjab retained responsibility for the basic 
health units in Kot Chandna. The refugee population of Kot Chandna was approaching 
100 000 in 1984 and the need to make other arrangements for specialised medical care 
became acute. The District Hospital was already overcrowded and could not 
accommodate an increase in need among the refugees. However, since space was 
available in the two neighbouring civil hospitals, in Isa Khel and Kalabagh, UNHCR 
continued to refuse to fund a separate hospital, even if the Provincial Government was 
unwilling to allow these civil hospitals to be used.
Notwithstanding these efforts to strengthen governmental hospitals in the districts and 
tribal agencies where Afghans were living, two Red Cross and Red Crescent 
organizations and five Afghan political parties had constructed and were running their 
own hospitals for the Afghans living in Baluchistan19 in 1983 along with seven 
charitable agencies and three political parties or political alliances who were running 
eight hospitals specifically for the Afghans in the North West Frontier (Table 11.2). 
By 1984, 22 hospitals specifically catering for Afghan refugees were officially 
recognised by the Government and UNHCR20.
The provision of sophisticated medical and surgical care was clearly a priority of 
many Red Cross and Red Crescent societies and political parties. Political parties 
affiliated with the Afghan resistance operated 13 (59%) of these hospitals while the 
International Committee of the Red Cross and several Red Crescent societies from 
sympathetic Islamic nations sponsored and managed another eight (38%) hospitals. 
Only one clinic-cum-hospital was set up by a foreign charity with funds from its own 
government - the US (Figure 11.4). These hospitals were surely an expression of 
solidarity with the Mujahideen. But their establishment may also have been influenced
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Figure 11.4
Organizations sponsoring hospital services 
for Afghans in Pakistan, 1984
Islamic party 13 
59%
US charity 1 
5%
Red Cross Society 8 
36%
Type of organization
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TABLE 11.2
Hospital services specifically established 
for Afghans living in Pakistan, 1984
HOSPITAL SPONSORING
AGENCY
COUNTRY OF LEGAL 
RECOGNITION
North West Frontier
1.Afghan Surgical Hospital Idara Ahya-ul-Uloom Pakistan
2.Afghan Gynaecological 
Hospital
Idara Ahya-ul-Uloom Pakistan
3.Ibn-Sina Surgical 
Hospital
Islamic Alliance for the 
Liberation of Afghanistan
Afghanistan
4.Ibn-Sina Medical 
Hospital
Islamic Alliance for the 
Liberation of Afghanistan
Afghanistan
5.1ttehad Surgical Hospital 
I
The Islamic Alliance Afghanistan
6.1ttehad Surgical Hospital 
11
The Islamic Alliance Afghanistan
7Jihad Hospital The Islamic Alliance Afghanistan
8.Surgical Hospital International Committee of 
the Red Cross
Switzerland
9.Paraplegic centre International Committee of 
the Red Cross/ Pakistan 
Red Crescent
Switzerland, Pakistan
lO.Orthopaedic centre International Committee of 
the Red Cross
Switzerland
11.Eye Hospital Pakistan Red Crescent 
Society/ League of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies
Pakistan, Switzerland
12.Surgical and 
Orthopaedic Hospital
Kuwait Red Crescent 
Society
Kuwait
13.0rthopaedic workshop Kuwait Red Crescent 
Society
Kuwait
14.Afghan Obstetric and 
Gynaecology clinic
International Rescue 
Committee
United States
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HOSPITAL SPONSORING
AGENCY
COUNTRY OF LEGAL 
RECOGNITION
Baluchistan
1.A1 Khidmat Hospital A1 Khidmat Welfare 
Society
Afghanistan
2.A1 Jehad Hospital
3.Ansari Hospital for 
Afghan Mujahids and 
Refugees
4.Hakim Sanai Hospital
5.1ttehad Hospital The Islamic Alliance Afghanistan
6.1slamic Aid health centre
7.Hospital for War 
Wounded
International Committee of 
the Red Cross
Switzerland
8.A1 Salam Hospital Saudi Red Crescent Saudi Arabia
22 hospitals 10 or more organizations 6 or more countries
partly by the restrictions on the involvement of charitable agencies and political parties 
in health care provided in the camps, partly by the lack of official plans for the 
provision of specialty and sophisticated medical care and partly by widely accepted 
beliefs in the merits of medical and surgical care. Stated policies of the Government 
of Pakistan and UNHCR were generally silent on the organization and management 
of referral services for the Afghan refugees; requests that funds, drugs, supplies and 
equipment be given to government hospitals locally and regionally were the only 
exception. Official endorsement and support appears to have been given to charitable 
agencies and political parties to organise and manage such services independently.
11.2.2 Creating a community health programme
Unlike the system of basic health units and the control programmes for priority 
diseases, the strategy to train lay health workers had no existing foundation on which 
to build. Concern for the health of women and young children in 1980 had led to the
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proposals for 'female scouts’ to work in the refugee villages and to the inclusion of 
lady health visitors in the staff of mobile teams and dispensaries. The health of women 
and young children was of particular concern because of the cultural and religious 
practice among Afghans of 'purdah' - or the seclusion of women. The practice of 
purdah limited the movements of women in the villages and their contacts with men, 
with implications for the use of health facilities and consultations with male members 
of health staff.
The difficulty of implementing the 'female scout' programme in a society which 
practised purdah had instead led the Refugee Health Directorate in the North West 
Frontier to create an additional post in the mobile teams for a traditional birth 
attendant, a 'dai'. The use of community-based health workers was only considered 
seriously at the end of 1981 by a foreign medical doctor who was advising the 
UNHCR sub-office in Peshawar (on secondment from a charitable agency), health 
advisors of UNICEF and several foreign charitable agencies21. They then held a 
seminar in December 1981 to discuss specific proposals to train Afghan women as 
'basic health workers'. However, their conclusion was that such a programme was 
'almost impossible’ because of the unwillingness of the Afghans to allow their women 
to participate in activities which were not associated with their own household. 
Instead, health education activities in the basic health units were to be strengthened, 
particularly by Pakistani lady health visitors.
Beginning in 1982 and continuing in 1983 plans to implement a community-based 
health worker (CHW) programme were revived and discussed, mostly by the health 
advisors of UNHCR and UNICEF. Much of the design of the programme came from 
a proposal originally written by UNICEF for the seminar in December 1981 which 
aimed to provide 'a structure for primary care ultimately to all refugee camps’22. This 
Primary Health Care (PHC) programme was to be sponsored by UNHCR and was to 
involve and co-operate with charitable agencies, WHO and UNICEF. The first step 
was to consolidate the experience of agencies who had established similar programmes
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among the refugees and to conduct a survey to gather information needed to design 
a training programme. This training course was then to be piloted in one camp by a 
charitable agency. Following an evaluation and subsequent modifications, training 
could then be undertaken by the charitable agencies and the Government in their 
respective areas.
This plan was approved by the States and Frontier Regions and Kashmir Affairs in 
June 1983 and work began in November by the Save the Children Fund (SCF), UK23. 
Despite delays with implementation, considerable progress was made by the Save the 
Children Fund during 1984, primarily in establishing a training-cum-management 
structure24, namely:
establishing a training centre and accompanying curricula, manuals and other 
aids.
training trainers to train and supervise community health supervisors in the 
basic health units.
creating a team to survey the targeted communities and to motivate and assist 
community leaders to establish health committees.
establishing posts in the basic health units for community health supervisors, 
at a ratio of 1:7500 refugees, as mid-level managers to facilitate integration 
with existing refugee health services.
training community health workers at a ratio of 1:30 refugee families, 
developing systems of reporting, referral and supply.
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However, rather than training women, these community health supervisors and 
community health workers were men. The original goal to train women had not been 
forgotten and plans for a similar programme to train ’dais’, traditional birth attendants, 
were first written at that time25. In addition, training of medical and administrative 
staff of the refugee health programme was also planned in order to prepare them to 
assume responsibility for the project26.
113 Comment
Although scant information was found in Pakistan to document retrospectively the role 
of the media, general coverage which was given to the Afghans in the first half of the 
1980s is fairly well-known. The media played a key role in bringing the needs and 
problems of the Afghans to the attention of the international community in general and 
western publics in particular. This in turn established international support for them 
and for efforts to assist them. It also created a system of accountability of the 
Government of Pakistan and international aid agencies to the international community 
at large.
Thus, from 1982 through 1984, considerable effort was made to close the gaps 
between the plans for health care and the reality of its provision. Governmental 
authorities modified existing plans for the provision of basic medical care to cater 
regularly for millions of Afghans living in remote and dispersed areas of the North 
West Frontier, Baluchistan and Punjab. They were supported in their efforts to make 
such care widely and equitably available by domestic and foreign charitable agencies. 
The strengthening of their capacity to manage this new system of basic primary care 
services was facilitated greatly by the specialised agencies of the United Nations, 
especially WHO which arranged for senior health professionals to advise both the 
Government and UNHCR at national and provincial levels. In order to ensure that 
services were delivered more effectively, great emphasis was placed on establishing 
an infrastructure which integrated all health activities under one management structure
354
and which made activities of a similar nature and standard available in all areas where 
Afghans were living.
While significant achievements in extending the coverage of primary care and 
improving the quality of services provided through basic and sub-health units were 
achieved with only moderate refinements, inefficiencies and limited effectiveness of 
disease control measures led to a major reorganization which integrated them into the 
refugee health programme. Separate management structures were created in the 
provincial Refugee Health Directorates in the North West Frontier and Baluchistan and 
separate workers were posted in the villages. This gave refugee health officials greater 
control over disease control activities and personnel. But it also meant that national 
programmes lost funds - which meant supplies and salaries. Not all governmental 
departments were happy with the transfer of responsibility. But because this 
reorganization of disease control activities was initiated, promoted and enforced by 
foreign medical advisors acting as health coordinators for WHO/UNHCR at national 
and provincial levels, they were realised. It is important to recognise that these 
advisors controlled the allocation of international funds for these activities which 
enabled them to take and enforce these decisions even though they were unpopular 
with branches of the Government.
Similarly, it was not until a Senior Health Coordinator had been appointed by 
WHO/UNHCR in 1982 that standards were written for the organization and 
implementation of health care for Afghan refugees nation-wide. These standards were 
policy statements on the organization of care which also provided guidance on the 
clinical management of specific health problems. In combination with existing 
governmental policies restricting foreign health workers to administrative and advisory 
roles, the organization and delivery of care was standardised between districts and 
provinces in Pakistan.
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This system of basic health services did not, however, address the needs of those at 
war. In particular, needs for first aid and sophisticated surgical and medical treatments 
were acute among those wounded during armed conflict. Vague plans of the 
Government and UNHCR to strengthen governmental hospitals were insufficient, and 
special facilities were set up and managed by various political parties and alliances as 
well as sympathetic Red Cross and Red Crescent societies. Despite the rapid and 
disorderly proliferation of such facilities, no further plans were formulated for the 
provision of referral services for the Afghans by officials of the refugee health 
programme. Policies, though unspoken, clearly condoned the establishment of new 
referral facilities by those with a vested interest in the war - independent of the 
refugee health programme. Consequently, there were comparatively few benefits for 
the development of Pakistani referral services.
While the Government of Pakistan went to great lengths to consolidate their 
responsibilities for managing and providing basic health services for Afghans living 
in Pakistan, they appeared to dissociate themselves from relief efforts undertaken for 
those civilians remaining in Afghanistan and those engaged in the war. While several 
foreign groups subsequently set up various referral centres in Pakistan, a few others 
began to organise teams to work in Afghanistan. No detailed policies and plans were 
formulated for such activities by officials of the refugee health programme. Instead, 
an unspoken policy left them alone to carry out the work they deemed necessary in 
whatever way they wished. Silence and discretion on the nature and work of these 
organizations appeared to be the only requirements of Pakistani authorities.
In contrast with the new referral centres which were run primarily by foreign Islamic 
groups and the teams of medical personnel which were organised and sent to work in 
Afghanistan by foreign charitable agencies independent of the refugee health 
programme, community health activities which were started during the same period 
were ostensibly a component of the refugee health programme. The community health 
programme aimed to meet common health needs of those living in villages in
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Pakistan, especially Afghan women and children. Notwithstanding the attempts to plan 
the community health programme as a component of the Government’s refugee health 
programme, it was also initiated and carried out by foreign agencies; in practice the 
preparations and pilot activities were organized and implemented by a British charity 
with support from UNHCR and Unicef. Without support from these international aid 
agencies, the training of refugees as community health workers would not have been 
incorporated into national policies and plans; nor would training programmes have 
been implemented. Yet, in practice, these initiatives were carried out in isolation from 
the Government’s system of refugee health services - both the delivery of care and its 
management. Thus, in Pakistan, specialised agencies of the UN and foreign charitable 
organizations also began to expand their roles by focusing on community health 
priorities within the refugee health programme, especially the unmet needs of women 
and children.
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
’Voluntary’ agencies as providers of medical care, 1985 - 1988: 
Working for a charitable or political cause?
12.1 Fulfilling Governmental responsibilities for basic services in villages
12.1.1 Achieving national targets for coverage of primary care
In keeping with their policy to provide a full range of health services in the basic 
health units while relying on regular health services outside the refugee villages for 
specialised care, the Government of Pakistan focused on improving the coverage and 
quality of care given in the basic health units from 1985 through 1988. By the 
beginning of 1987, the Provincial Government of the North West Frontier had set up 
two additional basic health units and 22 new sub-health units to cater for Afghans 
according the national targets of one centre for every 15, 000 people. Similarly, in 
Punjab permanent structures were built for existing basic health units in Kot Chandna 
camp and one new basic health unit was constructed in the new camp of Dara Tang 
for Afghans settled in Mianwali since the autumn of 1985.
12.1.2 Confronting poor management of the refugee health services in 
Baluchistan
Unlike the refugee health programmes in the North West Frontier and especially the 
Punjab which continued to expand, no new basic health units were established in 
Baluchistan since few additional refugees were registered there. Instead, there was a 
crisis of management which led to substantial reforms beginning in 1985. Throughout 
the first five years of the programme, between 1980 and 1985, the reports suggest that 
health services for Afghan refugees in Baluchistan were more a reality on paper than 
in practice. Several problems plagued the programme which were similar to difficulties 
faced by the Provincial Health Department in providing health services to nationals.
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Firstly, vacancies were common, especially in positions for medical doctors and 
female staff, and staff were frequently absent. These problems had been compounded 
by the decision of the Provincial Health Department to end the practice of seconding 
staff to the refugee programme in 1982. The ’scarcity of good health staff in 
Baluchistan’ was the reason given at that time, which also supports reported 
difficulties in recruiting health staff by the refugee health programme1.
Secondly, transportation to and from the refugee villages was insufficient which 
caused the supply of medicines and equipment to be irregular and supervision to be 
inadequate. Within the villages, there was a lack of accommodation facilities. Together 
with frequent delays in payment of salaries, conditions of work deterred rather than 
enticed potential health workers and invited delinquent behaviour among those 
employed2.
Due to the problems in the refugee health programme in Baluchistan, the second 
Senior Health Coordinator of WHO/UNHCR undertook a review of the programme 
in June of 19853. Chronic problems with staff and the lack of implementation of 
planned activities needed to be rectified. The problems highlighted in his review were 
further substantiated by three separate missions of the WHO in 1981 and 19854. 
Although three factors were singled out, all pointed to poor management and planning.
’no delegation of powers to health supervisory staff to actually control the 
health programme by the Commissioner for Afghan Refugees in Baluchistan;
inadequate health infrastructure to support a comprehensive health programme;
chronic vacancies in health positions.’5
Consequently, the Senior Health Coordinator of WHO/UNHCR recommended that a 
’smaller’ programme be implemented by the Government. Specifically, the plan was 
to6:
362
1. re-allocate health units with more reliance on sub-health units (those without 
medical doctors on the staff) and closure of inappropriately assigned units.
2. reduce staff assigned to the health units. Job descriptions in which individual 
staff perform more than one task were put forward, and positions for 
programmes not implemented to date were to be terminated.
3. review and reduce medicines and equipment to reflect a more ’compact’ 
programme and that the programme was no longer in an ’emergency phase’.
The re-allocation of basic health units and sub-health units was not implemented until 
1986 after a new Director was appointed for the refugee health programme at the end 
of 19857. The Provincial Government then reduced the number of basic health units 
from 40 to 24 by downgrading 13 basic health units to sub-health units and 
eliminating the others. Yet, there were 37 basic health units and 13 sub-health units 
for 592 716 refugees living in 62 camps one year later8. Due to the continuing arrival 
of refugees in 1987, the number of Government basic health units was again increased 
by 12 and 2 mobile teams were also added. By 1988, there were 49 basic health units, 
13 sub-health units and 2 mobile teams providing basic medical care to the 818 000 
refugees living in Baluchistan9.
12.1.2.1 Moving beyond ’lame duck’ management to leadership with authority
In the annual report of UNHCR for 1986, a vast improvement in the basic services in 
Baluchistan was noted10. Much of this was attributed directly to the new Director 
who controlled absences among staff and filled posts to a greater degree that his 
predecessor. Without strong leadership under new lines of accountability, the 
re-allocation of services among the refugee population and the re-assignment of duties 
among staff would not have made as great an impact on many of the problems. Even 
though an agreement had been reached in 1981, by the Secretary for Health, the 
Commissioner for Afghan Refugees and UNHCR, that the Health Directorate for the 
refugee health programme would function within, and be responsible to, the
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Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees, and that assistance from the Health 
Department would, in future, be limited to technical matters only, the Refugee Health 
Directorate continued to function somewhat as a ’lame duck’. This state of affairs was 
attributed to11:
the lack of a job description with accompanying confusion about his 
responsibilities and delegation of power;
the relationship of the Refugee Health Directorate with the Commissionerate 
for Afghan Refugees and the Provincial Health Department continued to be 
poorly defined;
the lack of authority delegated to the Director to implement health activities.
However, it was not until 1985 that these problems were overcome. Although the 
process of clarifying the relationships of the Refugee Health Directorate Health with 
the Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees and the Provincial Health Department was 
revived in 1983, it was not decided until 1985 that the Director was on secondment 
to the refugee health programme from the Provincial Health Department but that his 
office functioned independently since he was responsible to the Commissionerate for 
Afghan Refugees.
Independence from the Health Department was more firmly established in the autumn 
of 1985 when the process for recruiting and terminating staff of the refugee health 
programme was changed. Prior to September 1985, all health staff were hired and 
terminated according to the procedures for government employees. For example, 
health staff of the refugee programme were selected by representatives of UNHCR, 
the Director of the refugee health programme and the Provincial Secretary for Health. 
Approval was given by the Governor. This system had two main disadvantages. It was 
a lengthy process which caused delays in filling posts and in disciplining staff, and it 
did not make staff accountable to the Director of the refugee health programme. The 
latter consequence was compounded by the lack of a career structure within the
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refugee health programme, and not surprisingly loyalties were placed with the Health 
Department which could offer positions in future. The new Director of the refugee 
health programme, therefore, obtained responsibility for recruiting and terminating 
staff in 1985.
The relationship of the Refugee Health Directorate with the Commissionerate for 
Afghan Refugees also changed in 1985. However, unlike the change in personnel 
management, the change in financial procedures decreased the autonomy of the 
Director. Prior to 1985, expenditures were approved by the Directors of education, 
health and water supply. In response to an audit in 1985 which revealed 
misappropriation of funds in a water supply project, the Commissionerate limited 
independent expenditures to 5000 rupees or less. All other expenditures had to be 
approved by the Commissionerate.
12.2 Expanding roles for foreign voluntary agencies
12.2.1 Foreign charitable agencies as providers of basic health services in refugee 
villages
12.2.1.1 From collaboration to competition: the Refugee Health Directorate and 
foreign charitable agencies in Baluchistan
In addition to changes in the allocation of health services and the organization of its 
management, recommendations of the Senior Health Coordinator for strengthening the 
programme in Baluchistan emphasised a need to use charitable agencies, particularly 
as a short-term solution to strengthen the medical infrastructure and development of 
a preventive programme tailored to Baluchistan12. The advantages of using charitable 
agencies which were stated included:
’private funding for part or all of their project, allowing some relief for 
UNHCR;
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closer supervision/monitoring of programme, allowing greater freedom to make 
personnel changes and modifications as needed;
a chance to utilise different approaches to achieve preventive programmes and 
health education;
an ability to recruit individuals, possibly expatriates, in remote places that the 
Government has not been able to do thus far;
to allow the Government to concentrate on remaining programmes and the 
development of long-term preventive programmes which they can manage.’13
This recommendation indicated a substantial change in the policy on the roles of 
foreign charitable organizations in the refugee health programme14. Following the 
departure in 1985 of both the first Director of the refugee health programme in the 
North West Frontier and the first Senior Health Coordinator of WHO/UNHCR, greater 
involvement of charitable agencies was encouraged and supported. Expansion 
subsequently occurred, mostly in cross-border operations or other war-related relief 
efforts and mostly with support from the US Government and UNHCR.
In Baluchistan, there was also an increasing use of charitable agencies within the 
refugee health programme which was promoted solely by UNHCR and the concerned 
foreign charitable agencies. Between 1985 and 1987 there were two attempts to take 
over basic health units run by the Government, one of which was successful. Medecins 
Sans Frontier (France) assumed responsibility for four basic health units in Chagai 
District in early 1986 despite opposition from the Refugee Health Directorate. 
Ironically, these basic health units were returned to the Government two years later 
in October 1987 following a change in the policy of Medecines Sans Frontier; they 
had decided to provide technical advice to officials of the Government in Chagai 
District rather than implementing basic health units15.
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The transfer of these basic health units first to Medecins Sans Frontier and later back 
to the Refugee Health Directorate highlighted an interesting discrepancy between 
programmes run by charitable agencies and those of the Government. Medecins Sans 
Frontier was allowed to hire additional health staff with funds from UNHCR during 
their management of the basic health units. Following the return of the basic health 
units to the Refugee Health Directorate, UNHCR informed the Director that these five 
additional staff were to be terminated16.
Again in 1986, an attempt was made to take over the basic health units in Zhob and 
Loralei Districts of Baluchistan. This time the charitable agency was Catholic Relief 
Services (US), and again support was provided by UNHCR. Catholic Relief Services 
had been providing sanitation facilities and health education in these two districts 
since January of 1986. They had been assisted by the Refugee Health Directorate 
which had seconded 2 physicians and a lady health visitor, provided living facilities 
for staff and loaned 3 vehicles to the programme. The new proposal of Catholic Relief 
Services to provide supervision of preventive and curative care in the basic health 
units was not accepted since supervision responsibilities rested with the 
Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees. Instead, the Director recommended that any 
additional projects focus on establishing training centres for existing staff17.
Yet again, in 1987, a proposal was submitted by Action International Contra la Faim 
(France) to be involved in the basic health units in Zhob/Loralei Districts. Unlike the 
Medecins Sans Frontier and Catholic Relief Services proposals, Action Internationale 
Contra la Faim offered to assist in training basic health unit staff in mother and child 
health care18. Nevertheless, the initiative came from the agency with support from 
UNHCR and thus was initially treated with suspicion by officials of the Refugee 
Health Directorate19.
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12.2.2 Political parties and charitable agencies as providers of referral services 
in Pakistan and basic medical care in Afghanistan
12.2.2.1 Military or humanitarian priorities?
In addition to these attempts to take over existing basic health units in some refugee 
villages (by agencies with programmes in Pakistan as well as those without any 
involvement in the refugee health programme to date), other charitable agencies and 
political parties also set up other health services for Afghans from a base in 
Baluchistan. Table 12.1 indicates that by 1990, there were at least 17 organizations 
providing health care for Afghans from a base in Baluchistan. Fourteen (82%) of 
these organizations were recognised by officials of the refugee health programme and, 
together with one other Germany agency, had been granted registration in law by the 
States and Frontier Regions and Kashmir Affairs Division (SAFRON) of the Federal 
Government to work in Pakistan (Figure 12.1). Only three of the 14 agencies (21%) 
which were recognised by officials of the refugee health programme were registered 
as charities in law in Pakistan, and all three of these agencies were affiliated with 
Christian or humanitarian movements which originated in western Europe and North 
America. Ten of the remaining 11 agencies were based in western Europe (4), the US 
or Canada (3) and Islamic nations of the Middle East (3) . Only two of the 17 
agencies were Afghan (Figure 12.2).
The three agencies which were not recognised in the records of the refugee health 
programme were involved with the provision of health care inside Afghanistan. Even 
though two organizations acknowledged that some of their work took place m 
Pakistan, their activities were in support of cross-border operations - the provision of 
health care in Afghanistan itself. Even though one agency did not register with the 
Government of Pakistan and did not acknowledge working in Pakistan, they too were 
known to be using their base in Quetta to train and support health workers to work 
in rural Afghanistan.
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Figure 12.1
Legal status in Pakistan of charities providing health care
for Afghans from a base in Baluchistan, 1990
Registered in health 14 
82%
Not registered 2 
12%
Registered with SAFRON 1 
6%
Charities registered with the Government of Pakistan
Figure 12.2
Registration in law of charities providing health care
for Afghans from a base in Baluchistan, 1990
2
Middle East 3 
20%
Country of registration
North America 3 
20%
Europe 4 
27%
Pakistan 3 
20%
Afghanistan
13%
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TABLE 12.1
Organizations providing health services for Afghans 
from a base in Baluchistan, 1989
AGENCY NATIONAL­
ITY
BEGAN HEALTH
PROJECTS
1 2 3
1 Action 
International 
Contra la Faim
France 3/81 Sanitation, BHU 
support, training, 
inpatient care, 
MCH, laboratories
P Y Y
2.Inter-Church Aid Pakistan /83 BHU support, first 
aid, inpatient care
B Y Y
3.Handicapped
International
Belgium 9/85 Rehabilitation B Y Y
4.Catholic Relief 
Services
US 9/85 Sanitation, training P Y Y
5.Medecins Sans 
Frontiers
France 1/87 BHU provision, 
training
B Y Y
6.Intemational 
Committee of the 
Red Cross
Switzerland /83 First aid, inpatient 
and outpatient 
care, training
B Y Y
7.Kuwait Red 
Crescent Society
Kuwait /85 Hospital care ? Y Y
8.Saudi Red 
Crescent Society
Saudi Arabia /84 Hospital care, 
BHUs
B Y Y
9.Pakistan Red 
Crescent Society
Pakistan /80 First aid, PHC 
project
P Y Y
lO.Christian 
Hospital Extension 
Programme 
(CHREP)
Pakistan /83 Hospital care, 
BHU support
P Y Y
11.Human 
Concern Relief 
Fund Society
Canada /83 Hospital care, 
outpatient care
B Y Y
^Afghanistan
Nothilfe
Germany 11/86 Outpatient care, 
EPI, training
B N Y
13.1slamic Aid 
Health Centre
Afghanistan 2/81 Outpatient care, 
EPI, training
B Y Y
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AGENCY NATIONAL­
ITY
BEGAN HEALTH
PROJECTS
1 2 3
14.Welfare and 
Relief Committee 
for Afghan 
Refugees
Afghanistan 9/89 Outpatient care, 
training
B N N
15.Mercy Corps 
International
US 5/87 In- and out-patient 
care, first aid, 
mobile teams
B Y Y
16.Lajna Al-Dawa 
Al-Islamia
Kuwait /87 Training, MCH B Y Y
17.Health
Unlimited
United
Kingdom
10/84 Training B N N
17 agencies 11 or more 
countries
1980-
1989
Varied B=
13
Y=
14
Y
=1
5
1.Location of projects: Pakistan (P), Afghanistan (A) or both (B)
2.Recognised by officials of the refugee health programme: Yes (Y) or No (N)
3.Registered with the Government of Pakistan: Yes (Y) or No (N)
Most agencies which supported health relief in Afghanistan increasingly offered 
training to medical and paramedical workers from a base in Pakistan. The attention 
given to training reflected general agreement with the position adopted by the Swedish 
Committee for Afghanistan in 1985. In 1985, the Swedish Committee came to the 
conclusion that their efforts to support existing medical personnel inside Afghanistan 
would soon reach its limits because only 50 of the 200 medical doctors in Afghanistan 
worked in the rural areas20. Such a strategy was also consistent with widely held 
beliefs that one tactic of the Soviet and Afghan Governments’ for defeating the 
resistance was to prevent medical personnel from caring for the wounded, sick or 
malnourished21. Hence, priority was given to training medical and paramedical 
personnel in first aid, basic primary care and some preventive measures. Numerous 
training facilities were set up in Pakistan, and many agencies provided their newly 
trained staff with drugs, supplies and equipment when they returned to Afghanistan.
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Some agencies also sent teams of foreign medical personnel to supervise the work of 
these medical doctors and paramedical staff. Others provided support and supervision 
from a base in Pakistan only.
In addition to training courses, many of these agencies also ran clinics for outpatient 
care or inpatient facilities for more sophisticated medical and surgical care for 
Afghans in Pakistan. Table 12.2 lists five new referral facilities for Afghans which 
were set up in Baluchistan since 1984. Together with the eight facilities established 
between 1980 and 1984, there were at least 13 referral facilities on record which were 
specifically for Afghans in Baluchistan and which were organised and managed 
independently from government health services - for nationals or refugees alike.
Irrespective of their status within the refugee health programme, nearly all agencies 
providing health care from a base in Baluchistan were active in both Pakistan and 
Afghanistan (13/17, 76%); by this time only four of these agencies worked solely in 
Pakistan. Moreover, there were only five other agencies aiding the Afghans in fields 
outside of the health sector, for example in building systems of water supply or 
creating schemes for employment. Clearly, most charitable agencies and political 
parties had some involvement in the provision of health services for the Afghans 
(17/22, 77%) (Figure 12.3). Obviously, health care was of great importance to those 
with humanitarian and military missions alike.
Interestingly, two of the four agencies which were active in health relief in Pakistan 
only, Catholic Relief Services and CHREP, had a long history of involvement in 
Pakistan through local branches of Christian churches. A different two of the four 
agencies which were involved in health relief efforts in Pakistan only, CHREP and 
Action International Contra la Faim (France), had been participating in the refugee 
health programme since the early 1980s. One might conclude that those without any
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Figure 12.3
Involvement of charities in health care for Afghans
from a base in Baluchistan, 1990
Participation in health services, n=22
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TABLE 12.2 
Additional referral facilities established for 
Afghans in Baluchistan since 1984
FACILITY SPONSORING AGENCY AGENCY
NATIONALITY
1.Christian Hospital 
Extension Programme
Mission Hospital/ Inter Aid 
Committee
Pakistan
2.1npatient care: Chagai & 
Chaman districts
Human Concern Relief Fund Canada
3.1npatient care Action Internationale Contra 
la Faim
France
4.Mekkah Mukarsma 
Hospital
Saudi Arabian Red Crescent 
Society
Saudi Arabia
5.Malaria Hospital for 
Women and Children 
Afghan Refugees
Not specified Not specified
+ eight existing facilities,+ 4 or more organizations + 3 or more countries
13 referral facilities 7 or more organizations 6 or more countries
existing affiliations with groups in Pakistan and those arriving as the civil war in 
Afghanistan escalated had an interest in the outcome of the war which was equal to 
or greater than their interest in humanitarian relief for the refugees on its own.
12.2.2.2 From coordination to anarchy in the North West Frontier
The growing participation of foreign aid agencies and Islamic political parties in 
health relief operations for Afghans from a base in Baluchistan was small in scale and 
relatively orderly in comparison with developments in the North West Frontier. 
Compared with only 17 agencies at the end of 1984, officials of the refugee health 
programme acknowledged the participation of 32 ’voluntary’ agencies in the North
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West Frontier alone only one year later. At the end of 1988, this figure had risen to 
48 and in 1989 the total reached 50 or more (Figure 12.4).
The Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) was set up in 1989 to 
represent the collective interests of private, charitable agencies in the North West 
Frontier and a similar organization, SWABAC, was established in Baluchistan. 
ACBAR and SWABAC were, however, representative of those agencies based in 
North America or Europe. Agencies from Islamic nations set up their own 
coordinating body, the Islamic Coordinating Council (ICC), which was chaired by the 
Islamic Relief Agency. The directories of ACBAR for 198922 and the combined 
database of ACBAR and SWABAC of 198923 provide a great deal of information on 
the work of more than 65 agencies while mentioning five others which did not make 
entries. Differences between draft and final editions along with other lists of agencies 
involved in the refugee health programme24 indicate that no one list was complete. 
In other words, the exact number of agencies contributing to relief efforts was not 
known. Nor was the nature of their work documented and verified systematically. 
Similarly, the monetary value of these agencies’ contribution to the health programme 
was not routinely assessed or recorded. Moreover, numerous sources of funding, 
including general publics, national governments, private corporations, churches, 
foundations and specialised agencies of the UN, together with only vague notions 
about which agencies participated and the services they offered, means that the costs 
associated with their work would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to assess.
Other published accounts of the relief efforts and related events frequently mention 
agencies not included in the above sources, such as the Bureau Internationale de 
I’Afghanistan (BIA) of France, American Aid for Afghans of the US and Afghanaid 
of the UK who supported teams of medical personnel in Afghanistan25. Some 
accounts detail the work of agencies within North America and Western Europe to 
generate moral, material and financial support for the Afghan resistance and associated 
humanitarian assistance programmes26. Previous reports also cite agencies not listed 
in current editions or official records, such as Oxfam UK and World Vision
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Figure 12.4
Charities providing health relief for Afghans 
from a base in the North West Frontier, 1980-1989
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Number of agencies
of the US27. Baitenmann, for example, claims that 265 non-governmental 
organizations had a role in the Afghan civil war. Over 100 of these agencies worked 
with Afghans seeking refuge in Pakistan, over 50 agencies carried out cross-border 
operations from a base in Pakistan (with at least 27 other agencies supporting these 
operations from other countries) and over 70 agencies advocated the Afghan cause (60 
from a base in the US or Western Europe and 10 from a base in Pakistan).
From sources available in Pakistan, at least 70 agencies were found to providing 
health care for Afghans from a base in the North West Frontier between 1985 and 
1989 (Table 12.3). In addition to these 70, there were 18 agencies who were assisting 
in fields other than health and another 21 had applied for registration with the 
Government even though no details were given about their intended activities. At least 
some of the latter were planning to offer health care, for example the German and 
Iranian Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Agencies involved in health relief 
accounted for at least 80% (70/88) of those for whom their activities were known, and 
they accounted for at least 64% of all agencies identified (70/109,64%) (Figure 12.5).
Thirty-two of the agencies, or 46%, involved in health relief were registered as 
charities in law in Western Europe in comparison with only 10 (14%) from the US 
and Canada, 2 (3%) from Australia and Japan and 6 (9%) from the Middle East. Eight 
charities were registered in Pakistan (11%) and another eight were Afghan (11%) 
(Figure 12.6). Clearly, most agencies were from the wealthy nations of the North 
Atlantic region, 63%. Nearly one-third, 21/70 or 30%, of these agencies were not 
registered with the Government of Pakistan, most of which were involved in cross- 
border operations (Figure 12.7). However, many other agencies were working in both 
Afghanistan and Pakistan, bringing the total to at least 39 of the 70 agencies (56%) 
but probably closer to 50, or 71%, when those claiming to work only in Afghanistan 
and those for which the location of their work was not specifically documented are 
included.
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Figure 12.5
Charities involved in the provision of health care 
for Afghans from a base in the North West Frontier, 1990
Yes 70 
64%
Not known 21 
19%
1 7 %
Participation in health services, n=109
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Figure 12.6
Registration in law of charities providing health care
for Afghans from a base in the North West Frontier, 1990
US/Canada
1 5 %
Western Europe 32 
48%
8 Afghanistan 8 
1 2 %
Pakistan
1 2 %
Australia/Japan
3%
Middle East 6 
9%
Country of registration
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Figure 12.7
Legal status in Pakistan of charities providing health care
for Afghans from a base in the North West Frontier, 1990
Yes 49
No 21
30%
Registered with the Government of Pakistan
A
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TABLE 123
Organizations providing health care for Afghans 
from the North West Frontier, 1989
AGENCY NATIONALITY BEGAN 1 2 3
1.Afghan Refugee Leprosy 
Service
UK /86 N N P
2.Afghan Health and Social 
Assistance Organization
Germany/
Netherlands/
Afghanistan
1/87 Y Y B
3.Afghan Medical Aid Pakistan 11/89 Y Y B
4Afghanistan Nothilfe Germany 1/87 N N B
5 Aide Medicale 
Internationale
France 9/85 N Y B
6.Afghan OB/GYN clinic Afghanistan 11/84 Y Y B
7Austrian Relief Committee 
for Afghan Refugees
Austria 1/80 Y Y B
8.Afghan Relief Foundation Afghanistan /87 N N B
9.Afghanistan Vaccination/ 
Immunization Centre 
(AVICEN)
France 9/87 Y Y B
10.Afghan Refugees 
Humanitarian Unity
Afghanistan 7/85 Y N ?
11.Afghan Welfare Centre 7 /86 N N 7
12.CARITAS Pakistan Pakistan /80 Y Y P
13.Catholic Relief Services 
USCC
US /85 Y Y P
14.Christian Hospital 
Extension Programme 
(CHREP)
Pakistan /85 Y Y P
15.Committee for a Free 
Afghanistan
US /86 Y Y P
16.Danish Committee for Aid 
to Afghan Refugees
Denmark 1/84 Y Y P
17.Dental Clinic for Afghan 
Refugees
Afghanistan 1/84 N N B
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AGENCY NATIONALITY BEGAN 1 2 3
18.Dorsch Consult ? /86 N N P
19.Freedom Medicine US 2/86 Y Y B
20.German Afghanistan 
Committee
Germany 8/85 Y Y B
21.German Afghanistan 
Foundation
Germany 7/87 Y Y B
22.German Technical 
Cooperation GTZ
German /85 Y Y P
23.Hayat Services 7 /85 Y Y 7
24.Human Concern 
International
Canada 1/89 N N B
25.Human Concern Relief 
Fund
Canada /85 Y Y 7
26.Help the Afghans 
Foundation
Netherlands /85 Y Y B
27.Help Organization of West 
Germany
Germany /86 Y Y P
28.Inter-Church Aid Pakistan 11/79 Y Y B
29.Idara-e-Ahya-ul-Uloom Pakistan /80 Y Y 7
30.1ntemational Committee of 
the Red Cross
Switzerland /80 Y Y B
31.International Medical 
Corps
US 11/85 Y Y B
32.Intemational Rescue 
Committee
US 6/80 Y Y B
33.1slamic Relief Agency Sudan /84 Y Y B
34.1talian Cooperation for 
Development
Italy /84 Y Y P
35.Kuwait Red Crescent 
Society
Kuwait /84 Y Y P
36.Japan Afghan Medical 
Service
Japan /86 N N P
37.Lajna Al-Dawa Al-IslamiP uwait /87 Y Y B
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AGENCY NATIONALITY BEGAN 1 2 3
38.League of Red Cross and 
Red Crescent Societies
Switzerland Y Y P
39.Medecins Sans Frontiers Belgium 11/88 Y Y B
40.Medecins Sans Frontiers France 1/87 Y Y B
41.Medical Refresher Course 
for Afghans
France 9/85 Y Y P
42.Management Sciences for 
Health
US 11/87 N N B
43.Muslim Aid UK 6/86 Y Y B
44.Mercy Fund US 7/87 Y Y B
45.Muslim World League Saudi Arabia /86 Y N 9
46.Norwegian Refugee 
Council/ Norwegian Church 
Aid
Norway /80 Y N B
47.Pakistan Red Crescent 
Society
Pakistan /80 Y Y P
18 PP-German Basic 
Education
Germany /86 N N P
49.Psychiatry Centre for 
Afghan Refugees
? 9 Y Y P
50.Rabita Al-Alam Al-Islami Pakistan /88 Y Y P
51.Saudi Arabian Red 
Crescent Society
Saudi Arabia /80 Y Y B
52.Swedish Committee for 
Afghanistan
Sweden 1/84 Y Y B
53.Save the Children Fund UK /80 Y Y P
54.Sandy Gall Afghanistan 
Appeal
UK 4/88 Y Y ?
55.Shelter Now International Australia/ Sri 
Lanka
10/88 Y Y B
56.Serving Emergency Relief 
and Vocational Enterprises 
(SERVE)
UK 9/80 Y Y B
57.Salvation Army UK /84 Y Y B
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AGENCY NATIONALITY BEGAN 1 2 3
58.Seventh Day Adventists Pakistan /86 Y Y P
59.Society of Afghan Doctors 
and Other Health 
Professionals outside of 
Afghanistan
Afghanistan /80 N N B
60.Solidarites Afghanistan Belgium 6/84 Y Y B
61.Solidarites
Afghanistan/Guilde de Raid
France /86 N N B
62.Union Aid for Afghan 
Refugees
Germany /80 Y Y B
63.Union Aid of Afghan 
Mujahid Doctors
Afghanistan Y Y B
64.United Arab Emirates Red 
Crescent Society
UAE /88 Y Y ?
65.United Medical Centre of 
Afghan Mujahid Doctors
Afghanistan /82 N N B
66.Welfare and Relief 
Committee for Afghan 
Refugees
Afghanistan 9/87 N N B
66 Agencies
Agencies which acknowledge work in Afghanistan onlv
1 Action Internationale 
Medicale Estudiante
France 8/81 N N A
2.Mercy Corps International US 5/87 N N A
3.Medecins du Monde France 2/80 N N A
4.Norwegian Committee for 
Afghanistan
Norway 3/85 Y Y A
4 Agencies 3 countries 1980 - 87
70 Agencies in health
1.Location of projects: Pakistan (P), Afghanistan (A) or both (B)
2.Recognised by officials of the refugee health programme: Y (Y) or No (N)
3.Registered with the Government of Pakistan: Y (Y) or No (N)
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Thus, between 1985 and 1989, the North West Frontier became the base for a massive 
groups of charitable agencies and political parties. Most agencies provided health care 
and most worked in both Afghanistan and Pakistan even though priority was clearly 
given to cross-border and war-related relief efforts. Few agencies were national or 
local in character and instead represented societies from wealthier countries in the 
North Atlantic region.
The growing interest in the Afghan relief programme also affected the provision of 
sophisticated medical and surgical care in the North West Frontier. Table 12.4 lists 41 
new referral facilities which were established for Afghans since 1984. Unlike cross- 
border operations which were set up primarily by western groups, new referral 
facilities were established and managed mainly by Islamic groups - 28 of the 41 
facilities, or 68%, were affiliated with an Islamic organization even though many
Table 12.4
Additional referral facilities established for 
Afghans in the North West Frontier since 1984
FACILITY SPONSORING AGENCY AGENCY
NATIONALITY
1.Mission Hospital, Peshawar Christian Hospital Extension 
Programme
Pakistan
2.Christian Hospital, Tank Christian Hospital Extension 
Programme
Pakistan
3.Afghan Female Surgical 
Hospital
Idara-e-Ahya-ul-Uloom Pakistan
4.Kuwait Red Crescent 
Hospital, Jehangirabad
Kuwait Red Crescent 
Society
Kuwait
5.Miranshah Hospital Kuwait Red Crescent 
Society
Kuwait
6.Female and Children 
Hospital, Peshawar
Kuwait Red Crescent 
Society
Kuwait
7.Eye Hospital SERVE UK
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FACILITY SPONSORING AGENCY AGENCY
NATIONALITY
8.Abdul Manon Shaheed 
Hospital, Peshawar
Harka-e-Inqilab-e-Islamia Afghanistan
9.Barakai Hospital Union Aid Germany
lO.Tuberculosis Hospital in 
Kacha Garhi
Saudi Red Crescent Society Saudi Arabia
11.Physiotherapy Hospital, 
Peshawar
Saudi Red Crescent Society Saudi Arabia
12.Afghan General Hospital, 
Jalozai
Saudi Red Crescent Society Saudi Arabia
13.Umar Shaheed General 
Hospital, Peshawar
The Islamic Alliance Afghanistan
14.A1 Hijra-wal-Jehad General 
Hospital, Peshawar
Hazbi Islami Afghanistan
15.Badeer Rooghton (A1 
Fauuzan) Hospital, Peshawar
Human Concern Relief Fund Canada
16.Hospital Khulfa-e- 
Rashideen
? 7
17.Leprosy Department 
Mission Hospital, Peshawar
Mission Hospital, Christian 
Hospital Extension 
Programme
Pakistan
18.Marie Adelaide Leprosy 
Centre
Manghopir Leprosy Hospital Pakistan
19.Border Hospitals Human Concern 
International
Canada
20.1npatient facilities: 
Abbottabad, Bannu, Chitral
Islamic Relief Agency Sudan
21.Inpatient facilities: Chitral Medecins Sans Frontieres France
22.1npatient facilities: Mardan Union Aid for Afghan 
Refugees
Germany
23.1npatient facilities: 
Peshawar
Afghan Health and Social 
Assistance Organization
Afghanistan
24.1npatient facilities: 
Peshawar
Afghanistan Northilfe Germany
387
FACILITY SPONSORING AGENCY AGENCY
NATIONALITY
25.1npatient facilities: 
Peshawar
Medical Refresher Courses 
for Afghan Refugees
France
26.1npatient facilities: 
Peshawar
Welfare and Relief 
Committee Fund
Afghanistan
27.Freedom Medicine 
Hospital, Kohat
Freedom Medicine US
28.Freedom Medicine 
Hospital, Chitral
Freedom Medicine US
29.Shaheed Syed Abdullah 
Hospital
Jamiat-e-Islamia Afghanistan
30.Shaheed Saifullah Hospital Jamiat-e-Islamia Afghanistan
31.Shaheed Syed Jamaluddin 
Hospital
Jamiat-e-Islamia Afghanistan
32.Shaheed Abdul Latif 
Hospital
Jamiat-e-Islamia Afghanistan
33.Shaheed Ghulam Haider 
Hospital
Jamiat-e-Islamia Afghanistan
34 Jamiat-e-Islami Afghan 
Refugees Hospital
Jamiat-e-Islamia Afghanistan
35.Shaheed Shah Wali 
Hospital
Jamiat-e-Islamia Afghanistan
36.A1-Hiija Wal-Jihad 
Hospital (male)
Hizbe Islami (Khalis Group) Afghanistan
37.Shakoor Shaheed Hospital Islamic Alliance of 
Mujahideen
Afghanistan
38.Umar Shaheed Hospital Islamic Alliance of 
Mujahideen
Afghanistan
39.Artificial limb centre: Lady 
Reading Hospital
CARITAS Pakistan
40Artificial limb centre: 
Khyber Hospital
GTZ Germany
41.Paraplegic centre Kuwait Red Crescent 
Society
Kuwait
41 referral facilities 23 agencies 10+ countries
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were sponsored by charitable organizations (Figures 12.8 and 12.9). These facilities 
functioned independently of government health services - for nationals and refugees 
alike. Similar to the early years of the refugee health programme, the provision of 
sophisticated medical and surgical care continued to be an area in which foreign 
groups expressed and supported their own interests.
12.2.2.3 The refugee health programme in Punjab: a last remnant of coordinated 
national and international efforts?
Despite the relatively small Afghan population in Mianwali (less than 200 000 people) 
and their location a considerable distance from Afghanistan, charitable agencies also 
began to take part in providing health services for refugees in Punjab in 1985. Unlike 
Baluchistan where some foreign charitable agencies began to compete with health 
officials of the Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees to provide basic primary care 
in the camps, foreign charitable agencies which worked in Kot Chandna and Dara 
Tang camps did so in a complimentary and supportive way. In Table 12.5 it can be 
seen that no more than four agencies worked directly in the camps and that they 
worked to strengthen services offered by the basic health units through training 
programmes and laboratory support, or by focusing on activities which had not been 
implemented adequately to date, such as immunizations and other community health 
interventions. In combination with strong leadership by government officials, pleasant 
and productive working relationships were established.
Unlike the provision of basic care for which strategies and plans were mutually agreed 
upon, the provision of hospital care continued to engage the Pakistan Red Crescent 
Society, UNHCR and government officials of the refugee health programme in debate. 
In 1984 a delegation from the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in 
Geneva visited Pakistan and formulated a proposal together with the Pakistan Red 
Crescent Society to establish a hospital for the refugees in Kot Chandna camp. This 
proposal was submitted by the Pakistan Red Crescent Society to SAFRON and 
approval was granted in February 1985. UNHCR was apparently not
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Figure 12.8
Registration in law of organizations providing referral
services for Afghans in the North West Frontier, 1990
Afghanistan 15 
37%
1
Country of registration, n=41
M. East/E. Africa 8 
20%
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US 22% 
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Western Europe 9 
22%
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Figure 12.9
Organizations providing referral services for Afghans
in the North West Frontier, 1990
Charity 18 44%
Not known 1 
Govt agency
Political party 14 34%
Red Cross society
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17%
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TABLE 12.5
Organizations providing health care for Afghans
in Punjab, 1989
AGENCY NATIONAL­
ITY
DATE
BEGAN
HEALTH
PROJECTS
1 2 3
1.Catholic Relief 
Services
US 8/86 Training Y Y P
2.Church World 
Service
Switzer-land /85 ? Y Y P
3.Hayat Services ? /85 Funds Y Y ?
4.Medecins Sans 
Frontieres
Belgium 6/88 Immunizations,
laboratory,
training,
sanitation
Y Y B
5.Pakistan Red 
Crescent Society
Pakistan /85 Hospital care Y Y P
6.League of Red 
Cross Societies
Switzer-land /85 Hospital care Y Y P
7.Salvation Army UK 186 ? Y Y P
8.Save the Children 
Fund
UK 186 Community
health
Y Y P
8 Agencies, 5 or more countries, 1985-1988, Varied All All
L o c a t i o n ^ ^ ^ e c t s ^ a E s t a n ' ^ P J ^ I ^ a n S a ^
2.Recognised by officials of the refugee health programme: Yes (Y) or No (N)
3.Registered with the Government of Pakistan: Yes (Y) or No (N)
notified until June 1985 at which time they expressed the same concerns as before and 
reaffirmed their previous position.
A meeting was convened in August 1985 at which time it was decided that the 
Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees would continue to provide basic health units 
for the refugees in Mianwali, including Dara Tang camp. SAFRON honoured their 
commitment to the Pakistan Red Crescent Society and granted approval to them to 
provide hospital services with the support of the League of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies. The Government did, however, express their preference that the
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hospital should not be located in the camp. As a result of this decision, UNHCR 
support to local hospitals was withdrawn as it was no longer needed.
Preparations were made and the Kalabagh Referral Hospital officially opened in 
August of 198628. Services provided to the refugees and the local population 
included general medical and surgical care, X-ray and laboratory examinations and an 
outpatient department - originally established to screen referred patients. All cases, 
except emergencies, had to be referred by the basic health units in the camp or, in the 
case of local people, the medical officer of the Civil Hospital. Medical needs which 
were beyond the scope of the Kalabagh Referral Hospital were referred to Lahore. 
Thus, similar to refugee health programmes in Baluchistan and the North West 
Frontier, the refugee health programme in Punjab now incorporated a variety of 
charitable agencies which provided both basic and sophisticated treatments.
12.2.2.4 Behind the scenes: the influence of the Government of the US
Despite the overwhelming representation of agencies from Western Europe, the key 
donor who influenced and supported policies to use charitable or other private 
agencies to implement health care was the Government of the US. Of the more than 
400 million US$ required to fund the assistance programme for Afghan refugees in 
Pakistan each year, the largest donor was the US Government. The US Government 
provided nearly one-third of all costs through bilateral channels and gave additional 
funds through specialised agencies of the UN and, since 1984, the charitable agencies 
and political parties. For example, in 1984, the US contribution to UNHCR 
represented 35% of their budget. At that time, they also provided about 50% of the 
food donation given through the World Food Programme29.
Before the autumn of 1984, Pakistan’s policy required that US-owned rupees could 
fund only UNHCR and ICRC. In response, support from the US Government for the 
work carried out by Inter-Church Aid, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, Church World 
Service, the International Rescue Committee and the Salvation Army was channelled 
through UNHCR. UNHCR then became not only the conduit for funds but the
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umbrella for health activities more generally. In addition to directing UNHCR to 
support these agencies, the US Government also encouraged other donors to support 
these agencies30.
The US Government began to support the agencies directly in August of 1984 when 
appropriations were made to Americares from the civilian disaster relief fund of the 
Department of State31. In addition to funding relief for refugees in Pakistan through 
the Department of State, funds were also allocated for a ’Cross-Border Humanitarian 
Assistance Programme*. This cross-border programme was administered by USAID 
and drew resources from 1) Public Law 480, Title II Assistance which donated food 
commodities, 2) the Humanitarian Relief Programme of the Department of Defense 
which distributed excess defense stocks of food, medicines and other goods and which 
arranged free medical treatment for those wounded in war in facilities in the US, 
Europe or the Middle East, and 3) a new ’Humanitarian Assistance Programme’ of 
USAID which channelled 8 million US$ to charitable agencies in 1985 and 45 million 
US$ in 1988. Medical aid and cash-for-food were also provided through a new 
Afghanistan Programme of USAID’s Office for Disaster Assistance. The US 
Government became the largest single funder of cross-border relief; their contribution 
totalled some 250 million US$ between 1985 and 198932.
The availability of new and sizable sums of money accounts for much of the 
proliferation of charitable agencies in health relief operations. Perhaps surprising to 
some, funds from the US Government supported more European agencies than those 
from North America. This was consistent with policies adopted before 1985 which 
aimed to avoid the appearance of a confrontation between the US and Soviet Union. 
In order to fund a wide range of agencies and activities which were under the control 
of various leaders and political parties in many parts of rural Afghanistan, USAID 
used the International Rescue Committee as a conduit. By 1989 the International 
Rescue Committee had a substantial programme of refugee and cross-border projects 
and was the largest US programme in Pakistan33.
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Baitenmann, among others, believes that those charitable agencies which were 
involved in cross-border efforts were ’integral to the US strategy of low-intensity 
conflicts against communist forces’34. He further substantiates this interpretation of 
the political and military roles played by the cross-border health relief programme in 
his analysis of the 70 charitable agencies advocating the Afghan cause. Not only does 
he point out that most were based in the US or Western Europe (60/70, 86%), but he 
also noted that all were members of a ’web of right-wing organizations, which 
includes think tanks, funders, activists, church representatives, university intellectuals, 
soldiers of fortune, retired US generals and high government officials’ of which ’anti­
communism is the glue that holds these groups together’33. Furthermore, his 
chronology of events clearly linked the escalation of armed conflict and the provision 
of US Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to the Mujahideen with expansions in the cross- 
border humanitarian programme.
123 Calling the shots: Pakistani authorities or foreign interest groups?
Links between an expanded humanitarian programme of assistance and military and 
political strategies of low-intensity conflict in support of armed resistance call into 
question the ability of Pakistani health authorities to formulate and enforce policies 
independently for the roles of foreign aid and political organizations in a health relief 
programme. Instead, it may well have been that initial policies which limited the 
participation of foreign charitable agencies in the refugee and relief programmes were 
tolerated largely because they concurred with those of the most powerful donor - the 
Government of the US.
The arrival of foreign charitable agencies shortly after the specialised agencies of the 
UN became involved and after the plight and needs of the refugees were first 
publicised in 1980 was an important challenge to the Government. Support for the 
involvement of the charitable agencies came primarily from UN agencies, donor 
governments and the international public at large. Charitable agencies were seen to be 
a means to implement emergency services quickly, especially since health 
professionals, equipment and supplies were not readily available to meet the needs of
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the refugees. Not only could charitable agencies provide needed resources quickly, 
their organization allowed lengthy bureaucratic and diplomatic procedures to be 
bypassed without further delay in implementing services. Moreover, supporting 
charitable agencies provided an alternative to the Government who, some fear, may 
divert funds and other resources for their own purposes36.
In Pakistan, governmental support for charitable agencies between 1980 and 1984 was 
equivocable, and for good reason. Their previous experiences with foreign charitable 
agencies had shown that humanitarian work was often less important that other 
activities - ranging from tourism to intelligence work. Although the Government 
recognised the value of the resources which these agencies could provide, they were 
concerned about the effects these agencies would have on the already complex 
relationships between groups within Pakistan and between Pakistan and other nation­
states. Notwithstanding these concerns, the Government increasingly felt compelled 
to accept charitable agencies in the relief programme. Otherwise, they could have been 
accused of refusing international assistance, thereby denying the provision of essential 
services for the refugees or jeopardising other sources of international aid.
Although domestic and foreign charitable agencies began working with the Afghans 
very early in the relief operation, it was not until the mid-1980s that they began to 
arrive in mass. The escalation of armed conflict at that time, which included the 
provision of additional weapons directly from the US Government for the first time37 
and the need to care for those engaged in combat specifically or those supporting the 
resistance movement generally, entailed a large scale health relief effort. In attempting 
to expand health relief efforts within existing humanitarian programmes for the 
refugees or within the newly created humanitarian programme for cross-border 
operations (rather than those of an overtly military nature), private and charitable 
agencies became the institutional conduit for delivering health care. Such a strategy 
was consistent with existing policies which aimed to preserve the presentation of the 
war as a civil one between various groups within Afghanistan. Furthermore, it allowed 
this form of support to be presented as a humanitarian or technical intervention rather 
than one with overtly political motivations. As such, it also avoided a direct
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association between health relief efforts and military strategies and instead emphasised 
the provision of care for ’innocent’ victims - a cause which would be difficult to 
dispute on ethical grounds. This tactic would also be widely accepted by the general 
public of donor nations and thus was more easily justified.
Such a strategy required new policies within the refugee health programme. Beginning 
in 1985, ’voluntary’ agencies were ’encouraged to assist in delivering health care to 
the Afghan refugees*38, and in 1986 specific guidelines for their participation were 
issued jointly by UNHCR and the Director of Medical Services of the Chief 
Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees of the Federal Government39. These guidelines 
acknowledged that charitable agencies already provided one-third of the refugee 
population with health care. Criteria for their participation in the programme 
emphasised lines of accountability through provincial and national offices of the 
Government’s refugee health programme as well as UNHCR. Adherence to standards 
of care determined by the Government and UNHCR were another recurring theme, 
including salaries paid to various health workers, patterns of staffing services and the 
types of medicines and treatments to be given. Even though the charitable agencies 
were admonished repeatedly to coordinate their work with UNHCR and the 
Government, and to adhere to policies and plans determined by them, they were also 
told to ’try innovative approaches to health care problems and implement pilot projects 
using new strategies to enhance their effectiveness’40. In practice, therefore, they 
were increasingly given considerable scope to set up and run their own projects, and 
by 1989 ’the Pakistan Government had adopted a liberal policy towards charitable 
agencies to undertake relief work in refugee areas in sectors that they wish to 
supplement*41.
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CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
Management of the refugee health programme, 1985 - 1989: 
by, with or instead of the Government of Pakistan?
13.1 Competing for the coordinating role: the Government of Pakistan. WHO 
and UNHCR
13.1.1 Setting technical standards of care: specialised agencies of the UN move 
beyond an advisory role
The guidelines which the Federal Government and UNHCR formulated in 1986 for 
charitable agencies represented only a fraction of the standards being set for the 
refugee health programme. Beginning in 1985 the second Senior Health Coordinator 
of WHO/UNHCR began to compile an Operations manual for the Afghan Refugee 
Health Programme in Pakistan1. This manual brought together guidelines for each of 
the disease control programmes as well as the provision of basic primary care, 
community-based activities, referral services and emergency assistance. The roles of 
various organizations and protocols for management were also included. Despite the 
substantial amount of time put into the preparation of this manual by the Senior 
Health Coordinator and many other health professionals of WHO, it was never 
distributed to staff of the basic health units. Instead, its publication in 1987 coincided 
with the arrival of the fourth Senior Health Coordinator who had different views on 
standards to be adopted. This meant that further dissemination or enforcement of 
stated plans were not pursued. Revisions were begun and it was not until 1989 that 
guidelines were issued; yet again, these guidelines were for specific programmes and 
were issued as separate documents, for example for environmental health services2 
and maternal and child health care3.
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13.1.2 Negotiating responsibility for refugee health within the UN system: the 
inadequacies of joint leadership
Notwithstanding the failure to distribute and enforce the standards proposed in the 
operations manual, the process by which they were formulated characterised more 
radical shifts in power between the Government, WHO and UNHCR. Policies and 
plans originally gave responsibility for policy-making, planning and managing health 
services for the Afghans to government officials. The arrival of the first Senior Health 
Coordinator of WHO/UNHCR did not significantly alter existing structures within the 
refugee health programme since he acted in an advisory and supportive role to 
government officials at national and provincial levels.
The creation of the position of a Senior Health Coordinator did, however, alter the 
roles of both WHO and UNHCR. Through the Senior Health Coordinator, WHO 
provided leadership on refugee health-related issues within the UN system. They also 
fulfilled their mandate to provide expert advice and assistance to member 
governments. The first two Senior Health Coordinators were recruited on to the staff 
of WHO through the Emergency Preparedness and Response Unit in Geneva and 
seconded to UNHCR which provided funds for all associated costs. As staff of WHO, 
they made extensive use of the various resources of WHO, primarily by engaging the 
services of experts to guide all aspects of the programme. For example, the two 
evaluations of the refugee health programme overall, which were undertaken in 1981 
and 1985, were carried out under the auspices of WHO4, and specific disease control 
programmes were evaluated by officials of the relevant departments in WHO, such as 
for tuberculosis and malaria control5. Advisors to national programmes were also 
engaged in the formulation of related policies and plans for the refugee programme6, 
for example in generating a list of essential drugs for the refugee health programme.
Not only did the first two Senior Health Coordinators draw upon expertise within 
WHO, they invited other agencies with expertise in international health to assist 
officials of the refugee health programme. For example, the first Senior Health 
Coordinator arranged for the Centres for Disease Control of the US Government to
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assess the rates of infant mortality and poor nutritional status among Afghan refugees 
in 19847. This assessment provided important indicators about the effectiveness of 
existing interventions as well as unmet needs for care, and it was subsequently carried 
out by the Centres for Disease Control for UNHCR each year.
Although the Senior Health Coordinator’s position within both WHO and UNHCR 
appeared to facilitate the work of both agencies, there were serious managerial 
constraints with this arrangement. Most importantly, the Senior Health Coordinator in 
Islamabad and the Health Coordinators in the North West Frontier and Baluchistan 
were accountable to two agencies. This meant that they had to report to both agencies 
separately. Obtaining official approval for policies and plans was a lengthy and, at 
times, confused process. Different views on priorities to be adopted and actions to be 
taken were not uncommon, requiring additional effort on the part of the Senior Health 
Coordinator to negotiate and mediate between WHO and UNHCR - let alone with the 
Government and numerous charitable and private agencies.
13.13 The power of the purse: UNHCR takes the leading role
Consequently, in 1985, UNHCR decided to create a position within the Office of the 
Chief of Mission in Islamabad for a Senior Health Coordinator. This move 
consolidated decision-making powers within UNHCR when it was implemented in 
1986, and it ended the direct involvement of WHO in the refugee health programme. 
The Health Coordinators in the North West Frontier and Baluchistan continued to be 
seconded to UNHCR but no longer from WHO. Beginning in 1986, these advisors 
were provided by the Save the Children Fund under an agreement similar to the one 
previously held with WHO. Such an agreement allowed UNHCR to continue to 
benefit from the presence of foreign medical professionals, but without creating 
additional posts within UNHCR and at significantly less cost since these professionals 
were recruited and paid as staff of the Save the Children Fund (UK). Nevertheless, the 
dual accountability of these two Health Coordinators created tensions between 
UNHCR and the Save the Children Fund at times; the Save the Children Fund also
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considered these coordinators members of their staff under their jurisdiction (Figure 
13.1).
In 1986, UNHCR further strengthened their own capacity to coordinate and manage 
the refugee health programme by appointing three specialists in nutrition/maternal and 
child health, sanitary engineering and health programming. With the addition of these 
three professionals in Islamabad UNHCR now had their own health unit. The role of 
UNHCR then extended far beyond funding ’to provide guidance and coordination’8. 
In order to better manage the refugee health programme, UNHCR also took 
responsibility, ’on behalf of the Government*, for ’the procurement of vaccines, 
insecticides, vehicles and other specialised medical supplies’9 through their 
procurement unit in Geneva. Taking responsibility for providing leadership and for the 
provision of essential supplies not only placed UNHCR as the lead agency within the 
UN system for refugee health matters but also within the refugee health programme 
itself.
Not surprisingly, many officials of the Government’s refugee health programme 
resented UNHCR’s dominance in policy-making, planning and managerial processes 
as well as the credit given to them for health care provided. Nevertheless, UNHCR 
consolidated their leadership throughout the following years. The agreements which 
they reached with charitable and private agencies to manage and provide basic care 
in the camps was one mechanism which further strengthened UNHCR’s position 
within the refugee health programme - even though at times it was at the expense of 
the Government. Similarly, the appointment of foreign aid agencies as advisors and 
managers within specific disease control and community health programmes was 
another.
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13.1
13.1.4 Foreign aid agencies as managers of disease control programmes in 
collaboration with UNHCR
With the delegation of responsibility for each disease control programme to medical 
officers working in the two camps in Punjab in 1985, control programmes for malaria, 
tuberculosis and vaccine preventable diseases became an integral part of the refugee 
health programme in all three provinces. Building upon the efforts to formulate 
national standards for disease control among the Afghans, which had first been 
undertaken by the Senior Health Coordinator of WHO/UNHCR in 1984, work carried 
out between 1985 and 1987 focused on improving the coverage of chosen 
interventions and the efficiency with which they were provided.
13.1.4.1 Management of an accelerated programme for immunizations
Within the immunization programme, for example, Pakistani lady health visitors and 
Afghan midwives were given responsibility for vaccinating women between the ages 
of 15 and 45 in the basic health units in 1985. Crash programmes of tent-to-tent visits 
by female staff, vaccinators or outreach workers were also carried out in areas where 
coverage was especially poor in the spring and autumn of 1985. Notwithstanding these 
efforts, coverage had improved little by 1987. Consequently, an accelerated 
programme was designed and implemented under the direction of UNHCR in 
collaboration with Unicef, John Snow Incorporated of the US and the Afghanistan 
Vaccination/ Immunization Centre (AVICEN) of France.
Technical measures which were undertaken focused on improving the cold chain and 
procedures for using one sterile syringe for each vaccination or for sterilising syringes 
which were to be used more than once. Organizational changes took responsibility for 
vaccinating women and children away from fixed centres and gave it to mobile teams 
or outreach workers. The effectiveness of these efforts were to be monitored and 
assessed through coverage surveys in each district and tribal agency.
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Management was strengthened, primarily by engaging the advice of a consultant from 
John Snow Incorporated10 who worked closely with officials of the refugee health 
programme and charitable agencies. He was assisted by AVICEN, a French charitable 
agency providing immunization services in Afghanistan, which organised training 
courses in vaccination for health workers. The success of these strategies which were 
adopted in 1988 led UNHCR to engage the services of two full time advisors from 
John Snow Incorporated for the following year11. Like the control programme for 
tuberculosis which was the joint responsibility of the Italian Corporation for 
Development and the Government, the organization and management of the 
programme for immunizations became the responsibility of foreign aid organizations 
in collaboration with UNHCR, even though overall responsibility ostensibly remained 
with the Government.
To some extent, John Snow acted as the operational partner of UNHCR. Concerns 
about the ineffectiveness of vaccination activities before 1988 were expressed by 
UNHCR when the Centres for Disease Control found that at most 55% of young 
children had been vaccinated with BCG against tuberculosis in 1987. In 1988, 
UNHCR contributed 596 000 US$ for an intensified programme, 190 000 of which 
was for the procurement of vaccines. UNHCR also sought support from other 
specialised agencies of the UN which were concerned with immunization coverage. 
Unicef contributed 785 000 US$ for the vaccines, related supplies and equipment as 
well as the services of a consultant for one week before embarking on the new 
programme. WHO also provided the services of a consultant in the planning stages 
who advised UNHCR and the Government on strategies for carrying out surveys of 
coverage, delivering vaccination, organising the cold chain and deciding upon a policy 
for injection equipment. Many charitable agencies also made a contribution by 
employing staff to carry out vaccination activities12.
13.1.4.2 Management of the malaria control programme
Simultaneously, efforts were made to assess and enhance the effectiveness of other 
disease control activities. Like the Italian Cooperation for Development which had
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assumed responsibility for advising, monitoring and supporting the tuberculosis control 
programme in the North West Frontier in 1984 and John Snow Incorporated which 
took responsibility for the programme for immunizations in 1988, Medecins Sans 
Frontieres Belgium was given responsibility for strengthening the management of 
malaria control in 1988. Although all three organizations worked with Pakistani 
officials of the refugee health programme, technical standards and organizational and 
administrative protocols which were subsequently set by these agencies were usually 
adopted for nation-wide use in the refugee health programme. Thus, responsibility for 
programme management was heavily influenced, even assumed, by these agencies in 
practice although they were ostensibly in an advisory role to the Government.
The most notable exception was the tuberculosis control programme in Baluchistan 
which continued to be funded and monitored on an annual basis by the Regional 
Office of WHO for the Eastern Mediterranean in Alexandria, Egypt. Management and 
implementation of this tuberculosis control programme remained the responsibility of 
the Refugee Health Directorate in Baluchistan. Nevertheless, policies and plans were 
formulated in collaboration with WHO and the programme was monitored nationally 
by the Senior Health Coordinator of UNHCR. Thus, in general the management of 
disease control programmes increasingly became the responsibility of foreign aid 
agencies under the direction of UNHCR.
13.1.4.3 Moving beyond concerns for effective care to considerations of 
efficiency
In addition to strengthening management, control programmes for malaria and 
tuberculosis were streamlined by re-assigning similar tasks to only one member of the 
basic health units in the North West Frontier and Punjab. In Baluchistan, posts for 
Health Prevention Outreach Workers were created in the basic health units in 1986. 
These outreach workers similarly assumed responsibility for all preventive services, 
including sanitation measures, malaria and tuberculosis control and immunizations13. 
This reassignment of responsibilities indicates that the degree to which interventions 
were provided efficiently was an issue of concern for the first time. Concerns for
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effective control of communicable diseases and common illnesses had dominated the 
work of those responsible for managing and implementing care during the initial 
influx of Afghans to Pakistan. Now, concerns for inefficient use of resources were 
expressed and acted on, primarily by those who were financing the refugee health 
programme - UNHCR and WHO.
13.1 A A  Initiating and carrying out a sanitation programme
Even though the provision of adequate supplies of water was organised for the 
Afghans when they first began to arrive in large numbers in 1980, it was not until 
1985 that the settlement of nearly three million Afghans in over 300 villages made 
systems to dispose of wastes a high priority. Although sanitation projects had been 
undertaken by at least two charitable agencies, the Austrian Relief Committee and Les 
Enfants du Monde, and Unicef since 1980, the needs in 1985 far exceeded existing 
efforts. This led the Senior Health Coordinator to establish a new programme to 
provide basic latrines and health education regarding the importance of their use.
Subsequently, these activities became his responsibility within UNHCR and at least 
eight organizations were asked to initiate and manage such services. In the North West 
Frontier, the Austrian Relief Committee, International Rescue Committee, Pakistan 
Red Crescent Society and Unicef set up projects in 1985. In 1986, Catholic Relief 
Services, Action Internationale Contra la Faim and Medecins Sans Frontieres France 
set up similar programmes in Baluchistan, and Catholic Relief Services established a 
project in Punjab. Simultaneously, the Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees 
began to organise schemes for improved water supplies in the North West Frontier. 
Some of these agencies built upon existing efforts, such as the Austrian Relief 
Committee and Unicef. Others undertook this work as new projects in addition to their 
other health programmes.
Similar to other disease control programmes, these environmental health programmes 
were managed and implemented within the refugee health programme under the 
overall direction of UNHCR in collaboration with Unicef and charitable agencies. It
410
was not until November of 1989 that a position for a Deputy Director of sanitation 
programmes within the Refugee Health Directorate in the North West Frontier was 
created - some three to four years after the programme had begun. This post within 
the Government was created because sanitation activities had not been fully integrated 
within the Government’s refugee health programme and because coordination was 
poor between the Field Supervisory Medical Officers in the districts and tribal 
agencies and the charitable agencies which were implementing projects. Clearly, this 
programme had been set up and run in the camps by foreign aid agencies relatively 
independently from refugee health services provided by the Government.
13.1.5 Foreign aid agencies as managers of community-based health programmes 
in collaboration with UNHCR and Unicef
The community health worker programme was extended in 1985 to two other districts 
and tribal agencies in the North West Frontier and training of traditional birth 
attendants, ’dais’, was begun in one district. By the end of 1985, 21 camps had 
undergone the initial motivation of the community and 39 community health 
supervisors had been trained. These community health supervisors had trained 567 
community health workers. In addition, two community dais were trained who in turn 
had trained 18 family dais14. These achievements were not accomplished without 
many difficulties. First was the inability of community dais to train family dais on 
their own. Second was the issue of payment of the community health workers which 
were working as volunteers and later, salaries of community health supervisors. Lastly 
was a perceived lack of support from the Government for the programme.
Save the Children staff felt that, unlike the community health supervisors, the 
community dais could not adequately train family dais on their own which meant that 
the Save the Children team had to be more actively involved in training than 
originally intended. Subsequently, two additional lady health visitors joined the Save 
the Children team in March 1986. In addition to their responsibilities for training, this 
team was also to provide supervision, follow-up and resupply of equipment to the dais 
since lady health visitors in the basic health units were unable to take on these tasks.
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In order to increase the accountability of community health workers to the health 
services and to ensure continued participation, Save the Children staff proposed 
payment of Pakistan rupees 300 per month, initially by the Refugee Health Directorate 
and later by the communities15. However, since there were no problems with 
volunteering in practice during 1985, 1986 and 1987, community health workers 
continued to work as volunteers. Unlike community health workers, community health 
supervisors were given a salary of rupees 800 per month from the beginning. Although 
the receipt of a salary made them similar to other staff of the basic health unit, rupees 
800 per month was considerably less than other staff members with comparable 
responsibilities, namely malaria supervisors and vaccinators. The difference in salaries 
created increasing discontentment since the community health supervisors had also 
been given additional tasks, for example following tuberculosis cases, assisting with 
vaccinations, identifying handicapped refugees and assisting in maintaining the 
records of the basic health unit16. As a result, salaries were reviewed mid-1987 and 
subsequently increased.
Lastly, Save the Children staff perceived a lack of support from officials of the 
government refugee health programme17. Problems had been encountered with 
refugee health staff which were attributed by Save the Children staff to:
traditionally, health care was the domain of professionally trained persons. The 
use of illiterate and semi-literate health workers was not acceptable to all 
existing health staff.
most health staff had been trained in well-equipped hospitals with a curative 
bias. The use of community health workers was a new concept with different 
areas of emphasis.
there was a consistently high turnover of staff in all of the basic health units. 
This prevented continuity in the development of the programme and 
necessitated continual training of basic health unit staff.
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difficulties had been encountered with the supply and resupply of medicines 
to the community health workers. Many health staff opposed the use of 
medicines by lay health workers.
These problems led Save the Children staff to propose the creation of a supervisory 
post in the refugee health directorate with funding from UNHCR. The main 
responsibilities of this Deputy Director would be to supervise and integrate the 
community health workers and dais in the refugee health programme18. However, this 
Deputy Director who was appointed in September of 1986 was on secondment to Save 
the Children for over one year and worked from the Save the Children office until 
October 1987 (Figure 13.1). Thus, the acceptance of community-based health workers 
and their integration in the existing refugee health services was slow. Early in 1987, 
Save the Children further proposed the creation of supervisory posts in the districts 
and tribal agencies for the community health worker and dai programmes, similar to 
immunizations and malaria control19. Furthermore, they proposed the employment of 
a second lady health visitor in the basic health units to supervise the dais. Both 
proposals were agreed to by UNHCR which provided the funds to do so. However, 
a second proposal was submitted in the autumn of 1987 suggesting that an agreement 
had not been reached with the Refugee Health Directorate20. In addition, it was 
learned that the Government had signed bilateral agreements in February 1987 with 
the Italian Corporation for Development and a private foundation in the Netherlands 
to provide mother and child health care.
Notwithstanding the lack of integration of the community health worker and dai 
programmes and the rumours about new mother and child health care programmes, 
training continued and, by 1989, 96 community health supervisors and 1920 
community health workers had been trained in the North West Frontier alone. While 
training continued and the programme expanded to incorporate other districts, 
additional supervisory posts were created within the Refugee Health Directorate which 
enhanced the acceptability of the programme among staff of the refugee health 
programme. But it did not provide the means for more full integration of the
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programme which remained under the management largely of the Save the Children 
Fund in practice.
13.2 Leadership within the refugee health programme: the Government of 
Pakistan. UNHCR or WHO?
Planning and implementing health relief for Afghan refugees was the concern of three 
specialised agencies or funds of the UN: UNHCR whose mandate covers the well­
being of refugees in every sphere, WHO whose mandate gives it responsibility for all 
aspects of health and Unicef whose mandate provides for the well-being of children 
world-wide. Overlapping mandates and the need to respond quickly and coherently 
usually results in the designation of one agency as the leader within the UN. In 
Pakistan, UNHCR was designated as the lead agency for the refugee relief operation 
overall. Notwithstanding this delegation of authority, leadership within the refugee 
health programme changed hands three times over a ten year period.
Leadership of the refugee health programme was first assumed by the Government of 
Pakistan, through provincial health and political authorities. In extending existing 
services to Afghans and in planning for a separate system of health services for them, 
provincial authorities were first assisted in 1980 by WHO and Unicef who were 
advising national programmes for disease control and by UNHCR who provided the 
additional resources which were needed. Advice on technical and administrative 
matters generally was also made available by UNHCR when medical doctors and 
nurses were seconded from charitable agencies to their sub-offices in Peshawar and 
Quetta in 1980 through 1982.
The arrival of the Senior Health Coordinator in 1982 shifted managerial 
responsibilities. Within the UN system, the appointment of a Senior Health 
Coordinator as an official of WHO meant that WHO took responsibility for providing 
leadership for refugee health. Other agencies of the UN, together with many charitable 
agencies from abroad, then looked to WHO for guidance and leadership. Support for 
this post came primarily from the UN agencies: firstly, UNHCR which needed
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technical advice on the allocation of funds and which was willing to fund such a 
position, and secondly, WHO whose Emergency Relief Operations Unit in Geneva was 
trying to develop expertise and a role in refugee health.
In keeping with WHO’s preferred manner of working in an advisory capacity with 
member governments, provincial health authorities retained decision-making and 
administrative powers. But the creation of a post within the federal structures shifted 
responsibility for policy-making, planning and management for refugee health 
nationally. In addition to conferring with the Chief Commissionerate for Afghan 
Refugees and the States and Frontiers Regions and Kashmir Affairs Division, policies 
and plans were now formulated jointly with WHO and UNHCR through the Senior 
Health Coordinator. The technical and professional expertise of the Senior Health 
Coordinator, his position within the international aid agencies and his role in planning 
and approving financial and material resources donated through the UN meant that the 
balance of power was weighted in his favour. Thus, WHO provided much of the 
leadership of the refugee health programme in practice from 1982 - 1985.
The inevitable conflicts and stresses of working for two different agencies eventually 
led UNHCR to create their own post for a Senior Health Coordinator and to request 
the secondment of the provincial health coordinators from the Save the Children Fund 
rather than WHO in 1986. This shifted responsibility for refugee health within the UN 
system from WHO to UNHCR. Unlike WHO which worked primarily in an advisory 
capacity, UNHCR then took responsibility for making policy and plans as well as 
monitoring, evaluating and managing the refugee health programme generally.
UNHCR did this firstly by setting the standards of care to be used within individual 
programmes. One of the first activities of every Senior Health Coordinator was to 
write guidelines for the management of common diseases and the organization of 
health care. Beginning in 1982 and continuing throughout the following years, it was 
the Senior Health Coordinator who garnered support for standardised care and who 
made and approved specific proposals. Unfortunately, the turnover of medical 
professionals in this post meant that revisions were frequent. Thus, with the exception
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of the first guidelines which were written in 1982, most proposals were rarely 
disseminated widely and enforced. Nevertheless, the authority to determine standards 
of care became the responsibility primarily of UNHCR when they made the Senior 
Health Coordinator and provincial Health Coordinators members of their own staff in 
1986.
Secondly, UNHCR arranged for the effectiveness of existing interventions to be 
assessed. They asked the Centres for Disease Control of the US Government to 
evaluate the health and nutritional status of the refugees annually. Other agencies 
measured the coverage of priority interventions, such as immunizations, or their 
effectiveness in controlling problem diseases, such as malaria. While these evaluations 
provided important indicators of the successes and weaknesses of the refugee health 
programme, officials of the Government had relatively little say in planning or 
interpreting these evaluations. This was true even though many of the programmes 
being assessed were implemented by the Government. Furthermore, no training 
programmes were carried out to enable officials of the Government to use these 
assessments as management tools: many of the evaluations made extensive use of 
epidemiological techniques which were new to most government health officials. 
Clearly, UNHCR consolidated their leadership by gathering important information 
which they then used in planning and managing the refugee health services.
Thirdly, UNHCR promoted more efficient use of resources. Publication of studies 
which found widespread malaria and tuberculosis among the Afghans in the early 
1980s had made many of the health programmes political as well as technical issues 
of concern to government and international officials. Urgent needs to be seen to be 
doing something meant that it was not until the Senior Health Coordinator was first 
appointed in 1982 that the inefficiencies and limited effectiveness of existing 
provincial programmes to control diseases were first addressed. The subsequent 
incorporation of these programmes within the refugee health services gave refugee 
health officials greater control over disease control activities and personnel. Yet 
improvements were still too few, and beginning in 1985, UNHCR adopted a two-fold 
strategy. Concerns for inefficiencies led to a reduction in the numbers of health
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workers in the camps and their assignment to carry out more than one task. 
Interestingly, this concern was paramount to UNHCR who funded these programmes.
Concerns for ineffectiveness of disease control interventions and the lack of 
community health activities led UNHCR to contract other foreign aid agencies to take 
responsibility for advising and supporting the management of the various health 
programmes and services. Although these agencies were ostensibly in an advisory role 
to the Government, in practice they influenced decision making and administration 
immensely. Like the Senior Health Coordinator of UNHCR, many advisors from 
charitable agencies had considerable technical and professional expertise and they had 
responsibilities for approving donations of money and materials from abroad. Some 
had their own source of funds, but many relied on UNHCR. Collaborative 
relationships between these agencies and UNHCR meant that UNHCR supported these 
agencies in taking decisions and carrying them out. Thus, UNHCR consolidated then- 
own leadership partly through collaborative relationships with other foreign aid 
agencies who took responsibility for managing various health programmes.
Again, these developments raise important questions about UNHCR’s relatively new 
role in refugee health. Could the increasing involvement of UNHCR in refugee health 
mean less, not more, support for host governments in providing refugee health 
services?
133 The refugee health programme: in summary
Throughout the 1980s, the Provincial Refugee Health Directorates managed an 
independent health programme for Afghan refugees. ’Basic health services’ were given 
priority and were provided for the refugees through basic health units distributed at 
a ratio of 1:15 000 refugees living in the camps. The Government took responsibility 
for providing care among two-thirds of the refugee population while foreign and 
domestic charitable agencies cared for the rest. Specialised care was made available 
by the Government and UNHCR through existing government facilities, such as rural 
health centres and hospitals. In addition, there were numerous specialty and referral
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facilities exclusively for Afghans which were organised, financed and managed by 
charitable agencies and political parties independently.
Since health relief was first provided in 1980, basic curative care and the control of 
malaria, tuberculosis and vaccine preventable diseases were the priority components. 
All associated priority interventions were eventually provided in the camps by staff 
of the basic health units. Management of these programmes, however, gradually 
became the responsibility of foreign aid agencies in collaboration primarily with 
UNHCR and to a lesser extent the Government. Since 1985, other disease control 
programmes were initiated, for example for environmental health, which were also 
initiated and managed by foreign aid agencies in collaboration with UNHCR and the 
Government.
Efforts to provide preventive services were limited to clinics run by Pakistani lady 
health visitors and Afghan traditional birth attendants for women and young children 
in the basic health units; but even these clinics were biased towards providing curative 
care and disease control. This curative and facility-based focus was not been 
substantially altered by the adoption of a Primary Health Care approach in 1982. In 
practice, the adoption of a Primary Health Care approach meant the provision of 
community-based health workers in addition to existing services. These programmes 
were initiated and implemented solely by charitable agencies with support from 
inter-governmental organizations. Thus, community health workers and trained 
traditional birth attendants were not readily accepted by, and integrated in, existing 
refugee health services.
In addition to the refugee health programme, a host of foreign aid agencies became 
involved in providing health relief for those who remained in Afghanistan and those 
injured as a result of the armed conflict. This cross-border relief operation gave 
priority to basic first aid and medical care as well as medical and surgical care of 
those wounded in war. Many of the programmes set up by these agencies were 
organised and managed from a base in Pakistan. There was, however, little 
coordination between the two relief operations; other specialised agencies of the UN
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and a host of charitable or private organizations were specifically engaged for this 
effort.
Similarly, there was little coordination between the refugee health programme and 
health services provided by the Government of Pakistan for its own people. Although 
the refugee health programme was built around the same interventions which were 
given priority in the on-going health services of the Government, separate lines of 
accountability for managerial and political authority, different systems of remuneration 
and working conditions for health personnel, the participation of a host of foreign 
relief aid agencies and access to vast sums of money and material goods for refugee 
relief through various institutions of the international community enabled the refugee 
health programme to function independently. Not only did these and other factors 
influence the development of a parallel system of health services which functioned in 
isolation from other systems of health care within Pakistan, they contributed to the 
creation of a system of health services which consistently provided a higher quality 
of care. Unlike on-going health programmes of the Provincial Governments which 
continued to be under-resourced, insufficiently staffed and poorly managed, measures 
were taken to overcome these obstacles and others early in the development of the 
refugee health programme. This meant that health services provided for the refugees 
ensured that basic care of a quality acceptable to the Government and international aid 
agencies alike was available on a regular basis.
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CHAPTER FOURTEEN 
Getting in on the act: 
understanding the multiplicity of agencies 
promoting the health of Afghan refugees in Pakistan
The process by which health policies were formulated and put into practice for 
Afghans seeking refuge in Pakistan involved numerous and seemingly disparate 
institutions. Yet, the evolution of health services for them, and the varied and 
changing roles of the many institutions involved within it, concur with the analysis of 
the international policies to promote the health of refugees: there is coherence and 
consistency to the policy process. Furthermore, key findings from both studies 
emphasise the highly political nature of that process, both within a national and 
international context. This draws attention to Issues of power and reinforces an 
understanding of policy as the means through which power is managed within society. 
In this thesis, this was found to be true both for Pakistani society, as a nation-state, 
and for the international or global society within which the varied actors all worked. 
Gearly, the process by which health policies are formulated and carried out reflects 
relationships of power, the way it is controlled and for what ends it is used. Drawing 
on the main findings and conclusions of the study in Pakistan, the following 
discussion highlights key characteristics of, and the issues of paramount concern to, 
the policy process which ostensibly aims to promote the health of refugees.
14.1 The policy process: neglected dimensions of culture and discursive 
practices
14.1.1 Policies for refugee health: synergistic or antagonistic to self- and 
community- health development?
Assistance was first given to Afghan refugees by local people living near the borders 
with Afghanistan in the North West Frontier and Baluchistan. The choice of the 
Afghans to seek refuge among these people was greatly influenced by shared ethnicity,
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kinship, geographical heritage and political ideology. In other words, those seeking 
refuge sought help from those who would be sympathetic to their needs. Surely this 
was just one of many strategies adopted by the Afghans to protect and promote their 
own well-being.
Yet in setting up health services for them, the Afghans themselves were involved only 
as users or as auxiliaries to Pakistani and foreign health professionals. They were 
excluded from the management of these health services at all levels, especially 
decision-making processes for policy-making, planning, administering, monitoring or 
evaluating care provided. This was true even though services were provided ostensibly 
for their benefit. Consequently, official policies which were adopted failed to take 
account of, and build upon, the ways in which the Afghans perceived, promoted and 
protected their own health and well-being.
Instead, interventions which were made available reflected the priorities of national 
programmes for health of the Government of Pakistan and of global programmes for 
health of the international aid agencies. Even community-based health activities which 
were part of the Primary Health Care rhetoric of stated policies of both the 
Government and the international aid agencies, such as the training of refugee health 
workers and home visiting, and health care of special groups, such as for women and 
children, were low priorities in the refugee health programme.
Not surprisingly, there was little evidence that health services provided for the Afghan 
refugees in Pakistan influenced their health and nutritional status in any significant 
way. Instead, commonly measured indicators of death, illness and malnutrition 
remained much the same as in Afghanistan prior to their relocation despite a decade 
of service provision in Pakistan. Similarly, health services for the Afghan refugees 
appeared to be organised separate from, or in parallel with, their own practices for 
health; there was no evidence that they had become an integral component of Afghan 
society even though selected interventions may have become more acceptable to them.
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14.12 Refugee health care: a demand driven response?
The exclusion of the Afghans from decision-making processes, the lack of any notable 
change in their health and nutritional status and the parallel organization of official 
and informal systems of health care calls into question the provision of relief in 
response to demands based on the health of the refugees themselves. Consistent with 
approaches which perceive the policy process as a rational one, Cavallo1 points out 
that ’the tendency to see charity (or health relief) as dependent on the conditions of 
the poor (including refugees), and on the structure and development of poverty 
undoubtedly remains prevalent’. She then goes on to point out that any ’analysis 
normally accords a central role to demographic or economic factors (prices, epidemics, 
famines, population growth, demographic crisis, immigration, etc).... Charity (or health 
relief) ... is interpreted essentially as a response to the needs of the poor (refugees).... 
concern for the situation of the poor (refugees) is seen as the motivating element 
behind charitable action’.
In highlighting this trend, Cavallo rightly points out that ’this inhibits exploration of 
other kinds of explanations, relatively independent of the needs of the poor, but linked 
rather to the multiple meanings which charity held for benefactors*(emphasis added)2. 
One central question arising from this analysis of health policies for refugees is the 
nature and source of demand which generates relief or on-going services for health 
since they do not appear to respond to the health needs and related strategies for care 
of the refugees themselves.
Instead, this pattern suggests that those institutions endowed with power to promote 
health are unwilling to share it with refugees. The incorporation of refugees as 
legitimate managers and providers of health care raises several issues which focus on 
power. Clearly, the power to decide which health activities would be provided, by 
whom, and with what resources, rested with the international agencies and, to a lesser 
extent, governmental health officials. The power of the purse, the perceived expertise 
of medical doctors and nurses, and the coverage given to the plight of the refugees in 
the Pakistani and international press, for example, are just some of the factors which
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gave the Government of Pakistan and especially the international agencies greater 
control and influence over the decisions which were taken and the programmes which 
were implemented.
14.13 Cultural dimensions of health relief policy
The organization and provision of health interventions outside of existing cultural and 
social practices for health within Afghan society (whose culture and social structures 
generally differ markedly from Western, Middle Eastern and South Asian societies) 
points to the reality of different concepts of health and health care. Obviously there 
is no universal concept of health and thus health relief since each culture defines it 
differently. Official policies of institutions for refugee health relief thus reflect the 
values of a specific culture. Within the context of an international health relief 
operation for refugees, it is therefore possible to identify a dominant culture within 
which health relief is defined and dealt with in contrast with those cultures which are 
subjugated. Even within a national effort for health relief, one culture will dominate 
official policies while other cultural definitions and practices will be ignored, repressed 
or incorporated within the dominant cultural framework.
The dominance of allopathic medicine and epidemiology in policies of national and 
international institutions promoting the health of refugees suggests that institutional 
policies, and many individual practitioners, take for granted that there is a universal 
culture for health and health relief. Not only does this prevent health providers from 
learning from the people and from supporting individuals and communities in caring 
for their own health, it allows health relief to be an instrument for imposing cultural 
values. The cultural dimensions of policy, including the role of culture in managing 
power and relationships of power, need to be added in future to any analytic 
framework of health policies.
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14.1.4 Discursive practices and health relief
The dominance of an allopathic medical and epidemiological paradigm in determining 
the content of health policies for refugees, both nationally and world-wide, not only 
reflects the cultural values of those national societies which are most influential within 
the international community, it is evidence that there is an official discourse which has 
been developed for health generally and for refugee health care specifically. This 
official discourse for refugee health has institutional, political, scientific and social 
implications for the way in which refugee health problems are defined and the ways 
in which they are to be solved. It also defines the roles of health providers, from 
medical doctors to community health workers, as well as those of the beneficiaries of 
health relief interventions. Discursive analyses are a specialised discipline which, like 
culture, need to be incorporated in any future analytic framework of health policy.
14.2 National policies for refugee health: maintaining domestic stability
14.2.1 Host governments: key or peripheral actors?
This study originally aimed to identify major policy issues in refugee health care 
which are faced by host governments. As the official political and legal authorities of 
their national society, they are commonly thought to be, or are promoted as, key actors 
in the provision of health care for refugees. Within the health sector more generally, 
governments have been advocated as the means through which health services should 
be provided in lower income economies.
Yet, national and local governments are only one institution of society through which 
health policy is formulated and practised. They may or may not be key institutions in 
the policy process for the health of refugees. For example, in Pakistan and Somalia 
national or provincial governments played a significant role in managing and 
providing health care for refugees. Refugees and displaced persons in Thailand and 
Honduras, however, have access to health services which are managed and provided 
by international aid agencies; the governments have only peripheral roles in more
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general political, legal and administrative matters. Although goods and funds for the 
Guatemalan relief effort were donated by several agencies outside of Mexico, few 
were active in making decisions about priority problems and the means for their 
resolution, and even fewer took part in putting strategies adopted into practice; instead, 
community-based groups and institutions of civil society13 took the lead in working 
with and caring for the Guatemalans.
Clearly, some of the numerous and varied groups within any host society will have 
an interest in taking part in caring for refugees directly while others may feel a need 
to be involved only indirectly or not at all. This is as true of governments and military 
organizations as of institutions of civil society. Moreover, the particular role 
undertaken in the policy process by any institution of the host society will reflect 
primarily the interests of the institution in question, especially its relationships of 
power with other groups within its own society. Any analysis of the policy process 
must take into account the organization of society and particularly the roles played by 
both the institutions of political24 and civil society.
A significant influx of refugees: tens or hundreds of thousands?
The Federal Government of Pakistan initiated relief activities for a relatively small 
number of refugees: less than 5 per cent of the registered refugee population a decade 
later or as few as 20 000 refugees living in separate camps or villages. Relief was 
initiated by the Government not only in response to humanitarian needs for food and 
shelter, but more importantly to the effects of several thousand refugees on their 
somewhat precarious and strained political relationships with tribal and ethnic groups
1. According to Antonio Gramsci’s definition, civil society ’comprises all the ’so-called’ 
private organisations such as churches, trade unions, political parties and cultural 
associations which are distinct from the process of production and from the public 
apparatuses of the state.’
2. According to Antonio Gramsci’s definition, political society includes ’the various 
institutions of the state - the armed forces, police, law courts and prisons together with 
all the administrative departments concerning taxation, finance, trade, industry, social 
security, etc.’.
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in the North West Frontier and Baluchistan. Similarly, providing relief had political 
and economic implications for their political and strategic relationships with other 
governments, both near and far, as well as with international aid agencies. The 
provision of relief by the national and provincial governments was in response to the 
demands of their own constituencies: it was in their interest to be seen to be 
sympathetic and responsive.
14.23 Powerful symbols, but empty gestures?
Initial relief activities initiated by the Government gave priority to meeting basic needs 
for food and shelter through the distribution of commodities and materials. These 
priority needs and the methods used for meeting them were based on those used in 
previous disaster relief operations. They reflect an official discourse which defines 
relief according to immediate biological survival needs only; appropriate responses 
then revolve around the provision of needed goods and services as acts of charity or 
welfare.
Health care was one of the first services extended to the refugees by provincial 
governments. Similar to initial relief activities which were carried out through existing 
disaster relief mechanisms, health relief was provided by existing health facilities or 
extensions of existing services. In practice, a lack of resources and poorly developed 
structures for disaster relief generally meant that food and other supplies were 
distributed on an ad hoc basis. In the North West Frontier and Baluchistan, existing 
rural health services were inadequate or inappropriate to meet the needs of local 
people, let alone refugees; health relief activities were, consequently, also provided 
initially on an ad hoc basis.
143.4 Expanding official spheres of influence
The inadequacy of existing health services provided by the Government in rural areas, 
the inappropriateness of many health interventions given priority in governmental 
health policy and the inability of governmental structures to respond in any substantial
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or consistent way to the health needs of their own people suggests that the 
Government was motivated less by the health needs of the refugees or local people 
affected by the influx than by the opportunity to consolidate and extend their influence 
in the health sector.
Governmental provision of health services for the Afghans brought employment to 
thousands of medical doctors and paramedical professionals in Pakistan. In the context 
of scarce and diminishing public resources for health services within Pakistan, the 
adoption of a providing role also brought much needed funds and drugs, supplies and 
equipment in sizable quantities to the Government. Thus, the Government was able 
to satisfy the demands not only for employment and the resources needed to practice 
medicine, but also for continued leadership and influence of one of the most wealthy 
and politically active professional groups (medical) in their society; simultaneously, 
they enhanced their own position as providers of health services of a better quality for 
a larger number of people. Shared ethnicity, kinship, religious affiliation and political 
orientation of the local people and the Afghans also meant that the provision of health 
services for the refugees satisfied many domestic demands for government sponsored 
health relief. Thus, the priority given to health not only appeared to meet commonly 
perceived needs for humanitarian relief but more importantly allowed medical 
practitioners in Pakistani society and the Government to consolidate and enhance their 
roles as the organizers and legitimate providers of health care.
143 National or international policies for the health of Afghans in Pakistan?
143.1 National and international publicity: delineating demand
Just as the Pakistani media played a key role in establishing and maintaining domestic 
support for the refugees and for efforts by the Government or local charitable and 
political organizations to assist them, publication of the Afghan's flight to Pakistan by 
the international media generated support among western publics for the provision of 
relief by international aid agencies and donor governments. Equally important, 
domestic and international publicity established a system of accountability, for
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example of the Government of Pakistan to its own people as well as the international 
aid agencies and the international public at large; similarly, international aid agencies 
were held accountable to their own constituencies at home and abroad for their efforts, 
or lack of them. Clearly, the media was one means through which demand was created 
among the constituencies of the institutions providing health care for the Afghans.
Furthermore, domestic and international publicity influenced the definition of health 
problems, for example as malaria, measles and other diseases, as well as appropriate 
solutions, for example the provision of emergency medical care by medical 
professionals, Pakistani or foreign respectively. Both perspectives fail to meet the 
short- and long-term needs of refugees. The definition of poor health as disease fails 
to address other essential requirements for well-being, such as safety and security, 
water and other essential items, and an ability to provide for self and family. This 
approach narrows the causes of poor health to those acceptable in a medical, 
epidemiological framework. The choice of appropriate solutions is then limited, for 
example to the extensive use of pharmaceuticals. By adopting such a definition of 
health and associated responses for care, the media was one means through which the 
official discourse which defined health and health care for refugees was expressed, 
promoted and given legitimacy.
Popular media images of refugees as helpless victims among destitute hosts implies 
that those with resources and expertise are needed to manage and carry out relief 
activities. In organising and providing health care for the Afghans, responsibility for 
health was given to medical professionals, both within Pakistan and from abroad. 
Sympathies aroused by the media generated support for governmental and international 
agencies to provide emergency medical care rather than a range of relief and 
development activities for refugees and local people which were initiated and carried 
out by the refugees themselves and their local and national hosts. In so doing, the 
media transmitted and perpetuated an incorrect and paternalistic view of refugees; it 
was one means through which the official discourse which defined the roles of health 
relief providers and beneficiaries was expressed, promoted and given legitimacy.
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1432 Separate or integrated health services for refugees?
Domestic and international publicity of the arrival of several thousand Afghans 
seeking asylum in Pakistan created complex and sensitive relationships between 
interested groups and organizations within Pakistan and internationally. There was then 
great pressure on the Government, since it had adopted the lead role in organizing and 
managing refugee relief, not only to be seen to be doing something but to actually do 
it. Consequently, powerless and poorly developed existing structures for relief were 
quickly replaced by separate commissions (or departments) created specifically for 
refugee relief. Similarly, governmental policies for health relief were then formulated 
which authorised the creation of a separate system of governmental health services for 
the Afghan refugees. Within this new system of health services, separate programmes 
were established for different health and nutritional interventions, for example for 
disease control and basic curative care. This shift in policy was largely in response to 
the demands generated by the international community for the provision of aid 
immediately and exclusively for the Afghans.
International policies since World War II have characterised refugees as temporary 
visitors, partly by classifying them separately from other migrants or national citizens 
and partly by providing separate and distinct interventions for them. By definition, a 
temporary stay is a short one, negating the need for any thought or action for the 
longer-term. Efforts are made, therefore, to meet only the most immediate and 
pressing needs, with minimal inconvenience or disruption. The health relief effort for 
the Afghans was obviously no exception.
143 3  Expediency at the expense of efficient and sustainable services?
The creation of a separate system of health services for the Afghans clearly facilitated 
rapid and authoritative decision-making, together with the distribution of resources 
needed to implement them, because it allowed entrenched bureaucratic procedures and 
lengthy political processes within existing governmental structures to be bypassed. 
Even though this policy enabled the Government to act in a more timely, authoritative
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and effective way, it ignored considerations of both the efficient use of resources 
within a national context of growing scarcity and the potential for services to be 
sustained in the longer-term.
Concern for the inefficient use of resources was only expressed by the international 
aid agencies paying for refugee health care many years later when they wished to 
scale down their involvement or withdraw altogether. Concerns that this separate 
system of health services be sustainable in future were never on the agenda of either 
the Government or the international aid agencies; only the future employment of 
Pakistani medical personnel and the reallocation of material resources were placed on 
the political agendas of medical trade unions and provincial politicians alike when 
plans to end the programme were first discussed in 1989.
143.4 Health services for refugees: just basic?
Despite existing governmental health policies which gave priority to disease control 
interventions and the provision of medical and surgical care by medical practitioners 
in hospitals or health centres, government priorities for refugee health services were 
to provide basic preventive and primary medical care in camps/villages. The shift 
away from centre-based provision of rather sophisticated care may well have reflected 
the concern of foreign health professionals for more equitable access to care; 
arguments put forward, however, suggested that their concerns were for the level of 
sophistication rather than the appropriateness of activities which were to be undertaken 
on behalf of the refugees.
There was, and still is, a preoccupation with the potential for refugee health services 
to be much better than those available locally. Such a concern ignores the realities of 
many existing health services, especially in marginalised areas: they are poorly 
developed, staffed and supplied or they do not exist at all. This applies as much to 
referral services as to basic care. Unless foreign health workers are prepared to 
provide similarly poor services or none at all for refugees living in such areas, such
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a comparison misses the more fundamental consideration of whether the services 
provided are appropriate and workable.
143.5 Or referral too?
Current guidelines of key international aid agencies for more equitable access to health 
services give priority to providing basic services which address the most common 
problems of most refugees rather than sophisticated care which meets only the needs 
of a few. Such a priority was adopted in Pakistan; health services in camps/villages 
were limited to preventive and primary medical care in Basic Health Units and Health 
Posts, and seriously ill people were referred to existing government hospitals. This 
policy did ensure the provision of basic medical services in nearly all of the camps.
Even though funds and supplies were given by UNHCR to government hospitals in 
order to upgrade and improve referral services for the Afghans, it did not greatly 
improve care given in government hospitals since concurrent efforts to strengthen 
national and provincial health management were absent. Consequently, this system of 
basic health services did not address the needs of a population at war. In particular, 
needs for first aid and sophisticated surgical and medical treatments were acute among 
those wounded by armed conflict. The absence of efforts to strengthen the 
management and day-to-day running of national, provincial and district hospitals led 
to the creation of separate referral services which were managed and run by Afghan 
and Islamic political parties, sympathetic local and foreign Red Cross societies, and 
private or charitable agencies. Consequently, there were comparatively few benefits 
for the development of public referral services in Pakistan while the private provision 
of highly advanced and costly medical and surgical care proliferated haphazardly.
143.6 Humanitarian or strategic purposes?
Similar to policies for priority interventions which were largely determined by the 
policies and practices of international aid agencies, the roles of foreign charitable 
agencies in the relief effort were significantly influenced by foreign interests of allied
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Islamic and donor governments. Policies which limited the involvement of foreign 
agencies and health personnel changed markedly when cross-border operations and 
care of those wounded in war became international priorities as the war escalated in 
the mid-1980s. Previously, limited participation of foreign agencies and personnel 
suited both the Pakistanis who needed to provide employment for their own medical 
personnel and who wanted to control the rapidly changing political relationships with 
various Pathan and Islamic groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as with the 
most influential foreign aid donors who did not want to appear to be actively engaged 
in armed conflict with the Soviet Union.
Foreign military, religious and strategic policies to give active support to the 
Mujahideen incorporated medical care of those fighting the war, either from a base in 
Pakistan or their home lands in Afghanistan. Pressures from interested parties in the 
western countries and Islamic nations to support the rebels were matched by those 
exerted by sympathetic religious parties or tribal groups in Pakistan. Nonetheless, 
policies to provide many services through private, charitable foreign agencies and the 
provision of needed resources for their implementation came directly from foreign 
allied and donor governments, their publics and, to a lesser extent, the specialised 
agencies of the UN. Eventually, the need for such agencies to consult and cooperate 
with the Government became a formality, which many foreign agencies ignored.
14J.7 Foreign charity - a solution to, or part of, the problem?
The expanded roles adopted by private, charitable or aid agencies from abroad in both 
the management and direct provision of health care was justified by arguments 
stressing acute needs for high quality of care. Voluntary agencies were seen to be the 
means to implement emergency services quickly, especially since health professionals, 
equipment or supplies in Pakistan or Afghanistan were insufficient to meet the current 
needs of the Afghans. Not only could these agencies provide needed resources quickly, 
their organization allowed lengthy bureaucratic and diplomatic procedures to be 
bypassed.
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Thus, these agencies posed a dilemma for the Government who needed some of the 
resources these agencies could provide and especially the sympathies of those who 
supported them. Moreover, wide-spread images of desperate needs for care, and beliefs 
that governments divert funds for their own purposes, put great pressure on the 
Government to accept and work with these agencies. Otherwise, they could have been 
accused of refusing international assistance, thereby denying the provision of essential 
services or jeopardising other sources of international aid. Consequently, a plethora 
of agencies began to work in Pakistan - with or without official approval - in all 
aspects of the relief operation.
Unlike Somalia where foreign charities played a key role in securing international 
support for host government officials to manage and provide health services for their 
refugees, the Afghan relief effort became an international free for all. Perhaps more 
than other policies, the shift from limiting the roles of foreigners within a planned 
service to one where each appeared to decide independently what work would be 
undertaken, where and with what resources points to the power of international 
agencies and donor governments in determining policy and enforcing its practice. This 
was true not only in cross-border operations or services for the war wounded but also 
within what began as a public, national health service for the refugees: foreign 
charities increasingly took over the management of specific programmes and 
interventions within the refugee health service as well as the provision of care directly.
143.8 Seeking assistance from the UN: UNHCR, Unicef or WHO?
Three specialised agencies or funds of the UN played key roles in promoting the 
health of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan: UNHCR, Unicef and WHO. Specific health 
programmes and projects which were supported by these three different UN agencies 
were generally complementary in content, with WHO supporting disease control while 
Unicef promoted community health interventions and UNHCR provided the additional 
resources which were needed, for example. Such a division of labour between WHO 
and Unicef, in fact, reflects more general priorities for health which have been adopted 
and mutually agreed for their development programmes. Yet health programmes which
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were supported by the different UN agencies were usually carried out in isolation from 
national health or development programmes, and often from each other. The inputs of 
Unicef and WHO in particular, who were working in national health development, 
often failed to consider the refugees as anything but a temporary problem with refugee 
health activities planned and implemented as temporary, isolated solutions. 
Overlapping and poorly defined roles for refugee health of UNHCR, Unicef and WHO 
meant that their involvement changed over time and in content. Surely, this creates 
confusion for those seeking assistance from the UN; it may also lead to significant 
delays in planning and implementing health activities by governments.
143.9 Management of refugee health by, with, for or instead of, national and 
local institutions?
Leadership within the refugee health programme changed hands three times over a ten 
year period. The arrival of the Senior Health Coordinator in 1982 meant that WHO 
took responsibility in practice for providing national leadership for refugee health. 
Support for this post and the authority granted to it came primarily from UNHCR 
which needed technical advice on the allocation of funds and which was willing to 
finance such a position, and WHO which had seconded other senior health 
professionals to refugee programmes in Thailand (1979) and Somalia (1981). The 
technical and professional expertise of the Senior Health Coordinator, his position 
within the international aid agencies and his role in planning and approving financial 
and material resources donated through the UN meant that he held considerable power. 
Unlike the refugee health operation in Somalia where the secondment of a senior 
health professional to the Government allowed the Ministry of Health to take the 
leading role, the posting of a Senior Health Coordinator by WHO within UNHCR 
meant that policies and plans were then formulated jointly by WHO and UNHCR 
through the Senior Health Coordinator.
The power of the purse then enabled UNHCR to create their own post for a Senior 
Health Coordinator and to request the secondment of provincial health advisors from 
the Save the Children Fund rather than WHO in 1986. This shifted responsibility for
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refugee health within the UN system from WHO to UNHCR; it also shifted leadership 
responsibilities within the national refugee health services from WHO to UNHCR.
Instead of acting in an advisory or collaborative role, UNHCR then took responsibility 
for making policy and plans as well as monitoring, evaluating and managing the 
refugee health programme generally. UNHCR did this firstly by writing guidelines for 
the management of common diseases and the organization of health care. Secondly, 
UNHCR arranged for the effectiveness or impact of existing interventions to be 
assessed by foreign organizations, for example the health and nutritional status of the 
refugees and the coverage of priority interventions. UNHCR did not, however, support 
training programmes in management, epidemiology or public health which would 
enable officials of the Government to make use of these assessments. Thus, UNHCR 
consolidated their leadership by gathering important information which they then used 
in planning and managing the refugee health services.
Thirdly, concerns that disease control interventions were ineffective and that there was 
a lack of community health activities similarly led UNHCR to contract other foreign 
aid agencies to take responsibility for advising and supporting the management of the 
various health programmes and services. While many agencies had staff with 
considerable technical and professional expertise, few had their own source of funds, 
relying on UNHCR. Collaborative relationships between these agencies and UNHCR 
meant that UNHCR supported these agencies in taking decisions and carrying them 
out. Thus, UNHCR consolidated their own leadership partly through collaborative 
relationships with other foreign aid agencies who increasingly managed individual 
health programmes for the refugees.
The increasing involvement of UNHCR in the management of refugee health in recent 
years reduced support for the Government to provide refugee health services. Instead, 
UNHCR itself exerted greater control over all aspects of the management process, and 
it increasingly chose to collaborate with other foreign aid agencies to implement 
refugee health activities.
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143.10 Strengthening or undermining host capacities?
The creation of a separate system of health services for the Afghans allowed refugee 
health care to be the responsibility of firstly the Provincial Departments of Health, 
then the Commissions for the Afghan Refugees and finally the international aid 
agencies. Even though international agencies organise and provide health services for 
refugees in other countries, such as Honduras and Thailand, the value of such an 
approach is questionable in both the short-term, when numerous agencies arrive and 
establish an array of programmes according to their different priorities and abilities, 
and in the longer-term, when donor fatigue prevents further involvement of these 
agencies and the refugees and their hosts are left to fend for themselves.
There are several good reasons for local or national bodies, such as ministries of 
health, to take responsibility for refugee health care. Firstly, it is an opportunity to 
strengthen their management capabilities. Equally important is the opportunity to train 
and provide experience in health relief. As a result, the fragmented approach to 
providing health services is less likely to be compounded by a separate system of 
health care for the refugees within the country. Consequently, extreme differences 
between health services for refugees and nationals are likely to be avoided; 
accessibility and the quality of national health services may also be improved. In brief, 
the governmental or other local administrative body responsible for health would gain 
training and experience in managing and implementing health relief and on-going 
services rather than an ad hoc organization with a short life span or a foreign agency 
involved only temporarily.
The organization and management of health services for the Afghans failed to 
incorporate much needed 1) training of health providers in management and public 
health, 2) national standards for the provision and organization of care in a unified and 
coherent manner, 3) on-going seminars and workshops to communicate updated 
technical information and skills, 4) supervisory mechanisms to motivate staff who 
worked in routine jobs in isolated places, 5) career opportunities for growth and 
promotion, 6) communication systems to facilitate and enhance cooperative and
438
productive working relationships between the many institutions involved and 7) 
management structures with centralised policy-making and clear lines of authority and 
accountability. The failure to take these and other related issues into consideration 
suggests that the provision of health services for refugees was at the expense of health 
development.
14.4 Speculating about the future of the refugee health services in Pakistan
When this research was completed in 1989, world attention was drawn to a seemingly 
endless and horribly violent conflict between different political factions in Afghanistan 
following the withdrawal of Soviet troops. Within the international community, urgent 
needs for relief and rehabilitation in Afghanistan were topical: assessments of the 
damages of war were being undertaken, plans to reconstruct essential services were 
being formulated and preparations to put the plans into practice were made. Changes 
in the political conditions from which the Afghan refugees originally fled begged the 
question of the future of health services established for them in Pakistan, particularly 
those managed by the Government. Would they simply be discontinued? Should they 
be maintained? Or should they be integrated in national health programmes? 
Continued fighting since 1989 and an additional international war in 1990 have meant 
that these questions are as relevant today as they were five years ago.
14.4.1 The ideal policy option: integration
There are several good reasons why the refugee health programme in Pakistan should 
not simply be discontinued. Firstly, some Afghans will not return to Afghanistan but 
will continue to live in marginal areas where national health services are poorly 
developed or do not exist at all. Secondly, local people have benefited from refugee 
health services, especially in remote and isolated areas. The vast sums of money, huge 
quantities of material goods and extensive efforts used to establish and build up 
refugee health services need not be wasted. Lastly, vast resources have been used to 
improve the management of refugee health services. Significant progress has been 
made, not only in creating systems of supervision and support for the provision of
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basic care in villages, but importantly in reorienting refugee health programmes to 
include community health interventions, for example the use of essential drugs and 
training of community-based health workers. There are at least four different ways in 
which refugee health services could be integrated into national health programmes5.
l.The refugee health service structure in its entirety is redefined as a permanent unit 
within the Government.
With an annual budget of over six million US$ since 1983 from UNHCR alone6, this 
is a costly option which would not be justified if large numbers of refugees leave the 
areas in which they are currently living. Nor would the costs of maintaining a 
duplicate system be justified easily since national funds for health are already minimal 
and over stretched. Although the Tibetan health care system in India suggests that 
quasi-separate systems may be useful and feasible among some refugee communities, 
many of the factors which would argue for a quasi-separate structure do not readily 
apply to the Afghans in Pakistan. For example, the Afghans are unlike the Tibetans 
in India in at least three important ways; they are culturally and ethnically similar to 
their hosts, they do not live in a unified society and they do not have a long history 
of their own system for health care delivery. This option is, therefore, unlikely to be 
able to meet the needs of both the Afghans or their hosts in the longer-term.
2.Specific refugee health programmes are incorporated within corresponding national, 
provincial or district programmes.
In this option, the policies, practices and resources of specific refugee and national 
programmes would need to be evaluated. Subsequent mergers would then be able to 
build upon past experiences and existing resources of both programmes in order to 
strengthen on-going services. One strategy would be to incorporate camp health 
services into district and tribal agency health programmes. At provincial level, refugee 
health programmes for disease control, training community-based health workers and 
public health management could be evaluated and then merged with counterpart 
provincial programmes. Such a strategy would also facilitate the employment of many
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medical doctors, lady health visitors and other paramedical staff who currently work 
in the refugee services. Senior officials who have been on deputation could use their 
skills and experience as managers within provincial programmes. It would thus allow 
existing financial, material and human resources to be used in the longer-term.
3.Management units for refugee health services are maintained but given new terms 
of reference, for example to manage health relief preparedness and response at 
national and provincial levels.
This option would seek to build on the experiences and abilities of existing 
management structures to respond quickly, appropriately and with authority to future 
disasters - which inevitably will occur. This option would have been appropriate in 
Somalia before the current civil war broke out, where the Refugee Health Unit had 
gained considerable expertise in planning, preparing and managing health relief in 
acute emergencies7. The experiences of the Provincial health officials in the early 
1980s suggests that district and local health workers would be unlikely to respond to 
a separate management structure. Moreover, the fragmented and bureaucratic nature 
of the refugee health management structure, the need for clear and authoritative lines 
of accountability in emergencies, and current inefficiencies and limited effectiveness 
of refugee health activities make this option an unsuitable choice in Pakistan.
4.Resources from the refugee health services are simply transferred to the government 
health sector.
National health workers would be reassigned within, and drugs, supplies and 
equipment would become the property of, the Government’s health services. This 
option may be effective in countries where national health services are well developed. 
However, in Pakistan, where health services are poorly developed, such a transfer 
would most likely result in the loss or disuse of resources and experience from the 
refugee health programme.
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14.4.2 The likely reality: disintegration
Regardless of the many reasons which can be given in favour of, or against, these 
policy options, the process of formulating and implementing policies for refugee health 
in Pakistan suggests that the refugee health services will disintegrate because of a lack 
of political will and resources, and poorly developed national health structures.
Refugee health services were established by the Government and international aid 
agencies as a temporary, international programme solely for the immediate benefit of 
refugees living in separate villages. There has been little, if any, commitment of the 
international agencies most directly involved in refugee health relief (UNHCR and 
charitable agencies) to development in Pakistan. Nor has there been any substantial 
commitment by the specialised agencies and funds of the UN involved in health 
development (Unicef and WHO) to the refugees. The few international agencies 
currently supporting only refugee health services will probably transfer their support 
to repatriation programmes for those who return to Afghanistan or discontinue their 
involvement completely.
This process began in 1985 when many agencies first took part in cross-border relief 
operations and it intensified in 1989 when Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan. 
Many of those who might have redirected their efforts to developing health services 
in Pakistan (those who were already doing so, in addition to, or as part of, their 
refugee health assistance) had to leave during the war with Iraq. Moreover, it seems 
unlikely that international agencies currently working in health development in 
Pakistan would have supported the integration of refugee health programmes, partly 
because of their lack of involvement to date, partly because integration would require 
substantial resources in addition to those currently available, and partly because 
evaluations may find that refugee programmes provide better services requiring 
changes in their own.
The governmental health sector is equally unlikely to plan and request assistance for 
integrating refugee and national health programmes. Not only do they lack the
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resources to undertake such an integration independently, but their health service 
infrastructure is unable to accommodate some refugee health programmes, for example 
training community-based health workers. However, the problem is more than a lack 
of resources and a curative bias. Management support systems are poorly developed. 
Systems which ensure regular delivery of needed supplies and regular communication 
with senior health officials are functioning poorly at best. Opportunities for continued 
training or promotion of health staff are limited. The resulting apathy and low morale 
among staff is further compounded by poor personnel policies which fail to make 
health staff accountable to district, provincial and national bodies, instead of well- 
organised unions. Poor management policies and practices remained entrenched, 
perpetuating apathy, low morale and indifference amongst health staff. Fundamental 
structural changes needed to achieve integration would, therefore, be difficult and 
unpopular.
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CHAPTER FIFTEEN 
Policies for the health of refugees: 
promoting human rights, compassion or self-interests?
Disasters generally and refugees and displaced populations specifically are an 
increasing challenge, mostly for the governments and peoples of poorer countries in 
Africa, Asia, the Middle East and Latin America. The advent of the 1990s was 
marked, in fact, by the urgent needs of these people in Bangladesh, Iraq, Sudan and 
Turkey, for example. The responses by the international community continue, 
however, to be called into question. These responses can be understood within the 
context of the evolution of policies for international health relief during three historical 
periods.
The development of the global health relief system can be divided into three distinct 
historical periods characterised by their prevailing political and economic systems. 
Thus, the division into three periods is not arbitrary, each being distinguished by 
differences in the institutions and institutional relationships through which policy is 
formulated and implemented, the dominant body of knowledge which dictates the 
content of policy, and the group of experts who provide organizational and cultural 
leadership which directs and legitimises policy.
Firstly, during the latter half of the 1800s when the Red Cross movement initiated 
medical relief for those wounded in war as a humanitarian activity of nation-states. 
Secondly, during the first half of this century when inter-governmental institutions 
were created to continue and extend the tradition of inter-nationally provided medical 
relief to entire populations in response to the World Wars. Lastly, during the past forty 
years when western charities and inter-governmental relief agencies increasingly 
manage and provide medical and public health activities for relief in the developing 
world.
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Within these three periods of policy evolution, the prominent roles currently played 
by the specialised agencies and funds of the United Nations and private charitable 
agencies based in Europe and North America can be understood, especially since a 
historical approach places their policies and practices within the context of the cultural 
and political environment in which they originate. Although this research focused on 
these organizations, their policies and practices also highlight the important role played 
by donor governments and the various interest groups they represent - although in- 
depth consideration of their roles was beyond the scope of this thesis.
15.1 Key findings
15.1.1 A system for health relief globally
This thesis documents important legacies from the Red Cross movement of the late 
1800s and subsequent relief practices during and after the first World War. Between 
the formation of the Red Cross in the 1860s and the creation of the League of Nations 
after World War I, private charitable agencies provided health relief during and after 
war, both nationally and internationally. As private, charitable organizations these 
institutions drew heavily on Christian and humanist ideologies of helping those in 
need. This religious and humanist framework promoted relief as a humanitarian 
activity worthy of popular support which in turn legitimised the provision of relief to 
all in need regardless of nationality or national boundaries. Nevertheless, as 
institutions in a political system of nation-states, these private agencies depended on 
national governments for political authority to act in times of war; ironically, some, 
such as the Red Cross, even worked directly under the auspices of the military.
Medical and surgical care of individuals wounded during armed conflict was the 
primary concern of these relief agencies in the late 1800s, but by the end of the first 
World War health relief had expanded to incorporate the needs of civilians who were 
affected by armed conflict for basic medical care . Thus, international health relief 
began as a highly specialised and technical field in which medical and surgical
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sciences were applied to the casualties of war, but its mandate soon grew to care for 
civilians affected by war.
The engagement of governments, collectively and directly, in the provision of 
international health relief was then examined. All of the principal inter-governmental 
institutions currently involved in international health relief were originally established 
in response to the two World Wars. Like their predecessors, the private charities, these 
institutions depended on national governments for their existence and for legitimate 
authority to act in international relief operations. Nearly all depended on national 
governments to provide the vast resources needed for relief.
Unlike most private charitable agencies before them, these inter-governmental 
organizations were often faced with caring for entire populations, for example those 
under seige or those displaced by fighting or foreign occupation. Instead of setting up 
separate systems for health relief during the first half of the 1900s, however, most 
inter-governmental organizations facilitated and supported the provision of basic 
medical and surgical care by existing health services of local or national governments 
as well as those provided by private charitable agencies. Thus, health relief was not 
a distinct activity of the majority of inter-governmental institutions at that time, but 
rather of national governments primarily in Europe and private charitable agencies.
In contrast with the first one hundred years of international health relief for refugees, 
health care has been a significant component, if not one of the main activities, of 
international aid operations for refugees since the second World War. Medical doctors 
continue to manage international health relief operations but they are now required to 
have additional training in public health and epidemiology. Whether as staff of, or as 
consultants to, the main relief institutions, they recommend and confer legitimacy to 
health policies for refugees within a medical, epidemiological approach to public 
health. Thus, the priority in health relief for refugees now emphasises the provision 
of basic care for the most common health and nutrition problems; preventive 
measures, such as immunizations, adequate quantities of water and systems for the 
disposal of human wastes, are thought to be or equal, if not greater, importance than
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caring for individuals wounded during armed conflict, providing emergency and basic 
medical care and controlling epidemics of disease.
The institutions through which they formulate and implement health policies for 
refugees remain the same. Three specialised agencies or funds of the United Nations 
and private charities play key roles in the provision of international health relief for 
refugees. An in-depth analysis of the policies of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Health Organization (WHO) and 
the United Nations International Children’s Fund (Unicef) to promote the health of 
refugees exposes the simplicity and naivete of calls for one agency or fund within the 
UN system to adopt the leading or coordinating role in refugee health relief. Instead, 
this review illuminates important similarities in their policy-making processes, for 
example dependency on governments of wealthy nations in the North Atlantic region 
for political authority and financial resources or a very real vulnerability to the 
political interests of governments party to the conflict and associated relief operation.
Marked differences are also highlighted, drawing attention to obstacles and limitations 
to improving the ways in which they participate in international health relief efforts. 
For example, UNHCR plans and budgets yearly since its mandate provides for 
assistance in the shorter-term only. WHO’s participation is hampered by excessively 
bureaucratic structures and procedures or by what many consider a narrow and out­
dated focus on diseases and selected medical interventions. While appearing to be best 
placed to respond quickly and appropriately to the health needs of refugees, Unicef s 
selective approach to health care and its smaller size as an organization appear to 
constrain its interest in undertaking such an intensive, comprehensive and demanding 
role.
Thus, despite limited capacities to go beyond symbolic responses, the availability of 
considerable sums of money, the opportunity to enhance institutional prestige among 
the international public and a need to avoid unwanted publicity of being seen to be 
unsympathetic, irrelevant or ineffective in responding to the desperate needs of so
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many people generates enormous pressure on these agencies to take part in health 
relief operations - even if only symbolically.
Private charitable organizations were also considered as conduits for the provision of 
health care among refugee populations, both as complementary partners with inter­
governmental aid agencies and as potential alternatives. An examination of their roles 
in refugee health relief since the second World War reveals a close and complimentary 
association with domestic and foreign policy priorities of their own governments. 
Placing international health relief for refugees within the context of domestic and 
foreign policy interests of the wealthier nations helps to explain long standing 
preferences for technical solutions to the health needs of refugees within a welfare 
approach to relief aid.
Looking at the context in which these types of organizations provide health relief for 
refugees also brings to light their essential role in putting health policies into practice. 
Agencies with some affiliation to churches are found to have played a key role, 
especially during the years when many countries gained independence from colonial 
rule. More recently, a variety of charitable or private organizations have made the 
most of the sensational coverage given to refugees in the media to extend the scope 
of their work, geographically, sectorally and financially.
Thus, several charitable agencies have moved beyond the frontline to participate in the 
policy process as equal partners rather than as auxiliaries. This has brought them 
international recognition, substantial financial resources and rapid organizational 
growth. In turn, they now exert considerable influence in the policy making process. 
But, like the inter-governmental agencies, their influence is prejudiced by their 
dependency on wealthy, powerful governments for the legal, political and financial 
authority to work.
Dependency on wealthy, powerful governments characterises all of the international 
agencies involved in the provision of health relief for refugees, suggesting that most 
are motivate more by self-interest than compassion. Similarly, common myths of
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political neutrality are exposed, for example, through an analysis of the mechanisms 
used by wealthy governments to ensure that the work of the UN does not mitigate 
against their own interests. Specific roles which the specialised agencies of the UN 
and the private charitable organizations are most likely to play in any given refugee 
health relief operation can, therefore, be anticipated as well as the interventions most 
likely to be given priority within the prevailing medical, epidemiological approach to 
public health.
15.1.2 Health relief for Afghans in Pakistan, 1978 - 1988
In choosing to provide relief for Afghan refugees as early as 1978, the Federal and 
Provincial Governments of Pakistan were greatly influenced by shared kinship, ethnic 
identity and opposition to the policies of the Afghan Government of their own people 
in Baluchistan and the North West Frontier Provinces. This, together with pressures 
from foreign agencies, led them to create a separate and extensive health service 
specifically for the Afghan refugees. In setting up a refugee health service, officials 
of the Government and United Nations opted to provide basic curative care and 
disease control through the provision firstly of mobile teams and later static facilities 
in the refugee villages.
Foreign health workers were restricted to advisory and administrative roles and 
Pakistani health workers were employed to staff and manage the services in village, 
district and regional offices. Financial incentives were given to Pakistani medical 
doctors and Lady Health Visitors to offset the difficulties of living in remote and 
poorly developed areas as well as the lack of opportunities for career advancement. 
Such organizational policies ensured that the Government took responsibility for 
managing and providing health relief with support from the international aid agencies. 
They also allowed the Government to meet domestic needs for employment within the 
health sector, to avoid political conflict with tribal majorities in the northwestern 
provinces and to promote political and religious links with parties in Afghanistan.
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Domestic and international publicity put the Government under great pressure to put 
their health plans for the North West Frontier and Baluchistan Provinces into practice. 
Simultaneously, they extended services to refugees resettled in Punjab Province. While 
the Government consolidated its primary role in the provision of refugee health 
services, some foreign charitable agencies began to provide health relief in 
Afghanistan or sophisticated surgical and medical care in special-built hospitals in 
Pakistan independently; their efforts were in support of those at war. Most, however, 
continued to assist the Government, for example by setting up a community health 
component of services provided in the refugee villages.
The somewhat chaotic and uncoordinated efforts of so many health professionals, 
health programmes and aid agencies led the UNHCR and WHO to employ a Senior 
Health Coordinator for the refugee health programme at the same time. Based on the 
advice of this coordinator and his many efforts to strengthen and support 
Governmental officials in managing the programme, greater coherence was brought 
to the refugee health services, for example through the integration of disease control 
measures in rural health facilities and through the introduction of technical standards 
for health care nation-wide.
Between 1984 and 1988, the number of private, charitable organizations providing 
health care for the Afghans increased tremendously. Poor management and 
implementation of health services in Baluchistan before 1985 and the availability of 
large sums of money from the US Government since 1984 created an opening for 
charities to play an expanded role. Agencies with existing programmes for the 
refugees then extended the geographical and technical scope of their work to include 
the needs of those remaining in Afghanistan or those fighting the war. Many new 
agencies were created, by Afghan political parties, for example. Other foreign charities 
set up new programmes or services, both in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Some agencies 
even took over services previously provided by the Government. Interestingly, the 
arrival of these agencies coincided with the escalation of the armed conflict between 
the rebels and Afghan Government; the anarchic way in which they worked in
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Pakistan begs the question whether they were motivated by a charitable or military 
cause.
Not surprisingly, a greatly expanded role for foreign charities in the provision of 
health care for Afghans from a base in Pakistan coincided with a shift in leadership 
of the refugee health programme to UNHCR. Not only did UNHCR create their own 
positions for health professionals to manage the programme nation-wide, they 
delegated management of disease control and community health programmes to other 
foreign aid agencies: for example, a private consulting firm from the US 
(immunizations), a bilateral aid agency of the Italian Government (tuberculosis) and 
selected western charities from the Netherlands, Austria, the US and the UK (malaria, 
sanitation and community health workers).
UNHCR’s ability to take the leading role was largely due to their financial role, but 
it was also greatly facilitated by the policies and practices of influential donor 
governments - for both the relief programme and Pakistan’s developmental 
programme. Greater involvement of UNHCR in refugee health relief may well mean 
less, not more, support for the efforts of host governments or other locally-based 
administrations to promote the health of refugees, their own people or both.
In analyzing the findings of the case study in Pakistan key dimensions of the policy 
process were found to have been neglected: culture and discursive practices. Similarly, 
the analysis calls into question the notion that health relief is provided in response to 
demands based on the health of the refugees themselves. Instead, the exclusion of the 
Afghans from decision-making processes, the lack of any notable change in their 
health status, and the parallel organization of official relief and informal systems of 
health care highlights the need to maintain domestic stability in setting national 
policies for refugees. Again, key considerations of the policy process were found to 
have been neglected because the complexity of national societies have not been 
adequately taken into account. Instead, the rhetoric of national and international goals 
for health relief focus exclusively and simplistically on host governments. 
Nevertheless, these governments represent the interests of powerful groups within their
452
society and this was found to be reflected in policies for refugee health adopted by 
them.
But policies established nationally were quickly altered to accommodate the interests 
of international aid agencies and the groups they represent. In questioning whether 
policies are determined nationally or internationally, eight key policy issues which face 
providers of health care for refugees were identified. The evolution of policy in 
Pakistan indicates that foreign groups had tremendous influence in determining what 
would be done, for whom, by whom, with what resources, and for how long. Sadly, 
in speculating about the future of existing health services for the Afghans in Pakistan, 
this trend in the policy process suggests that they will disintegrate, leaving few - if 
any - lasting benefits for either the refugees or their hosts.
15.2 Recommendations: idealistic or realistic?
Derived from this study, there are several ways in which international organizations 
can assist governments or other locally-based administrations who host, or who will 
host in future, large populations displaced forcibly from their homes:
By improving health services in marginalised areas, especially in areas 
surrounding disputed international borders or areas of conflict.
By developing disaster preparedness of national and local governments, 
particularly for displacements of large groups of people who will be unable to 
return to their homes for long or indefinite periods of time.
By ensuring that priority is given to community development interventions, 
environmentally sound technologies and other measures which allow refugees 
and their hosts to provide for themselves and their families.
By providing experienced health personnel for relief, especially immediately 
following an influx of refugees.
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By providing material and financial resources for health relief throughout the 
relief operation and the development of on-going services.
By developing and conducting training programmes for national and refugee 
health workers, particularly in the management of public health services.
By providing experienced foreign health advisers to work with governments 
directly at national and provincial levels. Their roles should be to assist the 
government or other local administrative body in :
1. Establishing policies and standards for the organization and delivery 
of health care.
2. Training national and refugee health workers.
3. Developing logistical and administrative support systems.
4. Conducting forums for on-going communication among the various 
agencies, such as workshops, seminars and regular meetings.
5. Developing briefing sessions for newly arriving foreign health 
workers.
6. Monitoring the implementation of health activities.
7. Promoting understanding and good will between international 
organizations, host governments and local groups, and the refugees.
8. Encouraging and supporting simultaneous support and assistance to 
improve management and implementation of health services for 
nationals living in refugee-affected areas.
Yet the process of formulating and implementing policies for refugee health suggests 
that many of these recommendations are idealistic and unlikely to be put into practice. 
Instead, themes common to all of the analyses suggest more general conclusions about 
the policy process.
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153 Policies for refugee health: promoting health or self-interests?
153.1 The multiplicity of agencies: benevolent anarchy or a coherent system?
Within the humanist tradition established by the Red Cross, nation-states in Europe 
and North America evolved a separate system for providing health relief 
internationally during and after the two world wars. That a system exists, however, is 
not readily apparent. The practice of categorising relief organizations into three large, 
seemingly disparate, groups, namely governmental, non-governmental and inter- (or 
supra-) governmental enhances the perception that private, charitable agencies, the UN 
and many other inter-governmental organizations are separate from each other and, 
more importantly, from national governments who often have less noble, self- 
interested motives associated with them.
Moreover, such general groupings often focus attention on a few of the largest, most 
well-established organizations instead of the fluid process with which organizations 
are formed, merged with others or disbanded altogether. Many relief organizations 
have been transient, being created specifically for one relief operation. Others have 
found additional on-going purposes or have been succeeded by more permanent 
institutions in which relief was only one, usually low, priority. Thus, the numerous 
types, structures and purposes of the organizations involved in relief, the fluidity with 
which they are created, altered, merged or discontinued and their perceived separation 
from one another and from national governments (and therefore struggles for power), 
mask the reality of a coherent system with an image of benevolent organizational 
anarchy.
1533  Many leaders, few followers
Multiple agencies and personnel were involved in the policy process. Each had their 
own objectives and methods of working, and many agencies worked partially or 
entirely on their own. This meant that there were many leaders and few followers. The 
tendency of prominent international agencies in the 1980s has, consequently, been to
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focus criticism on the lack of coordination among the various organizations providing 
relief aid. Concern to improve health status by improved coordination suggests an 
underlying conflict among relief agencies not only in the way they perceive the 
problem and its solution but more fundamentally for power and legitimacy. Why are 
relief agencies, which are so well established, so well resourced and have extensive 
experience with refugees, unable to coordinate their work despite explicit desires to 
do so? Can we continue to believe that it is a technical or managerial problem? 
Competition and conflict were constant features of the relationships between involved 
agencies; this led to inefficient use of resources and it created a fragile and unstable 
system to manage and implement health interventions.
153 3  Charity or a human right?
Beginning with the Red Cross and continuing throughout its history, charitable 
organizations and the specialised agencies of the UN involved in relief have been 
promoted and perceived primarily as humanitarian institutions. Health relief in 
particular continues to be perceived and justified within a humanitarian framework of 
helping the needy; it has not become a right which ensures that people will have 
access to those measures and resources necessary for their survival and well-being. 
Instead, the scale and scope of need, as well as appropriate responses, remain open to 
interpretation.
15.3.4 Compassion or self-interest?
Both charitable organizations and UN agencies are dependent on national governments 
for authority to exist and to act. Dependency remains greatest on governments of 
wealthy nations who control the global political environment and who provide most 
resources for relief aid. In combination with the shift in institutional responsibility for 
health relief from national militaries (before World War I), or national health 
authorities (during the World Wars) to international aid agencies after World War II, 
governments and local organizations or poorer countries often have little, if any, 
control over international relief operations today.
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There is a lack of trust and good faith in host governments by many international 
agencies and personnel, and an utter disregard for the refugees’ priorities by most 
international agencies and governments, in the policy process for health. Interactions 
between these three groups revealed a marked reluctance of many international 
agencies to relinquish their autonomy and control over resources. Neither the 
Government nor the refugees were given the authority and means to participate on 
equal terms with international agencies. Nor were they able to become independent 
of international aid.
15.3.5 Power symbols, empty - even harmful - gestures
Even though most wars today are of lengthy or indefinite duration, refugee health care 
continues to be planned and provided as a temporary activity to meet short-term needs. 
Organizational responsibility for health relief is usually separated from development 
or on-going health services - locally, nationally and internationally. Not only are 
refugees defined as a temporary problem but they are considered an international 
responsibility. Priority is then given to the provision of emergency care by foreign 
professionals. Thus, the separate systems of health care which are created rarely 
become independent of foreign support - for their survival materially and politically.
Relief activities now focus on meeting the basic survival needs of entire populations, 
for example, for food, shelter, clothing and basic health care. Unlike the first 100 
years of relief when emergency surgical and basic medical care were priority health 
relief measures, public health interventions are now one of the main priorities of relief 
organizations. Nevertheless, health relief practice continues to emphasise technical 
interventions which are organized and managed primarily by medical doctors, many 
of whom have additional training in public health. Yet, these interventions are usually 
structures to meet only immediate needs, and many are minimalistic, for example, 
food rations, selective feeding programmes, medical screening, vaccination campaigns 
and emergency medical care. At present, this approach fails to address the underlying 
economic, social or political vulnerabilities which contribute to poor health, poor 
nutrition and even the loss of life. Damages to individual and national dignity, social
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and economic conditions and even health and nutritional status may be considerable 
even though policies ostensibly aim to promote the health of refugees.
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